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Facsimile of Minutes by Sir A. Nicolson and Sir Edward [Lord] G;

p. 183

British Documents on the
Origins of the War

1 898-1914

Edited by G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., F.B.A., and
HAROLD TEMPERLEY, Litt.D., F.B.A.

Vol. IX

THE BALKAN WARS
PART II

THE LEAGUE AND TURKEY

LONDON :
1934

5g_2-9— 2 (Crown Copyright Reserved)

Reprinted with the permission of
the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office

JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION JOHNSON REPRINT COMPANY LTD

111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003 Berkeley Square House, London, W.l

Reprinted from a copy in the collections of
The New York Public Library
Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations

First reprinting, 1967, Johnson Reprint Corporation
Printed in the United States of America

„prr': -IVERSITT

Volume IX
THE BALKAN WARS

PART II

THE LEAGUE AND TURKEY

Edited by

G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., and HAROLD TEMPERLEY, Litt.D.

with the assistance of
LILLIAN M. PENSON, Ph.D.

Table of Contents.

Pa<^e

Foreword by the Editors ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... vi

Note on the Arrangement of Documents... ... ... ... ... ... x

Plan of Volume IX (Part II) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xiii

List of Editorial Notes ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xvi

List of Abbreviations... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xviii

Names of Writers of Minutes ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xix

Chronological Table of Important Events... ... ... ... ... ... xx

List of Documents ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... .xxiv

Foreign Office and other Documents ... ... ... ... ... ... 1-1004

Chapter LXXIX.— The First Balkan War, October-December 1912 ... 1

Chapter LXXX.— The Armistice, December 1912-February 1913 ... 246

Chapter LXXXL— The Second Balkan War, February 3-March 31,

1913 475

Chapter LXXXIL— The End of the Second Balkan War, April-May

1913 627

Chapter LXXXIIL— The Third Balkan War 827

Appendix I. — The Russo-Bulgar Convention of 1902 ... ... ... 1005

Appendix II.— The Balkan Alliances, 1912-3 1006

Appendix III.— The Conference of St. James 1026

Appendix IV. — Meeting of Ambassadors at London, January 6, 1913 ... 1063

Appendix V. — The Last Meeting of Ambassadors at London, August 11,

1913 1065

Appendix VI. — The Rumano-Bulgarian Negotiations ... ... ... 1068

Appendix VII. — Note on Bulgarian State Papers 1074

Map of the Contested Zone ... ... ... to follow p. 1075

Index of persons showing the writers of despatches and the principal

persons mentioned in the text ... ... ... ... ... ... 1077

Subject Index ... ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... 1109

Foreword to Volume IX (Part 11).

The decision to publisli a selection from the British Documents deahng with
the origins of the War was taken bj^ Mr. Eauisay MacDonald, Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for Foreign x\ffairs, in the summer of 1924. It was confirmed
and announced by Mr. (now Sir) Austen Chamberlain in a letter of the
28th November, 1924 (published in " The Times" on the 3rd December), addressed
to Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson. Some extracts from this letter were published by the
Editors in the Foreword to Volume XI, and it need only be said here that the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to ' ' impartiality and accuracy ' ' as
being the necessary qualifications for any work wliich the Editors were to publish.

The second part of this volume, like the first, lias a distinct unity. Part I dealt
mainly with the Tripoli war and the Albanian rising, and showed how both the war
and the rebellion were successfully localised. In neither case was the task so difficult
as it proved when four Balkan nations went to war with Turkey. In one way or
another the consent of Europe had, in fact, been obtained beforehand to Italy's
annexation of Tripoli. But the four nations of the Balkan League did not ask the
consent of Europe either about going to war or about partitioning their conquests.
The result was to produce the intervention of the Great Powers. During the Tripoli
war international action for the promotion of peace had some success (v. Gooch (fc
Temperlei), Vol. IX (I), pp. 376-8, No. 381), but its action was intermittent and faint.
During the Balkan wars the Concert of Europe became a real thing. It failed to
prevent the smaller Powers from going to war; it succeeded in making peace possible
between the Great Powers. Austria-Hungary and Piussia were too acutely affected
by the changes in the balance of power to take up a neutral attitude. Italy was
affected by her recent war with Turkey. But France, Germany, and Great Britain
were able to take a detached view and to exercise a strong and successful influence in
favour of peace. For once Europe was a reality.

Though the Six Powers did not ultimately succeed in imposing their will on the
Balkan League and on Turkey, they did succeed in localising the w-ar. This fact and
the existence, even temporarily, of an international organisation had a powerful effect
upon Sir Edward Grey. Ke lias recorded it himself in his memoirs in words which
are quoted elsewhere in this volume (v. infra p. l()04j. We see an even more
impressive attempt to apply the principle during the crisis of 1914. Thioughout that
period Grey urged mediation or conference as a solution of the difficulties and as a
means of averting war. His last appeal on July 30, 1914, was couched in these
impressive words :—

" And if the peace of Europe can be preserved, and this crisis be safely passed,
my own endeavour would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could
be a party, by which she could be assured that no hostile or aggressive policy would
be pursued against her or her allies by France, Eussia and ourselves, jointly or
separately. I have desired this, and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last
Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly
improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has
had for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the reaction and relief that
will follow may make some more definite rapprochement between the Powers possible
than was possible before." (^

(') [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. XI, p. 194, No. 303.]

vii

It will be seen that the lessons and the memory of tlie Conferences during the
Balkan war had sunk deep. Even so late as 1929 Lord Grey remarked to one of the
Editors "over the 191-2-3 Balkan crisis I had, in fact, worked with Germany to
restrain Austria-Hungary and Russia. This made me a behever in the method of a
conference."

Apart from the descriptions of the working of the European Conference machine,
this volume contains nuich information as to the Balkan Allies and Turkey.
England had no direct interests in the Balkan campaign until Constantinople was
approached. Then the problems of the Straits and of the attitude of Russia became
of acute interest, and Sir Edward Grey's private letter of April 7, 1913, reveals his
inmost thought on the matter (pp. G60-1, No. 815). But, though England was not
directly concerned with the fate of Djakova or of Scutari, her representatives were
very well informed as to the" designs of the Balkan Allies. Some admirable reports
by Sir Henry Bax-lronside appeared in the first part of this volume, but his despatch
on the origin of the Balkan League in this part (pp. 360-8, No. 461) is even
more remarkable. Two important interviews with King Charles of Rumania are given
(p. 254, No. 342 ; pp. 998-9, No. 1253), and two conversations with M. Venizelos, the
first in February (pp. 496-7, No. 616) and the second in ll&y 1913 (pp. 776-7,
No. 960), are of great historical value. The homecoming to Belgrade of the Crown
Prince of Servia, Alexander (now King of Yugoslavia), was recognised as an historical
event, and is vividly recorded. Among other significant observations is the following :
" It w^as observed that amongst the crowd which witnessed the military procession
was a considerable contingent of South Slavs from across the Austro-Hungarian
frontier" (p. 997, No. 1252). There are also interesting references to the present
President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Professor Masaryck [sic] is stated to
have acted as an unofficial emissary between Austria-Hungary and Servia (p. 194,
No. 259; p. 317, No. 417).

The details of the negotiations round the Conference Table do not lend themselves
to quotation. But there are notable utterances by leading personalities. The
interview with the Emperor Nicholas of Russia on April 14. 1913, is of great interest
(pp. 688-90, No. 849). He apparently believed, reported Sir George Buchanan, that
'■ the disintegration of the Austrian Empire was merely a question of time," and
looked forward to "the day when we should see a Kingdom of Hungary and a
Kingdom of Bohemia while the southern Slavs might be absorbed by Servia, the
Roumanians of Transylvania by Roumania, and the German provinces incorporated
in the German Empire." M. Sazonov is generally timid in his utterances in this
volume, but' M. Isvolski, who had become Russian Ambassador at Paris, expressed
himself uncompromisingly (pp. 19-20. No. 25). Another interview is reported in
which both M. Isvolski and M. Poincare gave their views on the crisis (pp. 56-7.
No. 71). The views of M. Giolitti, the Nestor of Italy, were expressed with great
frankness (pp. 128-30, No. 172).

The conversation with the German Emperor recorded in February 1913
(pp. 503-0, No. 624, end.) shows him in a characteristic mood. One of the last
utterances of Herr Kiderlen-Waechter is recorded here fpp. 261-2, No. 352). There
is a revealing interview with Herr von Bethmann Hollweg (pp. 36-8, No. 47) and
the view of Herr von Jagow on the exaggerated fears as to Pan-Slavism is
interesting (pp. 756-7, No. 935).

As regards Turkey, three documents of special importance may be noted. The
first records an interview with Mahmud Shevket Pasha and I/zet Pasha on
January 27, 1913 (pp. 457-8, No. 571, end.) ; the next is Mr. Fitzmaurice's account
of his negotiations with Turkish statesmen (pp. 210-3, No. 287), and the last is a
letter of Lord Kitchener on the Turkish situation and on the future of Egypt fp. 88.
No. 118).

Vlll

The Appendices include a complete collection of the documents connected with
the formation of the Balkan League and show the remarkahle extent to which
Great Britain was informed beforehand of its activities.

The great interest of this volume is that it adds the British account of the
Balkan war to those already presented in the Grosse Politik, the Documents
diplomatique s fran(;ais,(^) Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Siebert-Benckendorff
and other Russian publications. There is now available a full British, French,
German, Austro-llungarian and Russian commentary on events. Even the month
of July 1914 is not at present so fully documented. In spite of the fullness of the
record there remain some gaps in our knowledge. Attention has been drawn in several
places to interviews held by Sir Arthur Nicolson which are not recorded in the British
archives (e.g., pp. 115, 157, Ed. notes). It is equally the case that the French
archives do not fully record all the conversations of M. Paul Cambon, or the German
and Austro-ITungarian all those of their respective ambassadors. There are
periods also when the Grosse Politik is jejune, and where Siebert-Benckendorff and
the Russians throw no light at all. But these omissions do not prevent the
documentary matter from being the fullest that has yet been published on any period
of history. From the technical point of view, therefore, no epoch is more likely to
repay the labours of the historian or to supply as ample material for the critical
faculty. The Editors have thought it advisable in this volume to illustrate the
relation of diplomatic transactions to military and political events by providing a
chronological table fpp. xxi-xxiii). In regard to the literature of the subject, the Editors
published a short but representative bibliographical note to Volume IX (I). They have
mentioned the names of a number of other books in appropriate places in the notes
to the present volume. For the most comxprehensive lists of recent works on the
subject they would refer to Section P, History of International Relations, §§ 6-7,
in the Annual volumes of the Internatiojial BihliograpJnj of Historical Sciences
(Oxford University Press). Volumes I-IV (1926-29) and Volume VII (1932) have
already been published.

Once again the private papers of Sir Edward Grey and Lord Carnock have proved
of invaluable assistance, not only in interpreting the attitude of the Secretary of
State and liis principal adviser, but in revealing the inmost thoughts of the British
representatives abroad as expressed in their confidential correspondence. It is as
well to mention again the statement of Lord Grey (already quoted in Volume VI,
p. ix) : "I did not, however, regard anything except my own letters and official
papers as deciding policy."

The technical note prefixed to this volume (pp. x-xii) is of unusual interest as
it summarises all that can be ascertained as to the circulation of documents to the
Cabinet and their submission to the Secretary of State. This obscure subject of
inquiry is of great importance. As the considerable research involved has been
undertaken by Professor Lillian Penson, the Editors have wished the contribution to
be signed with her name.

In accordance with the practice observed in the preceding volumes, the
documents in the present volume containing information supplied or opinions
expressed by certain Foreign Governments have been communicated to them for
their agreement. The response has been remarkably satisfactory, for in no case has
a Foreign Government offered any objection. None the less the Editors have,
according to previous practice, omitted in a few cases personal details or reflections

(2) [At the time of going to press the published volumes of this series extend only to
May 30, 1913.]

likely to offend individual or national susceptibilities. They can, however, assert in
this as in all previous volumes that they have omitted nothing which they consider
essential to the understanding of the history of the period. In this connexion they
beg to draw attention to their statement made in previous volumes ' ' that they would
feel compelled to resign if any attempt were made to insist on the omission of any
document which is, in their view, vital or essential."

In addition to despatches and telegrams, there are memoranda and minutes
which are properly official documents. No objection has been raised by His Majesty's
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the publication in this volume of any
documents of the above kind, nor to the publication of certain similar papers or of
private letters, which are not properly official documents, but which are preserved in
the Foreign Office.

The Editors desire to acknowledge assistance and advice from the Greek Minister,
M. Caclamanos, and from the Yugoslav Minister, Dr. Djurie. They have once again
to acknowledge similar help and counsel from various officials of the Foreign Office,
among whom thev would like to mention the Librarian, Mr. Stephen Gaselee,
C.B.E., Mr. J. W. Field, O.B.E., and Mr. A. F. Orchard. They wish also to thank the
officials of the Record Office in London and Mr. J. S. Barnes, CB., of the Admiralty.
Miss E. M. Keate, M.B.E., has assisted throughout in the preparation of the volume
for Press, and Miss D. M. Griffith, M.A., and Miss I. B. Johnston, B.A., have also
given help in this part of the work.

G. P. GOOCH.
HAEOLD TEMPEKLEY.

July 10, ]934.

Note on the Arrangement of Documents, &c.

The technical arrangement and details of this volume are very similar to those of
Volumes III, IV, VI, VII, and IX (1). The material deals, even to a greater extent,
with one theme, the course of diplomacy during the Balkan Wars.

Within the chapters the papers are placed in chronological order, as in previous
volumes, and, as before, chronological order means the date of despatch, whether to
or from London, not the date of receipt. The latter date is added wherever possible,
and readers should be careful to note it.

In this volume, for the first time, none of the documents date from the period
before 1906, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat the note on the classification
of the papers before that date, for which reference may be made to Volume I (p. ix).

The note prefaced to Volume III (pp. ix-x; described further the arrangement
inaugurated at the beginning of 1906 : —

" A new system was inaugurated at the beginning of the year 1906. From that
date all papers, irrespective of country, are first divided into certain general
categories, ' Political ' (the former ' diplomatic '), Commercial, Consular, Treaty, &c.
The papers are, however, not removed from their original files, the contents of each
file being treated as one document. The files of papers are classified within the
general categories according to the country to which their subject most properly
belongs. The volumes containing papers relating to any country are therefore in a
sub-section of the main series, and these sub-sections are arranged in alphabetical
order {e.g.. Political, Abyssinia, &e.). Previously the correspondence with, say, the
British Ambassador at Paris was kept distinct from the communications of the French
Ambassador in London, the latter being termed ' Domestic' This distinction is now
abolished, and all papers relating to a subject are placed together in one file or in a
series of files. The historian finds many difficulties in this arrangement, as the files
are not arranged in the volumes in chronological order or alphabetical sequence.
The Foreign Office overcomes these difficulties by compiling a manuscript register
of the contents, but this method cannot be used so satisfactorily by the historian. It
is to be feared that the new arrangement makes it more difficult for the historian to
be sure he has found all the papers relating to a given incident."

For the period covered by the present volume the documents are still at the
Foreign Office, in the original loose jackets. A combination of three methods has
again been used in the survey of the available material : —

(1) A comprehensive study has been made of the Confidential Print, which
contains, as the period develops, an increasingly large proportion of the papers.
Documents traced in this way have, as before, been checked by the originals in the
Foreign Office files, and notes and minutes added. In a few cases in this, as in
previous volumes, a note at the foot of a document has been inserted to show that
no original can be traced. In the majority of these instances, however, this does not
mean that there is no registered jacket for the paper, but that the jacket contains a
printed copy as the official record.

(2) Application has been made to the Foreign Office library staff for papers and
files of papers to, which reference has been found.

(3) The Foreign Office registers of despatches and telegrams sent to or received
from British Embassies or Legations have been searched. In a few cases this has
revealed documents which were not included in the Confidential Print, either because
they were not considered at the time of sufficient importance or because they were
regarded as especially confidential.

The Editors think that it may be of interest to students to have here an analysis
of the character of the Confidential Print and a summary of the evidence available
with regard to the submission of documents to the Secretary of State and their
circulation to the Cabinet.

The Confidential Print may be divided into two main categories, each of which
falls into two sub-divisions : — -

(a) The vast majority of the volumes are endorsed " Printed for the use of the
Foreign Office." These include —

(i) Collections of documents dealing with some specified country or subject,

e.g., "Correspondence respecting the Turkish War."
(ii) Memoranda based upon documents.

(b) A comparatively small number are endorsed "Printed for the Cabinet" or
have no endorsement. These again include —

fi) Collections of documents,
(ii) Memoranda.

The main distinction lies in the purpose of the print. In the case of (a), the
volumes are for use in the Foreign Office and at Embassies and Legations abroad.
Their circulation to the latter is evidenced in this volume, for example, by a reference
in a letter from Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir Henry Bax-Ironside to the fact that he
would "see in the Sections" what had been done in a certain negotiation (p. 209,
No. 286), and by a statement by Sir E. Paget that he had seen a despatch in the
Co7ifidential Print (p. 683, No. 842^1. In the case of {h) the prints are for immediate
use when matters of special urgency are under discussion.

The volumes of Confidential Print are formed normally from separate printed
copies of documents made immediately upon their receipt or despatch. They may,
however, contain papers not previously printed in separate form, and frequently do so
in the case of prints of the {h) class. The separate printed copies are normally included
with the originals in the jackets in which Foreign Office documents are preserved.
These jackets (from 1906 onwards; contain in some cases only manuscript versions,
more often typescript, very frequently both tj'pescript (or manuscript) and printed
copies, occasionally printed copies only.

The volumes of the Confidential Print (of both classes) were used frequently in the
Foreign Office ; but it must be noted that the printing of documents was a matter of
convenience, and did not determine the question as to the sending of the documents
to the Secretary of State or the Cabinet. In the preparation of the present volume
great care has been taken to note all the available evidence bearing on the personal
examination of papers by Sir Edward Grey. The jackets in which the documents are
filed are generally initialled on the cover even when there are no minutes, and in a
very large number of cases the initials " E. G." show that the Secretary of State
has seen the contents. In some cases the initials appear only on the documents
themselves. It must be noted that Sir Edward Grey initialled or signed every
telegram or despatch sent to a Minister abroad from the Foreign Office, save in very
exceptional circumstances, and that this is so much a matter of common form that it
has not been thought necessary to reproduce here the initials on the drafts of telegrams.
It is clear, however, that in some cases where the Secretary of State's initials do not
appear the documents have, nevertheless, been seen by him. Cases have been
observed where annotations in Sir Edward Grey's hand appear on the documents
themselves, and yet there is no minute by him nor are his initials on the cover.
Sometimes evidence is provided by the fact that directions for circulation, e.g., " The
King, The Cabinet," are in the hand of the Secretary of State. On some
occasions Sir Edward Grey drafted in his own hand a telegram in reply to a
communication which he had not initialled or minuted. It seems, therefore, that it
would not be possible to indicate definitely what papers were seen by him and what

xii

were not. It can only be said that the impression formed by reading a vast number
of papers is that there is evidence that the Secretary of State saw an immense
number of documents, and that he may have seen still more. In the present volume
there is direct evidence of one kind or another that he had before him all save a
very small percentage of the documents. It may be noted also that among those for
v.'hich there is no direct evidence some are to be accounted for by his temporary
absence from London, some by the fact that the out-letters in the Carnock MSS.
are all typed copies on which such evidence as may have existed would not be
reproduced. For private letters received by Sir A. Nicolson there is ample evidence
that they were normally seen by Sir Edward Grey, since instructions for circulation
are generally in his hand. We have, moreover, Sir A. Nicolson 's own statement on
the subject (p. 141, No. 184).

In some cases the jacket (or less often a document within a jacket) is endorsed
as being sent to the Cabinet. In the present volume all such endorsements have
been indicated. An investigation of the number of these cases, and of the papers
referred to earlier as printed for circulation to the Cabinet, would show that a large
number of papers actually went to the Cabinet as a whole. Other papers went to
some members of the Cabinet, but not to all. this being indicated on the jacket by
the names of the Ministers concerned ; the Prime Minister appears most frequently.
It is clear, however, that an investigation of these cases does not show all the papers
that went to the Cabinet. On p. 322 of Volume VII there, is a minute by Sir Edward
Grey on a document there printed : "I have read it to the Cabinet ; in view of
future possibilities copies of telegrams conversations and such papers as this and
M. Cambon's letter should be kept ready so that they could be printed and circulated
with little delay if need be." So also on p. 663 of the present volume a minute by
Sir Edward Grey shows that a document was to go before the Cabinet although it is
not endorsed to that effect.

The impression formed by working through the originals and the Confidential
Print is that a considerable body of material went to the Cabinet as a whole, though
naturally the number of documents is not anything like so large as that of the papers
seen by the Secretary of State.

An interesting example of the procedure can be found in Volume VI. A Cabinet
Committee for the discussion of the Anglo-German negotiations was formed early in
1911 (p. 590, No. 440 1. A printed collection of the papers was being made (p. 623),
but some went to the Cabinet Conunittee at once (pp. 625-9, No. 464), while others
did not (pp. 617-20, No. 460). A memorandum summarising the history of the
negotiations was also compiled for circulation to the Cabinet (pp. 631-6, No. 468).

The Editors have recorded in previous' volumes theiv regret that the Embassy
archives for the period after 1905 are not generally available. With the exception of
Japan (to 1910) and Russia, the Embassies and Legations have not yet sent their
later papers to England. The Editors can, however, confirm the judgment previously
expressed that the records are more exact and complete after 1906. There are a
few cases in the present volume in which the original texts of documents occurring
in the Confideiitial Print have proved impossible to trace. In the large number of
cases where opportunities for comparison exist such copies have been found to be
verbally exact, though the punctuation and capitalisation are standardised.

The private collections available at the Foreign Office continue to be of great
value. Many letters have been printed from the private correspondence of Sir Edward
(Lord) Grey, and Sir Arthur Nicolson (Lord Carnock). The papers of Lord
Lansdowne are also now available for use. Some of these were found too late to be
published in the earlier volumes of this series, but selections will be published in a
later volume. The value of such material is evident, but it is, generally speaking,
more complete in respect of in-letters than out-letters.

LILLIAN M. PENSON.

xiii

Plan of Volume IX (Part II).

Chapter LXXIX deals with the Fu"st Balkan War and covers the months of
October and November, in which the overthrow of the Turkish Empire in Europe
was achieved with startling rapidity. Numerous reports from British representatives
in the capitals of the five belligerents describe every phase of the struggle. Its
primary cause, declared Sir Arthur Nicolson on the outbreak of hostilities, was the
secret alliance which Russia had encouraged the four Balkan States to conclude.
Great Britain, he added, had been powerless to avert the conflict, and she could only-
endeavour to localize it by keeping Austria and Russia in touch. This policy was
unswervingly pursued by Sir Edward Grey. The despatches and private letters of
Sir George Buchanan and Sir Fairfax Cartwright reflect the changing moods of the
two most directly interested Powers, while the British Embassy at Berlin reported
the sincere desire of the Wilhelmstrasse to co-operate with Great Britain in averting
a European war.

Two major issues raised by the victories of the Allies form the subject of anxious
discussion in the later portion of the chapter. The advance of the Bulgarians through
Thrace appeared to involve the fate of Constantinople. M. Sazonov declared that if
it ceased to be Turkish it must become Russian — a prospect relished hy none of the
other Powers. In the opinion of Sir Edward Grey the ownership of the Turkish
capital was a question for Europe ; but he was indisposed to join in any attempt to
expel the victors from territor}^ elsewhere that they had won. At the other side of
the Balkan peninsula the advance of the Serbs towards the Adriatic raised an issue
as vital to Austro-Hungarian interests as that of Constantinople to Russia ; but in
this matter the task of British diplomacy was merely to avert a collision between the
two Eastern Empires. While the tension was rapidly increasing, and a letter of
November 24 from Vienna reported that everyone was talking of war as inevitable,
the Turks opened direct negotiations for an armistice in which Mr. Fitzmaurice, the
experienced First Dragoman of the British Embassy at Constantinople, played a
helpful part. The collapse of Turkey led Lord Kitchener, the British Agent and
Consul-General in Cairo, to suggest measures for diminishing her power of making
difficulties for Great Britain in Egypt.

Chapter LXXX describes the period of the Armistice, which Greece declined to
sign, and embraces the months of December 1912 and January 1913. The centre of
interest shifts from the Balkans to London, and Great Britain begins to play a more
active part in the drama. The proposal of Sir Edward Grey that the Ambassadors
of the. six Great Powers should meet in one of the European capitals to carry on
informal conversations about questions arising out of the war was welcomed in all
quarters. London was finally chosen as the ])lace of meeting. The Foreign Secretary
tactfully presided over the Reunions which began on December 17, and his
detailed records of the numerous sessions mirror the ceaseless anxieties of the
European situation. He was also nominated President d'honncur of the Peace
Conference which sat at St. James's Palace. The Serbs announced that they would
withdraw from the Adriatic ; but the frontiers of an independent Albania presented
an equally dangerous problem, since Austria-Hungary demanded Scutari for Albania
and Russia championed the claims of Montenegro. The fate of the iEgean Island;-
also began to engage the serious attention of the Ambassadors. As the negotiations
between the belligerents advanced it became clear that the refusal of the Turkish
Government to cede Adrianople, which was still under siege, was the principal
obstacle to peace. The Powers accordingly urged Turkey to yield on this point ; but
at this moment the Turkish Cabinet was forcibly overthrown on January 23 by Enver

xiv

Pasha and Talaat Bey, who stood for a continuation of the war. This chapter also
contains a detailed account in a despatch from Sir H. Bax-Ironside, dated January 6,
1913, of the creation of the Balkan League (pp. 3G0-8, No. 461).

Chapter LXXXI, which describes the first two months of the Second Balkan
War, covers the months of February and March. The ]\Iission of Prince Gottfried
Hohenlohe to St. Petersburgh, bearing a friendly autograph letter from the Emperor
Francis Joseph to the Emperor Nicholas, produced a momentary alleviation, but did
not ultimately relieve the dangerous tension between the two Empires. The
delimitation of an independent Albania, which all the Powers accepted in principle,
gave rise to a prolonged and dangerous conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.
Austria-Hungary strove to enlarge the boundaries of the future state by assigning to
it Scutari in the north and the towns of Dibra and Djakova in the east, while Russia
laboured for the aggrandisement of Servia. Germany's professions of friendship for
Great Britain aroused the apprehensions of M. Sazonov, who on February 14
sounded the British Ambassador with regard to the British attitude in the event of
war, though without result. Sir Edward Grey worked unremittingly for a balanced
settlement, supporting Servia's claim against Albania to Dibra and Djakova on the
ground that Austria-Hungary prevented Servia from having a port in the Adriatic
and Montenegro from relieving Scutari. Count Berchtold yielded on the question of
Dibra, but he held out for Djakova until the peace of Europe seemed to hang by a
thread. The crisis ended with the announcement on March 21 that Austria-Hungar}^
would concur in allotting Djakova to Servia (p. 608, No. 742).

Chapter LXXXH concludes the story of the second Balkan war, which came to
an end with the Treaty of London, signed on May 30. The principal source of
anxiety in the Chanceries during its closing phases was the determination of
King Nicholas to conquer and retain Scutari, despite the unanimous decision of the
Powers to award it to the future state of Albania. Convinced that it would be
disastrous to let Montenegro def}^ the Powers with impunity, and anxious to' avert
independent action on the part of Austria-Hungary, Sir Edward Grey strongly
supported the proposal for a joint naval demonstration, and a blockade of the
Montenegrin coast was begun on April 10. With the surrender of Scutari to
Montenegrin troops at midnight on April 22-3 the crisis reached its height ; but
twelve davs later King Nicholas placed the fate of the town in the hands of the Powers
(p. 76G, No. 948).

Other difficulties, scarcely less grave, remained to be overcome. Having agreed
to create an independent Albania, the Ambassadors in London proceeded to discuss
the frontiers and the government of the new state and the destiny of the ^Egean
islands. Meanwhile the Ambassadors of the Powers in St. Petersburgh, at the desire
of Rumania, held a series of meetings to examine Rumanian claims to compensation
for Bulgaria's aggrandisement. The tension between Austria-Hungary and Russia
remained acute, and ominous reports of friction began to pour in from Sofia and
Belgrade. The increasing part taken by Italy in the discussions, as the centre of
interest passed from Constantinople to the Adriatic, is reflected in the despatches of
Sir Rennell Rodd (Lord Rennell). The brightest spot in a dark sky was the trustful
co-operation of Great Britain and Germany in preventing a Russian conflict with
Austria-Hungary, and the German Government publicly expressed its gratitude for
Sir Edward Grey's activities as Chairman of the Ambassadors' meetings.

Chapter LXXXHI deals with the Third Balkan War, in which the victors
quarrelled over the spoils. Throughout June the reports from the Balkan capitals
announced the growing probability of a conflict, and described the efforts of the
Powers to avert the fall of the avalanche. It was in vain that Sir Edward Grey
warned the Allies of the deplorable effect on public opinion if they were to fight

among themselves, and reminded them that they might easily lose what they had
gained. Where Russia, the sponsor of the Balkan League, failed in her efforts at
mediation between Servia and Bulgaria, Great Britain could not hope to succeed. On
the night of June 29-30 Bulgarian troops attacked the Serbs and Greeks without a
declaration of war. On this occasion there was little danger of European complica-
tions. Rumania, whose claims Bulgaria had declined to satisfy while there was still
time, promptly intervened. When the Turks also profited by Bulgarian embarrass-
ment to reconquer Adrianople, M. Sazonov urged joint action by the Powers, but
received no encouragement from any quarter. The brief but sanguinary struggle, in
which Bulgaria succumbed to a crowd of enemies, was concluded by the Treaty of
Bucharest, signed on August 10. The negotiations were fully described in a
despatch from Sir George Barclay, dated August 8. At the same moment the
Reunions in London were adjourned for the summer holidays, and were never
resumed. Despite the prolonged debates, the frontiers of Albania and the ownership
of the ^gean Islands stood over for future determination. The chapter ends with
reflections from various angles on the new situation created by the war of the allies.
The defeat of Bulgaria, who had flouted the authority of Russia, was welcomed in
St. Petersburgli and Rumania's bloodless triumph was acclaimed by the German
Emperor. Careful observers, however, were aware that the Peace of Bucharest was
rather a truce than a settlement.

Appendix I deals with the important but obscure subject of the Russo-Bulgar
Convention of 1902. The texts of the various instruments, leading to the formation
of the Balkan League, are given in Appendix II together with a full account of
contemporary British information on the subject. Appendix III gives the official
protocols of the proceedings of the Conference of St. James. In Appendix IV will
be found a report of a Meeting of the Ambassadors at London on January 6, 1913,
which was found by the Editors at the last moment. The final Meeting of the
Ambassadors is recorded in Appendix \. Appendix VI contains an extract from the
Annual Report on Rumania for the year 1913 giving a valuable summary of
the negotiations between Rumania and Bulgaria. The last Appendix provides a note
on certain State papers published by Bulgaria.

xvi

List of Principal Editorial Notes.

Page

Opening of hostilities by Turkey with Bulgaria and Servia.

[Quoting Sir H. Bax-Ironside's despatch of October 16, 1912] 28

Greek declaration of war.

[Quoting Sir G. Lowther's telegram of October 18, 1912] 36

Itussian scheme of reform.

[Minute recording'conversation between Sir A. Nicolson and Count Benckendorff on

October 29, 1912] 61

Turkish request for interiiention of Powers and admission of ships of war to Bosphorus.

[Summarising Turkish communication of November 4, 1912] 89

Conversations between Sir A. Nicolson and Ambassadors at London.

[Citing O.U.A.; Sieberti 115,157,195

Capitulation of Salonica, November 8, 1912.

[Quoting telegrarrts and despatches] 121

Mr. Asquith''s speech at the Guildhall, November 9, 1912.

[Giving reference to The Times and to Poincare^ 125

Memorial presented to the Great Powers by Albanians.

[Quoting Sir G. Lowther's despatch of November 21, 1912] 183

Meetings of British and French military and naval experts.

[Exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon on November

22 and 23, 1912] 193

Sir Edward Grey's reply to M. Sazonov concerning Albania and Servia.

[Quoting telegram to Sir G. Buchanan of November 26, 1912] 200

Royal conversations with Ambassadors.

[Citing O.U.A., Siebert-Benckendorff, and D.D.F.^ 213, 311, 433,

723, 811

Locality of Conference of Ambassadors.

[Citing O.U.A.'] 271

M, Poincare's speech of December 21, 1912.

[Citing Siebert and Poincare] 278

[Citing O.U.A.I 315

Admission of Rumanian representatives to the Meetings of Ambassadors at London.

[Quoting documents and authorities] ... 285

Meetings of Ambassadors and Conference of St. James.

[Opening sessions on December 16 and 17, 1912] ... ... 292

Greco-Bulgarian difficulties over possession of Salonica.

[Referring to despatches and telegrams] 337

British diplomatic support to Russia.

[Quoting Grey MSS., Siebert and Siebert-Benckendorff] 353

War indemnity claimed by the Allies from Turkey.

[Referring to telegrams giving information] 430

Naval engagements between Greek and Turkish fleets, Janu(try 1913.

[Quoting despatches and telegrams] 430

Resumption of ho.stilities and Turkish reply to Powers.

[Quoting telegrams and minutes] 461

Sir A. Nicolson's conversations with Hakki Pasha and Tewfik Pasha and with Count
Mensdorff, February 17 and 18, 1913.

[Quoting despatches and O.U.A.] 512

xvii

Page

Surrender of Janina, March 6, 1913.

[Summarising telegrams] 556

International Commission for settlement of financial questions arising out of the Balkan
Wars.

[Giving particulars of summons and of opening, and citing authorities] 560

Bumuno-Bulgarian frontier.

[Conference to meet at St. Petersburgh ; procedure suggested] 563

Assassination of the King of Greece on March 18, 1913.

[Referring to The Times and despatches] 600

Greek occupation of Samos and other Turkish territory.

[Giving details] 607

Speeches hy Sir Edward Grey in the House of dommons, March 25 and April 7, 1913.

[Citing Pari. Deb., The Times, and O.U.A.] 616, 659

Fall of Adrianople on March 26, 1913.

[Referring to The Times and telegrams] 619

Meeting of .Ambassadors at London, April 8, 1913.

[Referring to despatch to Sir F. Cartwright and to other authorities] 662

Visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to England.

[Citing Siebert, O.U.A., and The Times} 675

Collective demarches to Balkaii Allies on proposed bases for negotiation and. the North
and North-East frontier of Albania.

[Giving dates of communications at the various capitals] ... ... ... 686

Surrender of Scutari, April 22/23, 1913.

[Giving details of evacuation] 734

Ministerial Council at Vienna, May 2, 1913.

[Citing O.U.A,] 760

The Enos-Midia line.

[Summarising Turkish communication of May 7, 1913] ... 779

Handing over of Scutari by Montenegro, May 14, 1913.

[Summarising telegrams] 786

Murder of Mahmud Shevket Pasha, June 11, 1913.

[Citing telegrams and The Times and recording ministerial changes] ... 841

Meetings of Ambassadors at London, June IB, July 1, and July 29, 1913.

[Recording business of meetings and giving authorities] ... ... ... ...854,894,941

Organisation of Albania.

[Giving minutes commenting on proposals made by Austria-Hungary and Italy] ... 873

Strategic position of Bulgaria, July 1913.

[Giving cross-references] 902

Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

[Turkish circular note of July 20, 1913] 923

Meeting of Ambassadors at London. August 11, 1913.

[Giving reference to Appendix] ... ... 980

Sir Edward Grey^s views on Conferences.

[Quoting Twenty-Five Years] 1004

Husso-Bulgar Convention of 1902.

[Giving references to Siebert, Siebert-Benckendorff , D.D.F.I 1005

Bulgarian State Papers.

[Describing contents] .. 1074

[6272]

xviii

List of Abbreviations.

A. cfc P. ...

B. F.S.P....
D.D.F. ...
G.P.

Jackh ...

Nicol.ton

O.-U.A.
Pari. Deh.
Poincare

Poincare, HI ...

Pribram

Siehert

Siebert-Benckendorff .

British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers.
British and Fore.ign State Papers.
Documents Diplomatiques Fran^ais (1871-1914).
Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette.

E. Jackh: Kiderlen-Wcicliter : der Staatsmann und Mensch. Briefwechsel
und Nachlass (2 vols., Bbrlin, 1924).

Harold Nicolson: Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock : A
Study in the Old Diplomacy (1849-1928) (1930).

Osterreich-U ngarns Aussenpolitik (1908-14).

Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords or House of Commons).

R. Poincare: Au Service de la France 11. Les Balkans en feu. (Paris,
1926).

R. Poincare: Au Service de la France IIL L'Europe sous les Arrnes,
1913. (Paris, 1926).

A. F. Pribram: Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary (Harvard University

Press, 1920-1).

B. de Siebert: Entente Diplomacy and the World, edited, arranged and
annotated by G. A. Schreinor (Now York and London, 1921).

[This is an English translation with the addition of a chronological
list of documents by the American Editor of Diplomatische Akten-
stiicke zur deschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre (Berlin
and Leipzig, 1921).]

This refers to a new German edition of the above by Herr von Siebert,
containing a number of additions. It is entitled Graf Benckendorffs
Diplomatischer Schriftwechsel (Berlin and Leipzig, 1928).

Twenty-Five Years

Lord Grey : Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (2 vols., 1925).

XIX

Names of Writers of Minutes.

F. D. A.
H. H. A.
E. A. C.

W. E. D.

E. G.

H. of C.
M.

Mr. F. D. Acland

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 1911-5.

Mr. H. H. Asquith (later First Earl of Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Oxford and Asquith) Treasury, April 8, 1908-December 5, 1916.

Mr. (later Sir) Eyre Crowe

Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1906-12;

Assistant Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 1912-20 ; Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 1920-5.

= Mr. (later Sir) William Edward Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, 1886-
Davidson, K.C. 1918.

= Sir Edward (later Viscount) Grey (of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Fallodon) December 11, 1905-December 11, 1916.

— First Viscount Haldane of Cloan

Lord Chancellor, 1912-5, and 1924.

Mr. (later First Viscount) Morley (of Secretary of State for India, 1905-10, and
Blackburn) March-May, 1911 ; Lord President of the

Council, 1910-4; in temporary charge of
the Foreign Office, July 1911, April 1913.

L. M. = Mr. (later Sir) Louis Mallet

11. P.M. = Mr. R. P Maxwell...

W. M. = Mr. (later Sir) Willoughby Maycock

A. N. = Sir Arthur Nicolson (later First Baron
Carnock)

H. N. = Mr. H. C. Norman ...

O. = The Fifth Earl of Onslow

A. P. = Mr. A. Parker

G. H. V. = Mr. G. H. Villiers

R. G. V. = Mr. Oater Sir) Robert G. Vansittart ..

[6272]

Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey,
1905-6 ; Senior Clerk, Foreign Office,
190(>-7 ; Assistant Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, 1907-13.

Private Secretary to Sir T. H. Sanderson,
1894-6; Assistant Clerk in the Foreign
Office, 1896-1902; Senior Clerk, 1902-13.

Superintendent of the Treaty Department,
Foreign Office, 1903-13.

Ambassador at Madrid, 1905-6; British
Representative at the Algeciras Con-
ference on Affairs of Morocco, 1906;
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, 1906-10;
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 1910-6.

2nd Secretary at St. Petersburgh, 1903-6;
employed in the Foreign Office, 1906-14.

Private Secretary to Sir C. Hardinge, 1904-6 ;
to Sir A. Nicolson, 1906, 1911-3 ; Assistant
Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey,

1909- 10 ; Clerk in the Foreign Office,

1910- 3; Assistant Clerk, 1913-4.

Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1906-12 ; Assistant
Clerk, 1912-7; Librarian, 1918-9.

Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1903-13; Assist-
ant Clerk, 1913-21.

Employed in the Foreign Office, 1908, 1911-3;
Junior Clerk, 1913-4; Assistant Clerk,
1914-20; Assistant Secretary, 1920-8;
Private Secretary to Lord Curzon, 1920-4;
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, 1928-30; Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 1930-

b 2

Chronological Table of Important Events.

lyiz.

Reference.

13 March

Serbo-Bulgarian secret trejitv

nn KlOfi-ll

... ... IJ Lf . i.\J\JKJ — X L

12 May

Serbo-Bulgarian military convention

pp. 1011-3

29 May

Greco-Bulgarian secret treaty

pp. 1013-6

30 September

Bulgaria and Servia mobilise

Vol. IX (1), pp. 722-723

1 October

Greece, Turkey and ^Montenegro mobilise

Vol. IX (1), pp. 724-5

5 October

Greco-Bulgarian military convention

pp. 1016-8

8 October

Joint Austro-Russian communication to the Balkan

Allies Vol. IX (1), pp. 734-5, 748, note

Montenegro declares war on Turkey

King of Montenegro rejects Austro-Russian advice ...

PP- 3-1

10 October

Collective communication of Powers to Turkey

... p. 12, vote

13 October

Servia, Bulgaria and Greece send note to Turkey

pp. 17-18

14 October

Greece, Bulgaria and Servia reject Austro-Russian
advice ...

Montegrins capture Tuzi ... ...

pp. 16-18

15 October

Porte rejects Powers' communication of October 10 ...

pp. 23-4

17 October

Servia, Bulgaria and Greece declare war on Turkey...

pp. 30, 35

Turkey declares war on Servia and Bulgaria

pp. 32-3

18 October

Treaty of Lausanne Vol. IX (1), p. 430, Ed. note

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR.

1912.

22-3 October

Greek victory at Sarandaporon

Reference.

23-4 October

Servian victory at Kumanovo ... ...

p. 66

24 October

Bulgarian victory at Kirk Kilisse

26 October

Crown Prince Alexander and Servian troops enter
Uskiib, renamed Skoplje

pp. 66, 148

29 October-

3 November

Bulgarian victory at Lule Burgas

P-71

2-3 November

Greek victory at Jenidje-Vardar

7 November

Turkish declaration to Great Powers

pp. 111-2

8 November

Salonica surrenders to Crown Prince Constantine
and Greeks ... ... ... ... .

p. 121

9 November

Russian note on the occupation of Constantinople by
the Balkan Allies

p. 162

Speech of Mr. Asquith at the Guildhall

p. 125, note

17-19 November...

Bulgars repulsed at Chataldja lines

18 November

Monastir surrenders to Crown Prince Alexander and
Servians

... pp. 170, 173, 178

19 November

Servian troops reach Adriatic at Alessio and elsewhere

p. 174

Bulgaria accepts Turkish proposal for armistice

p. 178

xxi

1912.
22-23 November

25 November

26 November

27 November
3 December

5 December

16 December

17 December
20 December

1913.

6 January

17 January

18 January

23 January
23 January

28 January
30 January

.' Exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and
M. Paul Carabon

M. PaSic claims for Servia, Durazzo and a large
hinterland in Albania in statement to The Times

.1 Classes of reservists called up in Austria-Hungary,
I partial mobilisation

.| Sir Eldward Grey discusses M. Sa/.onov's proposal for
a Conference of Ambassadors with M. Paul Cambon

Armistice signed at Chataldja between Bulgars and
Turks, not signed by Greeks ...

.' Treaty of Triple Alliance (Germany, Italy and
Austria-Hungary) renewed

. First meeting of the Peace Conference at St. James's
Palace under presidency of Sir Edward Grey

. First Meeting of the Ambassadors of the six Powers
at British Foreign Office

.1 Autonomy of Albania agreed upon by the six Powers

Reference.
... p. 193, note

... p. 166, 710^6

pp. 2C5, 213-4, 343-8

pp. 217-8

... pp. 248-9, p. 430

p. 292, note

pp. 292-3

pp. 302-5

Russia declines to dismiss her reservists

pp. 311-2, 318, 357, 359-360, 377

Six Powers' note to the Porte advising cession of
Adrianople to Balkan League and settlement of

future of JEgean Islands by Europe pp. 415, 417, 468

Turkish naval defeat by Greeks off Tenedos and

Lemnos ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... p. 430, rio^e

Six Powers' note accepted by Turkish Grand Council ... ... ... p. 438

Young Turk revolution at Constantinople engineered
by Enver Bey. Kiamil Pasha resigns, Nazim
Pasha murdered. Mahniud Shevket new Grand

Vizier pp. 438-9

British and Italian warships at Besika Bay ... ... ... ... ...p. 447

Turkish reply to Powers' note pp. 463, 468-70

THE SECOND BALKAN WAR.

1913. I

3 February ... Armistice ended and hostilities renewed by Balkan
League against Turkey ... ... ...

23 February ... Collective demarche of the Powers at Sofia, proposing

submission of Rumano-Bulgarian differences to
Powers

24 February ... Bulgarian acceptance of proposal of Powers ...
28 February ... Turkish acceptance of mediation of the Powers

2 March ... ... Collective demarche by the Powers at Bucharest

6 March Capture of Janina by Crown Prince Constantino and

Greeks ...

15-21 March ... Greeks occupy Argyrocastro, Tepelen, &c., in Albania
and Isle of Samos . . .

18 March Assassination of King George of Greece, and accession

of King Constantine ... ... ...

Reference,
p. 461, 7iote

... p. 538
... p. 538
... p. 545
... p. 549

p. 556, note

p. 607, note

p. 600, 7iote

xxii

Reference.

26 March

Turks surrender Adrianople

pp. 619, vote, 667-8

28 March

King of Montenegro refuses to accept proposed terms
re Scutari ... ... ... ...

p. 623

31 March

Powers agree on a naval demonstration against
Montenegro ...

p. 625

31 March

First Meeting of Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh ...

p. 627

3 April

Russia's communique explaining her non-participa-
tion in naval demonstration ...

p. 646

4 April

Austro-Hungarian, British, French, German and
Italian cruisers anchor off Antivari ...

pp. 640, note, 656, note

10 April

Pacific blockade begins

... pp. 662, 669, 710^6

22-3 April

I TT> 1 M Ti 1 nrVi ^ 1

Scutari surrenders to Montenegrins

p. 709

23 April

London Ambassadors' Conference adopts collective
note to the Porte asking for cessation of hos-
tilities, as the Balkan Allies have accepted the
bases of a peace

p. 709

4 May

King Nicholas gives way over Scutari ...

p. 766

5 May

London Ambassadors' Conference decides on inter-
national occupation of Scutari

... p. 771

6-14 May

Admiral Burney occupies Scutari on behalf of the
Powers ... ...

... p. 786, note

9 May

Decision of Conference of Ambassadors at St. Peters-

niiFCrn ii Q t.nfi T? n tit ii n n- 1^ nl crii fi n n TTnnt".if*p

nn 787 R

28 May

Debate in Rumanian Senate on the decision of the

.LUWt::Io •■• ... ... ... ... ••• ...

... p. 821

28 May

Speech of M. PaSic in Servian Skupshtina

pp. 822-3

30 May

Treaty of London signed

... pp. 825-6, 1049-51

1 June

Greco-Servian Treaty of Alliance and Military Con-
vention

pp. 1019-26

8 June

Telegrams of Emperor Nicholas of Russia to King of
the Bulgarians and King of Servia ...

pp. 843, 847-8

11-13 June

Mahmud Shevket Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey, assas-
sinated (11 June); Prince Said Halim new Grand
Vizier (13 June); Izzet Pasha, Minister of War ...

... p. 841, note

16 June

Montenegrins evacuate San Giovanni di Medua

... p. 863, note

30 June

M. Pasic announces in Skupshtina that Servia will
accept Russia's arbitration ...

p. 877

THE THIRD BALKAN WAR.

1913.

Reference.

30 June

Bulgars attack Serbs and Greeks and occupy Gjevgjeli

p. 875

Greeks compel surrender of Bulgar garrison in
Salonica ... ... ...

p. 886

3 July

Rumania mobilises against Bulgaria

pp. 880, 885, 902, note

2^ July

Servian victory over Bulgars at the Bregalnica

4 July

Greek victory over Bulgars at Kilkish

10 July

Servians finally repulse Bulgarian advance on the
Bregalnica

11 July

Greeks enter Serres ... ... ...

p. 903

XXUl

1913.

15 July ... ... Turks enter Aiuos ... ...

22 July ' Enver Bey recovers Adrianople from Bulgars, Turkish

! forces recover Kirk Kilissc

26 July ' Greek victory at Simetli, and occupation of Jumaia-

j i-Bala... "

30 July ... ...I Peace Conference at Bucharest begins ...

31 July ... ...! Beginning of armistice

6-13 August ...I Bulgarian decision in favour of demobilisation
j immediately on conclusion of peace (6 August);
decrees of demobilisation issued by Servia and
lUimania (13 August)

10 August ' Treaty of Bucharest signed between Greece, Rumania,

Servia, Montenegro and Bulgaria

11 August Last session of Ambassadors' Conference in London ...

29 September ... Treaty of Constantinople signed between Bulgaria
and Turkey (Ratifications exchanged, 14 October)

14 November ... Treaty of Athens signed between Greece and Turkey

Reference.

p. 939

pp 944,970-5
p. 944

p. 985, 7io#e

pp. 961, note, 965, 979
pp. 980, note, 1065-8

pp. 1002-4

xxiv

LIST OF DOCUMENTS.

Chapter LXXIX.
The First Balkan War, October-December, 1912.

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

Ftotii sir fr Tiowflifir

(Tel.)

1912.

o KJCTi.

Montenegrin note to Porte j depart-
ure of charge d'affaires from
Constantinople

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(.lei.;

8 Oct.

Conversation with M. Guesov : Bulgarian
mobilization

„ (Tel.)

8 Oct.

Further conversation: joint declaration
war apparently inevitable

From Sir R Paeet (^TpI "I

O LfCX.

(Zeecc/. 9 Oct.)

f V1'>1T1/>1'C/7T'T/1T1 117' I T rl H i!lT*T* TT/^Tl TT <T»'/^T1 •
\^ U IV I' t' 1 oHv U> IV W X til XI cl 1 V Ull \J UIl .

same subject ; effect of Montenegrin
declaration of war

i'Vom Count de Salis (Tel.)

8 Oct.

Joint declaration by M. Arseniev and
Montenegro's replj'

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

8 Oct.

Ultimatum of Balkan States to Turkey.
{Min.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

9 Oct.

Conversation with Baron von Macchio :
outbreak of war between Turkey and
Montenegro ; importance of attitude
of Bulgaria

c
o

From Sir H. Bax-Ironsi^e
(Tel.)

9 Oct.

Conversation with M. Dobrovid : same
subject

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

9 Oct.

Conversatio7i with M. Neratov : same
subject

Sir A. Nicolson to Lord

XX<AX UAll^ \ X 1 1 V Cli VK^ I

9 Oct.

Causes of war : secret alliance between
four Balkan States encouraged by
Russia; Count Berchtold's proposals;
difficult position of Turkey

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

10 Oct.

Conversations with M. de Hartwig and
Herr von Ugron : unsatisfactory atti-
tude of M. de Hartwig

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

10 Oct.

Reply of Balkan States to joint declara-
tion to be presented on October 13 ;
ultimatum to Turkey on October 15.
{Min.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

10 Oct.
(Reed. 11 Oct.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : outbreak
of war; efforts to secure localization.
{Min.)

To Sir R. Paget

10 Oct.

Conversation with M. Gruicf: disturb-
ances at ffskiib; Servia's attitude to
Austria-Hungary; question of Sanjak

XXV

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

Sir V Cartwright to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

1912.
10 Oct.

Austro-Hungarian efforts to maintain
European concert and status quo in
Near East. Problem of Sanjak

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

11 Oct.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
alleged attitude of Turkey if Powers
prevent Bulgaria from going to war ;
collective communication of October 10

To Sir F. Cartwright (Tel.)

11 Oct.

t^ame conversation: misrepresentation
of British attitude in Austria-Hungary ;
statement in The limes ... ... ...

1 ^

To Sir F. Bertie

11 Oct

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson : French proposal
of collective action by Powers ...

r 1 u III oir x' . i^tirLwrignt

(Tel.)

LZ UCt.

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
statement in The Times {v. No. 17) ...

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

12 Oct.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon:
proposal for Conference of Powers

21-

Frum Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

13 Oct.

Conversation with Gabriel Effendi Nora-
dunghian : no decision yet as to reply

^ r\ rY 1 TT f\ ^ r\ r>f\\\cirfi'i\Ta /^i^m TVl 1 1 T1 1 q '^ 1 /^Yl
to UtJ Vtill LU CUlltJl^ L i V c CUIlllll nil ICct tlUIl

of October 10

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

13 Oct.

Reply from Balkan States to joint

UtJCltll ciLlUll Ui Wt^^LUUci O. \X xjJ^v.j ...

From Sir F. Cartwright

13 Oct.

Conversation with M. Simic : report of

■ -i f Yyi o Ti r*n tyi tyi iitii/^qti/^ti t f\ Aiictt'io —
yjlxil III cL 11 dJlJlIil 11 11 ICct LlUIi L<J .rl. Li o U I i ct

Hungary on Balkan affairs

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

13 Oct.

(Ttectl lA Oct ')

Note to be presented to Turkey by
Bulgaria, Greece and Servia. (^Text.)

From Sir F. Bertie

13 Oct.

{BecO.. 15 Oct.)

Conversations with M. Isvolski : outbreak
of war; Turco-ltalian negotiations;

cxoi>ii/iiu.t^ yjL J. yj w A •■• ... ...

From Sir F. Cartwright

14 Oct.

Official statement in Fremdenblatt : pro-
gramme of Powers and their deter-
mination to maintain status quo

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

14 Oct.

Date of ultimatum to Turkey. Hostilities
to begin at once ...

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

14 Oct.

Proposal from M. Paul Cambon for
mediation by Powers, and a
Conference ; alteration in wording by
Sir Edward Grey ...

From Lord Granville (Tel.)

14 Oct.

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : French proposal for con-
ference ... ... ... ... ...

31)

To Lord Granville...

14 Oct.

Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann :
importance of keeping Powers together,
especially Russia and Austria-Hungary

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

15 Oct.

Greek ultimatum to Turkey demanding
release of Greek ships

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

15 Oct.

M. Miscev's report of conversation
between King of Greece and Emperor
Francis Joseph

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

15 Oct.

Reply of Porte to Powers ; no basis for
peaceful negotiations

No.

35
35
37

40
41

42
43

46
47

48
49
50

xxvi

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowtlier (Tel.)
From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
From Sir G. Buchanan ...

To Sir F. Bertie

From Lord Kitchener

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
From Sir G. Buchanan ...

Comnuinication from

Towfik Pasha

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From M. Gennadius

Communication from M.
Paul Canibon

Lord Granville to Sir A.

Nicolson (Private)

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

1912.

15 Oct. Turkish charoe d'affaires to leave Sofia.

No reply to be made to Bulgarian and

Servian notes
I * ■ ■

15 Oct. 1 Possibility of Turkish request to Khedive
(Itecd. 16 Oct.) to send contingent from Egypt. (Min.)

16 Oct. Departure of Turkish Minister from
Belgrade

16 Oct. Russian relations with Austria-Hungary ;
(Reed. 21 Oct.) localization of war. M. Sazonov's
assurance to Count Berchtold, and the
reply. M. Sazonov's unpopularity in
Russia (Min.)

16 Oct. Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
M. Poincare's suggestion of a con-
ference of Ambassadors ...

17 Oct. Turkey and Egyptian neutrality...

17 Oct. Declaration of war ...

17 Oct. Conversation with M. Sazonov : official
(Reed. 21 Oct.) communique in the Rossia on
October 16 (enclosure) ...

17 Oct. Turkish note to Bulgaria and Servia.

(Text.)

17 Oct. Conversations with M. Sazonov : his
pessimistic view of the Balkan outlook ;
general political situation

18 Oct. Conversation with M. Neratov : desira-
bility of preliminary consultation by
Russia, France and Great Britain

18 Oct. Declaration of war by Greece, Bulgaria
and Servia on October 17

18 Oct. French formula for mediation of Powers
(Text.) (Min.)

18 Oct. Conversation with Herr von Bethmann
HoUweg : Balkan war ; Anglo-German
relations. (Min.) ...

19 Oct. Influence of Pan-Slav movement on out-
(Recd. 23 Oct.) break of war ; Servian ambitions ;

possible results of defeat of Turkey ...

21 Oct. Message from Kiamil Pasha : Balkan
war ; hopes for speedy jjeace ; sugges-
tion of reforms. (Min.) ...

21 Oct. Conversation with Count BenckendorfF :
Sir Edward Grey's agreement with
suggestion of preliminary consultation ;
reform in Macedonia

21 Oct. Same conversation: misrepresentation of
British attitude in Russian press

22 Oct. Kiamil Pasha's statement re neutrality
of Egypt

xxvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1912.
22 Oct.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his
anxiety for Powers to intervene;
necessit}' for scheme of settlement.
(Min.)

„ (Tel.)

22 Oct.

Same conversation : M. Sazonov's des-
pondency ; his desire for mediation and
for support of France and Great
Britain

From, Sir R. Paget

22 Oct.
{llcvd. 2S Oct.)

Conversation with M. Pasic : position of
Austria-Hungarj' and Servia ; Balkan
States bent on territorial expansion.
Conversation with Herr von Ugron ...

To Sir G. Buchanan

22 Oct.

(Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
question of Straits; further informa-
tion required from Athens

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buchanan (Private)

22 Oct.

Misrepresentation of British action in
Russian press; Anglo-Russian relations

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

(Private)

23 Oct.

Question of Macedonia : proposal that M.
Sazonov should draft scheme of reform ;
mediation

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.) (Private)

24 Oct.

Conversation with M. Sazonov: draft of
reform scheme to be sent to London on
October 25. Conversation with M.
Bobcev

Sir G. Lowther to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

24 Oct.

Diplomatic situation at Constantinople ;
Greco-Turk relations

From. Sir E. Goschen

25 Oct.
{Reed. 28 Oct.)

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : his views on the war and
possibility of mediation. (Min.)

To Sir E. Goschen

25 Oct.

Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann :
same subject : desire of Herr von
Bethmann HoUweg for Anglo-German
co-operation

To Sir G. Buchanan

25 Oct.

Conversation between Count Benckendorff
and Sir A. Nicolson : Greek attitude
with regard to Straits. (Min.)...

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

26 Oct.

Conversation with Count Berchtold : his
visit to Italv ; Albanian question ;
moment for mediation approaching ...

From Sir R. Rodd

26 Oct.
(Becd. 2 Nov.)

Conversation with M. Mihailovic : re-
ported mobilisation of Austro-
Hungarian forces ; financial questions

To Sir F. Bertie

26 Oct.

CoJiversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson : M. Poincare's
telegram on procedure proposed by
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter ; Sir A.
Nicolson's view.s ; Russia and Austria-
Hungary should take initiative

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

27 Oct.

Conversation with Herr von TJgron :
proposed partition of Turkey-in-Europe
by Balkan States ...

From Lord Kitchener

(Tel.)

28 Oct.

Proposed neutrality of Egypt ; possibility
of rupture of relations with Greece

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

28 Oct.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
proposed procedure of Powers ...

XXV) 11

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir E. Goschen

1912.
28 Oct.

Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann :
successes of Balkan States ; necessity
for agreement of Powers ; problems for
settlement. (Min.)

From Sir F. Bertie

(Private)

28 Oct.

Conversations with M. Poincare and M.
Isvolski : procedure proposed by
Germany

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Private)

28 Oct.

Gravity of crisis ; inevitability of some
alteration in status quo: plan of the
Balkan States

To Lord Kitchener (Tel.)

29 Oct.

Egyptian neutrality to be maintained, as
in Turco-Italian war

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

29 Oct.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : joint
action with Austria-Hungary; desira-
bility of French initiative in future
action : attitude of Balkan States to
mediation

From Sir F. Cartwright...

Ed. Note.^

Minutes by Sir A.
Nicolson and Sir E.
Grey

29 Oct.
(Becd. 31 Oct.)

29 Oct.

Article in Fremdenhlntt on status quo in
the Balkans...

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
mediation and Russian scheme of
reform. (Min.)

60
61

To Sir R. Paget ...

29 Oct.

Communication from M. Gruic to Sir A.
Nicolson on Austro-Hungarian mobi-
lization. (Text.) ...

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

30 Oct.

Views held in official circles regarding
future settlement of Balkans. Count
Berchtold's suggestion of armistice

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

30 Oct.
(Becd. 4 Nov.)

Same subject : attitude of the press in
Russia; M. Sazonov's programme of
reforms ; his difficulties regarding
Austria-Hungarj- ...

From Sir R. Paget

30 Oct.
(Becd. 5 Nov.)

Servian military successes. Ambition of
the Balkan States for partition of
European Turkey. Dilemma of
Austria-Hungarj' ...

Communication from M.
Paul Cambon

30 Oct.

French protocol of " desinteressement."

(Text.)

To Sir F. Bertie

30 Oct.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
formula proposed by M. Poincare, on
collective intervention of the Powers.
(Text.)

„ „ (Private)

30 Oct.

Anglo-German conversations : agreement
that Austria-Hungary and Russia
should lead the concert ; proposed form
of mediation

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

1 Nov.

Conversation with M. Crozier : French
protocol of " desinteressement " ;
Count Berchtold's refusal to adhere ...

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

1 Nov.

Conversation with M. Poincare : same
subject. (Min.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1 Nov.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : spheres
of influence in Macedonia under " con-
tested zone" agreement; Russian
attitude regarding Adrianople...

No.'

88
89
90

91
92

93
94

96
97

100
101

xxix

Main Subject.

1912.
1 Nov.

1 Nov.

1 Nov.
{Becd. 4 Nov.)

1 Nov.
CRccd. 4 Nov.)

1 Nov.

Conversation with M. Yovanovic : even-
tual partition of Turkey ; Servian and
Bulgarian ideas about Salonica,
Constantinople and Dardanelles

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
question of limitation to territory to
be acquired bj' Balkan States ...

Same subject ...

French protocol of " desinteressement " ;
Germa;i attitude ... ... ... ...

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-

Waechter : British ships sent to

Salonica; no German ships available;
progress of war. (Min.) ...

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
question of territorial status quo; M.
Sazonov's proposals

I Progress of Bulgarian forces ; proposals
! of M. Poincare ; British communication
i to Berlin as to final territorial settle-

i ment ... ... ... ... ... ...

I Conversation with M. Poincare : his dis-
• appointment with Count Berchtold's
I reply to French protocol of
j "desinteressement"

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : reserves contemplated by
xVustria-Hungary ; direct negotiations j
between Austria-Hungary and Servia
advisable after the war ... ... ... !

Conversation with M. Poincare: his
agreement with Sir Edward Grey's
views on Austria-Hungary; difficulty
of giving Servia access to the sea ...

Same conversation : same subject ; private '
negotiations between Austria-Hungary
and Servia denied...

Same conversation: Russian proposal for
warning to Bulgaria from Great
Britain, France and Russia as to
Adrianople ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian

attitude to Constantinople ; Russia

would join other Powers in sending
ships to Constantinople ...

Conversation with M. Majarov : com-
munique in The Times that Bulgaria
would not retain Constantinople ;
British attitude to final territorial
settlement

2 Nov. Conversation with M. Sazonov : his '
{liecd. S Nov.) I formulation of reserves as to changes |
i in territorial .itatus quo; diplomatic
situation. (A/in.)...

1 N(

1 Nov.

2 Nov.

(Reed. 5 Nov.)

72
72

Conversation with M. Yovanovic: terri-
torial questions; attitude of Austria-
Hungary

XXX

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

113

114

115

116

117

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir E. Goschen

Sir R. Paget to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)
To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

(Tel.)

To Sir E, Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)
To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Lord Kitchener

(Private)

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

1912.
2 Nov.

2 Nov.

3 Nov.

3 Nov.
(Becd. 4 Nov.)

3 Nov.

4 Nov.

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : |
Bulgarian advance on Constantinople;
British attitude ... ... ' ... ... i

Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann : i
territorial settlement in Balkans; atti- I
tude of Russia and Au.stria-Hungary ;
importance of ascertaining Austro-
Hungarian views ...

Probability of Servian refusal to evacuate
the Sanjak if requested by Austria-
Hungary

French protocol of " desinteressenient '' ;
Italian attitude. {Min.)...

Conversation with M. de Fleuriau :
M. Poincare's abandonment of his pro-
posals to Powers ; suggested Anglo-
French representation to Austria-
Hungary

Anglo-French identity of views as to
impossibility of attempting to stop
Bulgarian progress

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's communi-
cation regarding views of Austria-
Hungary as to territorial settlement...

M. Guesov's gratitude for Sir Edward
Grey's message {v. No. 99) : Bulgaria
has no intention of retaining
Constantinople

Turkish notification to France as
mediation of the Powers. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Gruic: denial of
separate negotiations between Austria-
Hungary and Servia ; alliance of
Balkan States unimpaired

Instruction to ask M. Poincare for his
view of Turkish appeal for intervention
of the Powers

Conversation with M. Tosev : the San-
jak a question for Austria-Hungary
and the Balkan Alliance, not Servia
alone. (Min.)

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : proposal that Great Powers
should inform Balkan States of Turkish
appeal and enquire their views. (Min.)

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
M. Sazonov's reserves as to changes in
territorial status quo

Uselessness of suggesting approach to
Austria-Hungary by Servia alone ;
desirability of common action by Great
Powers ... ... ... ... ... 87

Important points to be considered as to
arrangement for future of Egypt in
view of Turkish collapse...

xxxi

From Sir E. Gosclien (Tel.)

119 1 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

1912.
4 Nov.

4 Nov.

4 Nov.
{Ileal. 5 Nov.)

To Sir F. Cartwright (Tel.) 4 Nov

To Sir G. Buchanan ... 4 Nov.

From Sir F. Bertie 4 Nc

(Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan 5 Nc

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) 5 Nov.

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 5 Nov.

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 5 Nov.

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) 5 Nov.

From Sir G. Buchanan 5 Nc

(Tel.)

(Tel.) ; 5 Nov.

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 5 Nov
(Tel.) (Private)

» !> 5 Nov.

(Tel.) (Private)

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter: uselessne.ss of suggesting
approach to Austria-Hungary by Servia
alone; advice to Austria-Hungary to
communicate her reserves on territorial
settlement ... ... ... ... ... 91

Conversation with M. Sazonov : questioji
of Adrianople; Russian ship to proceed
to Constantinople; Turkish apjieal for
mediation ; Austro-Huugarian attitude
to Conference ; territorial reserves.
(Min.) 92

Conversation with Gabriel Effendi Nora-
duughian : progress of war; position of
Constantinople; sending of ships by
the Powers. {Min.) 93

Conversation, with Count MensdorfF : no |
official information as to Austro- 1
Hungarian reserves; opportunity for
settlement of Balkan question ... ... 94

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
M. Sazonov's advice to Bulgarians not
to attack Chatnldja ; proijosal for
British and French advice ; Sir Edward
Grey's views ... ... ... ... 95

Conversations witli M. Poincare: his sus-
picions of Austria-Hungary's territorial
designs; Russian territorial views ... ' 95

Conversation with M. Sazonov: his com- i
munication to Turkish Ambassador;
acceptance of intervention of the
Powers bv Balkan States unlikely.
{Min.) ' ,96

Conversation with M. Yovanovic: denial
of negotiations between Austria- j
Hungary and Servia; informal pro- 1
posal for Cu.stoms Union... ... ... I 97

Utmost Powers could do to enquire of
Balkan States as to terms on which
they would suspend hostilities ... ... 97

Conversation between M. Bompard and
Gabriel Effendi Noradunghian : Turkish
appeal for mediation. (Min.) ... ... , 98

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano: Balkan settlement after the
war; question of Servian port ... ... 98

Conversation with M. Sazonov: question
of Servian port ; effect on interests of
Austria-Hungary ... ... ... ... 99

Conversation between M. Sazonov and
M._ Bobcev ; frontier questions ... ... 99

Draft of programme to be communicated
to Powers by Balkan States ' 100

Programme of Balkan States : question
of Dardanelles; the Sanjak ; Albania
and Salonica ; differences to be settled
among Allies themselves... ... ... IQl

xxxu

No.

Name.

Date.

133

To Sir G. Buchanan

134 To Sir F. Cartwright

135

136

137
138

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buchanan (Private)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

139 To Sir F. Berti

140

141

142
143

144

To Sir E. Goschen.

To Sir R. Paget

From Sir F. Bertie

(Private)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

145 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

146
147

148

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) | 7 Nov.

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

1912.
5 Nov.

5 Nov.

6 Nov.

6 Nov.
6 Nov.

6 Nov.

7 Nov.
7 Nov.

7 Nov.

Main Subject.

Page

Conyersaiion with Count BenckendorfT :
views of M. Sazonov concerning reply
to Turkish request for intervention ... 101

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
Austro-Hungarian views as to Balkan
settlement . . .

Position of Constantinople : importance
of inducing King Ferdinand not to
enter it

102

103

Attitude of Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment regarding Servian and Montene-
grin territorial expansion. {Min.) ... 104

Turkish appeal for intervention of Powers

Conversation with Baron von Macchio :
Turkish appeal for mediation; con-
sultation of Germany and Italy;
coercion of Balkan States not contem-
plated

Conversation between M. de Fleuriau and
Sir A. Nicolson : M. Sazonov's pro-
posal that M. Poincare should take the
initiative in proposing mediation on
basis of Ru.ssian programme ; M. Poin-
care's views...

Conversation with Herr von Kuhlmann :
Turkish appeal for mediation : Sir
Edward Grey's views; proposal for
collective demarche to Balkan States;
German views

Same conversation: Austro-Hungarian
terms with regard to Balkan settle-
ment; Servian demand for Adriatic
port ...

Conversation with M. Gruid: Servian
terms; question of Albanian autonomy

Conversation with M. Poincare : M
Sazonov's proposals; suggested scheme
of mediation by Great Britain, France
and Ru.ssia; territorial questions

Austro-Hungarian views; Servian desire
for port on the Adriatic

Conversation with M. Gruic': same sub-
ject; possibility of general agreement
except on Rumanian and Servian
claims

Austria-Hungarian views as to Balkan
settlement ...

Declaration by the Porte to Ambassadors
of five Powers; position of Constan-
tinople. {Text.)

Meeting of Ambassadors at Italian
Emba!5sy to meet Marquis di San
Galliano : Servian desire for port •
agreement between Italv and Austria-
Hungary of 1901 ...

105

106

107
108

108
109

110
111

111
112-

xxxiii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

From Sir 11. Rodd (Tel.)
From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

From Sir F. Bertie

(Private)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Private)

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)
To Sir II. Rodd

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1912.
7 Nov.

7 Nov.

7 Nov.
7 Nov.
7 Nov.

7 Nov.
7 Nov.

7 Nov.

8 Nov.

8 Nov.
8 Nov.

8 Nov.
{Becd. 9 Nov.

8 Nov.

8 Nov.
8 Nov.

8 Nov.

9 Nov.
9 Nov.

9 Nov.
{liecd. 10 Nov.

Italian attitude to
port. (Min.)

Servian desire for

Communications between M. Bogicevid
and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter
regarding Servian access to Adriatic.
German wafning to Servia. (Min.) ...

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : same subject ; attitude of
M. de Hartwig at Belgrade

Conversation with
same subject

M. Paul Cambon :

[6272]

Same conversation : proposed naval
demonstration at Constantinople

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
same subject ; Russian attitude to tem-
porary occupation of Constantinople ...

\ Same conversation: M. Sazonov's dis-
cussions with Count Thurn

M. Poincare's attitude to M. Sazonov's
policy regarding Bulgaria

Proposal for a Conference ; question of
acce.ss of Servia to the Adriatic

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter: Servian access to Adriatic;
suggestion for railway and free port ...

Report of refusal of Greek terms by
Turkey

Turkish request for mediation of the
Powers

Conversation with M. Sazonov : difficulty
of finding a settlement acceptable to
both Austria-Hungary and Servia.

{Min.)

Conversation with Herr von Kiihlmann :
question of Servian port ; Sir Edward
Grey's views

Capitulation of Salonica ...

Italian communication to M. Sazonov
regarding Servian claim to Adriatic
port ...

M. Poincare's proposal for a protocol of
" desinteressement " ; attitude of
Austria-Hungary to questions of San-
jak and Albania

Bulgarian support for Servia's claim for
Adriatic port. (Min.)

Conversation with Signer Giolitti :
Italian attitude regarding a Servian
Adriatic port

Conversations with Reuter's correspon-
dent and M. Yovanovicf: question of
Servian possession of Adriatic port.
(,Min.)

xxxiv

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Rodd

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir R. Paget

1912.
9 Nov.

9 Nov.

{Heed. 10 Nov.)

9 Nov.

(Heed. 16 Nov.)

10 Nov.

11 Nov.
{liecd. 26 Nov.)

12 Nov.

{Ilccd.26 Nov.)

12 Nov.

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : question of Servian port
should be discussed later. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Majarov : advisa-
bility of formulation of terms of peace
with Turkey as a whole ... ... ... 126

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject ; Russian views ; serious
language to Germany and Austria-
Hungary

Conversation with Signer Giolitti: Treaty
of Lausanne ; position of Austria-
Hungary and Russia ; frontier of
Albania; Servian access to the Adriatic
or .JSgean Sea. Effect of agreement
with Austria-Hungary over Albania ...

Conrersdtion with Ismail Kemal :
Albanian desire for independence

Conversation with M, Sazonov: his grati-
tude for Sir Edward Grey's represen-
tations to Austria-Hungarj' ; danger
of German reversion to " Agadir
policy." (Min.)

German declaration to Servia of military
support for Austria-Hungary if Russia
moves...

Change in relations of Austria-Hungary
and Servia : summons of Herr von
Ugron to Budapest ; his communica-
tion to Servia on his return ; conten-
tions on both sides. (Min.)

Request by M. de Giers for British
moderating advice to M. Pagid.
(Min.)

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : his agreement with Mr.
Asquith's statement as to postpone-
ment of discussion of isolated views
until the general settlement

Conversation with M. Salabacev : desire
for direct negotiations with Turkey,
not for mediation of Powers. (Min.) ...

M. Sazonov's alarm at language of M.
Bobcev : support of Servia by
Bulgaria ; his hope for conciliatory
policy of Austria-Hungary. (A/in.)

Conversation with M. Guesov : Serbo-
Bulgarian alliance ; visit of Dr. Danev
to Budapest...

Statement by Marquis di San Giuliano :
agreement of members of Triple
Alliance

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson
and M. Gruic : question of Servian
port ; attitude of Austria-Hungary ;
Servian intention to hold Durazzo ... I 140

XXXV

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

iPage

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir H.
Bax-Ironside (Private)

From Sir H. Bax-Iroiiside
(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Count de Salis (Tel.)

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

193 i To Sir F. Cartwright (Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie ...

From Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir G. Buchanan

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir R.
Paget (Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1912.
12 Nov.

18 Nov.

{liecd. lit A'of.)

13 Nov.

13 N(

13 Nov.

{Reed. 14 Nov.)

13 Nov.

(Itecd. l-'t Nov.)

13 Nov.

[6272]

Immediate problems : mediation and
possible entry of Bulgarian troops into j
Constantinople ; communications to I
Balkan States to be made by the
Powers; German attitude ... ... 141

Mediation proposals : Turkish desire for
direct communication with Allies ... | 142

Dr. Danev's audience with Emperor and
I Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Buda-
pest ; conversation with Count Berch-
told. {Min.) 142

Servian-Adriatic question. Bulgarian
complete agreement with Servia. (Min.) 143

Conversation with M. Poincare : Italy's
retention of ^jgean Islands ; objections
by France. (Min.)

Communication by Austria-Hungary to
King of Montenegro on occupation of
Albanian coast; Italian communication
expected

Sir Edward Grej-'s view in favour of post-
ponement of discussion of claims of
individual Balkan States until terms
of peace are formulated...

Mediation proposals: communication to
be made when other Powers have sent
instructions ...

Conversation with Count Berchtold : Dr.
Danev's mission ; anxiety for conclusion
of peace before Bulgarian entry into
Constantinople

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
Austria-Hungary and Servia ; Sir
Edward Grey's instructions to Sir R.
Paget; hopes for peaceful solution

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson ; M. Poincare's
opinion on temporary nature of occu
pation of territory by the Allies

13 Nov. I Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
(Itecd. 18 Nov.)\ opinion on Servian Adriatic port;

hostility towards Austria-Hungary;
attitude towards Bulgaria

13 Nov. Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
memorandum communicated by Count
Benckendorff on partition of Turkish
territory among the Allies if victorious.

(Text.) (Min.)

13 Nov. Servian question; attitude of Russia ...

14 Nov. Conversation with M. Yovanovic: position
of Austria-Hungary and Servia ; mobi-
lization of Austro-Hungarian troops.
(Min.)

c 2

xxsvi

Name.

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir E. Goschen...

To Lord Kitchener

( Private)

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

(Tel.)

213

214
215

To Sir R. Rodd

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

Date.

Main Subject.

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

Page

1912.

14 Nov. Greek attitude to question of Servian
port ; Balkan league originally for
three years only ; terms of settlement
left vague ... ... ... ... ... 153

14 Nov. donversatioii with M. Yovanovic : tele-
(Recd. 15 Nov.) gram from M. Pasic ... ... ... 153

14 Nov. i Conversation with M. Sazonov : questions
of cession of territory' to individual ^
Balkan States ... ... ... ... 154

14 Nov. Conversation with Count BenckendorfF :
his question as to attitude of Great
Britain if Austria-Hungary attacked
Servia : Sir Edward Grey's reply ... 154

14 Nov. Conversation, with Prince Lichnowsky :
I same subject; friendly relations of

Great Britain and Germany ... ... 155

14 Nov. Position of Egypt: " desinteressement "

policy of the Powers ... ... ... 156

14 Nov. Inadvisable prominence given by M.
Sazonov to question of Servian port;
his attitude becoming more pacific;
his official communique ... ... ... 156

15 Nov. Question of JEgean Islands ; to be con-
sidered first with Russia... ... ... 158

15 Nov. Conversation between Marquis Imperiali
and Sif A. Nicolson : ^gean Islands,
and their possible use as naval bases... 158

15 Nov. Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson
and M. Paul Cambon on November 9 :
M. Poincare's agreement to leave ques-
tion of Servian port to later date ... 158

15 Nov. Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson
and M. Paul Cambon on November 14 :
Russian enquiry as to attitude of
France if Austria-Hungary intervened
actively in Servia... ... ... ... 159

15 Nov. Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
resume of telegram from Marquis di
San Giuliano; Albanian question ... 159

16 Nov. Conversation with M. Poincare : com- ;
munications with Servian Government ; j
possibility of ships going to Durazzo... ; 160

16 Nov. Servian communication to Bulgaria on
(Reed. 17 Nov.) willingness to discuss preliminaries of |

peace ... ... ... ... ... 161

16 Nov. Conversation with M. Poincare : his
objection to Russian representations at
Belgrade 161

16 Nov. Conversation with M. Poincare : ^gean

Islands; retention by Greece or Italy... 161

16 Nov. Comnmnication from Count BenckendorfF
on November 9. Objections to tem-
porary occupation of Constantinople.
(Text.) 162

xxxvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

216

Frnvi Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1912.
17 Nov.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : position
of Russia and Austria-Hungary as to
Servian port on the Adriatic. (Min.)...

162

217

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

17 Nov.

Confirmation of news of passage of
troops for Ragusa and Cattaro...

164

2J8

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

17 Nov.

Conversation with M. Kokovzov :
need to obtain satisfaction for Servia ;
Russian attitude if Austria-Hungary
moved

164

219

(Tel.) (Private)

17 Nov.

Inexplicable change in language of M.
Sazonov : possible influence of
Emperor ; impossibility of leaving
question of Servian port unsettled

165

220

From Sir R. Paget

17 Nov.
(Eecd. 26 Nov.)

Conversation with M. Pasic : Servian
insistence on Durazzo; question to
remain in abeyance for the time
between Austria-Hungary and Servia.
(Min.)

165

221

To Sir F. Bertie (Private)

17 Nov.

iEgean Islands; objection to M. Poin-
care's proposal ; criticism of M.
Sazonov's management of Balkan
affairs

167

222

From Sir F. Cartwright
(lei.)

18 Nov.

Servian treatment of Austro-Hungarian
consuls. (Min.)

1 C7

iDY

223

From Count de Salis (Tel.)

18 Nov.
(Reed: 19 Nov.)

Audience with King of Montenegro;
his answer to the Austro-Hungarian
communication. (Min.) ...

168

224

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

18 Nov.

Agreement of all six Powers most
desirable ; direct conversations be-
tween Austria-Hungary and Russia
suggested

169

225

(Tel.)
(Private)

18 Nov.

Interview recently published at Belgrade
by M. de Hartwig ; his encouragement
of extreme Servian claims

169

226

From Sir G. Buchanan

.(Tel.)

18 Nov.

Conversation with M. Louis ; chief objec-
tion of Austria-Hungary to proposed
Servian port danger of fortification ;
attitude of M. Sazonov ...

169

227

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

18 Nov.
(Reed. 19 Nov.)

Surrender of Monastir to Servian troops

170

228

To Sir G. Buchanan

18 Nov.

Conversation with Count BenckendorfiF
on November 12 : telegrams from M.
Sazonov on question of Servian access
to Adriatic and Austro-Hungarian
objections. (Texts.)

170

229

18 Nov.

Conversation with Count Benckendorff
on November 10 : telegram from M.
Sazonov to Belgrade, same subject.
(Text.)

172

230

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

19 Nov.

(Becd. 20 Nov.)

Communication from M. de Giers of con-
ditions of armistice. (Min.)

173

231

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

19 Nov.

Presence of Servian troops on Adriatic
coast ...

174

XXXVlll

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

From iSir G. Buchanan

(Tel.) (Private)

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buclianan (Private)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

1912.
19 Nov.

19 Nov.

( Tiecd. 20 Nov.)

19 Nov.

20 Nov.

21 Nov.

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) \ 21 Nov.

To Sir E. Gosehen (Tel.) 21 Nov.

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

21 Nov.

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) 21 Nov

To Sir E. Gosehen

21 Nov.

Communication by Baron von Griesinger
and Signer Baroli to Servia; identic
with that made by Herr von Ugron
{v. No. 176) ; M. Pasic's reply

Public feeling against Servia. Decision
that mobilization, if necessary, should
be on large scale. Herr von
Tschirschky's visit to Budapest. {Min.)

Conversation, with M. Poincare : accept-
ance by Balkan States of Grand Vizier's
proposal for Armistice ; mediation of
Great Powers not desired. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his
correspondence with Count Berchtold ;
difficulties of various territorial claims.
(Min.)

Reply of M. Guesov received through M.
de Giers ; acceptance of Grand Vizier's
proposal to discuss terms of Armistice

Conve rsation with M. Sazonov: denial of
reports about M. de Hartwig at
Belgrade ... ... ... ... ... 17^

Results of surrender of Monastir. M. de i
Hartwig's influence at Belgrade. '
Russian attitude ...

M. Guesov's reply to communication from
Powers : direct negotiations in pro-
gress ... ... ... ... ... ... I 180

Report by Dr. Danev of Archduke Fraiiz
Ferdinand's view that Austria-Hungary
would not make a casus belli of Servian
access to Adriatic. (Min.)

Political situation in Vienna as to Balkan
Affairs : position of Russia and of
Germany

Conversation with M. Pasic : slight de-
crease in tension between Servia and
Austria-Hungary ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
German proposal for agreement by
Powers on main points of Balkan
settlement ...

Conversation with M. Gruic : reply from
M. Pasic to Austro-Hungarian com-
munication on Servian access to
Adriatic

Austro-Hungarian view that Servian
reply was not sufficiently definite.
(Min.)

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
points of agreement required between
Great Powers : difficulty concerning
Servia between Austria-Hungary and
Russia; German attitude

XXXIX

NoJ

Name.

247 , To Sir F. Bertie

248 i From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

From Sir E. Gosclion (Tel.^

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir 11. Paget

(Private)

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.) I

1912.
21 Nov.

22 Nov.
22 Nov.
22 Nov.

22 Nov.

22 Nov.
22 Nov.

22 Nov.

22 Nov.
(Becd. 23 Nov.)

22 Nov.

23 Nov.

24 Nov.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
same subject ; communication made by
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter to M.
Jules Cambon

Seriousness of situation ; position of Bul-
garia ; obligation of Allies to support
each other if attacked

184

185

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon
suggested conference of delegates of
Powers ... ... ... ... ... I 186

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha : con-
ditions proposed by Allies for armistice
unacceptable, but discussions con-
tinuing; suggestion that Allies should
formulate conditions for peace ... ... 186

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : approval of suggested dis-
cussion among Powers. (Min.) ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his con-
currence in proposal of discussion be-
tween Powers

187

Servian access to Adriatic : precautions
in case of action by Austria-Hungary 188

Interviews at Budapest between Count
Berchtold, Herr von Tschirschky and
the Duke di Avarna : revision of peace
conditions by the Powers. (Min.) ... [ 188

189

Servian proposal made to M. Poincare.
Moderation recommended by him : his
suggestion of neutralised port for
Servia 189

Political situation in Vienna complicated
by consular quarrel with Servia ; Count I
Berchtold's attitude : general position
of Austria-Hungary, Russia and
Germany ... ... ... ... ... 190

Conversation with M. Pasic : Servian
I demands : alternative proposals ; Alba-
nian autonomj' ... ... ... ... 192

Conference between chief of Austro-
l Hungarian General Staff and chief of
j German General Staff ... ... ... 194

Unofficial proposals for settlement made
1 by Austria-Hungary to Servia through
I Professor Masaryk and others ... 194

Progress of war ... ... ... ... 194

Conversation with Count Bosdari :
Austro-Hungarian attitude to Servian
port question. (Min.) ... ... ... 195

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Turkish rejection of armistice pro-
posals of Allies. {Min.) ... ... ... 195

No.

Name.

Date

From Sir R. Paget

Mr. Theo Russell to Mr.
Tyrrell (Private)

From Sir G. Lowtlier

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1912.
24 Nov.
(Eecd.SO Nov.)

24 Nov.

25 Nov.
25 Nov.

(Tel.) 25 Nov.

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 25 Nov.

(Tel.) i

From Count de Balis

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

Ed. Note.—

To Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen

To Sir F. Cartwright

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

25 Nov.

26 Nov.

25 Nov.
(Meed. 26 Nov.)

25 Nov.
25 Nov.

25 Nov.

26 Nov.
26 Nov.

26 Nov.

{Jlecd. 27 Nov.)

26 Nov.

Main Subject.

Conversation with M. Yovanovic : un-
official overtures from Austria-Hungary
for settlement of Servian port
difficulty

Viennese views on political situation

Change in tone of diplomatic circles at
the Porte

Reply of Servian Government not given
direct to Herr von Ugron but to Baron
von Griesinger and Signor Baroli.
Servian attitude. (Min.)

Cause of increasing tension between
Russia and Austria-Hungary ...

Beginning of armistice discussions

Austro-Hungarian suggestion of Customs
Union and some cession of territory;
King of Montenegro's reply

M. Sazonov's reply to M. Popovic:
economic position of Servia ; possible
solution. Suggestion that Ambassadors
at Paris should meet for discussion ...

Page

Desirability of early
Ambassadors

discussion by

Conversation with Dr. Georges Streit:
probability that Servia would have to
give way to Austria-Hungary as to
Albania

Communication bj' M. Pasid to The Times 201

Conversation with Herr Zimmermann ;
anxiety about reported Russian
mobilisation. (Min.)

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
reported opinion of M. Sazonov on
Servian difficulty; German and British
views

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
question of Servian port

Same conversation : claim of Great Powers
to participate in peace terms ... ... | 204

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Austro-Hungarian advice to Turkey ... j 204

Feeling in Vienna regarding fate of |
missing Austro-Hungarian consul.
{Min.) j 205

Calling out of three classes of reservists 205

Conversation with M. Poincare : attitude
of France, Germany and Great Britain
in event of war between Russia and
Austria-Hungary

.iudience of Colint Thurn with the Czar :
hopes of pacific solution of Servian port
question ... ... ... ... ...

206

206-

xli

No. Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

282 To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir G. Buchanan

284 To Sir F. Bertie

1912.
26 Nov.

26 Nov.

286 Sir A. Nicolson to Sir H, 26 Nov.
Bax-lronside (Private)

Memorandum by ^Ir. Fitz- 26 Nov.
maurice I

From Vice-Consul de
Garston (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.) ;

From Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Bertie

To Sir E. Goschen

From Sir F. Bertie

(Private)

From Sir H. Bax-lronside
(Tel.)

27 Nov.

27 Nov.
27 Nov.

27 Nov.

{BecJ. >l Dec.)

27 Nov.

28 Nov.

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) ! 28 Nov.

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.) : 28 Nov.

To Sir F. Bertie ..

28 Nov

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
I proposed conference of Great Powers ... ' 207

I I

{Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
attitude of Austria-Hungary and of
Russia 207

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson on November 20 :
^^l^gean Islands; claims bv Italy and
Bulgaria ~ 208

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson on November 21 :
reply of M. Poincare to suggestions
sent by M. Louis ... ... ... ... 208

General position in Balkans; desirability
of meeting of a Conference ... ... 209

Direct negotiations for armistice between
Porte and Balkan League. Comparison
with crisis of 1877-8. Interviews with
Ambassadors and others. {Min.) ... 210

Mobilization of 16th Army Corps
(Austro-Hungarian). Calling up of
other reserves ... ... ... ... 213

Movements of troops to Bosnia and
Herzegovina ... ... ... ... i 213

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Serbo-
Bulgarian questions ; his hesitation
about consultation of Ambassadors
and other matters. (Min.) ... ... 214

Attitude of M. Sazonov : Servian port
question ; Albania ; proposal for meet- !
ing of Ambassadors at Paris ... ... 215

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon ; M.
Sazonov's proposal for conference of
Ambassadors at Pans

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
Austro-Hungarian and Russian mili-
tary preparations ; possibility of a
conference of Ambassadors

Conversation between Mr. Saunders,
Times Correspondent, and M.
Isvolski

Discussion by M. Guesov with other
Ministers on Austro-Hungarian mili-
tary preparations : intention to address
Triple Entente

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
proposal for conference of Ambassadors

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky.
Enquirj- by Sir E. Grey as to German
views on proposal for Ambassadorial
consultation at Paris ; three points of
reference

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson: advice to Servia

217

218

220

220-

221

222

223

xlii

No.l

Name.

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir G. Buchanan

Date.

Main Subject.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

Page

1912.
28 Nov.

28 Nov.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. 28 Nov.
Nicolson (Private)

29 Nov.

29 Nov.
29 Nov.
29 Nov.

29 Nov.
29 Nov.

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson, M.
Paul Cambon, Count Benckendorff and
Marquis Jmperiali : uneasiness as to
attitude of Austria-Hungary and Ger-
many; M. Pasic's manifesto

Conversation between M. de Etter and
Sir A. Nicolson; Servian reply to
Austria-Hungary. Conversation be-
tween Coiint ]\Iensdorff and Sir A.
Nicolson. (Min.) ...

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
M. Sazonov's desire for Conference of
Ambassadors, possibly in Paris...

Conversation with M. Dmovski, leader of
Polish party in Russia : military pre-
parations by Austria-Hungary : Russian
relations with Austria-Hungary

Conversation with M. Sazonov. Influence
of the Czar ; Count Thurn's audience
with the Czar ; effect of crisis on the
Entente

223

224

225

227

Audience of Count Thuru with the Czar, i
Effect of consular incident on Austro-
Hungarian attitude to Servia ...

Conversation with M. Guesov : Servian
access to Adriatic essential; attitude of
King of Bulgarians

British attitude to question of Servian
port ...

Conversation with Count
conference proposal

Mensdorff :

228

229

230

From Sir F. Cartwright i 30 Nov.

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan 30 Nov.

(Tel.) {Reed. 1 Dec.)

From Sir R. Paget i 30 Nov.

(Private) I

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

2 Dec.

(Tel.) 2 Dec.

231

Communication of aide-memoire to
M. Neratov : M. Sazonov's proposal on
Servian port question (cp. No. 270) ... ! 230

Russian communication to M. Pasic on |
his statement in The Times. (Min.) ... ;

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
contradiction of reports in French
press of German encouragement of
Turkey

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
conference proposal ; Count Berchtold's
preference for London as place of
meeting ; his views on three points of
reference suggested by Sir Edward
Grey. (cp. No. 297.) (Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposed
meeting of Ambassadors ; Servian port
question

Servian attitude ; views of members of
diplomatic corps ...

Conversation with M. Guesov: Greco-
Bulgarian relations ; German statement
as to proposed conference of Ambassa-
dors ...

Greco-Bulgarian relations ...

232

233

234

235
235

xliii

No.

Name.

Date.

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
To Sir F. Bertie

Sir A. Nicolson
Buchanan

to Sir G.
(Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir R. Rodd ...

To Sir E. Goschen

To Sir F. Bertie

From Sir F. Elliot

1912.
2 Dec.

(Becd. S Dec.)

3 Dec.
3 Dec.

3 Dec.

3 Dec.
3 Dec.

3 Dec.

4 Dec.

4 Dec.
4 Dec.

4 Dec.

7 Dec.
{Becd. U Dec.)

Main Subject.

Page

Servian uneasiness at Austro-Hungarian
military preparations; views of
M. Yovanovic

Military situation in Chataldja lines ...

Conversation with M. de Hartwig :
Austro-Hungarian military prepara-
tions; unrest in Slav provinces

Greek proposal to Bulgarian Government
that powers of Triple Entente should
act as arbitrators. (Min.)

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
Servian port question

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon:
speech by Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg: question of German support
of Austria-Hungary

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
speeches by Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter and Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg ; German support of Austria-
Hungary ; attitude of Russia ; Servian
port question

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
Russian counsels at Belgrade ; French
enquiry as to British attitude in event
of European war ...

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his
proposal to go to London for peace
negotiations ; question of Salonica.
Other members of Greek delegation ...

235
236

236

237

238

Same subject : anxiety as to reception in
Russia; Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's
encouragement of Turkey ; possibility j
of European war ... ... ... ... i 239

Conversation with Herr von Ugron :
exaggerated reports of Austro-
Hungarian military preparations;
attitude of Servian Government ... 240

Increasing danger of political situation ;
effect of Servian capture of Durazzo ;
influence of M. de Hartwig at Belgrade 240

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his views :
on Albanian frontier ; Servian port j
question ; locality of meeting of |
Ambassadors ... ... ... ... 241

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson j
and the Marquis Imperiali on Novem- 1
ber 30 : audience given by Emperor of
Russia to Count Thurn : Servian access
to Adriatic ...

242

243

244

245

xliv

Chapter LXXX.
The Armistice, December 1912-February 1913.

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

330
331

332
333

From, Sir R. Paget

1912.
1 Dec.
{Heed. 7 Dec.)

3 Dec.
[{Heed. 7 Dec.)

Communication from M. 4 Dec.
Majarov

Tu Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

334 I To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

335 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

336

337

338

339

340

341

To Sir F. Bertie ...

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

342 From Sir G. Barclay

343 To Sir F. Bertie ...

344 ' To Sir F. Cartwright

345 „ „

5 Dec.
5 Dec.

5 Dec.

6 Dec.

6 Dec.
6 Dec.

6 Dec.

6 Dec.
(Reed. 9 Dec.)

6 Dec.

Conversation with M. Pasid : Servian
port question ; attitude of Russia and
Austria-Hungary ...

Servian uneasiness at Austro-Hungarian
militarj' preparations. Conversations
with M. Yovanovic and M.
de Hartwig...

Signature of Protocol of Armistice at
Chataldja on December 3. Terms

Locality of conference of Ambassadors ;
Sir Edward Grey's views

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
conference of Ambassadors ; subjects
for discussion

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Herr von
Bethmann Hollweg's speech ; attitude
of Russian press ...

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon:
Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's speech ;
British repudiation of rumoured
intrigues in Syria

Same conversation : locality of conference
of Ambassadors; Sir Edward Grey's
views

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter: German acceptance of
conference proposal ; locality of meet-
ing; inchision of Rumania. (Min.) ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : locality
of conference. (Min.)

Same conversation : differences between
Greece and Bulgaria; Greek proposal
for arbitration bv Triple Entente.
{Min.)

Same conversation: Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg's speech; its authorship

Audience with King of Rumania; con-
dolences from King George on death of
King's sister: discussion of Balkan
affairs

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon ;
desirabilitj' of informal character of
conversations between Ambassadors ...

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
points for discussion by Ambassadors...

Same conversation: same subject; Count
Berchtold's views ; instructions sent to
Count Mensdorff ...

xlv

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

346

To Mr. E. Howard

1912.
6 Dec.

Conversation with Dr. Carlin : situation
created by Herr von Bethmann Holl-
weg's speech

257

347

From Sir R. Paget

(Private)

6 Dec.

M. Pasid's communication to The Times.
Coti'Versattons with I^. de Hartwig and
M. Tosev

257

348

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

7 Dec.

Conversation with M. Poincare : locality
of conference; Kussiaii insistence on
Paris

259

349

To Sir E. Goschen

7 Dec.

Same subject ...

259

350

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

7 Dec.

Same subject. Suggested inclusion of
Rumania

259

351

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

7 Dec.

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Awstro-Hungarian reservation on Ser-
vian port question ; inclusion of
Rumania. (Min.)...

260

352

From Sir E. Goschen

7 Dec.
{Itecd. 9 Dec.)

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg's speech ; attitude of Austria-
Hungary. (Min.)...

261

353

)) ))

7 Dec.
{Becd. 9 Dec.)

Proposed conference of Ambassadors ;
German reply. (Text.) (Min.) ...

263

354

To Sir E. Goschen

7 Dec.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
diplomatic groups of pjuropean powers
not in opposing camps; position of
Germany, France and Britain ...

264

355

Communication from Tew-
fik Pasha

7 Dec.

Provision in terms of the armistice for
opening of peace negotiations in Lon-
don ; revictualling of Adrianople and
Scutari

264

356

Communication from M.
Paul Cambon

7 Dec.

Count Berchtold's reply to Sir Edward
Grej-'s proposal for meeting of Ambas-
sadors; locality of conference ...

265

357

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

8 Dec.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : meeting
of Ambassadors ; proposed inclusion of
Rumania ; points for discussion at
conference; Albanian frontiers; pro-
posal for neutralised ports on Adriatic ;
questions of yEgean Islands and
Mount Athos. (Min.)

265

358

(Tel.)

8 Dec.

Same conversation : Russian military
preparations ; Russian moderating
influence on Servia

266

359

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

9 Dec.

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen-
Waechter : selection of London for
place of meeting of Ambassadors.
(Min.)

267

360

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

9 Dec.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject. (Min.)

267

361

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

9 Dec.

Sir E. Grey's views on Albania and pro-
posal for neutralised ports ; locality of
conference ; possibility of immediate
informal conversations ...

268

xlvi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

362

363

364

365

From Sir F. Elliot

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir F. Elliot

1912.
9 Dec.
{Reed. 17 bee.)

9 Dec.

366 From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) ' 10 Dec.

367
368

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

10 Dec.
10 Dec.

369 From Sir G. Lowther i 11 Dec.

(Tel.)

370 : To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

371

372

373

374

375

376

J) »

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir G. Buchanan

11 Dec.

11 Dec.
{Reed. 16 Dec.)

11 Dec.

.¥mufe bv Lord Onslow ... 11 Dec.

From Sir E. Goschen 12 Dec.

(Tel.) :

Page

Conver.'iation with M. Venizelos : M.
Guesov's inability to go to London ;
character of pre-war arrangements
between Allies; revictualling of!
Adrianople ... ... ... ... | 268

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson
and Count Benckcndorff on Decem-
ber 3: Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's
speech; Prince Lichnowsky's views on
British attitude in event of war

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
meeting of Ambassadors; question of
inclusion of Rumania ; possibility of
meeting of formal Conference at Paris ;
Sir Edward Grey's suggestions as to
subjects for discussion

Conversation with M. Gennadiiis: reasons
for Greek failure to sign the armistice ;
her readiness to do so

Possibility of unofficial Serbo-Austro-
Hungarian conversations. Visit of
Professor Masaryk to Belgrade

Conversation with M. Sazonov: advice to
Servia

Forthcoming meeting of Ambassadors.
Servian relations with Austria-
Hungary

Advice given to Porte by members of
diplomatic corps. Instructions to
Ottoman plenipotentiaries. (Min.)

Conversation with ^t. Gruic : Servian
anxiety concerning Austria-Hungary.
Sir Edward Grey's advice to Servia ...

Improvement in political situation ; M.
Sazonov's endeavour to moderate
Servian opinion; his views on lines of
settlement; his calm attitude on
Balkan affairs generallj'...

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
forthcoming meeting of Ambassadors ;
British attitude to discussion of Straits
question

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali ;
Marquis di San Giuliano's views on
forthcoming meeting

Conversation with Count Benckcndorff :
Albanian question and Servian access
to the sea ; communication of aide-
memoire. {Text} ...

Conversation with Count Trauttmanns-
dorff : Austria-Hungarv and Servia ... 280

Conversation with Herr von Kiderlen- j
Waechter : his desire that Ambassa-
dors' conversations should be kept }
secret ... ... ... ... ... i 281

xlvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

I Page

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Bertie ...

Fnim Sir H. Bax-Ironside 13 Dec.

(Tel.)

1912.
12 Dec.

12 Dec.

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Austro-Hungarian attitude to Servia
and Servian port question

282

Conversation with Count Benckendorff : i
instructions sent bv M. Sazonov to [
Belgrade. (Text) I 282

Conversation with M.
Servian relations
Hungary

Servian conversations
Hungary

do Fleuriau : |
with Austria-

)

with Austria- '

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir R. Rodd

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir R. Rodd

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
To Sir F. Bertie

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir E. Goschen
To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

13 Dec.

14 Dec.
{Bead. 20 Dec.)

15 Dec.
(Becd. 28 Dec.)

16 Dec.

16 Dec.
16 Dec.

16 Dec.

17 Dec.

18 Dec.
18 Dec.

18 Dec.

Conversation with ^1. Sazonov : his state-
ment to Count Thurn as to danger of
Austro-Hungarian proposal to exact
guarantees from Servia. {Min.)

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
question of ^gean Islands

Conversation with M. Pasic : Sir E.

Grey's advice to Servia; Austro-Hun-
j garian policy

Resignation of Austro-Hungarian Chief
of General Staff ; appointment of Baron
Conrad von Hotzendorf ; impression
made in Italy. (Min.) ...

Professor Masarvk's visit to Vienna

Visit of M. Yovaiiovic to Vienna ...

Conversations separately with Paul
Cambon, Count Benckendorff, Marquis
Imperiali and Prince Lichnowsky ;
procedure at meetings of Ambassadors

Conversation between Marquis Imperiali
and Sir A. Nicolson on December 9:
M. Majarov's views on peace terms ...

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
Sir Edward Grey's wish for unanimity
as to Albania and Servian access to
Adriatic; his advice to Servia ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
his instructions

Finst Meeting of Ambassadors at London :
procedure; Albanian question and
Servian access to Adriatic

Conversation with M. Gruic: Servian
instructions on claim to access to
Adriatic

Conversations with M. de Giers and
Gabriel Effendi Noradunghian ;
Russian view of attitude of Turkey ;
representations by Russia, France and
Germany. (Min.) ...

Second Meeting of Ambassadors ; Alba-
nian frontier ; ^Ogean Islands ; Salo-
nica ; communique to Press

283

284

xlviii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

395
396

397

398

399

400

401
402

To Sir E. Goschen

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

1912.
18 Dec.

18 Dec.

To Six G. Lowther (Tel.) ' 19 Dec

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)
To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

To Sir F. Bertie

From Sir G. Lowther

403 To Sir F. Cartwright

404

To Sir R. Paget ...

405 To Sir F. Elliot ...

406 • Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

407

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

408 ' From Sir R. Paget

409

410

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

411 From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

19 Dec.

20 Dec.
(Reed. 27 Dec.)

20 Dec.
20 Dec.

20 Dec.

21 Dec.

{Reci].2It Dec.)

22 Dec.

23 Dec.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
Montenegrin claim to Scutari ...

Conversation with Dr. Danev : Allied
demands on Turkey ; questions for the
Great Powers

Instructions to speak in same sense as
Russian, French and German Ambas-
sadors (cp. No. 393)

Conversation with Count MensdorfF :
press comMunique on conversations of
Ambassadors ; reported Austro-Hun-
garian military preparations

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
Scutari; Marquis di San Giuliano's
desire to gain time before question is
discussed

Conversation with
Austro-Hungarian
Servia

Count Mensdorff :
policy towards

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :

Austro-Hungarian mobilization ; Scutari 3O0

Conversation with Gabriel Effendi Nora-
dunghian : instructions to Turkish
delegates; question of Adrianople

Third Meeting of Ambassadors : commu-
nique to press ; Albania and Servian
access to Adriatic...

Conversation with M. Gruid : Servian
aide-memoire on Adriatic port ques-
tion ; resolution oi meeting of Ambas-
sadors. (Texts)

Conversation with M. Venizelos : ^gean
Islands; question of Straits; Albania...

Relations between Russia and Austria-
Hungary; German attitude; object of
Austro-Hungarian military prepara-
tions. (Min.)

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Albania ; -iEgean Islands : Adrianople.
(Min.)

Conversation with M. Pasic : transfer of
M. Yovanovic to Servian legation at
Vienna ; Servian port question ; Alba-
nian frontier

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Scutari ;
Albania. (Min.) ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his con-
versation to Count Thurn on Russian
warning to Turkey ; relations between
Balkan States. Austro-Hungarian
mobilization. (Min.)

Russian warning to Turkey. (Min.)

xlix

No.

N.ame.

Date.

Main Subject.

Pnge

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget

Communication from Count
BenckendorfiF

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

Communication from M.
Novakovic

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir R. Rodd

From Sir R. Paget

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buchanan (Private)

1912.
23 Dec.
{Rccd. 27 Dec.)

24 Dec.

25 Dec.

26 Dec.

28 Dec.

(Kerd. 'i Jan.,
1913.)

28 Dec.

30 Dec.

31 Dec.

31 Dec.
(Reed. 4 Jan.)

31 Dec.

[6272]

Russian press comments on agreement oi
Six Powers with regard to Albania and
Servia port question

Conversation with M. Sazonov: Russian
warning to Austria-Hungarj- ; Scutari ;
Adrianople

3ir E. Grey's support of Russia concern-
ing Scutari communicated to Prince
Licliiiowsky and Count Mensdorff ;
Servian access to Adriatic

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subjects; Au.stro-Hungarian internal
situation. (Min.) ...

Policy of Austria-Hungary ; demobiliza-
tion question ; internal situation

(Conversation with M. Stevanovid : Pro-
fessor IMasarvk's visit to Vienna

Russian request for British and French
support at Ambassadors' conference on
four points...

M. Sazonov's warning to Austria-Hun-
gary regarding retention of Russian
reservists

M. Sazonov's request for support :
Scutari; Albanian frontier ...

Instructions to urge Porte to make early
conclusion of peace in her own
interest : attitude of Austria-Hungary
and Bulgaria

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
four points for which British support
had been requested

Servian views on Albanian frontier

Views of Porte in offering to submit to
decision of Great Powers, except on
question of Adrianople. (Min.)

Conversations between M. de Etter and
M. de Fleuriau and Sir A. Nicolson :
Count Berchtold's telegram about
Austro-Hungarian military prepara-
tions ...

Conversation with iSlarquis Imperiali :
frontier of Albania ; Servian or neutral
port; Salonica; Adrianople

Conversation with M. Pasicf : Servian
attitude to proposed frontier of
Albania. (Min.) ...

Complications in Europe : Rumania and
Bulgaria ; Ru.sso-Austro-Hungarian
relations ; British support of Russia
over Scutari

313
314

315

315
316
317

317

318
318

318

319

320

322
322
324

325

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir G. Buchanan

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

Memorandum by Lord
Onslow

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Elliot

From Sir E. Goschen

From Sir G. Barclay

From Sir F. Cartwright

1913.
1 Jan.

1 Jan.

1 .Jan.

1 Jan.

To Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie ...

1 Jan.
{'Reed. 7 Jan.)

1 Jan.

2 Jan.

2 Jan.
(Reed. 6 Jan.)

3 Jan.
{Reed. 6 Jan.)

3 Jan.

{Reed. 6 Jan.)

3 Jan.

British diplomatic support to Russia
over Scutari and Albanian frontier ;
other points {ep. No. 418)

Conversation with M. Guesov :
with Rumania

relations

Convcrmtion with M. Sazonov : Austro-
Hungarian message to Russia on mili-
tary preparations ; Russian attitude ;
Scutari. {Min.)

Conversations with M. de Etter and
M. de Fleuriau : Russian warning at
Constantinople

Conversation with ]Marquis Imperiali :
question of Scutari ; Albania ; yEgean
Islands

Conversation between Dr. Danev and Sir
A. Nicolson : Turkish attitude as to
Adrianople ; difficulties between Allies

Peace negotiations in London. Attitude
of the Balkan States ; military prepara-
tions. M. Kalchev's mission to
Chataldja

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
Russian observations on Austro-Hun-
garian aide-memoire ; commercial
access for Servia ; precedent of
Article 8 of Suez Canal Convention ...

Fourth Meeting of Ambassadors : death
of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter ;
Albania ; .<Egean Islands ; peace nego-
tiations

Conversation between Count Bencken-
dorff and Sir A. Nicolson: military
measures in Austria-Hungary and
Russia ; M. Sazonov's reply to Count
Berchtold

326

327

328

329

332

334

336

Conversation between M. Venizelos and
Sir A. Nicolson: /Egean Islands ... 338

Reception of Ambassadors by Emperor
William : prospects of Peace Con-
ference ... ... ... ... ... 338

Enclosing despatch from Lieutenant-
Colonel Lyon on military situation and
feeling in Rumania concerning war
with Bulgaria. {Min.) 339

Enclosing despatch from Major Sir T.

Cuninghame on military situation in

Austria-Hungary, and movement of

troops on frontier. {Min.) ... ... i 343

Communication made by Count Bencken-
dorff concerning Austro-Hungarian
military measures ; Durazzo ; Albanian
frontier

Conversation with
same subject

M. Paul Cambon :

348

349

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

445
446

447

448
449

450
451

452
453

454
455

456
457

458
459

460
461

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

1913.
3 Jan.

3 Jan.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A. 3 Jan.
Nicolson (Private)

To Sir G. Lowther .(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir R. Rodd

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright ..

To Sir R. Rodd

4 Jan.
4 Jan.

4 Jan.

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel ) 5 Jan.

{Reed. 6 Jan.)

Fron: Sir G. Lowther 6 Jan.

(Tel.) I

From Sir G. Buchanan I 6 Jan.

(Tel.) I

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 6 Jan.

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

To Sir G. Barclay

To Sir E. Goschen

From, Sir H. Bax-Ironside

6 Jan.

{liecd. 20 Jan )

462 I To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) i 7 Jan.

(1) [For the sixth Meeting of Ambassadors
[6272]

Conversation with Dr. Danev : .^gean
Islands

Same conversation: relations of Rumania,
Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Bulgaria

Austro-Hiingarian military measures;
uncertainty as to attitude of Russia in
Near East. Concersation with M.
de Giers

Proposal for collective representation at
Constantinople

Conversation with M. Sazonov : British
support on Scutari question diplomatic
only; Russian views. (Min.)

Request for Italian help in finding com-
promise over Scutari

Fifth Meeting of Ambassadors ; proposed
collective representation at Constanti-
nople ; French suggestion of naval
demonstration(i)

Conversation with Marquis Imperial! :
Italian objection to cession of Mount
Lofchen to Austria-Hungary ...

Conversation with ]\Iarquis di San
Giuliano : question of Scutari ; attitude
of Austria-Hungary and Russia, and of

, Italy

Ottoman views on questions of Adria-
nople and ^gean Islands

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
retention of reservists without issue of
Imperial ukase

Proposal to support collective demarche
by naval demonstration ...

349

350

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

Conversation between M. Majarov and |
Sir A. Nicolson on January 1 : Bulga- i
rian demand for Adrianople ... ... ; 358

Conversation with Dr. Danev: interven-
tion of Powers at Constantinople ... 358

Conversation with M. Take Jonescu :
same subject ; his desire for representa-
tion at Sofia ... ... ... ... 359

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
his communication of a verbal note as
to Russian military preparation.
(Text) 359

History- of Balkan League... ... ... 360

Decision of seventh Meeting of Ambassa-
dors to make a demarche collective at
Constantinople ... ... ... ... 369

at London v. infra, pp. 1062-5, App. IV.]

d 2

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

From Sir R. Paget

To Sir F. Cartwright

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir E.
Goscben (Private)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget
To Sir G. Bucbanan

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir G. Lowther
To Sir R. Paget ...

From Sir G. Bucbanan

(Tel.)

1913.
7 Jan.
{llecd. 13 Jan.)

7 Jan.

To Sir R. Rodd

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowtber

(Tel.)

JJ J)

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwrigbt ...

To Sir H. Ba\-Ironside

479 To Sir F, Elliot ...

7 Jan.

8 Jan.

8 Jan.
{Ttecd. 13 Jan.)

8 Jan.

9 Jan.
9 Jan.

9 Jan.
{Itecd. 10 Jan.)

9 Jan.
(Reed. 10 Jan.)

9 Jan.

Attacks of Servian press on weakness of
Government in regard to Bulgaria ;
treatment of Servia by Austria-
Hungary

Conversation witb Count ^Nlensdorff :
impossibilitj' of giving Scutari to
Montenegro ; Catbolic inbabitants ;
Russian position; Sir E. Grey's bope
for compromise

Seventb Meeting of Ambassadors:
collective demarch e at Constantinople ;
naval demonstration ; ^gean Islands
and otber questions

Appointment of Herr von Jagow as
Minister for Foreign Affairs at Berlin

Convcrsai'wn witb Count Bercbtold :
inability of Austria-Hungary to yield
about cession of Scutari to iSIontenegro

Servian press opinions on treatment of
Servian claims

Conversation witb Count BenckendorfF :
inability of M. Sazonov to give way
about Scutari witbout compensation
for Servia in Albania

Conversation witb ^I. Paul Cambon :
anxiety for naval demonstration to
support collective demarche; Britisb
sbips ready to start

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha and
Reshid Pasha : impossibility of Turkish
surrender of Adrianople...

Conversation with M. Gruie : sacrifices
Servia was prepared to make to ensure
peace of Europe. (Text)...

Retention of Russian reservists witb
colours until end of March

iEgean Islands ; Prince Lichnowsky's
representations concerning cession of
islands to Greece; Italian attitude

Agreement of Ambassadors at Constanti-
nople on text of collective note

Same subject. (Text). {Miru)

Eighth Meeting of Ambassadors: agree-
ment of Austro-Hungarian Government
to demarche cnllectire in Con.stanti-
nople and to naval demonstration ;
opinions of otber Ambassadors; pro-
posed reply to Servian communication

Conversation between Dr. Danev and Sir
A. Nicolson : probability of rupture of
negotiations on question of Adrianople

Con versation witb M. Venizelos : ^gean
Islands; cession to Greece or Turkey...

liii

Page

480 1 To Sir R. Rodd ...

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

{From Sir R. Rodd

1913.
9 Jan.

9 Jan.

10 Jan.

(Tel.) 10 Jan.

(Reed. 11 Jon.)

From Sir E. Goschen

3> >l

To Sir V. Bertie

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...
To Sir F. Cartwright ...

To Sir G. Lowther

To Sir G. Barclay
From Sir K. Goschen

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Bu.chanan (Tel.)
To Sir G. Barclay

10 Jan.

(I'ecd. lii Jan.)

10 Jan.

(Becd. 10 Jan.,

10 Jan.

10 Jan.
10 Jan.

10 Jan.

11 Jan.
11 Jan.

11 Jan.

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
questions to be brought before Con-
ference of Ambassadors ... ... ... , 382

Conversations with M. Sazonov : naval
demonstration ; public opinion towards
Austria-Hungary; attitude of Czar ... 383

Conversations with Dr. Danev, Tewfik j
Pasha and Reshid Pasha : difficulties
regarding cession of Adrianople ... 384

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano: willingness of Italy to sign
declaration that none of Great Powers
should retain any oi .^Egean Islands.
(Mill.) 384

Concersation with Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg : suggested pressure at Con-
stantinople by Great Britain and
Germany ... ... ... . ...

Concersation with Herr Zimmermann :

Rumania and Bulgaria ; Servian

evacuation of Durazzo; question of

Albania ... ... ... ... ... 386

Further conversation : Salonica as a free
port. Memorandum by Herr Zimmer-
mann on customs questions, Ottoman
public debt, Truc^ of international
railway to Adriatic. (Text)

Conversation with il. Paul Cambon :
^gean Islands ; apprehensions of
Marquis di San Giuliano roused by
campaign in French press about Syria

Conversation with Dr. Danev : convoca-
tion of peace conference; impossibility
of agreement about Adrianople

Ninth Meeting of Ambassadors : M. Paul
Cambon's draft of Note to Turkey;
reference to Governments of Great
Powers ! 390

Conversation between Tewfik Pasha and
Reshid Pasha and Sir A. Nicolson :
basis on which peace conference might
be resumed

Conversation between Mi Take Jonescu
and Sir A. Nicolson : position of
Rumania

Collective demarche at Constantinople;
modifications suggested, (.l/in.)

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
Count Berchtold's opinion on hastening
discussion on Albanian frontiers

Conversation with M. Take Jonescu and
M. Misu : Rumania and Bulgaria; Ur.
Danev's uncompromising attitude . . I 391

liv

495

496

497

498

499

500

50J

502

503

504

505

506

507

508

To Sir G. Lowther

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir G. Buchanan

From Sir R. Paget

Page

1913.

11 Jan. ; Con versation, with Tewfik Pasha and
j Reshid Pasha: cession of Adriano,)le:
I improbability of Turkish acceptance ;
! proposed withdrawal of Turkish Dele-
gates to Peace Conference

11 Jan. Conversation between ^I. INIajarov and
Sir A. Nicolson: breaking off peace

j negotiations

12 Jan. I Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Bulgaria and Rumania; question of
Silistria

13 Jan. I Austro-Hungarian anxiety about attitude

of Russia. (.1/i/i.)...

13 Jan. Frontier claimed by Rumania ; her
I differences with Bulgaria ; Russia and
I Austro-Hungarian pressure at Bucha-
I rest. {Mill.)

13 Jan. Audience with the Emperor William :
(Itectl. 20 Jan.)' naval demonstration; attitude of
Rumania. Conversation with Herr von
Bethmann Hollweg: same subjects;
question of Adrianople ; Anglo-German
co-operation. (Min.)

13 Jan.

14 Jan.

14 Jan.
{Reed. 15 Jan.)

14 Jan.

15 Jan.
{Reed. 20 Jan.)

Conversation with Dr. Danev : possible
denunciation of armistice; collective
demarche of Great Powers at Con-
stantinople ...

Tenth Meeting of Ambassadors : accept- 1
ance of proposed reply to Servian |
communication ; proposals for modifica- j
tions in note to Turkey; question of I
Ottoman debt ... ... ... ... j

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali : I
^gean Islands ; British desire for !
status quo in Asiatic provinces

Naval demonstration at Constantinople; i
suggestion that ships might go to
Besika Bay; British warning to Turkey
that Powers would not intervene to
save Adrianople

395

396

397

398

401

403

404

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano; effect of Triple Alliance on

. his attitude ; his suggested compromise ]
about ^gean Islands. {Min.) ... ... j 404

Conversation with Count MensdorfF : I
three courses open to Turkey; Sir E.
Grey's views ... ... ... ... 405

Conversation with Count BenckendorfF
and M. Paul Cambon : Albanian
question ; Russian public opinion on
Servian question ... ... ... ... 406

Servian policy towards Austria-Hungary ;
abandonment of proposed visit of
M. Pasid to Vienna ; Servian dis-
appointment with attitude of Russia,
France and Great Britain 407

No.

Name.

Date.

! Main Subject.

jpage

509

From Sir R. Rodd

1913.
15 Jan.
(Becd. 20 Jan.)

Conversations with Marquis di San
Giuliano : .^Egean Islands ; factors
governing Italian attitude. {Min.)

408

510

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

15 Jan.

Eleventh Meeting of .Embassadors:
decision of Balkan delegates that
Peace Conference had failed; conflict-
ing reports ; question of Mount Athos

411

511

To Sir E. Goschen

15 Jan.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
German objections to naval demonstra-
tion; Sir Edward Grey's views

414

512

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

1 16 Jan.

Enquiry as to delay in presentation of
collective note to Porte ...

414

513

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

16 Jan.

Same subject : effect of German modifica-
tions of note and consequent delay ;
favourable attitude of Grand Vizier to
note ; proposal for strong support of
Grand Vizier by Triple Entente.
{Min.) ... '.

415

514

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

16 Jan.
{Becd. 20 Jan.)

M. Guesov's anxieties about Rumania ;
continued mobilization of Austro-
Hungarian army ; condition of Adria-
nople ; secret negotiations between
General Ivanov and Shukri Pasha

416

515

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

17 Jan.

Desirability of avoiding impression at
Constantinople of division between
Powers

417

516

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

17 Jan.

Collective demarche of the Powers

417

517

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

17 Jan.

Decision of Council to continue war if
Turkey refuses to agree to conditions
in collective note ...

418

518

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

17 Jan.

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
suggested pressure by France, Russia
and Great Britain at Constantinople.
Sir E. Grey's views

418

519

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

17 Jan.

Conversation with M. Guesov: proposed
cession of territory to Rumania. (Min.)

419

520

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

17 Jan.

Discussion of Scutari and Albanian
frontier to take place at meeting of
Ambassadors on 22nd ; importance of
German influence at Vienna

419

521

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

17 Jan.
{Becd. 18 Jan.)

Differing attitude between groups of
Powers since repulse of Bulgarians at
Chataldja; proposed answer to collec-
tive note. {Min.)...

420

522

To Sir E. Goschen

17 Jan.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky:
communication on abandonment of
naval demonstration ; question of ships
going to Besika Bay. {Text) ...

421

523

)> )>

17 Jan.

Same conversation: attitude of Austria-
Hungary about Scutari and Albania...

422

524

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

17 Jan.

Twelfth Meeting of Ambassadors : delay
inpresentingcollective note at Constanti-
nople ; reply to Servian communication

423

Ivi

Main Subject.

'Page

525

526

To Sir F. Elliot

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

527 From Sir R. Paget

To Sir F. Bertie ...

1913.
17 Jan.

18 Jan.

18 Jan.
{Reed. 25 Jan.)

18 Jan.

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) 19 Jan

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

19 Jan.
{lUcd. 20 Jan.)

From Sir G. Buchanan ' 20 Jan.

(Tel.) {Reed. 21 Jan.)

To Sir G. Lowther

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

534 To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

535 ! To Sir F. Elliot

20 Jan.

21 Jan.

21 Jan.
2] Jan.

536 \ To Sir H. Bax-Ironside... 21 J

637 To Sir R. Paget 21 Jan.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir F. 21 Jan.
Cartwright (Private)

From Sir E. Goschen 22 Jan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright 22 Jan

(Tel.)

Conversation between M. Skouloudis and
Sir A. Nicolson on January 14 : failure
of Peace Conference ; no fresh proposal
from Turkey; armistice to be
denounced

Secret negotiations reported between M.
Sazonov and Marquis della Torrctta
respecting frontiers of Albania and
Montenegro. {M i n. )

Conversation with Herr von Ugron:
Servian relations with Austria-Hun-
gary; importance of British influence
at Belgrade

Conversation between - M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson : conversations
between the Emperor William and
M. Jules Cambon ; his desire to main-
tain agreement of Great Powers

Question of Adrianople : danger to
Turkey if hostilities were resumed

Communication from Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg : German readiness to use
influence at Vienna; desirability of
British advice at St. Petersburgh, and
Anglo-German co-operation

Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposed
representations at Constantinople ; con-
ditions on which Russia would inter-
vene. {Min.)

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha, Reshid
Pasha and Nizami Pasha: collective
note; Turkish desire for greater defini-
tion ...

Sir E. Grey's desire for compromise;
diflRculty of urging Russia to further
concessions in view of her acquiescence
in Adriatic port question

Question of war indemnity from Turkey

Conversation between M. Skouloudis and
Sir A. Nicolson : notification of failure
of Conference postponed...

Conversation with M. Majarov and M.
Teodorov : proposal that Sir E. Grey
should give counsels of moderation at
Bucharest

Conversations with M. Vesnid : boundar3'
between Servia and Albania ... ... ! 431

Position of Count Berchtold and of M. \
Sazonov in the Albanian question ...[ 432

Conversation with Herr Zimmermann :
questions of Scutari and of ^gean
islands; strength of German public
opinion as to Asiatic Turkey. {Min.)...

Conversation with Count Berchtold:
Turkish desire for economic freedom...

Ivii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

641 Fro7n Sir F. Cartwright...
! (Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To M. Gruid

From. Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

55] , From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

191.3.
22 Jan.

22 Jan.

23 Jan.

23 .Jan.

23 Jan.

23 Jan.
(Itecd. 2i Jan.)

23 Jan.

24 Jan.
24 Jan.

24 Jan.

24 Jan.
24 Jan.

24 Jan.

25 Jan.

Sam,e conversation : question of indem-
nity ; its effect on Turkey and expected
surrender of Adrianople. (3/m.) ... 434

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
denial of rumour about division of
spheres of interest in Asia Minor
between members of Triple Entente ... 435

Thirteenth Meeting of Amba.ssadcrs :
redaction from M. Poincare concerning
Ottoman debt ; Greek claims to con-
sultation as to ]\It. Athos ; discussion
of frontiers of Albania ... ... ... I 435

Grand Assembly at Imperial Palace ;
opinions of Ministers of State: military '
and political situation, decision in |
favour of peace. {Min.)... ... ... j 438

Coup d'etat at Constantinople,
of Nazim Pasha

Death

Question of yEgean islands ; Anglo-
German co-operation

Message from Talaat Bey : preservation
of internal order in Turkey

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
Albanian question ; possibility of
appointment of International Com-
mission

Reply drawn up by Meeting of Ambas-
sadors to Servian communication of
January 8 (No. 472)

438

439

440

441

Coup d'etat in Con.stantinople ; members
of new Cabinet; German influence ... 441

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
events at Constantinople ; desirability
of taking no immediate action. {Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
advice to Bulgaria; attitude of
Austria-Hungary; her position and
that of Germanj' in Triple Alliance ...

Conversation with Herr Zimmermann :
events at Constantinople ; strict
neutrality of Germany; importance of
unity of the Powers

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
Albanian question

Same conversation: integrity of Asia
Minor; British desinterrcssement in
Syria

442

443

444

Anglo-German co-operation ; influence of
military partj* ... ... ... ... 444

New Government in Turkey ; probable
attitude to collective note and to entry i
of foreign ships; internal policy.!
(Min.) I 445

Iviii

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

I Page

1913.

Tu Sir G. Lowther (Tel.) , 25 Jan.

To Sir F. Cartwright ... j 25 Jan.

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside i 26 Jan.

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) ! 27 Jan.

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Count de Salis

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir F. Elliot ...

To Sir E. Goschen

From Sir G. Lowther

28 Jan.
28 Jan.

28 Jan.

29 Jan.

29 Jan.
29 Jan.
29 Jan.

30 Jan.
{liecd. 3 Feh.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside 30 Jan.

j (i;ecd. S Feb.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ... ! 30 Jan.

Despatch of two ships from Malta to
Besika Bay in view of internal con-
ditions ; Italian decision to send ships 447

Fourteenth Meeting of Ambassadors : '
situation in Constantinople ; Scutari
and Albania; Ottoman Debt ... ... 447

Attitude of Bulgaria and Servia should
Porte insist on retaining Adrianople ;
influence of King Ferdinand. (Min.)... I 449

Conversations with Count Benckendorff
and with Prince Lichnowsky : effect of
resumption of hostilities ; German
anxiety as to suspected Russian designs
in Asia Minor ... ... ... ... 450

Possibility of Russo-Bulgar military con-
vention. (Min.)

Conversation between Mr. O'Beirne and
M. Sazonov : denial of suspected
Russian designs in Asia Minor ; con-
ditions on which Russia might take
military action. (Min.) ...

(Jonversation with Count Benckendorff
and M. Paul Cambon : question of
Scutari ; German apprehension of
Russian move in Armenia

Conversation with Montenegrin
gates: question of Scutari

Dele-

M. Jules Cambon 's account of conversa-
tiou between M. Sverbeiev and Herr
von Jagow : necessity for cession of
Adrianople ; danger of position of new
Government in Turkey ...

Instruction to consult M. Jonnart on
alleged designs of King of Montenegro
to cede part of Sanjak to Austria-
Hungary

Fifteenth Meeting of Ambassadors : note
from Balkan Allies to Turkey ; Otto-
man debt; Mt. Athos

Conversation with M. Venizelos: rupture
of negotiations ; question of ^Egean
Islands ... ... ... ... ... I

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
proposal for German representation at
Constantinople; Russian policy as to
Asia Minor and Bulgaria

Enclosing report from Lieut. -Colonel
Tj'rrell on conversations with Mahmud
Shefket Pasha and Izzet Pasha con-
cerning the war. (Min.)

Origin of the Balkan League

Conversation with Dr. Danev : rupture of
peace negotiations ; desirability of
delaying denunciation of armistice
until Turkish reply to collective note
had been received...

lix

Name.

1 Date.

Main Subject.

Page

574

1
i

To Sir R. Rodd

1913.
30 Jan.

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
danger of European interference in
Asia Minor : articles in the Temps
about Syria

460

575

To Sir R. Paget

30 Jan.

Conversation between M. Novakovic and
M. Nicolic and Sir A. Nicolson :
rupture of peace negotiations ...

460

576

To Sir F. Bertie

30 Jan.

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson : M. Sazonov's
denial to M. Louis of reported threats
to Turkey ; attitude of Germany
towards Austria-Hungary

461

Ed. Note. — Minutes by
Mr. Vansittart, Mr. A.
Parker, Mr. Maxwell,
and Sir A. Nicolson

31 Jan.

Turkish reply to collective note ...

461

577

Frovi Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

31 Jan.

Same subject. New Government called
that of "National Defence" ...

463

578

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

31 Jan.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
reply of Porte

463

579

From Sir E. Goschen

31 Jan.
(Becd. 3 Feb.)

Conversation with Herr von Jagow :
integrity of Asiatic Turkey ; Russian
intentions; relations between Rumania
and Bulgaria; reply of Porte ...

464

580

To Sir F. Bertie

31 Jan.

Conversation with Paul Cambon :
reply of Porte ; German attitude to
question of Adrianople and Scutari ...

466

581

To Sir E. Goschen

31 Jan.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky:
Albanian question

466

582

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

31 Jan.

Growing animosity between Russia and
Austria-Hungary : possibility of general
war arising from Servia ...

467

583

From Sir G. Lowther

1 Feb.
(Becd. 5 Feb.)

Collective Note to the Porte of
January 17. Replv of January 30.
{Texts) .■

467

584

Frora Sir R. Paget

1 Feb.
{Becd. 4 Feb.)

Concersation with M. Pasic : his message
to Count Berchtold and the latter's
reply

470

585

To Sir F Bertie

1 Feb.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
anxiety felt in Rome and Berlin about
Asia Minor: articles in the Temps ...

471

586

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

1 Feb.

Sixteenth Meeting of Ambassadors :
Turkish reply to collective note ; Sir
E. Grey's proposed statement to
Dr. Danev ...

471

587

Fro7n Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

2 Feb.

Conversations with M. de Giers and
Count Berchtold : Prince Hohenlohe's
mission to St.-i^etersburgh ... ...

473

588

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

3 Feb.

Seventeenth Meeting of Ambassadors :
agreement of Powers with Sir E. Grey's
proposed statement to Dr. Danev

473

589

From Mr. Barclay (Tel.)

4 Feb.

Views of M. Pasic on boundaries of
Albania. {Min.) ... ... ... ...j

474

Chapter LXXXI.
The Second Balkan War, February 3-March 31, 1913.

No.

590

591

592
593
594

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

596

597

599
600

601
602

603
604

605
606

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

595 ! Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

From Sir ]■]. Goschen

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

From Mr. Barclay (Tel.)
)j J)

To Sir F. Bertie

1913.
5 Feb.

5 Feb.
(Reed. 10 Feb.)

6 Feb.

7 Feb.

7 Feb.
{Reed. 10 Feb.)

8 Feb.

8 Feb.
(Reed. 9 Feb.)

9 Feb.
(Reed. 17 Feb.)

10 Feb.

10 Feb,
(Reed. 11 Feb.)

10 Feb.
(Reed 17 Feb.)

10 Feb.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his
discussion of Austro-Hungarian rela-
tions with Russia with Prince
Holienlohe. (Min.)

Article in Novoe Vremya: possibility of
general war ; importance of attitude of
Great Britain

Prince Ilohenlolie's mission to St.
Petersburgh

Conversation with M. Sazonov: Albanian

question

Eighteenth Meeting of Ambassadors :
concessions from Austria-Hungary ;
difficulty of expecting further conces-
sions from Russia ...

M. Sazonov's views ; his desire for
greater firmness of Triple Entente ...

Representation by Turkish Delegates that
Powers should intervene ; impossibility
of ceding Adrianople

Enclosing translation of Viennese tele-
gram in Frankfurter Zeitung ; Count
Berchtold's policy ...

Conversation with Baron von Wangen-
heim : necessity for some control by the
Powers over peace conditions ...

Prince Hoheiilohe's mission to St.
Petersburgh. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov: German
views about Albania ; attitude of
Austria-Hungary ...

Position of Servia. (^'o« i'ersaf ion between
M. Spalaikovid and M. Guesov ...

Con versation with Mahmud Shevket :
Turkisli decision to place her case in
hands of Powers. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Pasic : Albanian
frontier

Return to Belgrade of Servian delegates
to Peace Conference. Audience of :
M. Venizelos with King Peter; his j
conversation with M. Pasid. Conversa-
tion with M. Novakovid ...

Eighteenth Meeting of Ambassadors on
February 6: delimitation of Albania;
views of the Powers

Conversation with
Albanian frontier

M. Paul Cambon:

Ixi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

490

607
608

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

609 To Sir F. Cartwright

610 To Mr. Barclay (Tel.)

611

612

613

614

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir G. Buchanan

615 To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

616 i From Sir F. Elliot

617 .To Sir F. Cartwright ...

618 Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.

Nicolson (Private)

619 To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

620 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

621

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

622 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.) (Private)

623
624

To Sir G. Lkowther
From Sir E. Goschen

1913.
11 Feb.
{Becd. 12 Feb.)

11 Feb.

12 Fob.

W Feb.

13 Feb.

14 Feb.

14 Feb.
(Becd. 20 Feb.)

14 Feb.

15 Feb.

15 Feb.
15 Feb.

15 Feb.

16 Feb.
(Becd. 17 Feb.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov :
subject; Rumanian question ...

Conversation with Count Benckendorff
and M. Paul Cambon : same subject ;
proposed International Commission ... 491

Nineteenth Meeting of Ambassadors:
communication from Tewfik Pasha;
Rumanian question

491

Position of Servia ; her gains from the
war ; danger of incurring war with
Austria-Hungary ... ... ... ... 493

Conversation with M. Sazonov: Bulgarian i
request that Russia should intervene
at Bucharest ... ... ... ... 493

Conversation with M. Misu : settlement
by direct negotiation with Bulgaria the
best solution

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :

" crux " of the difficulty
Russia and Austria-Hungary

between

Conversation with Count Benckendorff
and M. Paul Cambon : new Russian
proposals as to Albanian frontier

Agreement of all Powers, except Ger-
many, to proposed answer to communi-
cation of the Porte

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his
opinion about possible cessation of
hostilities : Greek readiness to assist
Bulgaria; Salonica. (Min.)

Twentieth Meeting of Ambassadors:
Rumano-Bulgarian difficulty

494

495

496

497

Letter from Emperor Francis Joseph to
the Czar, and the Czar's reply ... ... ' 498

Albanian frontier : Russian proposal
communicated to German, Austro-
Hungarian and Italian Ambassadors ... 499

British, Russian and French representa-
tions at Sofia ... ... ... ... 5O0

Russian proposal as to Albanian frontier ;
disappointment of Count Mensdorff:
objections to a commission ... ... 501

Conversation with M. Sazonov: Anglo-
German relations; Admiral Tirpitz's
speech ; Russian uneasiness as to British
attitude in event of war ... ... 501

Draft reply to Turkish note. (Text) ... 502

Enclosing memorandum by Lord Gran-
ville : his conversation with the
Emperor William on situation in
Rumania ; German desire for peace.
(Min.) 503

Ixii

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel. Private)

From Sir F. Bertie

(Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir F.
Cartwright (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From. Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)
To Sir G. Lowther

To Sir E. Goschen

641 To Sir R. Paget ...

642 I To Sir F. Cartwright

191.3.
17 Feb.

17 Feb.

18 Feb.

19 Feb.
19 Feb.

19 Feb.
{Becd. 24 F

19 Feb.

20 Feb.

eb.)

Conversation with M. Jonnart :
policy

Russian

20 Feb.

20 Feb.
(Itecd. 21 Feb.)

20 Feb.

Anglo-German relations ; British attitude
in event of war

Conversation with M. Jonnart : pro-
posed replacement of M. Louis by
M. Delcasse

Conversation with M. Patic: Albanian
question

Conversation with M. Sazonov : appoint-
ment of M. Delcasse

French criticism of Russian policy:
M. Sazonov's anxiety and the Czar's
determination to maintain peace

Prince Hohenlohe's mission : tension .still
e.xisting between Austria-Hungary and
Russia; position of Germany;
Rumanian question. {Min.)

Same subject ; probability of mediation
between Rumania and Bulgaria ;
German efforts to improve relations
with Great Britain

Conversation with M. Neratov : Russian
decision about Servian territorial
questions. (Min.) ...

Conversations with Count MensdorfF and
with Prince Lichnowsky : same
subject

A^jpointment of
St. Potersburgh

Delcasse to

20 Feb.

20 Feb.
20 Feb.

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha and
Hakki Pasha : Turkish desire to know
terms that the Powers would propose ...

Conversation between Prince Lichnowsky
and Sir A. Nicolson : German
acceptance of draft reply to note of
the Porte

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky:
German representations at Vienna ;
impossibility of Au.stro-Hungarian
concession on both Djakova and Dibra

Further conversation: German aide-
memoire on terms of peace

Further conversation: the Emperor
William's conversation with Lord
Granville on J'ebruary 15 : Rumania's
demand for Silistria

Conversation with M. Vesnic: impossi-
bility of cession by Servia of Djakova
and Dibra ...

Con versation with Count Mensdorff :
frontier of Albania; aide-memoire on
terms accejjtable to Austria-Hungary.
(Text)

Ixiii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir F. Bertie

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From, Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

655 To Sir F. Cartwright ...

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir E.
Grey (Private)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

1913.

20 Feb. Conversation with Count Benckendorff
and M. Paul Canibon : same subject

20 Feb. Anxiety in St. Petersburgh : opinions of
the Royal Family; conversation with
M. Sazonov : attitude of Germany and
Austria-Hungary ... ... ... ... 520

21 Feb. Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
refusal to hand over to Mussulman
Albania towns with Slav religious
in.stitutions. (Min.)

21 Feb. CohversatioiL with Count MensdorfF :
concession proposed by Austro-
Hungarian Government; Russian view

21 Feb. Twenty-first M eeting of Ambassadors :
German aide-memoire on terms of peace
and collective note of January 17 ;
Rumano-Bulgarian frontier

22 Feb. Conversation with Herr von Jagow : his
agreement with Sir E. Grey and desire
for compromi.se

22 Feb. Conversations with M. Pasic and M.
(Eecd. 28 Feb.) Stevanovic : delimitation of Albania.

{Min.) 527

23 Feb. Communication of Austro-Hungarian
proposal to M. Sazonov : Russian
religious scruples about Dibra and
Djakova ,528

23 Feb. Conve rsntion with Herr von Jagow:
danger of deadlock with Austria-
Hu/igary unless Russia gave way

24 Feb. Conversation with M. Sazonov: Prince
Hohenlohe's reception at St. Peters-
burgh ; M. Sazonov's request for
reduction of Austro-Hungarian forces
on Servian frontier

24 Feb. Sam e conversation : increase in German
armaments: consequences in Russia ...

24 Feb. Communication of Sir E. Grey's telegram
(No. 650) to Count Berchtold : Albanian
frontier. (Min.)

24 Feb. Conversation between Count Mensdorff
and Sir A. Nicolson : agreement of
Austria-Hungary to latest draft reply
to Turkish note

24 Feb. Conversation with General Wilson :
military opinions in France on
possibility of war over Balkan affairs.
(Min.)

25 Feb. Enclosinq translation of four notes
(Reed. 3 Mar.) between the Bulgarian and Servian

Governments. {Min.) ... ... ... 533

25 Feb. Standstill of military operations ; critical
(Reed. 3 Mar.) state of affairs; possibility of war with
Rumania. Knclos^nq note from
M. Nekludov to M. Guesov

Ixiv

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

To Sir F. Bertie

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buchanan (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen

Memorandum by Count
Mensdorff

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
From Sir R. Paget

To Sir F. Bertie

C o m in un i cation from

Tewfik Pasha

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel)

From Sir E. Goschen

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir G. Barclay i
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan |
(Tel.)

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) j

To Sir F. Cartwright ... |

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)
To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

191.3.
25 Feb.

25 Feb.

26 Feb.
26 Feb.

26 Feb.
28 Feb.

28 Feb.

28 Feb.
(Eecd. 3 Mar.)

28 Feb.

1 Mar.
1 Mar.

1 Mar.

(Reed. 3 Mar.)

1 Mar.
{llccd. k Mar.)

2 Mar.

(Itecd. 3 Mar.)

2 Mar.

3 Mar.

4 Mar.
4 Mar.
4 Mar.

Twenty-second Meeting of Ambassadors :
Russian communication on condition of
civil population at Scutari, &c.

i Russian militarj' strength ; effect of
Balkan Confederation on military
position of Austria-Hungary ; British
position in event of war ...

Question of dismissal of reservists

Twenty-second Meeting of Ambassadors :
resolution as to dispute between
Rumania and Bulgaria ...

Communication from Count Berchtold :
delimitation of Albania ...

Same subject : Russian and Aiistro-
Hungarian concessions

Same subject ...

Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance :
article in the Temps

effect of

Twenty-third Meeting of Ambassadors :
resolution for communication to
Rumania

Turkish acceptance of mediation by
Great Powers. Twenty-fourth Meeting
of Ambassadors

Conversation with M. Guesov : conditions
for conclusion of peace ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : inability
of Russia to make further concessions

Conversation with Herr von Jagow : his
inability to urge further Austro-
Hungarian concessions ...

Conversation with M. Descos : his report
of conversation with M. Spalaikovic.
(Min.)

Collective demarche at Bucharest, and
the reply. {Min.)

Russian decision to disband reservists
upon reduction of Austro-Hungarian
forces in Galicia

Conyersation with Marquis di San
Giuliano : deadlock over Djakova:
proposed international commission

Twenty-fifth Meeting of Ambassadors :
Rumanian reply to collective demarche;
proposals for mediation ...

Same subject ...

Albanian frontiers : attitude of Austria-
Hungary, Russia and Germany

Proposal for International Commission on
Djakova question to avoid deadlock ...

Ixv

No,

Name.

Date.

MaiQ Subject.

689 ' From Sir G. Buchanan
I (Tel.)

681

682
683
684
685
686

687
688

689

To Sir R. Paget ...

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan ...
To Sir F. Cartwright ...

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

Memorandum from M. de ,
Etter

690 I From Sir G. Buchanan

I (Tel.)

691 From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

692 ' To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

693 From Sir H. Bax-Jronside

694

695
696
697
698
699

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

Memorandum from Count
Mensdorflf

To Sir F. Bertie

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

700 To Count de Salis (Tel.)

[6272]

1913.
4 Mar.

4 Mar.

5 Mar.

6 Mar.

(Reed. 10 Mar.)

6 Mar.

7 Mar.
• 8 Mar.

8 Mar.

9 Mar.

10 Mar.
10 Mar.

10 Mar.

(Itecd. 17 Mar.)

10 Mar.

11 Mar.
11 Mar.
11 Mar.

11 Mar.

Negotiations regarding reduction of
Russian and Austro-Hungarian troops.
Conversation with M. Sazonov ...

Conversation with M. Gruic: Prizrend,
Ipek, Djakova and Dibra; attitude to
possibility of European war

Negotiations regarding joint demobiliza-
tion in Russia and Austria-Hungary...

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
Albanian question

Conversation, with Count Berthtold :
same subject. (Min.)

Improvement of relations between
Austria-Hungary and Russia. (Min.)

Twenty-sixth Meeting of Ambassadors :
resolutions on question of Albanian
frontier ; conditions in Valona ;
Ottoman debt

Same subject ...

Same subject ; proposal for communica-
tion to Servia and Montenegro

Same subject : Russian proposal to dis-
cuss organisation of Albania. (Min.) ...

Proposed communication to Servia and
Montenegro. (Min.)

Same subject : Austro-Hungarian pro-
posal. (Min.)

Same subject : German and Austro-
Hungarian views ...

Enclosing despatch from M. Pasic to
M. Spalaikovic read by him to M.
Guesov ; request for modification of
territorial settlement under Serbo-
Bulgarian alliance. (Text)

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
Albanian frontier ; proposed communi-
cation to Servia and Montenegro

Same conversation ; same subject; request
for Russian assurance

Same subject ...

Question of acceptance by Allies of
mediation

571

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Albanian
frontier ... ... ... ... ... 571

Communique to be published concerning
reduction of Austro-Hungarian and
Russian forces ... ... ... ... I 572

Communication to Montenegrin delegate |
on behalf of the Powers (after twenty- '
seventh Meeting of Ambassadors) ... 572

Ixvi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

701

To Sir R.

Paget (Tel.)

1913.
11 Mar.

ConvemaiAon with M. Gruic : Servian
objections to evacuation of territory ...

573

702

To Sir G

Buchanan

(Private)

11 Mar.

Albanian question : Russian view
impressed on Berlin and Vienna bv
Sir E. Grey

573

703

From Sir

F. Cartwright
(.lei.;

12 Mar.

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
same subject ; seriousness of situation
if Scutari fell. (Min.)

574

704

(Tel.)

12 Mar.

Same conv ersation : suggested peace
preliminaries. (Min.)

574

705

From Sir

G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

12 Mar.
(Reed. 13 Mar.)

Reply from M. Sazonov to proposals for

11 III I \jCii V lyj IL \J I IL/clilllct'. yxutii'.i ...

575

706

To Sir E.

Goschen (Tel.)

13 Mar.

Replies from Powers indicating general
agreement as to conditions of peace

576

707

From Sir

E. Goschen

13 Mar.
(Itecd. 17 Mar.)

Semi-official Berlin telegram published in
Kol ni.srhe Zeitung on Mr. Asquith's
speech in House of Commons

577

708

From Sir

F. Cartwright

13 Mar.
(Reed. 15 Mar.)

Text of com munique in Fremdenhlatt on
reduction of Austro-Hungarian and
Russian forces; Press comments

578

709

To Sir G.

Buchanan

13 Mar

Ooixvevsdtioii' between Count Bencken-
dorff, M. Paul Cambon and Sir A.
Nicolson on February 25 : telegram on
mediation communicated by Count
BenckendorfT

\JO\f

710

To Sir r.

Bertie ...

13 Mar.

Mediation between Turkey and the
Allies; question of frontier line and
indemnity

Ool

711

To Sir F.

V.''tllL'»Vll^Ill/ ...

13 Mar.

Conversation with Count MensdorfF :
Russian reply to proposed agreement
about Albanian frontier...

581

712

i '/ oil

14 Mar.

Same subject ...

583

713

From Sir

H. Bax-Tronside
(Tel )

14 Mar.

Text of reply by Allies to offer of
mediation. (Min.)...

714

From Sir

G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

14 Mar.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Press
statements in Austria-Hungary and
Ru-ssia

584

715

From Sir

F. Elliot

14 Mar.
(Reed. 20 Mar.)

Greek reply to offer of mediation by the
Powers

585

716

To Sir F.

Cartwright

14 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff ;
Servian attitude respecting Scutari ;
Russian proposal as to Djakova

586

717

To Sir F.

Bertie ...

14 Mar.

Con versation with M. Paul Cambon :
same subject

586

718

To Sir G.

Lowther (Tel.)

15 Mar.

Twenty-eighth Meeting of Ambassadors:
bases of negotiation

587

719

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

15 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff:
Austro-Hungarian reply to last com-
munication about Djakova and Albanian
frontier

588

Ixvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

720

To Sir F. Bertie

191

15 Mar.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
same subject

588

721

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

15 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
same subject

589

722

Fiuin Sir F. Cartwright

16 Mar.
(Reed. 19 Mar.)

Enclosing despatch frojn Major Sir T.
Cunninghame, Military Attache :
demobilisation measures in Austria-
Hungary

591

723

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

17 Mar.

Possibility of Austro-Hungarian ulti-
matum to Montenegro on fall of
Scutari ; question of Russian attitude ;
British position

592

724

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

17 Mar.
(Becd. 18 Mar.)

Conversations with M. Sazonov and with
Count Thurn; question of International
Commission. (Min.)

592

725

To Sir F. Bertie

17 Mar.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon ;
attitude of Russia and Austria-
Hungary

594

726

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

17 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
same subject

594

727

To Sir E. Goschen

17 Mar.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
same subject; enclosing German state-
ment respecting Albanian frontier ;
Montenegro and Servia ...

595

728

Sir A. Nioolson to Sir F.
Cartwright (Private)

17 Mar.

Position of Russia and Austria-Hungary.
Difficulties with Allies regarding terms
of peace; weakness of Turkey ...

596

729

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

18 Mar.

Conversation y;iih M. Sazonov : possibility
of immediate fall of Scutari ; question
of naval demonstration. (Mm.)

598

730

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

18 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff:
M. Sazonov's refusal to accept Inter-
national Commission without definite
knowledge of its composition ...

599

731

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

18 Mar.
Hiecd.25Mar.)

Press controversy in Russia and Austria-
Hungary regarding identic communi-
que and Russian supplement

599

732

To Sir F. Bertie

18 Mar.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon;
proposal for collective demarche con-
cerning Scutari at Belgrade and
Cettinje

600

733

To Sir F. Cartwright

18 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
same subject

601

i o-±

1 1 ^* ni fiffi IJ /T 1 / en rwT IT* A

Nioolson

lo iviar.

L clc^I dill 11 Ulli ItX. Ocl^UIHJ V Lu IVJ..

de Giers of March 17

602

735

From, Sir G. Buchanan

19 Mar.
\l\tC(l. iylUT.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : object of

X 11 Lt;l 11 tl LlUIldl V^OIllllllbalUll Ull Lei I J-

torial questions

602

736

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

19 Mar.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
same subject: communications between
St. Petersburgh and Vienna

603

737

» )} •••

19 Mar.

Twenty-ninth Meeting of Ambassadors :
conditions of peace ; destiny of Scutari ;
question of indemnity ; S. frontier of
Albania

604

[62721 e 2

Ixviii

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

IPage

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Private)

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Elliot

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

Minute by Mr. Norman ..

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

1913.
19 Mar.

20 Mar.

21 Mar.

(Reed. 25 Mar.)

22 Mar.

(Ttecd. 23 Mar.)

22 Mar.

23 Mar.

23 Mar.
{Bec.d. 31 Mar.)

24 Mar.

25 Mar.

26 Mar.

26 Mar.
28 Mar.

Conversations with M. Sazonov : question
of International Commission ; possible
naval blockade of Antivari

Resolution of Ambassadors concerning
collective note of Powers to Servia and
Montenegro...

Disbandnient of reservists to begin on
March 24

Sir Fi. Grey's views on formation of Inter-
national Commission ... ... ... j

Conversation with Count Mensdorff : j
conditions on which Austria-Hungary :
will renounce Djakova ... ... ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposed
settlement of Scutari and Djakova
questions. (Min.) ... ... ... ...

605

606
606
607

608

Attack on Count
Vremya. (Min.)

Thurn in Novoe

Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposed
communication to Servia and Monte-
negro...

Thirtieth Meeting of Ambassadors :
communication from Count Berchtold
regarding Djakova and Scutari

Resolution of Ambassadors on frontiers
of Albania ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov: resolu-
tion of Ambassadors concerning com-
munication to Servia and Montenegro

Bases of negotiations for peace ; collective
communication to Greece. (Text)

Italian approval of Ambassadors' resolu-
tion about Albanian frontier ...

609

610

611
612

612
613
614

Communication from Count Mensdorff ;
Austro-Hungarian representations at j
Cettinje and Belgrade. (Texts) ■ 614

Urging authorization without delay of
communication to Belgrade and
Cettinje

Conversation with M. Delcasse : Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum to Montenegro

Thirty-first Meeting of Ambassadors :
collective demarche at Belgrade and
Cettinje ; isolated action of Austria-
Hungary

Conversation with Mehmed Bey Konitza
and M. Philippe Nogga : Albanian
view of political situation

Conversation with M. de Etter : Russian
warning to Bulgaria against raising
questions of Constantinople and the
Straits

616

617

618

619

Ixix

No.

Name.

j D;ite.

Main Subject.

Page

757

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

1913.
28 Mar.

{Itecd. 29 Mar.)

Conversation with Herr von Flotow :
question of mandate from Powers to
Austria-Hungary and Italy to deal
with Montenegrin question. (Min.) ...

620

758

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

28 Mar.

Conversation with M. de Etter : Bul-
garian acceptance of Enos-Midia line ;
Russian request for British support at
Constantinople

620

759

From Sir R. Paget

28 Mar.
{lU'.cd.Sl Mar.)

Joint action of Great Powers hampered
by dilatoriness of Russia. (Min.)

621

760

To Sir F. Cartwright

28 Mar.

Thirty-second Meeting of Ambassadors :
question of admission of Greek and
Rumanian delegates ; resolution about
Montenegro and naval demonstration

622

761

To Sir G. Buchanan

28 Mar.

Conversation with M. de Etter:
Montenegrin acceptance of terms pro-
posed by Powers except as to Scutari

623

762

To Sir F. Bertie

28 Mar.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
M. Sazonov's views about naval
demonstration against Montenegro ...

623

763

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

31 Mar.

Collective demarche at Constantinople ...

624

764

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

31 Mar.

Action of M. de Hartwig in first delaying
and then altering joint representation
at Belgrade

624

765

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

31 Mar.

Instructions for collective action at Sofia

624

766

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

31 Mar.

Proposal for naval demonstration at
Antivari

625

767

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

31 Mar.

Thirty-third Meeting of Ambassadors :
same subject

625

768

Communication from Count
MensdorfF

31 Mar.

Count Berchtold's thanks for collective
demarche at Belgrade and Cettinje ;
question of Servian reinforcements,
and naval demonstration

626

Chapter LXXXII.

The End of the Second Balkan War, April-May 1913.

769

1
i

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.) ;

1
1

1913.
31 Mar.

(lUcd. 1 Apr.)

First Meeting of Ambassadors at
St. Petersburgh to mediate between
Rumania and Bulgaria ...

627

770 ;

(Tel.)

31 Mar.

(Bead. 1 Apr.)

Identic telegram drawn up at Meeting of
Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh to be
sent to their respective Governments.
(Min.)

628

771 i

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Decision published that French Govern-
ment would not join in naval
demonstration against Montenegro

629

772

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

1 Apr.

French attitude to proposed naval
demonstration

629

ixx

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

773

From Count de Salis

1913.
1 Apr.

Montenegrin reply to representation of
jr owers i } . . . ... ... ...

774

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Conversation with M. Pasic : Servian
obligation under terms of alliance to
assist Montenegro

630

775

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

1 Apr.

Reply from Porte to the collective note
of the Great Powers. (Text) ...

631

( / u

li^rnni Sir P TJnrlrl ^T^^l ^

1' / y/llv Oil XX. XVU'Jvl y XtJl,^

1 Apr.

C oiiv crsixtio n with M^aro[uis di San
Giuliano: possibility of French absten-
tion from naval demonstration; effort
of Italy to prevent isolated action by
Austria-Hungary. (Min.)

632

777

To Sir ¥. Bertie (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
M. Sazonov's opinion that some
indemnity to the Allies should be
allowed

DOO

778

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Conversation with Count Beuckendorff :
M. Sazonov's support of joint naval
demonstration

AQO
DOO

779

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
despatch of Austro-Hungarian ships to
Antivari : Sir Edward Grey's views ...

633

780

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

1 Apr.

Conversation with M. Pichon : despatch
of French ship to Corfu for naval

Ut^ lllUllo LI tlvlUli , UIlLLlLtllULV tXlJXJUb

Russia and Germany

634

( Oi.

T'ci Sit* T*^ { In ri'.wn cr ri 'f.

(Tel.)

1 Apr.

naval demonstration

635

782

To Sir F. Bertie

1 Apr.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon;
same subject

635

783

»» )» •••

1 Apr.

Same conversation : Bulgaria and Russia;
question of entry into Constantinople;
possibility of necessity for European

v^ijii^x L-oa ... ... . , , ... ...

636

784

To Sir G. Buchanan

1 Apr.

Enclosing memorandum by Count
Beuckendorff; proposed communication
at Sofia by Entente Powers

637

785

To Count de Sali.s

1 Apr.

Conversation between M. Popovic and
Sir A. Nicolson : naval demonstration ;
siege of Scutari ; decision of the

xruwt:i& ... ... ...

637

786

Communication from M.
de Etter

1 Apr.

Telegram from M. Nekludov to M.
Sazonov : terms refused by Bulgaria;
Russian offers

638

787

Communi cation from Count
Beuckendorff

1 Apr.

xcic^ifiiii iiuiii lyi. otizonov \jO v^ount)
Beuckendorff : Russian inability to
consent to guarantees tending to
diminution of sovereignty of Balkan

o ucl tc;23. \ifl I n . ) ... ...

639

788

Communication from M.
de Etter

1 Apr.

Possible despatch of Russian squadron to
Constantinople to protect Christian
population ...

639

789

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

2 Apr.

Naval demonstration ; instructions sent to
British officers at Corfu ; necessity for
French participation

639

Ixxi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

790 To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

791 ; From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

792 From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

793 I Fro7n Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)
794

1913.
2 Apr.

2 Apr.
{Itecd. 3 Apr.)

795

To Sir F. Bertie

796 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

797 ! To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

798 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

799

800 To Sir F. Bertie ...

801

802 To Sir R. Rodd

803

804 I To Sir F. Cartwright

805

806 To Sir R. Rodd

807 Front Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

2 Apr.

2 Apr.
{Heed. 4 Apr.)

2 Apr.

3 -Apr.

3 Apr.

3 Apr.
{Reed, k Apr.)

3 Apr.
(,-Recd. 7 Apr.)

3 Apr.

4 Apr.

5 Apr.
(Eecd. 6 Apr.)

Uselessiiess of continuing Meetings of
Ambassadors unless steps be taken to
enforce agreement about Albanian
frontier. Thirty-fourth Meeting of
Ambassadors

Conversation with M. Sazonov and with
M. Delcasse : same subject ; suggested
representation at Cettinje

Conversation with Count
naval demonstration

Berchtold ;

Conversation with M. Pichon : same
subject. {Min.) ... ... ... ...

Conversation with M. Pichon on April 1 :
same subject : Russian vacillation.
{Min.)

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and
Count Benckendorff : same subject :
impossibility of sending British ships
without either French or Russian
ships; adjournment of thirty-fourth^
Meeting of Ambassadors...

640

641

642

643

645

Communique issued to Russian press :
same subject ... ... ... ... 646

Same subject ; British inability to act
without either France or Russia ... 646

Same subject : delicate position of
Russian Government : their gratitude
to British Government ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov and
M. Delcasse : question of compensation
for Bulgaria. {Min.)

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and
Count Benckendorff: possibility of]
Bulgarian advance to Constantinople 649

M. Pichon's suggestion that Great
Britain and Austria-Hungary act as
mandatories of Europe ... ... ...

647

650

651

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
naval demonstration ; Italian readiness
to co-operate

Same conversation : proposal that reunion
of Ambassadors should put on record
what had been accomplished ; possi-
bility of Bulgarian advance on
Constantinople

Conversation with Count Mensdorff : tele-
gram from Count Berchtold : naval
demonstration. (Text) ... ... ... 651

Thirty-fifth Meeting of Ambassadors:
naval demonstration ; communication to
Bulgaria (cp. No. 850) 653

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
possibility of concessions by Austria-
Hungary to Montenegro ... ... 654

Conversation with ^l. Sazonov: his appre-
ciation of international naval demonstra- 1
tion ; supply of arms to Montenegro;!
fear of Bulgarian attack on Chataldja 655

Ixxii

Name.

Date.

1913.

From Sir II. Paget (Tel.) 5 Apr.

5 Apr.
(Reed. 7 Apr.)

From Admiralty ...
From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) | 6 Apr.

From Count de Sal is

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

6 .Vpr.

(Reed. 7 .ipr.

7 Apr.
7 Apr.

Coinmunication from Count i 7 Apr.
Benckondorff I

To Sir G. Buchanan

(Private)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironsidc

(Tel.)

From Admiralty ...

818 To Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel. Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

(Tel. Private)
From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget

To Sir K. Goschen

7 Apr.

8 Apr.
8 Apr.
8 Apr.
8 Apr.

9 Apr.
(Reed. 10 Apr.)

9 Apr.

9 Apr.
(Reed. 10 Apr.)

9 Apr.
(Reed. 11 Apr.)

9 Apr

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) 10 Apr.

Main Subject.

Allied reply to communication of the
Powers on basis for peace negotiations
(No. 749). (Text)

Enelosing telegram from Vice-Admiral
commanding 3rd Battle Squadron :
message to Montenegrin Government...

Conversation with M. Venizelos :
embarrassment caused by Servia and
Montenegro

Montenegrin reply to Vice- Admiral

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
naval demonstration ; stops to be taken
in event of failure. (Min.)

Speech by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg :
apprecia»tion of Sir E. Grey's work ;
speeches of Mr. Churchill and Mr.
Asquith

Russian observations on reply of Allies
to collective note of the Powers.
(Min.)

Conversation with M. Poklevski-Koziel :
possibility of Bulgarian entry into
Constantinople; the Straits

Thirty-sixth Meeting of Ambassadors:
proposed reply to note of the Allies.

(Text)

Enelosing telegrams from Admiralty
to Vice-Admiral 3rd Battle Squadron.

(Min.)

Enclosing memorandum from Count
Benckendorff suggesting communication
to the Porte

Action of M. de Hartwig at Belgrade ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : serious-
ness of position if Scutari fell ; French,
German, Austro-Hungarian and
Russian attitudes. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov :
M. de Hartwig at Belgrade

action of

Conversation with M. Pichon : refusal of
Servia to send troops for siege of
Scutari

Friction between Bulgaria and Servia :
Conversations with M. Tosev and Herr
von TJgron ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
Sir E. Grey's views on isolated action
by Austria-Hungary on fall of Scutari

Conversation with M. Stevanovic: instruc-
tions to Servian troops before Scutari
to suspend operations ... ... ... 669

Ixxiii

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

669

From Count de Salis

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

1913.
10 Apr.

{Rccd. 11 Ajir.)

10 Apr.

From Sir G. Buchanan ... 10 Apr.

{Reed. H A'pr.)

Repeating telegram from Vice-Admiral
Burney to Count de Salis : establish
ment of close blockade of coast

To Sir F. Bertie

10 Apr.

From Sir G. Buchanan > 11 Apr.

(Tel.) I (Reed. 12 Apr.)

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

11 Apr.

To Sir F. Cartwright ... i 11 Apr.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

(tel. Private)
To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget

» 5>

11 Apr.

12 Apr.
12 Apr.
12 Apr.

12 Apr.
{Reed. 19 Apr.)

12 Apr.

{Reed. 19 Apr.)

From Sir G. Buchanan ■ l.S Apr

(Tel.) j (EecfZ. IJ, Apr.)

Conversations with Marquis Imperiali
and with Prince Lichnowsky : critical !
position on fall of Scutari ... ... j 670

Enclosing protocols of meetings of
Ambassadors 'at St. Petersburgh on |
Rumano-Bulgarian frontier on April 4
and 7 670

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
southern frontier of Albania ; difiicul-
ties with Greece ... ... ... ... 673

Same conversation: suggestions for
avoiding an entry into Constantinople
by the Bulgarians... ... ... ... 674

Further conversation : German communi-
cation to Italy ... ... ... ... 674

Further conversation: suggestion that
Turkey should cede Scutari to the '<
Powers for disposal ... ... ... 675

Conversation with M. Sazonov : war
indemnity; customs duties. {Min.) ... 675

Same conversation : instructions sent to
M. de Hartwig ; order to Servian
troops to abstain from operations
against Scutari ... ... ... ... 676

Coniersation with Herr von Jagow : his
desire to prevent isolated action by
Austria-Hungary : anxiety about
Scutari ... " \ 676

Thirty-seventh Meeting of Ambassadors:
communication to the Allies ; possibility
of Bulgarian advance on Constanti-
nople; compensation to Montenegro ... 677

Blockade of Montenegrin coast : French
irresolution ; anxiety in Austria-
Hungary ... ... ... ... ... ; 679

Demarche of the Powers at Sofia:
importance of immediate action ... 680

Satisfaction with Russian communique... 680

Thirty-seventh Meeting of Ambassadors:
proposal made by M. Paul Cambon for
dispatch of international fleet to
Constantinople ... ... ... ... | 680

Change in attitude of Servian Govern-
ment ; withdrawal of troops from
Scutari 681

Conversation with M. Tosev : Serbo-
Bulgarian relations ... ... ... 682

Conversation with M. Sazonov : proposal
to send international fleet to
Constantinople. {Min.) ... ... ... 684

Ixxiv

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Gosehen

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Bertie ...

From Sir R. Rodd

Sir R. Paget to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

1913. [
13 Apr. Delay in Russian reply about demarche \
{Becd. H A'pr.) ' of the Powers ; desire to modify

formula concerning indemnity. {Min.) 685

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Count de Salis (Tel.)
From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

From Sir R. Paget

14 Apr.

14 Apr.
14 Apr.

14 Apr.

{Becd. 21 Apr.)

14 Apr.

15 Apr.

(Becd. 19 Apr.)

15 Apr.

16 Apr.

(Becd. 21 Apr.)

16 Apr.
(Becd. 21 Apr.)

17 Apr.
17 Apr.

17 Apr.

17 Apr.
(Becd. 21 Apr.)

17 Apr.

18 Apr.

18 Apr.
(Becd. 25 Apr.)

18 Apr.
(Becd. 21 Apr)

Conversation with Count Berchtold : pro-
posal to send international fleet to
Constantinople. (Min.) ...

Same subject ...

Communication from Count Benckendorff
and Count Mensdorff on North and
North-East frontiers of Albania. (Text)

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Montenegrin indemnity ; question of
Scutari

Audience with the Emperor Nicholas :
international situation ; friendly rela-
tions of Great Britain and Russia;
position at Constantinople. (Min.)

Thirty-fifth Meeting of Ambassadors:
British declaration on Albanian
frontier difficulty {cp. No. 805) ... ...

Italian opposition to ambitions of Greece
in Epir is and J5gean Islands ... ...

Conversation with
resentment in
Russian attitude

M. Tosev :
Bulgaria

growing
against

Enclosing protocol of Meeting of
Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh on
April 11 : Rumano-Bulgarian frontier

Enclosing protocol of Meeting of
Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh on
April 15: Rumano-Bulgarian frontier

Serbo-Bulgarian relations ...

Meeting of Ambassadors at St. Peters-
burgh on April 17 : Rumano-Bulgarian
frontier. (Min.)

Terms of suspension of hostilities
between Turkey and Bulgaria ...

Enclosing of formula of Conference of
Ambassadors on Rumano-Bulgarian
frontier. (Text.) (Min.)

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon
and Sir A. Nicolson on April 9:
Southern frontier of Albania ; import-
ance of acceptance by Greece ...

Thirty-eighth Meeting of Ambassadors:
attitude of Montenegro : resolution on
Montenegrin loan ...

Same subject ...

Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations:
arbitration bv Russia

proposed

Article in Samouprova: Servian claims
to districts within Bulgarian sphere
according to Treaty ... ... ... ,

702

Ixxv

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

864 Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

FrOm Count de Salis

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Tronside \
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)
To Count de Salis (Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G.
Buchanan (Private)

From Count de Salis

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)
To Count de Salis (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

Communicatio7i from Count
Mensdorff

From Sir R. Eodd

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

From, Sir H. Bax-Ironside

From Sir R. Paget

1913.
19 Apr.

Negotiations between Greece and Servia ;
possibility of Greek overtures to
Turkey, and approach of Bulgaria and
Servia to Rumania

20 Apr. ' Guaranteed loan to Montenegro
(Reed. 21 Apr.)

21 Apr.

21 Apr.
21 Apr.

21 Apr.

22 Apr.

M. Guesov's endeavours to bring Greek
and Servian Governments into line;
temporary suspension of hostilities ...

Reply of the Allies to collective note of
the Powers (No. 816). {Text). (Min.)

Resolution of thirty-ninth Meeting of [
Ambassadors on financial .assistance to
Montenegro and surrender of Scutari
to the Powers

Thirty-ninth Meeting
same subject

of Ambassadors :

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Scutari ; question of necessity for
landing international contingent of
troops. (Min.)

Necessity for maintaining good relations
between Great Britain and Russia ...

23 Apr. ' Fall of Scutari

23 Apr.

23 Apr.
23 Apr.

23 Apr.
(Becd. 26 Apr.)

24 Apr.
24 Apr.

24 Apr.

(Eecd. 29 Apr)

24 Apr.
(Tiecd. 28 Apr.)

703
704

705
705

706
707

708

708
709

Fortieth Meeting of Ambassadors:
collective note to be presented to
Turkey 709

Collective note to be presented to Allies [ 710

Collective note
Montenegro ...

to be presented to

710

711

Conversation with M. Sazonov : fall of
Scutari; concessions to Montenegro;
po.ssible action of Austria-Hungary ;
Serbo-Bulgarian relations. {Min.) ...

Telegram from Count Berchtold : pro-
posed communication to Montenegro as
to Scutari. {Min.)

Conversation with Signer de Martino :
Southern frontier of Albania: claims
of Greece ; question of neutralisation of !
certain territory ... ... ... ... j 7J2

Question of Scutari ; Austro-Hungarian
anxiety ; doubt of the usefulness of
Ambassadors' meetings ...

Communication to Montenegro drawn up
at Meeting of Ambassadors : urgent
necessity to avert isolated action by
Austria-Hungary ...

Conversation with M. Nekludov : difficul-
ties between Allies ; suggested meeting
of Prime Ministers

Conversation with M. Stevanovic : move-
ments of troops in Macedonia ; proposed
revision of Serbo-Bulgarian Treatj^ .

713

714

•15

Ixxvi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

883

To Sir G. Buchanan

24 Apr.

Conversation between M. Paul Cambon,
Count Benckendorff and Sir A.
Nicolson on April 22 : reply from
Allies

717

884

To Count de Salis

24 Apr.

Conversation between M. Popovid and
Sir A. Nicolson: irrevocability of
Montenegrin decision to take Scutari...

717

885

To Sir V. Cartwright

24 Apr.

Conversation between Count Mensdorff
and Sir A. Nicolson on April 22 : tele-
grams from Count Be'rchtold urging
increased pressure on Montenegro

718

886

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

25 Apr.

Conversation with M. Pichon : M.
Isvolski's suggestion of territorial com-
pensation to Montenegro

719

887

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

25 Apr.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject. (Min.)

719

888

To Count de Salis (Tel.)

25 Apr.

Instructions to report and to let Vice-
Admirals know when collective
communication had been made to
Montenegro

720

889

Proccs-verhal of Meeting
of Ambassadors

25 Apr.

Forty-first Meeting: resolution to proceed
at once with collective demarche at
Cettinje

720

890

From Sir R. Piiget

25 Apr.
'(Reed. 28 Apr.)

Reception of news of fall of Scutari in
Servia ; opposition to intention of
Powers to give Scutari to Albania

721

891

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

25 Apr.

Effect of fall of Scutari on European
situation ; necessity for prompt action

721

892

From Sir F. Cartwright
(lei.)

27 Apr.

Conversation with Count Berchtold : his

LI 1J5<1|J pUl 11 Llllir 11 L W 1 Lll pi UpOScllS or

Ambassadors on April 25 ; need for
more strenuous measures to make
Montenegro yield; Austro-Hungarian
impatience. (Min.)

723

893

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

28 Apr.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : danger
of independent action by Austria-
Hungary

724

894

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

28 Apr.

Conversation with Count Mensdorff : his
instructions to press for coercive action
against Montenegro; Sir E. Grey's
proposals

725

895

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

28 Apr.

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano : refusal of Italy to act alone
with Austria-Hungary. {Min.)...

726

896

From Count de Salis

28 Apr.
(Becd. 3 May)

Collective representation to Montenegro ;
note from M. Vukotic. (Text) ...

726

897

To Sir R. Rodd

28 Apr.

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
Italian reservation of liberty of action

728

898

To Sir E. Goschen

28 Apr.

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
importance of British and Italian co-
operation in coercive measures against
Montenegro

728

Ixxvii

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir F. Cartwright

From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

To Sir E. Goschen

Frotn Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
From Count de Salis

1913.
28 Apr.

29 Apr.

29 Apr.
{Reed. 2 May)

29 Apr.
29 Apr.

29 Apr.

30 Apr.

30 Apr.
30 Apr.

Forty-second Meeting of Ambassadors:
proposed measures of coercion against
Montenegro; views of M. Paul Cambon
and Sir E. Grey; proposals for com-
pensation of ^lonteuegro

Conversation with Count Berchtold : his
anxiety for practical solution of
Scutari question ; his determination
that Austria-Hungary should act alone
if necessary : E.ssad Pasha's attitude.
{Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject

Conversation with Herr von Jagow and
Count Szogyeny : probability of imme-
diate action by Austria-Hungary

Enclosing protocol of seventh meeting of
Conference of Ambassadors on Rumano-
Bulgarian mediation

Conversation with Count MensdorfiF :
Viennese press statement on immediate
action by Austria-Hungary ; arrange-
ment between King of Montenegro
and Essad Pasha ...

Conversation between M. Majarov and
Sir A. Nicolson on April 26: con-
centration of Greek forces in Salonica
vilayet ; Bulgarian hope for moderating
influence of Great Powers

Conversation between Prince Lichnowsky
and Sir A. Nicolson on April 26 :
serious misgivings about possible
action of Austria-Hungary

Italian refusal to act with Austria-
Hungary alone; their readiness to
co-operate with Great Britain. (Min.)

Aide-memoire from M. Sazonov :
importance of maintaining solidarity
of Powers ...

Proposed announcement bj' Count
Mensdorff that Austria-Hungary will
I act alone

Conversation
subject

ith M. Pichon : same

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject ; M. Sazonov's wish that Italy,
Great Britain and France should take
part in demonstration. (Min.)

Same subject; importance of decision by
M. Sazonov as to course proposed

Conversation with Count BenckendorfiF :
same subject; Russian advice to Servia

30 Apr. ' Montenegrin reply to collective repre-
(Recd. 5 May) sentation by Powers regarding
i Scutari. (Text)

Ixxviii

No.

915

916
917

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir G. Buchanan

1913.
30 xVpr.

30 Apr.

Enclosing communication made by
Count Mensdorff : proposed coercive
measures against Montenegro ...

Conversation with Count
dorfl : same subject

Bencken-

Count Benckendorff to Sir i 30 Apr.
A. Nicolson i

918 Sir R. Paget to Mr. 30 Apr.

Tyrrell (Private) i

919 \From Sir F. Cartwright 1 May

(Tel.) {Eecd. 2 May)

920
921

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
From Sir F. Elliot

922 i To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

923 j To Count de Salis (Tel.)

924 ! From Sir G. Buchanan

1 (Tel.)

925 I „ „ (Tel.)

926 I To Sir F. Cartwright ...

927

928
929

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

930 I From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

931
932

933

1 May
1 May
1 May

1 May
1 May

1 May

1 .May

2 May
2 May

To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 2 May
From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 2 May

From. Sir G. Buchanan 2 May

(Tel.)

Telegrams from M. Sazonov to Russian
Ambassadors at Vienna, Berlin, and
London ; Montenegrin question and
solidarity of Powers. (Min.)

Award of Grand Cordon of the White
Eagle to M. do Hartwig. (3Iin.)

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
Montenegrin question and possible
military action by Austria-Hungary
and Italy

British inability to participate in
coercive measures without France

Collective communication of Powers;
vieAvs of M. Coromilas

Communication of pro-memorid from
Montenegro to Ambassadors by Sir E.
Grey

Representation to be made at Cettinje ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov: his tele-
grams to Sofia and Belgrade to suggest
Russian arbitration

Same conversation : Russian position and
that of Austria-Hungary ; importance
I of attitude of Great Britain

j Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
I effect of separate action by Austria-
I Hungary on Concert of Europe

Forty-third Meeting of Ambassadors:
verbal communication by Count Mens-
dorff ; representation on behalf of
Montenegro from M. Popovic ; commu-
nication of draft treaty by Sir E. Grey

Political outlook : M. Sazonov's attitude,
and that of the Czar

Conversation with M. Pasid:
warning to Montenegro ...

Servian

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano: his impressions of Monte-
negrin communication ...

Possibility of separate action by Italy in
Albania

Conyersation with Marquis di San
Giuliano : position of Italy and
Au.stria-Hungary concerning Albania
{Min.)

Conversation with M. Sazonov: British
inability to act without France ; ques-
tion of Montenegro and Scutari. (Min.)

Ixxix

No.

Name.

1 Date.

Main Subject.

P«ge

934

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

1913.

2 May

P'orty-third Meeting of Ambassadors : Sir
1 E. Grey's proposal of collective repre-
.sentation at Cettinje to avert separate
action by Austria-Hungary

[

755

935

From Sir E. Goschen

2 May
(Reed. 5 May)

Conversation with Herr von Jagow:
maintenance of Concert of Europe;
question of Scutari and attitude of
Montenegro

756

936

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

2 Mav
{Itecd. 19 May)

Enclosing aide-memoire from M. Sazonov
defining attitude of Russian Govern-
ment in event of isolated action by
Austria-Hungary. (Text)

757

937

To Count de Salis (Tel.)

3 May

Instruction to join in collective repre-
sentation without Austria-Hungary if
necessary

759

938

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

3 May

Russian attitude. Possible effects of
separate action by Austria-Hungary ...

759

939

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

3 Jlay

Conversation with Count Berchtold : his
denial of reported imminence of
military action. (Min.) ...

760

940

From Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

3 May

Mobilisation of Italian fleet

760

941

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

3 May

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Monte-
negro and Austria-Hungary ; question
of Scutari; risk of serious conflict

761

942

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

3 May

Conversation with Count Mensdorff :
same subject ; abstention of Austria-
Hungary from collective demarche at
Cettinje

762

943

From Sir E. Goschen

4 May

Negotiations between Vienna and Rome
concerning Albania; danger of dis-
content in Greece ...

763

944

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

4 May

Conversation with M. Paleologue : com-
munication by M. Isvolski concerning
Montenegro and Austria-Hungary

764

945

(Tel.)

4 May

Instructions to M. Paul Cambon for next
Meeting of Ambassadors...

765

946

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

4 May

Conversations with M. Sazonov' and M.
Doulcet : position of Austria-Hungary
and Italy regarding Montenegro and
Albania

765

947

From Count de Salis

(Tel.)

4 May

Representation made at Cettinje : fate of
Scutari to be placed in hands of the
Powers

766

948

(Tel.)

4 May

Message to Sir Edward Grey from King
Nicholas: same subject ...

766

949

From Sir R. Rodd

4 May
{Reed. 17 May)

Italian policy ; renewal of Triple
Alliance ; fear of isolated action by
Austria-Hungary ; naval and military
preparations

767

950

5 ]Vl3.y

Giuliano : Albania and attitude of
Italy

769

951

(Tel.)

5 May

Same conversation : Italian repudiation
of territorial ambition in Albania

769

Ixxx

Name.

Date.

jSIain Subject.

1913.

952 To Count de Salis (Tel.) ' 5 May

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir E. Goschen

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
From Sir R. Paget

From Sir F. Elliot

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

To Sir R. Rodd ...
From- Sir G. Lowther

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir R. Rodd

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

5 May
5 May

5 May

6 May

G May
■{Rccd. IS May)

6 May
iltecd. IS May)

6 May
(Reed. 13 May)

7 May
7 May

7 May

8 May
8 May

8 May
(Becd. 13 May)

8 May

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A. | 9 May
Nicolson (Private) \

Instructions to express appreciation of
message from King of Montenegro:
collective communication to be made
at Cettinje : occupation of Scutari ...

Conversations with M. Paul Cambon and
Count Benckendorff : proposal to send
international naval detachment to
Scutari

Fortj'-fourth Meeting of Ambassadors :
message from King of Montenegro:
resolutions for taking over the town by
naval detachment ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky ;
same subject

Conversation with M. Sazonov : projected
occupation of Albania by Italy and
Austria-Hungary : importance of
participation of Russia, France and
Great Britain. (Min.)

Frontiers of Bulgaria and Rumania :
modified text submitted by Count
Thurn

Bulgarian attitude to Servia and Russia

Enclosing pro-memorid from M. Nova-
kovic : proposed partition of Balkan
territorv

'70

770

771

772

773

773
774

775

Conversation with M. Vonizelos : relations
between Bulgaria and Greece. (Min.) ' 776

Question of
Conference

reassembly of Peace

Instructions to inform Bulgarian Govern- \
ment of strict impartiality of Great
Britain in Rumano-Bulgarian frontier
question ... ... ... ... ... 778

Conversation with Marquis Imperial! : i
review of situation by Marquis di San
Giuliano

Reassembly of Peace Conference ...

Conversation with M. Guesov : impartial
attitude of Great Britain in frontier
question

Co nversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano: his review of situation.
(Min.)

778
780

780

Forty-fifth Meeting of Ambassadors : j
project for organization of Albania ; |
taking over of Scutari : aide-memoire
from Tewfik Pasha on Treaty of Peace ; j
question of amnestv for Koutzo-Vlachs
(Texts) ... .\ 783

Political situation in Austria-Hungary ...

785

Ixxxi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject

i Page

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

From Count de Salis

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir F.
CarT.wright (Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan ...
To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...
From Sir R. Paget

(Tel.)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...
To Sir R. Paget

To Sir R. Rodd

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

To Sir F. Elliot

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

(6272]

1913.
10 May

{Reed.

13
{Tteed.

13
14

May
19 May)

Mav
19 May)

May
May

15 May

15
(Reed.

May
19 May)

15 Mav

15 May

786

788
89

(Eecd

Mav

2i May)

17 May

19
20

20
20

May
May

Tension between Bulgaria and Servia ;
concentration of Servian troop.s on
frontier ; Bulgarian appeal for Russian
mediation

Enclosing decision of Conference of
.Vnibassiulors at St. Petor.sburgh on
Runiano-Bulgarian frontier question.
{Text)

("ollective communication made to Monte-
negro on Maj' 1, and reply of May 13.

(Texts)

Project for government of Albania.
Importance of signature of peace treaty

Conversation with M. Stevanovic : pro-
posal for revision of Serbo-Btilgarian
treaty. Conversation with M. Tosev :
his fear of Servian action. {Min.) ... ; 790

Intimation by Marquis di San Giuliano |
to M. Caclamanos that Greece cannot
hold both sides of Corfu Channel. {Min.) 791

.\ttitude of Russian press. Influence of '
Pan-Slavism in Russia ... ... ... , 792

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
Albanian frontiers ; Corfu Channel ;
Rhodes 794

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson

and M. Majarov : history of the

frontier-line; urgent necessity to sign
peace ... ... ... ... ... 794

Enrlosinq summary of proposed Bulgarian i
repl^' to Servian claims ... ... ... j 795

Conversation with M. Pasic : Servian
approach to Bulgaria for revision of
treaty 797

Conversation with Dr. Danev : his desire
for early signature of treaty of peace j 798

Conversation with Servian Delegates:
northern Albanian frontier; Servian
access to Adriatic ; re-opening of Peace
Conference ...

(Conversation with Marquis Imperiali:
Italian negotiations regarding JEgean
Islands

799

Conversation between M. Majarov and
Sir A. Nicolson on Maj' 13: authority I
received by former to sign draft |
Treatv ; complaint of Greek forces at \
Salonica ... BOO

Conversation between M. Skonloudis and
Sir A. Nicolson on May 13 : question
of signature of draft Treaty ... ... 801

Forty-sixth Meeting of Ambassadors:
Servian and other proposals for amend- 1
metit of draft Treaty ; Austro-
Hungarian reservation ; French pro-
posal for organisation of .\lbania ... 801

Ixxxii

No.

Name.

1 Date.

Main Subject.

Page

986

To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

1913.
21 May

Proposal for amendment of draft Treaty;
Sir E. Grey's views

805

987

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

21 May

Conversation with M. Panas: Bnlgar-
Greek relations

806

988

To Sir F. Bertie

21 May

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon and
Count Beiickendorff : Italian attitude
about ^goan Islands

806

989

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

21 May

Conversation with M. Majarov : overtures
of Greece and Servia to Rumania ;
danger of delay in signature of Treaty

807

990

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

22 May

Concentration of Bulgarian troops on
Serbo-Bulgarian frontier

807

991

From Mr. Crackanthorpe

22 May

{Becii. Mi Mnij)

Opinions of Servian press on Serbo-
Bulgarian Treaty : concentration of
Servian forces on frontier ; preference
for direct negotiations with Bulgaria
rather than mediation of Russia

808

992

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

23 May

Fighting between Greeks and Bulgarians.
Conversation with M. VenizeloS : his
appeal for nrbitration. (Min.)...

809

993

To Sir R. Rodd

23 May

/I ± ' 1_J_ O* A XT * 1

Conversation between Sir A. Nicolson
and Mnrquis Imperiali on May 13:
Servian demand for clause on Danube-
.\driatic Railway in preliminary
Treaty of Peace ...

810

994

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

23 May

.Vustro-Huiigarian impatience at delay in
signing preliminary peace ; suspicions of
Servia and Greece; anxiety for peace
of Europe

810

995

To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

24 May

Proposed alterations in Treaty of Peace

811

996

brom. bir F. Elliot (Tel.)

25 May

('onversntioii with M. Coromilas: same
subject. (Min.)

812

yy/

From Sir H. Bax-Tronside
(Tel.)

25 May

Servian note to Bulgaria ...

812

998

From Sir E. Goschen

(lei.)

26 May

(Jonversation with Herr von Jagow :
Czar s message to King of Bulgarians

813

999

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

26 May

Greek intimation to M. Sverbeiev of

Entente

813

1000

To Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

26 May

Impossibility of proposed alteration in
Treaty

HI Q

1001

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside...

26 May

Conversation between M. Majarov and Sir
A. Nicolson: Bulgarian urgency to end
existing situation

814

1002

To Sir F. Cartwright

26 May

Forty-seventh Meeting of Ambassadors:
Sir E. Grey's proposal that delegates
to Peace Conference not prepared to
conclude peace with Turkey should
leave London ; Albanian question ;
Servian access to Adriatic

814

1003

To Sir G. Lowther (Tel.)

27 May

Sir E. Grey's statement to Peace
delegates

816

Ixxxiii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

1004 From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

ioa5

1006

100
1008

1009
1010

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To Sir R. Paget

From Mr. Crackanthorpe
(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironaide
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

From. Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

1011 From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.)

1012

1013
1014
1015
1016

1017
1018

1019

To Sir F. Bertie ...

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

From Mr. Crackanthorpe
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Bertie

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

1913.
27 May
{Ilecd. 28 May)

27 May

28 May
{Ttecd. 29 May)

28 May

28 May
28 May

28 May

29 May
29 May

29 May
{Eecd. 2 June)

29 May
(Reed. 30 May)

30 May

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his
distress at supposed misunderstanding
of Greek attitude ; instruction to
Greek delegates

Bulgarian attitude to Servian note ;
decline of Russian influence ...

(Jonversations with M. Novakovic?, Dr.
Danev, M. Gennadius and Osman
Nizami Pasha; Sir E. Grey's statement
as to signature of Treaty

Conversation with M. Stevanovic : Serbo-
Bulgarian relations

Servian proposal for conference at St
Petersburgh between Prime Ministers
of four allies

Distribution of Bulgarian army ...

Conversation with Count Berchtold : his
hopes that preliminaries of peace would
be signed without delay ; his opinion
that Bulgaria and Servia will fight ;
attitude of Rumania

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
proposal to Bulgaria

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
question of continuance of meetings of
Ambassadors

Confirmation of St. Petersburgh protocol
by Rumanian Senate

Views of M. de Hartwig and Herr von
Ugron on Serbo-Bulgarian relations ...

Review of Servian foreign policy by
M. Pasid before the Skupshtina

Conversation with M. Pichon : necessity
for immediate signature of pre-
liminaries of peace : financial questions ;
Russian views; position of France

M. Pasid's speech ; Austro-Hungarian
attitude

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
Sir E. Grey's denial of any secret
agreement for division of Asia Minor ...

Forty-eighth Meeting of Ambassadors:
signature of Peace Treaty ; questions of
.^gean Islands and southern frontier
of Albania ...

[0272]

/ 2

Ixxxiv

Chapter LXXXIII.
The Third Balkan War.

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie

From Consul-General Lamb
(Tel.)

1025

1026 From Sir E. Goschen

1027
1028
1029
1030

1031

1032
1033

1034
1035

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Elliot

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)
To Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.)

1913.
31 May

31 May

1 June

2 June

3 June

4 June

5 June
5 June

5 June

6 June

7 June

8 June

9 June

Efforts of King of Bulgarians and M. |
Guesov for peaceful solution. Meeting
between M. Guesov and M. Pasid at '

^ Sofia ,827

Postponement of meeting of Prime
Ministers. Servian proposal for
conference at St. Petersburgh ; 827

Representations of Czar and Emperor I
William to King of Bulgarians.
Russian invitation to Allies to con-
ference at St. Petersburgh ... ... 828

Meeting of M. Guesov and M. Pasic.
Proposed meeting of Prime Ministers
of four allied countries, probably at
Salonica 828

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
Russian desire that Balkan Allies
should apply to Triple Entente for
mediation ... ... ... ... ... 829

Signature of Greco-Servian under-
standing at Salonica ... ... ... 829

Sir E. Grey's denial of secret arrange- 1
ment about Asia Minor ... ... ... 829

Conversation, with M. Gennadius : fron-
tier of southern Albania ; .^gean
Islands 830

Signature of Greco-Bulgarian under-
.standing at Salonica. Servian proposal
for meeting of four Prime Ministers ... 831

Rumanian intimation to Russia of her
attitude in event of Serbo-Bulgarian 1
war ... ; 1 832

Forty-ninth Meeting of Ambassadors;!
request to belligerents to reduce arma- |
ments ; provisional government for
Albania: Servian access to Adriatic ... I 832

M. Danev's objections to advice given by |
M. Pichon and M. Isvolski : que.stion
of Russian arbitration ; military
position of Bulgaria. (Min.) ...

Organisation of Albania

833
834

Occupation by Bulgarian troops of
territory claimed by Servia. Servian
note to Bulgaria ... ... ... ... 834

Conversation with M. Venizelos : Greek
understanding with Servia ... ... 835

Enquiry as to M. Sazonov's views in
1 event of war ... ... ... ... 835

Ixxxv

.Wo.

Name.

jjute.

Main Subject.

Page

1033

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

1913.
9 June

Fiftieth Meeting of Ambassadors: inter-
national railway question

836

1037

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

10 June

Servian note to Bulgaria ...

837

1038

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

10 June

Enquiry as to M. Pichou's views on possi-
bility of settling Albanian frontier and
question of ^gean Islands

837

1039

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

10 June

Bulgarian replv to Servian note (No.
1033)

838

1040

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

10 June

Con versation with M. Paleologue :
Czar's telegrams to King of Bulgarians
and King of Sorvia; attitude of
Greece

838

1041

From Sir G. Barclay

'(Tel.)

10 June

Conversation with M. Maiorescu :
Rumanian attitude

838

1042

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside...

10 June

Conversation with M. Majarov: dangers
of war

839

1043

To Sir G. Barclay

10 June

Conversation with M. Misu : communica-
tion of note from M. Maiorescu. (Text)

840

1044, From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)
1045^ From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

11 June

French reply to British communication
as to enquiry at St. Petersburgh
(No. 1035)

841

(Tel.)

11 June

Bulgaria ii reply to Servian note of
June 10

841

1046

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

11 June

Intimation by M. Maiorescu to Bulgaria
and Servia that Rumania would
mobilize if war broke out

842

1047

From Mr. O'Beirne (Tel.)

11 June

M. Sazonov's suggestion of meeting of
Balkan Premiers at St. Petersburgh ...

842

1048

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

11 June

Conversation with M. Gennadius : Greek
proposal to other Allies ...

842

1049

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

11 June

Czar s telegrams to King or Bulgarians
and King of Servia; Bulgarian reply

843

1050

To Sir F. Bertie

11 June

Fifty-first Meeting of Ambassadors:
adjournment of discussion on South
Albanian frontier and ^gean Islands

843

1051

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

11 June

Fiftj'-first Meeting of Ambassadors:
same subject ; note from Marquis
Imperiali

844

1052

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

12 June

Instructions to urge Servia to agree to
meeting at St. Petersburgh

&45

1053

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

12 June

Answer to question in House of Commons
on Serbo-Bulgarian treaty

846

1054

To Sir F. Bertie

12 June

British attitude to question of war
indemnity

846

1055

From Mr. O'-Beirue

12 June
{Heed. 16 June)

Telegrams sent by Czar to King of the
Bulgarians and King of Servia on
June 8 {Text)

847

1056

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)
[6272]

13 June

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his
readiness to go to St. Petersburgh to
meet other Premiers ; his objections to
mediation by Russia alone

/ 3

848

Ixxxvi

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1057

1058
1059
1060
1061
1062

1063
1064

1065

1066

1067

1068
1069
1070

1071

1072

1073

1074
1075

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To Sir F. Elliot ^Tel.)
From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)
From Sir P. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

From Mr. Dering (Tel.)

(Tel.)

From Count de Salis

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1913.
13 June

13 June

14 June
14 June
16 June

16 June

17 June
17 June

17 June
(Reed. 24 June)

18 June

18 June
(Ttecd. 19 June)

19 June
19 June

19 June

20 June
20 June

20 June

(Itecd. 23 June)

21 June
21 June

' Reply from M. Pasid to suggestion for
! submission of differences to arbitration
at St. Petersburg!!

Same subject.
Ministry

Formation of new
M. Venizelos on

Reply to views of
arbitration ...

Bulgarian proposal for jr/nt occupation
of disputed territory

Greek acceptance
St. Petersburgh

of invitation to

Withdrawal of resignation of M. Pasic.
His acceptance of invitation to
St. Petersburgh

Italian willingness to give islands to
Greece except Astypalaia. (Min.)

Information from Count von Quadt of
Bulgarian intention to attack Servia
and Greece without declaration of war

Conversation with M. Coromilas : frontier
desired by Greece ; attitude of Italy
and Austria-Hungary

Conversation with Count Borchtold :
attitude of Bulgaria and Rumania.
Conversation with M. Yovanovic

Conversation with Dr. Danev : conditions
of Bulgarian demobilization ; Bulgarian
attitude to arbitration. {Min.)...

King Ferdinand's intimation to M.
Blondcl : Rumanian attitude to Servia

Italy's policy as to return of islands to
Turkey. {Min.)

Conversation with Marquis di San
Giuliano : his denial of negotiations
with Greece and of desire to retain
Astypalaea ... ... ... ... ...

Conversation with M. Plamenatz :
Montenegrin attitude in conflict
between Servia and Bulgaria ... ...

Conversation with M. Neratov : diffi-
culties of arbitration on Serbo-
Bulgarian dispute...

Withdrawal of resignation of M. Pasid
Bulgarian replies to the Servian notes;
attitude of Servia towards Russia

Conversation with Dr. Danev : Bulgarian
attitude to arbitration ...

Instructions to express hope that Servia
will make no reserves about arbitration

849
849
850
850
850

851
851

852

853

854
855
855

856

857

858
859
859

Ixxxvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1076 From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

lOl' From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1078 From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

1079 \ From Sir H. Ba.x-Ironside
(Tel.)

1080

(Tel.)

1081 To Sir F. Cartwright

1082 To Sir E. Goschen

1083 'From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

1084 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

lf85|F)-om Sir G. Buchanan
I (Tel.)

1086 From Sir R. Paget
lOSylFrom Sir G. Buchanan ...
10881 To Mr. Carnegie

1089 Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
I Nicolson (Private)

1913.

22 June

23 June
23 June
23 June
23 June

23 June

24 June

24 June
(Reed. 30 June)

25 June

25 June
{llecd. 30 June)

26 June

(llecd. 30 June)

26 June

1090 I To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) j 27 June

1091 To Sir F. Cartwright .

Ed. Note.—
Minutes by Lord Onslow,
Mr. Norman, Mr-
Maxwell, and Sir E.
Grey

1092 iCoihmunication from Count
Benckendorff

1093 From Sir G. Buchanan

28 June

8-10 Julv

28 June

29 June

Conversation with M. Stevanovid:
Russian pressure on Servia to submit
to arbitration unconditionally; Servian
note to Bulgaria. (Min.)

Conversation with Prince Nicholas of
Greece : Czar's attitude to Bulgarians ;
the Prince's views...

Greco-Servian understanding regarding I
frontier ... ... ... ... ...

Montenegrin decision to join Greece and
Servia in event of war ...

Bulgarian determination to declare war
against Greece and Servia

Fifty-third Meeting of Ambassadors(-) :
declar^ition to Servia and Montenegro
about protection of minorities ...

859

860

861

862

863

Conversations with Prince Lichnowsky, j
Count Mensdorff, Marquis Imperiali :
prospect of war between the Balkan
Allies 863

Conversation with M. Salabascev : war
inevitable. Anxiety of Count Berchtold ^ 864

Conversations with Dr. Danev : his atti-
tude to invitation to St. Petersburgh.. . 884

Bulgarian reply to M. Sazonov ; Russian
denunciation of Treaty of 1902 ; atti-
tude of Rumania; and of Russia ... 836

Russian representation to Servia urging
acceptance of arbitration : attitude of
M. Pasic' j 866

Conversation with M. Sazonov : view on
situation ; influence of Austria-
Hungary. (Min.) 867

Conversation with M. Pichon and M. i
Paul Cambon ; prospect of war between
Balkan Allies ; policy suggested as to
Russia and Austria-Hungary ...

(Tel.) {llecd. 30 June)

M. Sazonov's policy ...

Conversation with M. Poincare, M.
Pichon and M. Paul Cambon : localiza-
tion of war; attitude of Powers

Joint proposal from Austria-Hungary
and Italy concerning Albania. {Text.)
(Min.)

Same subject ...

869
870

871

872
873

M. Sazonov's telegram to Sofia. (Text.)... ' 874

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Bulgarian
acceptance of arbitration ; his attitude
to Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania

(-) [For the fifty-second Meeting of Ambassadors at London v. infra, p. 854, Ed. note.]

874

Ixxxviii

No.'

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1094

1095

1096

1097
1098

1099

1100

1101

1102
1103
1104

1105

1106
1107

1108
1109
1110

1111
1112

From Sir R. Paget

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

(Tel.)

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to
Sir A. Nieolson (Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir E. Goschen

(Tel.)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)
To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

To "Mr. Carnegie ...

To Sir E. Go.schen.

To Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir E. Goschen (Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay
From Sir F. Elliot

1913.
29 June
(Becd. 7 July)

30 June
30 June

30 June

1 July

2 July
2 July
2 July

Conversation with M. Stefanovic :
Servian anxiety as to Bulgarian expan-
sion to Albanian frontier

875

Bulgarian attack on Servian and Greek
forces. Departure of King of Greece
for Salonica... ... ... ... ... , 875

Conversation with M.
efforts to preserve
preparations for war

Political situation

Yenizelos : his I
peace ; Greek '

876
876

877

Statement by M. Pasic before Skup-
shtina : Servian acceptance of arbitra-
tion

Conversation with Herr von Jagow :
reported Russian proposal of combined
arbitration by Groat Powers. {Min.)...

Notes exchanged between Servia and :
Bulgaria concerning cessation of '
hostilities ' 878

Conversation with M. Mincov : military j
situation : question of Bulgarians in
Macedonia ; alleged French and j
Russian action at Bucharest; question 1
of intervention of Powers ... ...I

3 July Bulgarian offers to Rumania

3 July
(Reed. 4 July)

3 July

4 Jtdy
4 July
4 July

Rumanian intimation of mobilization to
Bulgaria

Memorandum given to Paul Cambon
and Count Benckcndorff respecting con-
ditions acceptable to Austria-Hungary
for International Commission on
delimitation of Albania. (Text.)

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : i
j)olicy of non-intervention in Serbo-
Bulgarian war ; attitude of the Powers

Same conversation: question of Albania

Conversation with Count Benckendorff ^
and M. Paul Cambon : policy of non- I

intervention... ... ... ... . . 1

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : '
same subject

Bulgarian military policy ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Russian
advice to Servia ; danger of Austro-
Hungarian intervention; possibility of
collective action by Powers ; position of
Rumania

879
880

880

882
883

883

884
884

884

4 July Reception of news of Rumanian mobiliza-

I tion at Bucharest ... ... ... ... 8g,5

4 July I Attempt of Greece and Servia to make
{Becd. 10 July) \ Bulgaria responsible for hostilities.

I Military events. (Min.) ' 885

Ixxxix

No. I

Name.

Date.

Maiu Subject.

Page

1113: To Sir F. Cartwright

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

1114
1115

1116| From Sir G. Barclay
1117

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1118 From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

1119; To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
112o! To Sir F. Cartwright ...

1121 „ „ (Tel.)

1122 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1123 From Sir F. Cartwright

(Tel.)

1124 Sir K. Howard to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

1125 From Sir G. Barclay
1126

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

1127

1128

1129
1130

(Tel.) I

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1913.
4 July

4 July

5 July

5 July
{Itecd. 6 July)

6 July
{Reed. 7 July)

7 July

7 July
7 July

8 July

9 July

9 July
{Reed. 10 July)

9 July
{Reed. 14 July)

9 July

10 July

Conversation with Count Mensdorff and
Marquis Imperiali : their proposal for
organisation of Albania : amendments
proposed. {Text) ...

Relations between Austria-Hungary and
Russia

Reported offer made to Bulgaria by
Austria-Hungary ...

Rumanian mobilization. {Min.) ...

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same sub-
ject ; Bulgarian appeal for Russian
intervention

Alleged Austro-Hungarian offer to
Bulgaria; attitude of Turkey ...

Austro-Hungarian attitude

Fifty-fifth Meeting of Anibassadors(^) :
administrative organisation of Albania ;
autonomy of Mount Athos ; localisation
of the war ...

Conversation with Count Mensdorff:
suggestion that organisation for Albania
should be drawn up by Austria-
Hungary and Italy

887

889

890
890

891

891
892

892

894

From Sir G. Barclay IQ July

(Tel) \ (Reed. 11 July)

Conversation with M. Sazonov : Bulgarian
desire for Russian intervention ; his i
objection to their attitude ; plans to I
detach Rumania from Austria-Hungary j 895

Count Berchtold's return from visit to
Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl. |
Views of Emperor on Bulgaria and I
Rumania. (Min.) 895

Conversation with Signor Brambilla :
Italian arrangement with Austria-
Hungary I 896

Bulgarian appeal to Russia ; Rumanian
mobilization. {Min.) ' 896

Conversation with M. Sazonov: proposed
British advice to Austria-Hungary ;
Bulgarian appeal to Russia ... ... 896

Conversations with M. Sazonov : his
variations in policy : his proposal to |
urge declaration of armistice and I
meeting of four Prime Ministers at St.
Petersburgh... ... ... ... ... 897

Conversations with M. Sazonov : same
subject : his attitude to Bulgaria and !
Rumania ... ... ... ... ... 899

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject. (Min.) 901

Conversation with M. Schebeko : M. 1
Maiorescu's statement of Rumanian
claims in event of defeat of Bulgaria... 902
(■■') [For the fifty-fourth Meeting of Ambassadors at London v. infra, p. 894, Ed. vote.]

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

1131

1132
1133

1134

1135

1135
1137
1138
1139

1140
1141

Communication from Count
BenckendorflF

From Sir V. Elliot (Tel.)
To Lord Granville

To Sir F. Cartwright

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside ...

Sir H. Bax-lronside to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

(Tel.)

1913.
10 July

11 July
11 July

11 July

12 July

12 July
(Becd. 13 July)

13 July
(Reed. H July)

(Tel.) 14 July

{Itecd. 15 July)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.) 14 July

1142 To Sir F. Cartwright

1143

1144

1145
1146

1147

1148

14 July

From Sir R. Paget (Tel.) ' 15 July

From Sir G. Barclay

■(Tel.)

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

From Lord Granville

(Tel.)

15 July

15 July
15 July

15 July

16 July

Telegrams from M. Sazonov to Sofia,
Belgrade, Athens and Cettinje making
proposals for armistice and conference
at St. Petersburgh ; telegram to
Rumania to same effect. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Venizelos : same
subject: refusal of Russian proposal ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
questions of Albania and ^gean
Lslands

Conversation with Count Mensdorff ;
Count Berchtold's views on non-inter-
vention

Conversation with M. Mincov : protest
against attack by Rumania on
Bulgaria ; Sir E. Grey's views on non-
intervention

Military situation ; effect of war on
Balkan States

Conversation with M. de Hartwig ;
representations to M. Pa.sic

his

Page

Dr. Danev's statement on appeal of
Bulgaria to Russia; military situation

Conversation with M. Dobrovic : Turkish
advance to Adrianople : request from
King Ferdinand that Great Britain
would address Porte. (Min.)

Negotiations for peace. Servian and
Greek demands ; effect of action of
Rumania on Bulgarian position

Question of continuing Meetings of
Ambassadors ; Albanian organisation
and Southern frontier

Conversation with Count Mensdorff and
Marquis Imperiali : proposals for dis-
cussion at next Meeting of Ambassadors

Conversation with M. de Hartwig;
meeting between M. Pasic and M.
Venizelos; urgency of Bulgarian repre-
sentation; Servian views

Conversation with M. Schebeko : his
communication to M. Maiorescu of
Bulgarian offer. (Min.) ...

Instructions to a.sk French view on pro-
posed advice to Porte

Conversation with Count Berchtold : atti-
tude of M. Pasid ; opposition in
Skupshtina ; Austro-Hungarian view
on frontier question

Fifty-sixth Meeting of Ambassadors :
project for organisation of Albania
proposed by Count Mensdorff and
Marquis Imperiali

912

Conversation with Herr von Jagow :
German pressure on Turkey not to '
advance beyond Enos-Midia line ... 914

xci

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

1149 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

1913.
16 July

(Tel.) i {Reed. 17 July)

1150

(Tel.)

1151 To Mr. Marling (Tel.)

1152 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1153' To Sir G. Buchanan

16 July
{Beed. 17 July)

16 July

1154 Comm unication from Count ; 16 July
i Mensdorff i

1155 From Sir F. Cartwright
i (Tel.)

1155 From Sir G. Barclay

' (Tel.)

1157 To Sir F. Cartwright

I (Tel.)

1158 From Sir R. Paget (Tel.)

17 July
17 July

17 July

18 July

1159 From Lord Granville 1 18 July

(Tel.) !

1160 From Sir G. Buchanan ' 18 July

(Tel.) ,

1161 From Lord Granville

1162 From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

1163 From Sir G. Buchanan
(Tel.)

20 July
{Reed. .22 July)

21 July
21 July

1164

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.) 21 July

Conversation with Dr. Danev : Bulgarian
position; appeal to Russia

914

Conversation with Count Tarnow.ski ;
possible action of Austria-Hungary ;
Macedonian question ; Russian position ;
possibility of European war. {Min.) ... , 914

Instructions to urge Turkey not to j
advance beyond Enos-Midia line; risk
of intervention b3' some Great Power... 915

M. Sazonov's instructions to M.
de Giers to urge Turkey not to advance
beyond Treaty line. {Min.) ... ... ' 916

Conversation with Count Benckendorff :
proposal for International Commission
of Control for Albania ... ... ... 916

Count Berchtold's proposal for concerted
action by Powers to stop hostilities and
cause the belligerents to enter into
negotiations ... ... ... ... 917

Count Berchtold's visit to Emperor
Francis Joseph at Ischl : extension of
Servia 917

Representations by M. Blondel and M.
Schebeko to M. Maiorescu ; mediation
or direct negotiation ... ... ... 918

Conversation with Count Mensdorff : same I
subject ; views of Powers on territorial
settlement ! 918

Return of M. Pasid from Uskiib after
interview with M. V'enizelos : willing-
ness of Greece and Servia to negotiate
with Bulgaria

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: his
view that belligerents should settle
territorial questions themselves ;
suggestion of conference at Bucharest

919

920

Conversations with M. Sazonov : his
instructions to Count Benckendorff to
suggest representations to Turkey that
she must respect Treaty line ; possi-
bility of naval demonstration. {Min.)... j 920

Conversation with Herr von Jagow : his
objections to conference of Powers ;
possibility of conference of Balkan
States at Bucharest. {Min.)

Greek and Servian proposals to Rumania

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his
instructions to Count Benckendorff to
ask that Ambassadors should discuss
measures to stop Turkish advance ;
occupation of Adrianople ; possibility
of coercive action. {Min.)

921

923

Conversation with M. Venizelos : i
Bulgarian acceptance of proposal to
discuss preliminaries of peace ; frontier |
proposed by Greece ... ... ... ' 924

XCll

No.!

Name.

Main Subject.

; Page

1165 To Sir F. Cartwright

1166 To Sir R. Rodd ...

1167! From Sir F. Cartwright
I (Tel.)

1168 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
i (Tel.)

1169 From Lord Granville

1170 Tn Lord Granville

1171

1172

1173

1174

1175

1176
1177

Lord Granville to Sir A.
Nicolson ' (Private)

To Sir H. Bax-Ironside

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Mr. Carnegie ...

Tu Sir F. Cartwright

To Lord Granville (Tel.)
To .Mr. Carnegie (Tel.)

1913.
21 July

21 July

22 July

22 July
22 July

22 July

23 July

24 July

25 July
25 July

Conversdtioiis with M. Paul Cambon and
Count Benckendortt' ; with Prince
Lichnowsky ; and with Count Mensdorff
and Marquis Iniperiali : questions of
naval demonstration ; financial help for
Turkey ; possibility of Conference of
Powers. Fifty-seventh Meeting of
Ambassadors: organisation of Albania:
Turkish advance ...

Conversation with Marquis Imperial! ;
proposal for abolition of capitulations
in Albania ...

Conversation with Herr von Jagow :
Prince Lichnowskj-'s report of
Ambassadors' Meeting ; measures to be
taken to coerce Turkey. (Min.) ...

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky :
German approval of retention of |
Kavalla by Greece; question of i
Bulgarian port ... ... ... ... '

Conversation with Herr von Jagow: his
objections to Conference of Powers ;
distrust of Austri:i-Hungary rather <
than of Russia. Conversation with
M. Jules Cambon : Rumanian Circular
Note

Conversation with M. Sazonov : German
objection to naval demonstration
Russian views. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon : same
subject; Russia and Turkey; necessity
for review of settlement of Thrace and
Macedonia by Powers

Fifty-eighth Meeting of Ambassadors:
Gorman and British opposition to
coercive measures against Turkey ;
views of other Powers ; collective
demarche at Constantinople ; Montene-
grin loan ; organisation of Albania ;
telegram from King Ferdinand on
invasion of Bulgaria by the Turks;
appeal to Powers ...

925

927

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
military situation ; territorial ques- j
tions; possibility of naval demonstra- 1
tion. (Min.)... ' I 927

Conversation with M. Genadiev :
Bulgarian readiness to accept terms ;
reported Austro-Hungarian promise to
Bulgaria to reopen question at early
date. (Min.) "..

928

929

930

Instructions to encourage Bulgaria to
send delegates to arrange terms of
peace. (Repeated to all belligerent
States) : 931

931

932

933

Turkish advance ; possibilitv of Russian
action " 935

Proposed termination of Meetings of
Ambassadors ... ... ... ... 935

XClll

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1178

From Lord Granville

(Tel.)

1913.
25 July

Conversation with Herr von Jagow :
possibility of Russian action ; his
enquiry at Vienna; French proposal to
Germany. (Alin.) ...

936

1179

To Sir F. Bertie

25 July

Conver.t'ifion with M. Paul Cambon :
same subject : his idea that Russia
should act alone ...

936

1180

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

26 July

Con versation with M. Pichon : naval
demonstration ; necessity for collective
action ; Italy and ^'Egoan Islands.
(Min.)

937

1181

From Lord Granville

(Tel.)

26 July

Conversation with Herr von Jagow:
adjournment of Meetings of Ambassa-
dors ...

938

1182

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

26 July

Departure of M. \ enizelos for Bucharest;
his hopes for immediate arrangement of
preliminaries of peace; occupation of
Dcdeagatch ...

938

1183

To Mr. Marling (Tel.)

26 July

Instructions to inform Grand Vizier that
invasion of Bulgaria had altered situa-
tion ; British inability to protect
Turkey from consequences of her own
action

939

1184

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

26 July

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his con-
tinued desire for naval demonstration
by Triple Entente; his fear of Austro-
Hungarian action at Belgrade ...

940

1185

To Sir R. Redd

28 July

Conversation with Marquis Imperiali :
yEgean Islands ; anxiety of Marquis di
San Giuliano for settlement

940

1186

From Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

29 July

Conversation between M. Paleologue and
Mr. Carnegie : views of Austria-
Hungary on Adrianople ; fears for
peace negotiations at Bucharest

941

Ed. Note

29 July

Proceedings of Fifty-ninth Meeting of
Ambassadors : proposed communica-
tions to Montenegro and Servia ;
organisation of Albania ...

941

1187

To Sir F. Bertie

30 July

Conversation with M. Paid Cambon and
Count Benckendorff : southern frontier
of Albania; ^gean Islands; proposed
International Commission

943

1188

From Sir G. B.-^rclay (Tel.)

31 July

Proceedings at first meeting of Con-
ference at Bucharest ; suspension of
hostilities for five days ...

944

1189

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

31 July

Conversation with M. Genadiev : Bul-
garian desire for settlement at
Bucharest

945

1190

To Sir F. Cartwright ...

31 July

Conversation with Count Mensdorff and
Marquis Imperiali : proposed adjourn-
ment of Meetings of Ambassadors

945

1191

From Sir G. Barclav

(Tel.)

1 Aug.

Joint declaration to be made bj' Powers
to Rumania concerning !l&avalla.
(Min.) .'

946

1192

From Sir F. Cartwright
(Tel.)

1 Aug.

Conversation with Count Berchtold :
issue of Bucharest conference. {Min.)

947

xciv

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

; 1913.

1193 To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.) 1 Aug

1194
1195

1196
1197

1198

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)
To Sir F. Cartwright ...

From Sir F. Elliot (Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1 Aug.
1 Aug.

2 Aug.

3 Aug.

1199 Vrom Sir H. Bax-Ironside 4 Aug.

(Tel.) illccd. 5 Aug.)

lonn From Sir G. Barclay

I (Tel.)

1201' From Sir G. Buchanan
j (Tel.)

1202 To Sir F. Cartwright

1203 To Lord Granville

120 J To Sir G. Barclay (Tel.)

12051 From Sir G. Buchanan
! (Tel.)

1206

1207

1208

1209

1210

To Sir F. Bertie (Tel.)

To Sir F. Cartwright (Tel.)

To Sir F. Elliot

From Sir G. Barclay

(Tel.)

5 Aug.
5 Aug.
5 Aug.

5 Aug.

6 Aug.
6 Aug.

6 Aug.

6 Aug.
6 Aug.
6 Aug.

Sir E. Grey's proposal as to southern
frontier of Albania and ^gean
Islands

Same subject : concessions and conditions

Sixtieth Meeting of Ambassadors:
Albanian gendarmerie; communication
from Count Mensdorff about Montene-
gro; southern frontier of Albania;
restitution of ^gean Islands ; proposed
International Commission

Fate of Kavalla. (.1/;/).)

Results of private conferences between
Balkan representatives at Bucharest...

Con versation with Sazonov : Russian
uncertainty as to course of action ;
Russian advice to Bulgaria; question
of Kavalla. {Min.)

Plans of Dr. ]')anev to continue war ;
reported agreement of M. Genadiev ...

Improbability of separate peace between
Rumania and Bulgaria ...

948
948

949
951

951

952
953
953

Improbability of action by Russia in
Armenia ... ... ... ... ... 954

Sixty-first Meeting of Ambassadors :
delimitation of Albania; ^gean Islands 954

Conversation, with Prince Lichnowsky:
proposed offer to Turkey... ... ... 956

[nstructions as to representation about
Kavalla 957

Concentration of troops at Karaurgan.
Conversation with .Af. Sazonov:
his denial of reported plan for advance
into Armenia. (Min.) ... ... ... 957

Instructions to impress on M. Pichon
seriousness of French insistence that
Islands shoidd go to Greece; Sir E.
Grey's representations at Vienna and
Berlin as to frontier questions

(Tel.) 7 Auc

Same subject. Sir E. Grey's forthcoming
statement in Parliament about
adjournment of Meetings of Ambassa-
dors ...

958

959

Con versation with M. Gennadius : com-
plaint from King of Greece of British
attitude as to Kavalla ; ^gean ;
Islands 959

Conversation with M. Cretzeanu : agree-
ment of Servian and Bulgarian
delegates; hopes for agreement with
Greeks 931

British action as to Kavalla. Conversa-
tion with M. Maiorescu : same subject 961

xcv

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

1211 From Sir G. Barclay (Tel.)

1212 From Lord Granville

(Tel.)

1213 From Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

1214 To Sir G. Barclay

1215 From Sir R. Rodd

1216 From Sir F. Bertie

(Tel.)
(Tel.)

1913.
7 Aug.

7 Aug.

7 Aug.
7 Aug.

7 Aug.

1217

1218

1219

1220

1221

(Tel. By Post) (Reed. 8 Aug.)

From Sir F. Bertie

(Tel. By Post)

From Sir G. Buchanan

To Sir F. Bertie

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

From Sir H. Bax-Ironside

7 Aug.
(Itecd. 8 Aug.)

7 Aug.
(lic-d. It Aug.)

7 Aug.

8 Aug.

(Tel.) (Reed. 9 Aug.)

1222| To Lord Granville
1223 To Sir F. Bertie

(Tel.)
(Tel.)

1224 To Sir R. Rodd (Tel.)

From Sir G. Barclay ...
1226 To Sir F. Cartwright ...

8 Aug.
8 Aug.

8 Aug.

8 Aug.
{Reed. 13 Aug.)

8 Aug.

Conversation with M. Venizelos : his
desire for non-intervention bj' Powers,
and recognition of settlement at
Bucharest as final

Conversation with Herr Zimmermann ;
his anxiety that Powers should not
interfere with Bucharest settlement.
(Min.)

Bulgarian note : instructions to sign
preliminaries of treaty of peace;
beginning of demobilization

Instructions to congratulate Rumanian
Government on conclusion of peace ...

Communication from Italian Foreign
Office ; declaration to be made by Italy
at Meeting of Ambassadors ; attitude
of France about vEgean Islands

M. Pichon's uneasiness with regard to
Italian intentions concerning xEgean
Islands

Conversation between M. Paleologue
and Mr. Carnegie : information from
M. Isvolski that Bucharest treaty
would have to be revised by Russia
and Austria-Hungary

Conversation with M. Sazonov : indeci-
sion of Russian Government as to
measures necessary to secure evacua-
tion of Adrianople ; clamour of Press
for intervention. (Min.)

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
M. Pichon's objection to conference to
revise Balkan Treaty ; Sir E. Grey's
opinion

M. Sazonov's intimation to Turkhan
Pasha that Russia would not allow
Turkey to retain possession of
Adrianople ...

Negotiations between M. Genadiev and
Count Tarnowski to obtain revision
of Bucharest Treaty. (Min.) ...

Commenting on Herr Zimmermann's
views (No. 1212)

Sixty-second Meeting of Ambassadors:
Count Mensdorff's suggestions about
southern frontier of Albania

Sixty-second Meeting of Ambassadors(*) :
JEgean Islands

Meetings of
Bucharest

Peace Conference at

Sixty-second Meeting of Ambassadors:
consent of Austria-Hungary to nomina-
tion of International Commission to
settle delimitation of Southern Albania ;
.^gean Islands

{*) [For the sixty-third Meeting of Ambassadors at London v. infra, pp. 1065-8, App. V.]

xcvi

No.

Name.

1227

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)

1228 From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1229 From Lord Granville

1230
1231

1232
1233

1234
1235

From M. Misu

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

To Sir G. Buchanan (Tel.)
To Lord Granville

>t »

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1236 To Lord Granville (Tel.)

1237

1238
1239
1240

1241
1242

From Lord Granville

From Mr. C. Barclay

From Count Mensdorff

(Private)

From Mr. C. Barclay

(Tel.)

From Mr. Crackanthorpe

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

1913.

9 Aug. Instructions to thank M. Sazonov ;

(No. 1205) and to add hope that Russia
will take no action without informing
Great Britain and France ... ... 977

9 .\ug. Conversation with M. Sazonov: Adri-
anople; action in Armenia; Treaty of
Bucharest; Sir G. Buchanan's views;
understanding between Russia and
Austria-Hungary essential ... ... , 977

10 Aug. Enclosing translations of telegrams
(Reed. 12 Au<j.) between King Charles of Rumania and

Emperor William: Treaty of Bucharest, i

(Texts) ! 978

10 Aug.

11 Aug.

11 Aug.
13 Aug.

13 Aug.

14 Aug.

{Reed. 18 Aug.)

Signature of Treaty of Peace

979

Conversation with M. Sazonov : his j
promise to take no action without
consulting Great Britain and France.

(Min.) I 980

Con versdtion with Count Benckendorff :
validity of Treaty of Bucharest ... 980

Conversation, with Prince Lichnowsky :
retention of Kavalla by Greece ;
attitude of Russia ; recovery of
Adrianople for Bulgaria ; possibility of
negotiations with Turkey ... ... 980

Same conversation: Southern Albania;
attitude of Greece ; influence of
Germany ... ... ... ... ... 981

Conversation with M. Sazonov: his
reply to Count Thurn regarding i
revision of Treaty of Bucharest ; his \
conversation with Turkhan Pasha;
views of Czar on Adrianople. (Min.)... \ 982

Conversation with Prince Lichnowsky : 1
retention of Kavalla by Greece; ]
question of Adrianople ... ... ... 983

Conversation with Herr Ziinmermann :
action of Emperor William; King
Charles of Rumania's telegram ;
revision of Treaty

14 Aug. Meetings of Peace Conference at
(Recd.lSAvq.) Bucharest

14 Aug.

15 Aug.

15 Aug.
{Reed. IS Aug.)

18 Aug.

Congratulations from Count Berchtold on
results of Meetings of Ambassadors ...

Secret agreement between Rumania,
Greece, Servia and IVIontenegro to
guarantee execution of Treaty of
Peace, as against Bulgaria

Reception of Peace in Belgrade.
Acrimony of Servian Press on pro-
posed revision of Treaty...

Conversations with M. vSazonov: question
of Adrianople : news of Turkey's
advance ; his desire for action by
Triple Entente. (Min.) ...

983
984
985

986

xcvii

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1243

From Mr. Marling (Tel.)

1913.
18 Aug.
{Ittcd. 19 Aug.)

Collective demarche to exercise pressure
on Porte ; lack of instructions from
Germany and Great Britain

988

1244

From Sir G. Buchanan ...

19/20 Aug.
{Er.;d 2.J Avg )

Changes in attitude of Russia : M.
Sazonov's acceptance of Bucharest
Treaty; opinions of France and

Aiicfi*iQ_ rT iiTifTQTV * nrivnn r\T T^i i ■pItot'

1\. KiJliL lct~ Ll.\-Lll^<X>l y y cX, LI V <i/ll\^x£ \JL ± Lll t^^j

1245

From Mr. Crackanthorpe

19 Aug.
{llccd. 21, Aug )

Conversation with M. Pasic : his
arrangements with Rumania at
Bucharest. {Min.)

991

1246

To Mr. Marling (Tel.)

20 Aug.

Repeated authorization to join in
representation to the Porte respecting
further aggressive action by Turkey ;
concert of the Powers to be maintained

991

1247

From Sir G. Buchanan

(Tel.)

20 Aug.

Conversation with M. Sazonov : same
subject ; recall of M. de Giers cancelled
on withdrawal of Turkish troops.
(J/itt.)

992

1248

From Sir E. Goschen

20 Aug.
( Tfprrl 9^ A tin \

Conversation with Herr von Jagow:

billllt^ oUUJtrt, tj ilIl<l'llCLd,i UU^> CULL Ul

Turkey; collective representation to
Porte ; his preference for direct nego-
tiations between Turkey and Bulgaria.
(Min.)

993

1249

To Mr. Marling (Tel.)

21 Aug.

Conversation with Tewfik Pasha ; assur-
ance that Turkish troops are being

t, n M T'Ji wn • 1 n Qf',7*nr''f",i OT1 "fn iTifnTTn

VtlLilIUldWll , XlLoul IIV.L'IL/Il t^KJ IIIIUX 111

Grand Vizier of this communication ...

994

1250

iJo7i%77iunzc(xtion from Tew-
fik Pasha

21 Aug.

Same subject : assurance that Turkey
will maintain declaration of July 19 ...

994

1251

From Mr. C. Barclay ...

25 Aug.
( liprd 7 kf-nf \

Rumanian policy

995

1252

From Mr. Crackanthorpe

25 Aug.
yitecd. 1 Sept.)

Entry of Servian Crown Prince into
Belgrade; increasing mistrust of
Russia ; Question of foreign loan

QQ7

1253

From Mr. C. Barclay

25 Aug.
( Tfpr/I 1 Sprit \

Audience with King Charles of Rumania:
opinion of Bulgaria and her diplomacy

998

1254

From Sir F. Elliot

26 Aug.
{Becd. 1 Sept.)

."1 udi (')tc c with icing Constantme ■ mili-
tary situation at time of armistice ...

999

1255

From Sir R. Rodd

2 Spnt
(Eec(i 8 Sept.)

Ttn linn n f^<i rf> f.t^ V>i3 rf^cru Tr\(^f\ n c f t*i tin r?

of Turkey; ^gean Islands. (Min.) ...

1000

1256

To Count MensdorfF

7 Sept.

Joseph on Count MensdorfT

1001

1257

From Air Crackanthorpe
(Tel.)

± J. OtJ^l/.

\X Ucll (III LCC u_y 1 U Ul O Lcl Ul o t (* t u .N y l( W

in Macedonia as against Bulgaria

1001

1258

From Mr. Marling (Tel.)

30 Sept.

Signature of Treaty of Constantinople
between Turkey and Bulgaria ...

1002

1259

2 Oct.
(7?ccd. « Oct.)

Same subject ...

1002

XCVlll

Appendix I.

THE RUSSO-BULGAR CONVENTION OF 1902.

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1902.

Russo-Bulgar Convention

29 May

Text

1005

Appendix II.

THE BALKAN ALLIANCES, 1912-3.

(a) The Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson

1912.
6 Apr.

Conversation with Count Benckendorff:
conclusion of Alliance

1007

Minutes by Sir A. Nicolson
and Sir Edward Grey

15 Apr.

Conversation with M. Paul Cambon :
same subject

1008

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir
A. Nicolson

(Private) (Tel.)

19 Apr.

Negotiations for Military Convention ...

1009

From Sir G. Lowther

17 June

Conversation with Assim Bey: Serbo-
Bulgarian Alliance and negotiations
with Greece. (Min.)

1009

From Mr. C. Barclay

19 June

Knowlege of Alliance by other Powers ...

1010

Communication from
Count Benckendorff

5 Nov.

Secret Annex to Alliance Treaty. (Text)

1011

To Sir G. Buchanan

8 Nov.

Same subject ...

1011

Serbo-Bulgarian Military
Convention

12 May

Text

1011

(6) The Greco-Bulgarian Alliance.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir
A. Nicolson (Private)

1912.
1 Apr.

Greco-Bulgarian negotiations

1013

Mr. C. Barclay to Sir A
Nicolson (Private)

23 May

Same subject ...

1014

Mr. C. Barclay to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

G July

Conclusion of Treaty...

1014

Mr. C. Barclay to Sir A.
Nicolson (Private)

15 Aug.

Summary of Treatj' ...

1014

From Sir F. Elliot

1913.

1 Dec. i
(Seed. 13 Dec.)

Enclosing Greco-Bulgarian Treaty and
Military Convention. (Texts) ...

1015

xcix

No. 1 Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

— ! From Sir H. l}:ix-lronside
(Tel )

1912.
10 Oct

Reported conclusion of Secret Treaty of
Alliance. {Min.) ...

1018

— Stiitement by M. Cacla-
iiiaiios

1934
lij June

I naccuracy
Treaty in

of report of

signature of

1018

— Frow, Sir H. Bax-Ironside
(Tel.)

1913
15 Apr.

Greco-Servia
Treaty

n negotiations

for defensive

1019

— Greco-Servian Treaty of
Alliance and Military
Convention

1 June

Te.rts ...

1019

Appendix III.

PROTOCOLS OF CONFERENCE OF

ST. JAMES.

— j Protocols of Sessions
1

16 Dec, 1912-
9 June, 1913

Texts

1026

Appendix IV.

MEETING OF AMBASSADORS AT LONDON, JANUARY 6, 1913.

To Sir F. Cartwright

Sixth Meeting of Ambassadors: Russian
communication on ^gean Islands; pro-
posed collective demarche to Turkey;
naval demonstration ... ... ... 1063

Appendix V.

THE LAST MEETING OF AMBASSADORS AT LONDON, AUGUST 11, 1913.

To Sir F. Cartwright

1913.
11 Aug.

Sixty-Third Meeting of Ambassadors:
International Commission for southern
frontier of Albania; question of Mge&n
Islands, formula resolved ; adminis-
tration of Mount Athos ...

1065

Appendix VI.

THE RUMANO-BULGARIAN NEGOTIATIONS, 1913.

No.

Name.

Date.

Main Subject.

Page

1914

Extract from Annual

11 Mar.

Summary of negotiations ... ... .;.

1068

Report for Rumania

(Reed. 30 Mar.)

Appendix VII.

NOTE ON BULGARIAN STATE PAPERS 1074

CHAPTER LXXIX.

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR, OCTOBER-DECEMBER

1912.

No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Peru, October 8, 1912.

F.O. 42213/33672/12/44. D. 1-40.

Tel. (No. 442.) Urgent. E. 3-15.

Montenegrin Charge d' Affaires handed in an abrupt note to Porte this morning
stating that in view of frequent incidents on frontier his Government had decided to
leave solution of all questions pending between the two countries to the arbitrament
of war.(^)

Diplomatic relations are consequently broken off — Montenegrin Charge^d'Affaires'
communication being equivalent to a declaration of war — and Charge d' Affaires and
staff who have received their passports leave Constantinople in a few hours.

It would appear as if Montenegro had been put forward by other Powers in order
to place them in the position of declining advice of Great Powers in view of actual
outbreak of hostilities in which one of their confederates was engaged. (^)

(') [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 51); to Berlin (as No. 253); to Bucharest
(as No. 32) ; to Cettinje (as No. 104) ; to Paris (as No. 525) ; to Rome (as No. 332) ; to Athens
(as No. 212); to St. Petensburgh (as No. 997); to Vienna (as No. 247); to Sofia (as No. 99).
Copies were .sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [A communication from Tewfik Pasha dated October 8 informed Sir Edward Grey to
the same effect. (F.O. 42293/33672/12/44.)]

(5) (Hostilities began on October 9, reported by telegram (No. 33) from Count de Salis
of October 9, D. ll-lo a.m., R. 5 p.m. (F.O. 42392/33672/12/44.)]

No. 2.

Sir H. Box-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Sofia, October 8, 1912.

F.O. 42227/33672/12/44. D. 4 p.m.

Tel. (No. 54.) Confidential. E. 9 p.m.

I have just returned from a long conversation with the Prime Minister.

His Excellency discussed development of situation since my departure on leave.
He assured me that both His Majesty and he himself had ( ? used) their utmost efforts
during the last few weeks to dissuade the remainder of the Cabinet, the leading
statesmen, and the War Office officials from pressing for mobilisation, but in vain.

The King was on horns of a dilemma, if Hie Majesty had not signed the mobilisa-
tion decree he would, in Prime Minister's opinion, have lost his Throne; if war should
unfortunately break out he would doubtless, still risk it, but his action would then .be
in sympathy with Bulgarian nation. Previously to mobilisation. Prime Minister had
offered on several occasions to resign, but His Majesty had asked him to continue in
office, and the Eussian Minister had acted in the same manner.

(1) [A copy of this telegram was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]
[6272] B

I spoke strongly to Prime Minister in a strain similar to that employed by Sir A.
Nicolson to the Bulgarian Minister in London, as reported in your despatch No. 29 of
25th September. (')

(Sent to Belgrade.)

(2) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 714-5, No. 746.]

No. 3.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.O

Sofia, October 8, 1912.

F.O. 42231/33672/12/44. D. 6 p.m.

Tel. (No. 55.) E. 9 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram (Oct[ober] 8).(^)

I saw Prime Minister directly after my Eussian and Austrian colleagues had
presented to him their identic instructions.f^) His Excellency asked them to explain
to him the meaning of the second paragraph of these instructions, namely, " that the
Powers would take in hand the realisation of reforms in the administration of
European Turkey." Neither of the Ministers were able to enlighten him on this
point, and they said they would refer to their Governments for exact information as
to such reforms.

Prime Minister informed them that he would not fail to acquaint His Majesty
and his colleagues with the contents of the document now brought to his notice, but
he pointed out to them that their action had come very late in the day.

His Excellency further told me that he had informed the Ministers that
Bulgarian Government now found themselves in the exact position of the Eussian
Government in 1875 [1877]. (*) On 13th March of that year Lord Derby wrote as
follows to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh : "In submitting draft protocol
to(*) Count Schouvaloff declared that in view of the sacrifices Eussia had incurred,
of the stagnation of industry and commerce, and of the enormous expenditure
necessitated by mobilisation, Eussia could not demobilise without obtaining some
tangible results with regard to the amelioration of the lot of the Christians in Turkey.
Ambassador added that Emperor sincerely desired peace, but not peace at any
price." (^) The Prime Minister gave me the text of the above in French.

(Very Confidential.)

Prime Minister told me privately that he was afraid that war was inevitable. He
again assured me that he had done his very utmost to oppose such an issue, the.
enormous gravity of which he did not fail to realise.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

(1) [A copy of this telegram was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

(3) [cp. O.-U.A., IV, p. 573, Nos. 3992-3; p. 576, No. 3997; pp. 584-5, No. 4009. cp. also
Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 734-^, No. 782.]

(*) [A correction by Mr. Vansittart changed " 1875 " to " 1877 " and deleted "to" before
" Count Schouvaloff."]

(5) [The quotation is from Lord Derby's despatch No. 68 of March 13, 1877, to
Lord A. Loftus (F.O. Russia/ 960). The wording is slightly paraphrased.]

No. 4.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

F.O. 4'2'234/33672/12/44. Belgrade, D. October 8, 1912, 8 p.m.

Tel. (No. 27.) R. October 9, 1912, 8 a.m.

Austro-Hungarian Minister tells me that he made, joint representation with
Russian Minister this afternoon. M[inister for] F[oreign] A [ffairs] 'replied that he
could give no answer at once but he could assure the Powers that he would do all that
he possibly could to avert war. He would at once call a Council of Ministers and
consult with the Bulgarian Gov[ernmen]t to whom an identical representation had
been made. He said that the fact that Montenegro had declared war — without
however consulting the other States — had complicated the situation and it was
regrettable that the Powers had not taken this step before the mobilisation.

It is difficult to say how far situation is still within control of the Gov[ernmen]t.
There is no real enthusiasm in the country for war but it would doubtless be difficult
to bring military party and other extremists to reason.

Sent to C[onstantino]ple and Sofia.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Athens (as No. 215) ; to Cettinje (as No. 105) ; to Bucharest
(as No. 33) ; to Berlin (as No. 254) ; to Rome (as No. 383) ; to Paris (as No. 530) ; to St.
Petersburgh (as No. 1002) ; to Vienna (as No. 250). A copy was sent to the Director of Military
( 'perations.]

No. 5.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Cettinje, October 8, 1912.

F.O. 42224/33672/12/44. 1). 8-4 p.m.

Tel (No. 32.) Urgent. R. 9 p.m.

Russian and Austrian Ministers have just made joint declaration, text of which
will be (?) communicated to you.(^)

King replied that intervention of Powers was tardy. It was two months ago since
he had solicited that intervention, (^) but Europe had remained dumb. For thirty-four

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 534); to Berlin (as No. 258); to St. Petersburgh
(as No. 1005); to Constantinople (as No. 747); to Vienna (as No. 254); to Athens (as No. 218);
to Belgrade (as No. 55) ; to Bucharest (as No. 37) ; to Sofia (as No. 105) ; to Rome (as No. 387).
A copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [The text was sent to Sir Edward Grey by Count de Salis in his despatch (No. 39) of
October 8, R. October 12. (F.O. 42746/33672/12/44.) It is identical with the text given in
Gooch ft- Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 734-5, No. 782.

The text of the King of Montenegro's reply was as follows: —

Sa Majeste, apres avoir entendu lecture de la declaration prescrite, nous a repondu comme
suit: — " Je regrette que I'intervention des Puissances se produise un peu tard. Voici deux
mois que la note du Gouvernement montenegrin sollicitant cette intervention a ete remise;
I'Europe est restee muette et je me suis cru oublie. La Turquie nous a cause tant de torts
depuis trente-quatre ans, et surtout ces dernieres annees. Les troupes turques ont occupe notre
territoire et y ont etabli des retranchements. J'ai proteste a maintes reprises mais j'ai preche
dans le desert. Depuis longtemps le Montenegro demandait la joiiction des routes et le
dessechement du lac de Scutari : rien n'a ete fait jusqu'ici, et plusieurs villages de la Zeta sont
inondes. Enfin et surtout les massacres de nos freres Chretiens sur les confins du Montenegro
n'ont pas discontinue et m'ont frappe au coeur. En ce moment la situation du Royaume est
telle que, meme si les allies se degageaient vis-a-vis de lui- — ce que je ne puis supposer un ■
instant — I'etat d'esprit de mon peuple m'obligerait a entrer en action. Vous me comprendrez.
Je suis profondement peine de ne pouvoir suivre les conscils des deux Empires amis et
protecteurs et surtout de leurs gracieux Souverains qui ont toujours ete si bons pour moi."
(F.O. 42746/33672/12/44.)]

(3) [cp. Gooch & Temperley. Vol. IX (1), p. 602, No. 606.]

[6272] B 2

years he had suffered wrongs from the Turks, who had occupied points on his
territory, refused junction with his roads or co-operation to (? prevent) flooding of
his territory. Above all continued massacres of Christian brothers on the frontier
had struck him to the heart. Even if his allies (? desert) him (?) feelings of his
country would force him to action.

After delivering his reply, the King entered his carriage and started to join the
troops at Podgoritza. Relations with Turkey have been broken off, and hostilities
may begin at any moment.

No. 6.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia, October 8, 1912.

F.O. 42232/33672/12/44. D. 8-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. 56.) Very Confidential. E. 9-30 p.m.

The ultimatum of Balkan States to Turkey was drawn up last week in Belgrade,
and was submitted to King of Bulgarians on 4th October. His Majesty approved it
in entirety. On the other hand, Greek Government have raised slight technical
objection to wording. As soon as a formula acceptable to the three States is arrived
at it will be presented to Turkish representatives at Sophia, Belgrade, Athens, and
Cettinje.

Montenegrin Government have given carte blanche to the other three States to
decide on wording.

I hear from an excellent source that latter Government purposed declaring war
to-day, and have only been restrained with difficulty by their allies.

A whole Servian division is now marching towards the Bulgarian frontier, and
is expected to be in Sophia in three days. Arrival of Servian troops in this capital
will cause much excitement, and will greatly solidify present entente.

Contents of the ultimatum are to the effect that Ottoman Government should
grant autonomy in Macedonia under the segis of the Great Powers, and that their
representatives at Constantinople are to be held responsible for carrying out of reforms
in a satisfactory manner.

The governors and higher officials are all to be Christians. The above are the
chief points ; the wording, however, is such as, in my opinion, to exclude acceptation
by Ottoman Government. No time limit is fixed for a reply, but the present intention
is to repeat ultimatum after five days' delay.

Repetition of ultimatum will fix time limit of twenty-four hours, after which war
will be declared simultaneously by the four States.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

MINUTE.

See a record by me of what the Montenegrin Ch[arge] d'AflFfaires] told M. Bompard which
indicate.^ that Montenegrin action was prepared in concert with the others. (^)

A. N.
E. G.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Athens (as No. 216); to Bucharest (as No. 34); to Cettinje;
to Paris (as No. 531) ; to St. Petershuxgh (as No. 1003) ; to Rome (as No. 384) ; to Vienna (as
No. 251); to Berlin (as No. 255). A copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations!

(2) [cp. D.B.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. IV. p. 83, No. 88. The telegram given there was quoted
by Sir A. Nicolson in a note to Sir Edward Grey. (F.O. 42473/33672/12/44.)]

No. 7.

Sir F. Cartivright to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Vienna, October 9, 1912.

F.O. 42379/33672/12/44. D. 1-30.

Tel. (No. 99.) R. 3-15.

In absence of Mfinister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] at Delegation I saw Under
S[ecretary] of S[tate] for F[oreign] A[ffairs] this morning. (^) He told me that
although the outbreak of war between Turkey and Montenegro was serious it had not,
in his opinion, greatly aggravated general situation especially if hostilities limited
themselves to desultory fighting along the frontier. The key to the situation was still
at Sofia and he was afraid from information which had already reached Ministry that
the answer of Bulgaria to the Austro-Russian communication would be most
unsatisfactory.

I enquired of him whether the Austro-Hungarian Gov[ernmen]t had taken into
consideration the next step which would be taken on receipt of Bulgarian reply. He
told me he thought that Mfinister for] F[oreign] A[fEairs] would probably leave lead
in the matter to France.

As regards action at C[onstantino]ple by the Powers he told me last night
instructions had been sent to Austrian Ambassador at C[onstantino]ple to act in
concert with his cx)lleagues.f^) It was indifferent to the Austro-Hungarian
Gov[ernmen]t whether the action were collective or individual, the essential point
being that it should be taken in hand without delay.

(') [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 58); to Berlin (as No. 261); to Bucharest
(as No. 40); to Cettinje (as No. 112); to Constantinople (as No. 752); to Paris (as No. 537);
to Rome ^as No. 390) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1008) ; to Sofia (as No. 107). A copy was sent
to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [This interview is not noted in O.-U.A., but there are references to interviews between
Count Mensdorff and Sir Edward Grey on October 9, O.-TJ.A., IV, pp. 587-8, Nos. 4014-5.]

(3) [v. O.-U.A., IV, pp. 577-8, No. 4000.]

No. 8.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia, October 9, 1912.

F.O. 42403/33672/12/44. D. 8-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 60.) Very Confidential. R. 10 p.m.

The King's "chef de cabinet," whom I have just seen, informed me that he
considers war to be quite inevitable. He stated that the position of the King and
Cabinet would otherwise be untenable ; he added further that action of Montenegro
had taken Bulgarian Government by surprise (see my telegram No. 56(^)), but he
admitted that it had caused satisfaction.

The above may be taken as His Majesty's view of the situation.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

(') [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 548); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1016); to
Rome (as No. 397) ; to Vienna (as No. 263) ; to Berlin (as No. 269) ; to Constantinople (as
No. 761) ; to Bucharest (as No. 4-5) ; to Athens (as No. 224). A copy was sent to the Director
of 'Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 4, No. 6.]

No. 9.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grcy.C)

St. Petershurgh, October 9, 1912.
F.O. 42400/33672/12/44. D. 8-25 p.m.

Tel. (No. 357.) E. 10 p.m.

My telegram No. 355 (Oct[ober] 7).(')

In spite of declaration of war by Montenegro. (^) Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs was to-day less pessimistic, and did not think that it extinguished all hope of
a peaceful termination to the crisis.

He had not yet received from the Russian representatives to the Balkan States
any report with regard to action which they had taken conjointly with their Austrian
colleagues, but he had heard indirectly that Servia, Bulgaria and Greece would in any
case await the result of the communication which the five Ambassadors were to make
at Constantinople.

His personal opinion was that if Turkey at once announced her readiness to place
the question of reforms in the hands of the Powers the Governments of the three
Balkan States might be able to restrain popular movement in favour of war, and
eventually to demobilise. Terms of article 23(*) were rather vague, and the Balkan
States would probably insist on receiving an assurance that the governors of all the
vilayets in European Turkey should either be Christians, or, if Mahommedans, should
be approved by the Powers. This point, as well as that of finding some solution of
the Cretan question that would give satisfaction to Greece, presented the chief
difficulties. If Servia. Bulgaria, and Greece could be induced to keep quiet it would
not be difficult for Europe to bring pressure to bear on IMontenegro and Turkey to
stop fighting. His Excellency said that initiative taken by Montenegro was quite
inexplicable, and that he did not believe that any of the other three States would
commence hostilities before Monday.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 546) ; to Berlin (as No. 268) ; to Bucharest (as
No. 44); to Rome (as No. 396'): to Constantinople (as No. 759); to Sofia (as No. 109); to Vienna
(as No. 262) ; to Bclorade (as No. 60) ; to Cettinje (as No. 114) ; to Athens (as No. 223). A copy
was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol'. IX (1), pp. 740-1, No. 792.]
(') [v. supra, p. 1, No. 1.]

(") [Treaty of Berlin, v. Hertslet : Map of Europe by Treaty, (1891), Vol. IV, p. 2779.]

No. 10.

Sir A. h'icolson to Lord Hardinge.

Private. (^)

My dear Hardinge : — Foreign Office, October 9, 1912.

I have been wishing to write to you by the last mail or two, but really have never
had time to do so, and I do not know whether I shall be able even now to write you
so full a letter as I should wish.

I am not going to discuss the possible developments which may follow upon the
very serious event which took place yesterday, when Montenegro declared war. I
should think there is extremely little doubt that Bulgaria and Servia will immediately
follow suit, and I suppose that Greece will unwillingly also be dragged into the
conflict. To my mind the primary cause of all that has happened is the secret alliance

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

wliich Russia encouraged the four States to conclude. (^) I imagine that SazonofE had
in his mind in the first instance merely to gain a diplomatic success over Austria and
to re-establish Russian prestige in the Balkan Peninsula. He should, however, have
foreseen that by encouraging and promoting the close understanding between the four
Powers he was practically raising hopes and aspirations which they had some grounds
for thinking Russia would enable them to realise. Moreover, unless our information
is quite erroneous, Bulgaria and Servia even went so far as to peg out between them-
selves districts in Macedonia which would fall to each other when the Turkish Empire
broke up. He has now been compelled to throw as much cold water as anyone upon
the measures which the Balkan States thought fit to take. Whatever may be the
ultimate result of the conflict, which now seems inevitable, Russian prestige will have
lost, rather than gained. The secondary cause was also Berchtold's proposals. (^) The
third is doubtless the difiiculties in which Turkey finds herself in her internal
administration; the Albanian insurrection(*) and the war with Italy. (•'^) As to the
belated steps which the Powers are taking towards averting a conflict, it is not a
chapter in European diplomacy which will be very satisfactory to look back upon. We
were quite ready to leave to Russia and Austria the duty of using such language and
taking such measures as they might think desirable at the Balkan capitals, as they are
the two Powers who are mostly interested in those quarters, but we considered that the
steps which were to be taken at Constantinople should be done by all the Great Powers
together. At the same time we were desirous of not using language at Constantinople
which would merely incense the Turks and do more harm than good. We succeeded,
I think, to a certain extent in modifying the representations which were to be made
at Stamboul.(') I need not say that we have always kept most carefully in view the
necessity of us doing as little as possible to arouse moslem feeling, as we know very
well the effect which would be produced amongst our mussulmans in India. I am
afraid, however, that careful as we are, an attack by Christian Powers on Turkey
will create a good deal of trouble in your dominions, and I daresay we shall be
reproached for not having put our foot down and averted the conflict. You know just
as well as I do that we are perfectly unable to take such steps. Our main efforts are
now directed to keeping Austria and Russia in as close touch with each other as possible
in the hopes that thereby the war may be localised. I doubt very much, however,
whether these two Powers will continue for long to work hand in hand, and I fear
that if Austria is compelled to make any forward move to prevent the Sandjak from
being occupied by Servia or Montenegro, it will be exceedingly difficult for the
Russian Government to abstain from taking some counter action. The whole state
of things however is in such a welter that it is .impossible to predict what may occur,
so it is futile my entering into any speculations on the subject.

I think on the whole that Sazonoff's visit here(') was satisfactory, but though we
no doubt had satisfactory conversations with him and have made some progress in
strengthening the relations between the two countries, he is such a weak and
uninfluential man in his own country that I do not attach much importance to the

impressions which may have been produced upon him personally (^)

[I am, &c.

A. NICOLSON.]

(2) [For the Balkan Alliance generally, v. infra, pp. 1006-26, App. 11.]

(3) [d. Gooch (t- TemperJey, Vol. IX (1), pp. 618-748. Chapter LXXVITJ
(<) \v. ihid., Vol. IX (1), pp. 449-512, Chapter LXXV.]

(5) \v. ihid., Vol. IX (1), pp. 259-448, Chapter LXXIV.]
(*) [cp. infra, p. 12, So. 16, note (^).~\

C) [v. ihid., Vol. IX (1), pp. 749-772, Chapter LXXVIIT. For M. Sazonov's report to the
Emperor Nicholas on his journey abroad in September-October 1912, v. Siehert. pp. 366-70.]

(*) [The omitted paragraphs refer to British action as regards Lhassa and Afghanistan, and
to the Balkan situation, on which it adds no new information.]

No. 11.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 42540/33672/12/44.
Tel. (No. 30.) Confidential.

Belgrade, October 10, 1912.

D. 1.
R. 3-20.

I saw Russian Minister the day before the Austro-Russian communication(^) was
to be presented. He appeared much upset and told me that he thought joint represen-
tations were now useless and did more harm than good as they only weakened
influence of the Powers ; the situation, he said, was now out of the control of the
Government and there would be revolution if they endeavoured to demobilise.

Austrian Minister told me confidentially that while Monsieur de Hartwig had
no option but to obey his Government's instructions it was very evident he was much
annoyed at having to act in concert with him and he thought that undoubtedly
Russian Minister had discussed the communication with the Prime Minister before it
was officially presented as they had had a long interview the same morning.

I regret that there are many reasons to suspect Russian Minister is not acting
straightforwardly. He promoted Serbo-Bulgarian entente and has always encouraged
Servia to rely on Russian support. His position in present crisis is consequently
awkward and he seems to overcome the difficulty by carrying out his instructions
officially while privately encouraging Servia to count upon Russian sympathy and to
think in spite of declaration of the Powers concerning maintenance of Status quo if
the Balkan States acquire territory they cannot be turned out.

But Monsieur de Hartwig's record in Persia shows that this is not improbable.
I think that if Servian Government and people could really be made to under-
stand that if they go to war they shall under no circumstances retain territory, that
Powers will not even permit them to (gr[ou]p undecf^'pherable]) extract reforms or
an indemnity and as they have acted against wishes of Powers the latter will obstruct
their raising loans in foreign markets it might have a cooling effect.

(1) [v. supra, p. 3, No. 4. cp. Gooch d: Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 734-5, No. 782; p. 748,
Ed. note-l

My telegram No. 56.(')

The reply of the Balkan States to the Identic Representation made by Russian
and Austrian Ministers in the four capitals has now been drawn up.(^)

I have seen rough draft. It is a short and (? gr[ou]p omitted) like document.

Balkan States thank the Powers for kind interest -displayed in Macedonian affairs
which they most highly appreciate. They refer to a note to Ottoman Government.
The chief point [s] in this note were contained in my telegram above mentioned; a
clause however has just been added to the effect that Turkey must not only agree to
all the terms contained in that note but must also pay in addition all the costs of
mobilisation incurred by Greece, Servia, Bulgaria. The terms are such as in my
opinion, [are] designed to exclude acceptance by Ottoman Government.

No. 12.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 42549/33672/12/44.
Tel. (No. 61.) Secret.

Sofia, October 10, 1912.
D. 5 P.M.
R. 5-55 P.M.

(1) [v. supra, p. 4, No. 6.]

(2) [V. infra, pp. 16-7, No. 22.]

The reply to Powers will be presented t© Russian and Austro-Hungarian repre-
sentatives at Belgrade Athens and Sofia on Sunday October 13, and note to Ottoman
Government will be forwarded to Turkish representatives in these respective capitals
on same date.

The note will be followed on October 15th by an ultimatum to Turkish Govern-
ment, requesting a reply in 24 hours, at the expiration of which time war declared
simultaneously by these States.

Concentration of Bulgarian and Servian troops is expected to be quite completed
by Oct[ober] 16th; hut from secret information received here, Greek concentration
will not be terminated before Oct[ober] 23.

MINUTES.

The reply foreshadowed in Sir H. Bax-Ironside's tel[egrain] No. 56 referred to above is
" That Ottoman Gov[ernmen]t should grant autonomy in Macedonia under the regis of the
Great Powers and their Representatives in Constantinople to be held responsible for carrying
out reforms in a satisfactory manner. All Governors and high officials are to be Christians."

[A. N.]

This makes it clear that nothing short of a determination by the Great Powers to coerce
the Balkan States and Turkey by force would secure the peace.

E. G.

No. 13.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 42685/38672/12/44. St. Petershurgh, D. October 10, 1912, 8-55 p.m.

Tel. (No. 359.) R. October 11, 1912, 11 -45 a.m.

M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] who returned this morning has, since receiving
Bulgarian reply, given up all hope of averting the war. He said Russian Ambassador
was authorised to join in making communication to the Porte as soon as his colleagues
received their instructions, but that nothing would come of it and that war would
break out Sunday or Monday. His efforts were being now concentrated on
endeavouring to localize it.

He has instructed Russian Ambassador at Vienna to express hope that even if
Servians make false step in entering the Sanjak Austrian Gov[ernmen]t will keep
their heads and not make equally grave mistake in occupying it. They would gain
nothing by doing so as, so long as Powers adhere to principle which they had laid
down that there was to be no alteration of territorial status qiio, Austria need not fear
Servia would be allowed by Europe to establish herself there. If Servia attempted
to do so at end of war there would always be time enough for Austria to expel her
and her task would be an easy one as Servia would be then exhausted. Russian
Ambassador was instructed to give positive assurances that Russia would not intervene
in the war if Austria abstained from taking any such action.

M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] mentioned subject to German Chancellor.
Latter seemed to quite understand Russian position and M[inister for] F[oreign]
A[ffairs] believes that German Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed to give
friendly advice in above sense. H[is] E[xcellency] however observed to me that
Austria knows that Germany is so afraid [of] being isolated and consequently so
dependent on her that Austria is not inclined to listen to German advice if it does
not suit her interests.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Athens (as No. 228) ; to Belgrade (as No. 66) ; to Sofia (as

No. 115); to Cettinje (as No. 120); to Vienna (as No. 271); to Berlin (as No. 276); to

Constantinople (as No. 766) ; to Bucharest (as No. 51) ; to Paris (as No. 556) ; to Rome (as
No. 405). A copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]

I suggested that it might be prudent for Eussian Minister at Belgrade to warn
Servian Government not to enter Sanjak as if they did so they would find themselves
confronted with Austrian army. H[is] E[xcellency] said he would speak to Servian
Minister here. He added that Austrian occupation of Sanjak would be breach of
neutrality which would inevitably entail Eussian intervention. Would it .be possible
in view of grave issues at stake "for us to give a hint to Servian Government of the
danger of provoking Austria?

M[inister for] F[oreign] A [fairs] spoke to me of the possibiUty of Europe inter-
vening to stop war on the first favourable opportunity or after some decisive battle
had been fought. I observed that in that case it might be advisable for the Powers
to continue their present conversations and endeavour to elaborate settlement of
Macedonian question that would be acceptable to Austria and Eussia alike as other-
wise we should have no definite proposals to make to the two belligerents.

MINUTES.

Para. 1. The impression of the Russian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[frairs] tallies with
our own.

Para. 2. .45 Montenegro has set the example of going into the Sanjak,(^) it will be harder
to dissuade or restrain Servia from following her example next week. The language to be held
by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna is reasonable enough, and it will be satisfactory if the
German Ambassador does likewise. If the Russian warning to Servia respecting the Sanjak is
not efFective, it is unlikely that anything we c[oul]d say w[oul]d be more so. (It might even
suit Servia to provoke these complications in certain eventualities.)

Last para. It w[oul]d certainly be well for the Powers to continue their conversations, but
I suppose the terms of the settlement must necessarily be influenced by the fortune of the war.

R. G. V.

Oct[ober] 11.

It is unlikely that we can say anything at Belgrade that will be of use.

R. P. M.
A. N.

Telegraph to Sir G. Buchanan.{^) Your telegram No. 359. You may, if you think it useful,
inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have already impressed upon Austrian Ambassador
here my firm conviction that if Austria makes no forward move Russia will not do so, and my
earnest desire to see Russia and Austria keep in touch.

E. G.

(2) [Marginal note by Sir A. Nicolson : "But she has not done so. — A. N."]

(3) [This telegram was sent (No. 1027) on October 11, 9 p.m. cp. also Gooch & Temperley,
Vol. IX (1), p. 729, No. 773; p. 769, No. 810; D.D.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. IV, p. 244, No. 235.]

No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

F.O. 42188/33672/12/44.
(No. 16.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 10, 1912.

The Servian Min[iste]r called at the F[oreign] 0[i£ce]' on Oct[ober] 7, and said
that there had been a disturbance at Uskub and the windows of the Servian Consulate
broken. He was also instructed to inform me that he had heard from Belgrade that
movements of Austrian troops were reported on the Servian frontiers on the Danube,
the Save, and the Drina. He was informed in reply that we had heard of no move-
ments on the part of Austria. The Servian Minister then asked if there was any-
thing to tell him regarding the negotiations that were passing between the Powers.
He said that it did not matter much what the Powers did if they did not insist on
Autonomy for Macedonia under the Guarantee of the Powers : and even this might
not completely satisfy Servia since she would want to be satisfied as to the future of

the Sanjak. Although she was on good terms with her three allies she would not
I shirk war alone against Austria and Turkey combined if there were any Austrian
I occupation of the Sanjak. If Austria entered the Sanjak war with Servia must ensue.
Possibly this might be thought folly but it took Austria a long time to subdue Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Servia could maintain a guerilla war for a long time. The Serbs
had two objects in requiring the Autonomy of Macedonia — the tirst being the ameliora-
tion of the condition of their compatriots there and the second that once Macedonia
became an autonomous province Austria's temptation to occupy it would be gone.

M. Grouitch was very vehement and he made it clear that in his opinion Servia
had far more to fear from Austria than from Turkey and he was highly distrustful
of the former Power.

He said that he had had a conversation with M. Cambon in which the latter had
enquired why Servia. in the event of war. could not avoid entering the Sanjak sjnce
according to the Vienna press such action on her part would bring the Austrian troops
across the frontier. He had replied that if Servia were at war with Turkey she must
be free to enter Turkish territory where she chose, but if Austria carried out the
threat foreshadowed in the Viennese press — war with Servia would ensue.

[I am, &c.

E. GREY.]

No. 15.

Sir F. Cartivright to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private. (')

My dear Nicolson, Vienna, October 10, 1912.

The situation in the Near East is changing so rapidly every moment that it is
useless to trouble you with a long letter with regard to it, and I will therefore limit
my observations to a few of the views held here as to the prospects of the immediate
future.

1 think it may be taken for granted that the Austro-Hungarian Government will
continue to do all in their power to maintain the European Concert, and that they
will use every diplomatic means to maintain the present "status quo" in the Near
East. Beyond th£ use of diplomatic means to attain this end, I do not think the}' will
go, for as far as I can ascertain there is no special predilection or enthusiasm here
for the present established state of things in European Turkey, and there are plenty
of conceivable re-arrangements of it which would safeguard Austro-Hungarian interests
better, or certainly equally well. The continual unrest in Macedonia is a permanent
source of anxiety to Austria-Hungary, and it opens the door to all manner of com-
plications between this country and Russia. Any feasible scheme which can be
devised for establishing a more stable state of things in Macedonia than that at present
existing there, would — I think — not be unwelcome to Count Berchtold, provided that
such a scheme can be secured without breaking up Europe into two opposing camps.
The policy of Austria-Hungary towards the Ottoman Dominions is not a positive, but
a negative one ; she seeks for no territorial aggrandisement for herself, but she will
not admit that Salonika shall fall into the hands of a vigorous nation — Bulgaria, for
instance — and she will not allow — as I have often reported to you — that the Sandjak
should fall into the hands of Servia. If the Sandjak has to be abandoned by Turkey
as a i-esult of the coming war, Austria will certainly occupy it unless, perhaps, she
may be persuaded to allow it to be merged in- a Greater Albanian Principality. Russia,
I believe, objects to the creation of a Greater Albanian Autonomy, but she may
perhaps prefer to yield upon that point if Austria can be induced to solve the Sandjak
problem in the way I have just mentioned above.

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912. This letter is endorsed in Sir Edward Grey's hand
as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.]

In spite of all the supposed affection of Austria-Hungary for Turkey, I think that
many wrong ideas exist with regard to this. It was no doubt a cardinal point of
Aehrenthal's policy to assert that Austria-Hungary would do nothing to disturb the
"status quo" in the Near East; this was due not so much to a belief in the
permanency of such "status quo," as in a desire to avoid raising questions which
might strain the relations between Kussia and this country. Aehrenthal had no
predilection either for Young or for Old Turks, and in fact for the former he had a
marked antipathy. When some two years back the Grand Vizier Hakki-Pasha came
to Marienbad to see Aehrenthal, (^) and there was much talk in the press that Turkey
was about to join the Triple Alliance, a confidant of Aehrenthal enquired of him
whether this rumour was true. Aehrenthal replied that nothing would induce him
to enter into an alliance with Turkey, and that all the civiHties which were passing
between the Dual Monarchy and the Porte were delusive. He said : — " I am like the
doctor at the bed of the sick man ; I do not grasp his hand but I hold his arm to feel
his pulse. When I reahze that it is about to cease beating, I shall drop it." . . . .{^)

Yours trulv,

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

(2) [cp. Gooch tf-: TemperJey, Vol. IX (1), pp. 198-9, Nos. 173-4; p. 205, No. 179.]

(3) [The rest of the letter describes speculations on the issue of the war.]

No. IG.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.
F.O. 42738/33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 770.) Foreign Office, October 11, 1912, 6-30 p.m.

Austrian Ambassador informs me confidentially that Austrian M[inister for]
F[oreign] A[f?airs] is informed that an important member of Turkish Gov[ernmen]t
has said that if Powers stop Bulgaria from going to war Turkey would place in the
hands of the Powers the execution of the reforms that are necessary.

I urged that Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] should discuss this
information with Russia; if Turkish Gov[ernmen]t could not say this officially now
they might be induced to say it if war went against them ; and whenever they did say
it officially Russia and Austria, if agreed, would be in a strong position to stop the
war. The Balkan States would after such a declaration by Turkey be really making
war not against Turkey, but against the Powers.

Austrian Ambassador could not tell me name of Turkish Minister referred to :
it seems t<x> much to expect that Turkish Gov[ernmen]t could say this officially in
face of popular excitement in answer to collective communication of Powers made
yesterday, fM but I send it for your information in case future developments or infor-
mation obtained by you make it opportune to make use of it later on.

(1) [cp. Gooch <i: Temperley, Vol. TX (]), pp. 733-4, Nos. 780-1, p. 737, No. 786, pp. 739-41,
Nos. 790-2, pp. 741-2, No. 794. The collective communication of the Powers to Turkej' was
made on October 10, reported by telegram (No. 452) from Sir G. Lowther, D. October 10,
7.55 P.M., R. October 11, 8 a.m. (F.O. 42562/33672/12/44.) cp. O.-U.A., IV, pp. 606-11,
Nos. 4040-3.]

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.
F.O. 42737/33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 274.) Foreign Office, October 11, 1912.

A statement appears in the "Times" to-day(M that, in authoritative Austrian
circles, the failure of the European attempt to prevent war is attributed in large
measure to the halting attitude of the British Government, which made it apparent
that there would be no adequate European guarantee of the requested reforms in
European Turkey.

I have shown this to the Austrian Ambassador. I have reminded him that the
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs made the same criticism on the phrase
' ' prendront en mains " as I had made ; that I had waived this criticism within an
hour of seeing the text of the formula, in order to avoid delay ;(^) that one of the
suggestions of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French Government on
the 5th-6th was that representations in Constantinople should be deferred until after
the representations to the Balkan States ;(^) and that we had authorised our Ambas-
sador on the 7th (*) to join in a collective communication in Constantinople, which
had not been made until the evening of the 10th, because the other Ambassadors
were not all ready. (')

The Austrian Ambassador admitted that these were the facts.

I said that we could not be made the scapegoat in the European Press for the
failure of the Powers. If this were really attempted I should reply, not by inspiring
our Press, but by a direct statement in Parliament, and by laying papers. We had
worked most sincerely for co-operation and peace, but, if there were to be recrimina-
tions, and the attitude of individual Powers when they were working together was to
be singled out for reproach, we should have to look after our own interests.

The Ambassador said that he was sure that Count Berchtold, whose views on the
points to which I had referred had been as stated, had never countenanced such a
statement as that reported in " The Times.". The " Times " correspondent in Vienna
was active in collecting unfavourable information, and the authoritative circles referred
to were probably somewhat vague, and not very authoritative.

I said that this might be so, but that Austrian circles more definitely authoritative
might contradict the misrepresentation.

The Ambassador promised to report to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once
what I had said.

I said I was sure Count Berchtold had not countenanced tne misrepresentation.

(1) \v. The Times, October 11. 1912, p. 6. cp. O.-U.A., IV, p. 606, No. 4040; p. 633,
No. 4072.]

(2) [r. Goorh & Temperley, Vol. IX (1), p. 739, No. 789.]

(3) \v. ibid., Vol. IX (1), p. 735, No. 783.]
(••) {v. ibid., Vol. IX (1), p. 740, No. 791.]

(^) [v. immediatelj' preceding document, note (i).]

No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 42632/33672/12/44.
(No. 500.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 11, 1912.

M. Cambon informed Sir A. Nicolson on Oct[ober] 5(M that the Turkish Mfinister
for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] had declared to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at

(1) [On the date of the interview with M. Paul Cambon, Sir A. Nicolson wrote to Sir Edward
Grey a minute which forms the basis of the present des])ateh. For the action taken as a
result, V. Gnnch rf- Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 734-5, Nos. 781-2. cp. D.D.F., 3"" Set., Vol. IV,
p. 55, No. .=i7 "

Constantinople that Turkey would refuse to take into consideration an ultimatum from
the Balkan States, but that she would be disposed to give to the Powers the most
serious assurances in regard to the introduction of reforms. She was also decided to
introduce the reforms laid down by the law of 1880 — and was determined to increase
considerably the number of deputies representing the different nationalities in the
Chamber.

This announcement has encouraged M. Poincare to propose, in agreement with
M. Sazonow, that the Powers should inform the Balkan States and Turkey to the
following effect : —

1. That they emphatically reprove any measures susceptible of leading to a breach
of the peace.

2. That if war nevertheless broke out between Turkey and the Balkan States,
they (the Powers) would not admit, on the termination of the war, (whatever the
issue) any change in the territorial status quo in the Balkan Peninsula.

3. That, basing themselves on Art[icle] 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers
would take in hand, in the interests of the Christian populations, the realization of
reforms in the administration of European Turkey, it being understood that these
reforms would not impair ("porter atteinte a) the integrity of Ottoman territory.

It goes without saying that this declaration reserves to the Powers the liberty to
study the nature of the reforms.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that he would communicate the above to me.
Sir A. Nicolson said that he would like, as a personal expression of opinion, and with
the sole desire to facilitate the acceptance by the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t of any
communication from the Powers, to make one or two observations and ask for one or
two explanations.

Sir A. Nicolson understood that the communication was to be collective.
M. Cambon said that he believed collective as regards Constantinople — Austro-Eussian
as regards the Balkans. Sir A. Nicolson enquired whether 1, 2 and 3 were to be
communicated simultaneously to the Balkan Gov[ernmen]ts and to Constantinople.
M. Cambon said that he presumed 1 and 2 would be comm[unicate]d to the Balkan
Gov[ernmen]ts, but that No. 3 would only be comm[unicate]d when Turkey had
accepted it. Sir A. Nicolson said that he asked' this because if we comm[unicate]d
No. 3 to the Balkans it would hamper matters very much at Constantinople, and if
the Turks refused to have anything to say to it, the Powers would cut a very poor
figure in the Balkans.

As to the terminology and purport of No. 3, Gabriel Effendi had told the Austrian
Ambass[ado]r that the Porte was prepared to give most serious assurances as to
reforms, but apparently was not prepared to go further. The proposed
comm[unicatio]n went very much further, and even much further than Art[icle] 23
of the Treaty of Berlin, and, so far as Sir A. Nicolson. could see, effaced Turkey
entirely and ignored her, and practically entrusted to the Powers themselves the duty
of reforming Turkish administration, with Turkey having no voice in the matter.
This was the largest demand which, as far as Sir A. Nicolson could recollect, had ever
been made on Turkey. Sir A. Nicolson was only making these observations with a
view of showing that he feared No. 3 as it was at present worded had very little
chance of being accepted or entertained by the Porte. It was in reality asking Turkey
to abdicate in favour of the Powers, and imposing on the latter an enormous
responsibility. M. Cambon said that M. Poincare had intimated that he would be
quite prepared to consider any amendment in the phraseology.

Sir A. I^Iicolson said that he hoped I should be in London on Oct[ober] 6 when
he would submit to me the proposed communication. All Sir A. Nicolson had said
was merely his personal opinion, and in no wise intended as carping criticism. We
were as anxious as anvone that means could be found to preserve the peace.

[I am. Sic.l ^\
E. G[REY].

No. 19.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edicard Grey.C)

Vienna, October 12, 1912.

F.O. 42846/33672/12/44. D- 7-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. 101.) 10-0 P.M.

Your telegram No. 274. (')

I have seen Minister for Foreign Affairs and discussed with him the statement
made in yesterday's " Times. "(^) He told me that he had received a telegram from
Count Mensdorff on the subject reporting his interview with you. Minister for Foreign
Affairs assured me that neither m Government nor in well-informed circles did any-
body believe that you had impeded action in efforts to prevent outbreak of war in
the Near East. He enquired of me whether I had any complaint to make as regards
Austrian press. I told him that I had none, and I must say that I fail to find any anti-
English current running in press here. "Times" correspondent admits this. T
suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that he should seize the first opportunity of
having an article inserted in some inspired Austrian organ asserting that no doubts
could exist as to the loyalty of England to the maintenance of European concert
in Balkan matters. He said that he thought he could see his way of [sic] doing
something of the kind.

" Times " correspondent tells me that he did not mean to assert that any specific
charges were being made here against England, but that he understood in the lobbies
of the • Delegations that it was believed that owing to our supposed pro-Turkish
sympathies the Balkan States had become convinced that we would oppose intro-
duction of effective control in Macedonia, and that this belief had driven them to
decide on war.

(1) [A copy of this telegram was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 13, No. 17.]

(3) [v. The Times, October 11, 1912, p. 6, and cp. infra, p. 20, No. 26, and note {^).
cp. O.-U.A., IV, p. 633, No. 4072.]

No. 20.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. (')
F.O. 43274/33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 562.) Foreign Office, October 12, 1912.

French Ambassador informs me that French M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]
thinks that a Conference of the Powers should be announced at once if Turkish
Gov[ernmen]t accept invitation already made to discuss reforms : he considers
Austrian Gov[ernmen]t sure to agree to this and is prepared to sound German
Gov[ernmen]t.

If Turks do not agree to discuss reforms French M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]
thinks that Powers should take into consideration question of when developments of
the war may make mediation opportune. His object is to preserve solidarity of
Europe and prevent divergent interests from developing.

I have said that I entirely share his view as to importance of preserving solidarity
of Europe and agree with his proposals if other Powers will accept. (^)

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 279); to Vienna (No. 275); to St.
Petersburgh (No. 1029). In the last case the words " I have informed Russian Ambassador "
were added. A copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations, cp. infra, p. 29, No. 38.]

(2) [For the negotiations of this period, v. Poincare, pp. 238-9.]

No. 21.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Constantinople , October 13, 1912.

F.O. 42830/33672/12/44.
Tel. (No. 459.)

D. 11-35 A.M.
R. 11-40 A.M.

I gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs that no decision was arrived at
yesterday as to reply to be given to communication of Powers. (*) Cabinet was not clear
as to meaning of communication. They were at a loss to understand why an examina-
tion of reforms should be necessary seeing that the law of 1880 had been elaborated
with the assistance of the Powers, and that present Government had expressed the
intention of putting it into force ; that they had even gone so far as to select Christian
persons who could fill some of the higher offices, and that the Government would be
prepared to attach foreign advisers of different nationalities to the governors.

As regards " measures " to be taken to bring the reforms about, he declared that
foreign control was absolutely inacceptable. Even if any Turkish Government could
be brought to agree to it, it was impracticable, for the different local elements would
necessarily come under the influence of one or the other foreign advisers, a system
which would be found unworkable, as exemplified by old Condominium in Egypt.

T pointed out in a friendly spirit to his Excellency that the object of the com-
munication was to try and pi*event hostilities, and it was not a moment for discussing
details, and I suspect that the object of the Turkish Government is to endeavour to
gain a few more days to advance their mobilisation.
{Sent to Sophia.)

(1) [This telegram was sent to Athens (as No. 231); to Belgrade (as No. 71); to Cettinje
(as No. 123) ; to Bucharest (as No. 52) ; to Paris (as No. 567) ; to Rome (as No. 412) ; to St.
Petersburgh (as No. 1035) ; to Vienna (as No. 278) ; to Berlin (as No. 282). A copy was sent to
the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 12, No. 16, note (i).]

The reply of the Balkan States referred to in my telegram No. 61, Secret, of
October 10th, (') will be handed to Eussian and Austrian-Hungarian representatives in
three capitals to-morrow, Sunday evening. Following is full translation from original
French : —

" The Bulgarian Government, having taken note of the declaration that
the six Great Powers have, through the Austrian and Eussian representatives,
addressed to Bulgaria, and having come to an understanding with the Governments
of the other Balkan States, express their gratitude for the interest displayed by the
Powers in favour of the peoples of European Turkey, and for their promise to take
in hand the realisation of administrative reforms on the basis of article 23 of the
Treaty of Berlin.

"The Eoyal Government, however, in accord with the Greek and Servian
Governments, estimate that, after the many promises of reform so often and so
solemnly given by Turkey, and which have been expressly recorded in international
instruments, it would be cruel not to endeavour to obtain reforms more radical and

No. 22.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 42870/33672/12/44.
Tel. (No. 65.) Secret.

Sofia, October 13, 1912.

D. 12-5 P.M.

E. 2-15 P.M.

(1) [v. supra, pp. 8-9, No. 12.]

more definite in favour of the Christian populations of the Empire such as would
veritably ameliorate their miserable lot, if they were sincerely and integrally applied.

"For this reason the Balkan States have considered it their duty to address
themselves directly to the Government of His Majesty the Sultan, and to point out
to them the principles on which the reforms to be introduced should be based and the
guarantees which must be accorded for their sincere application.

" They are convinced, that if the Imperial Ottoman Government is willing to
follow this course, order and tranquillity will be established in the provinces of the
Empire, and a firm peace will be assured between Turkey and the Balkan States,
which had, up to the present, too often suffered from the arbitrary and provocative
attitude that the Sublime Porte has adopted towards them."

The Balkan States have at the last minute decided not to enclose copy of their
note to the Ottoman Government(^) in their reply to Austrian and Eussian Ministers.

(2) [v. infra, pp. 17-8, No. 24.] .

No. 23.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{')

Vienna, October 13, 1912.

F.O. 42848/33672/12/44. D. 1-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 105.) R. 7-15 p.m.

Servian Minister came to me this morning with the following information, which
he assured me he had received from a very good source. It was to the effect that
Germany had recently given Austria-Hungary to understand that she did not wish
her to take any steps without consulting her in Balkan matters which might lead
to complications with other Great Powers. The Servian Minister interpreted this to
mean that Austria must not move against Servia in the event of a temporary occupa-
tion of the sanjak by the latter, but must await peace negotiations before bringing
real pressure to bear at Belgrade to obtain evacuation of the sanjak.

I told Servian Minister that I had no confirmation of the report, but that I had
reason to believe that Austria would do nothing precipitately, and I therefore hoped
that Servia would give no cause for a rupture arising between her and her neighbour.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 70). A copy was sent to the Director of
Military Operations.]

No. 24.

Sir H. Box-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.O

F.O. 42871/42549/12/44. Sofia, D. October 13, 1912, 1-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 66.) Secret. R. October 14, 1912, 12-30 a.m.

My telegram No. 65. (^)

Following is a translation of the note which will be presented to the Turkish
charge d'affaires to-morrow evening. He will receive special facilities for telegraphing
contents : —

After preamble : "In spite of action taken by Great Powers through the
medium of Austria and Russia in the Balkan capitals — an action by which they

(^) [This telegram was not sent to the Embassies, as the note was published in the
newspapers.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 16-7, No. 22.]

[6272] ( !

promise to take in hand the realisation of reforms in administration of European
Turkey — the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia consider it their duty,
however, to address themselves direct to Ottoman Government, in order to declare
to them that radical reforms sincerely and integrally applied can veritably ameliorate
the miserable lot of the Christian people of the vilayets of the Empire, can guarantee
order and tranquillity in Turkey in Europe, and assure a firm peace between the
Turkish Empire and the Balkan States, towards which the Porte has too often
adopted an arbitrary and provocative attitude which nothing justifies.

"The three Governments, whilst regretting that Montenegrin Government is
unable, owing to events which have already occurred, to take part in this action,
invite the Porte to proceed immediately, in concert with the Great Powers and
Balkan States, to elaboration and introduction of the reforms in European Turkish
provinces agreed to in article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, basing them on principles
of ethnical nationalities (autonomous administration of provinces, Belgian or Swiss
Governors-General, provincially-elected assemblies, gendarmerie, freedom of educa-
tion and militia) in entrusting the application of the same to a superior council
composed of an equal number of Christian and Mussulmans under the supervision of
the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the four Balkan States
in Constantinople.

" They trust that Turkey will be able to declare that she accepts these demands,
and will bind herself to put in execution w'ithin six months the reforms contained in
the present note and in the explanatory note annexed herewith, and that she will, as
a proof of her assent, withdraw the mobilisation decree."

There is a question of making an addition, which at the time of telegraphing has
not received the assent of the Greek Government, to the effect that the three States
demand reimbursement of general mobilisation of their armed forces provoked by
mobilisation of the Ottoman troops.

This demand, if not included in the note, will be contained in ultimatum.

Annexed to the note of 13th October :■ — •

"1. Confirmation of ethnical autonomy of the nationalities of the Empire, with
all its consequences.

" 2. Proportional representation of every nationality in Ottoman Parliament.

"3. Admission of Christians to all public offices in provinces inhabited by
Christians.

"4. Eecognition on an equal footing with Ottoman schools of schools of all
grades of Christian communities.

"5. Engagement by Porte not to endeavour to modify the ethnological character
of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire by transplanting of a Mussulman population.

" 6. District recruitment of Christians for military service with Christian cadres.
Suspension of enlistment until after the formation of cadres.

"7. Reorganisation of the gendarmerie in separate vilayets of European Turkey
under the effective command of Swiss or Belgian organisers.

"8. Nomination in vilayets inhabited by Christians of Swiss or Belgian valis,
accepted by the Powers, and assisted by general councillors chosen by electoral
districts.

" 9. Creation at the Grand Vizierate of a superior council composed of Christians
and Mussulmans in equal numbers to supervise application of these reforms. The
Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the Ministers of the four Balkan States at
Constantinople will be commissioned to follow operations and labours of this council."

No. 25.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edicard Grey.

F.O. 43199/33672/12/44.
(No. 439.) Confidential.
Sir,

Paris, D. October 13, 1912.
E. October 15, 1912.

The Russian Ambassador was dining at my hotel yesterday and I had some
conversation with him after dinner. His memory is not good. He told me that war
was inevitable and that he had thought so all along. The essential thing now was to
circumscribe it and if the views and intentions of Austria were as pure and
disinterested as those of Russia the fight would be limited to a contest between Turkey
and the Balkan States and Greece. He hoped that neither side would be over defeated
or over victorious so that the Great Powers might after a time persuade the
combatants to cease fighting and to listen to reasonable conditions.

Monsieur Iswolski went on to say that the two speeches at Vienna made by Count
Berchtold and Dr. von Bilinsky had caused a disastrous panic on the Paris Bourse and
were calculated to do much mischief. They were not of a peaceful tendency. I
suggested to my Colleague that in Constitutional Countries when money was required
for armaments and measures for self defence it was generally necessary to sound an
alarm in Parliament. Monsieur Iswolski continued to regret the tone of those speeches
which were certain to create distrust in Russia. He did not think that Count
Berchtold had sinister intentions nor had Baron d'Aehrenthal when Monsieur Iswolksi
had his interviews with him at Buchlau, but someho'w he was pushed into the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Baron d'Aehrenthal had even assured him
most solemnly and he believed sincerely that he regarded the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar
as properly divisible between Servia and Montenegro whenever the Sick IMan's
inheritance came to be distributed. If now for any reason or on any pretext Austro-
Hungarian troops entered the Sanjak there would be an outburst of public sentiment
in Russia against Austria, the Catholic Austria regarded with hatred by the Russian
people as the oppressor of the Orthodox portion of the Slav subjects of the Emperor
Francis Joseph. Such an event would be dangerous to peace between Russia and
Austria. He trusted that the Austro-Hungarian Government would abstain from such
a proceeding.

To-day Monsieur Iswolski renewed the conversation. He told me that the
Russian Government expected Servia to begin' the war to-morrow. It was to be hoped
that the Porte would be persuaded to accept the Italian terms for a resumption of
peace. He had the assurance of Monsieur Tittoni that it was the Porte and not the
Italian Government which had put forward fresh stipulations. The Turkish Govern-
ment claimed that the conditions favourable to Turkey such as the cessation of
hostilities and the restitution of the iEgean Islands should be carried out at once and
that the concessions to Italy should await confirmation by the Turkish Parliament.
The Italian ultimatum would expire in two days' time and unless the Porte gave way
Italy would make some attack on Turkey which would complicate the Balkan difficulty.
In these circumstances the Italian Ambassador had made a suggestion and an enquiry
at the Quai d'Orsay. He had enquired of Monsieur Poincare what would be the
attitude of the French Government if Italy proposed an entirely fresh basis for the
resumption of peaceful relations between Italy and Turkey and asked the Powers to
recommend the Porte to accept the offer by the Italian Government. The conditions
might be that there should be no mention in the Treaty of Peace of Turkish
Sovereignty or Suzerainty in regard to Tripoli, but hostilities would cease, the Turkish
troops would be withdrawn from Tripoli and its acquisition by Italy would be
recognized by the Powers.

Monsieur Poincare had, so Monsieur Iswolski was informed, by His Excellency,
replied that the French Government would act strictly up to the Treaty engagements

(') [cp. Gooch (i: Temperley, Vol. IX (1), p.

428, No. 45.3.]

[6272]

C 2

of France towards Italy whenever the proper time arrived for doing so, but unless he
could be assured that the Porte would accept such conditions and wished for the inter-
vention of the Powers in recommending their acceptance by Turkey, he could not take
any step in the matter and he must also be assured that the other Powers would be
willing to join in the recommendation to the Porte.

Monsieur Iswolski told me that Monsieur Poincare was about to consult you on
the subject of the suggestion made by Monsieur Tittoni. He requested me not to let
Monsieur Poincare know that he had given me the information in regard to
Monsieur Tittoni 's suggestion and the preliminary reply which the President of the
Council had made to it.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 26.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Vienna, October 14, 1912.

F.O. 43159/33672/12/44. D. 1-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 106.) R. 3-30 p.m.

My tel[egram] No. 101 of Oct[ober] 12.(')

Inspired leading article in the semi-official Fremdenblatt(^) yesterday contained
following passage evidently inserted by order of M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]
as result of conversation I had with him on Saturday. I think this shews how
desirous he is to avoid any unfortunate polemics arising in the press as to the common
action of the Powers in the Near East.

Passage is as follows

' ' Great Powers have drawn up a common programme ; all the Great Powers have
announced in an unequivocal form to the Balkan States that they would not tolerate
any infringement of the status quo. The unanimity of the Powers has shown itself
in this matter to be complete, and reproaches made against British Gov[emmen]t
have been recognised as entirely unfounded. England has repeatedly manifested her
agreement with the other Powers in a manner which excludes the possibiHty of all
doubt and has proved that she is endeavouring to do all in her power to advance the
cause of peace."

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 15, No. 19.]

(3) [The passage below was reproduced in The Times of October 14, 1912.]

No. 27.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia, October 14, 1912.

F.O. 43158/33672/12/44. D. 2 p.m.

Tel. (No. 69.) Confidential. R. 3 p.m.

My telegram No. 61 of Oct[ober] lO(^) Secret, penultimate paragraph.

Ultimatum will be delivered to-morrow night or early Wednesday morning.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [v. supra, pp. 8-9, No. 12.]

Hostilities will commence openly Friday morning, but large numbers of Bulgarian
and Servian troops will cross the frontier on Thursday. Servian troops are passing
through day and night for the frontier.

Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.

No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. O
F.O. 43278/33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 565.) Foreign Office, October 14, 1912, 2-15.

My telegram No. 562.(=')

French Ambassador has made following proposal

1°) Si le Gouvernement ottoman accepte de discuter avec les Puissances les
reformes a introduire dans la Turquie d' Europe, une Conference internationale se
reunira immediatement pour I'etude et I'application de ces reformes;

2°) Si le Gouvernement ottoman se refuse a la discussion et que la guerre eclate,
les Puissances se eoncerteront ausisit-ot en vue d'une mediation ;

3°) Si la mediation reussit, la Conference internationale se reunira, dans le plus
bref delai, pour I'etude et I'application des reformes;

4°) Si la mediation echoue, la Conference internationale se reunira de meme
pour prendre, a la fin des hostilites; les mesures que commandent le souci de la paix
generale et I'interet commun de I'Europe.

I have replied that for the Powers to offer mediation with the certainty that both
parties would refuse it would make the Powers ridiculous unless they were prepared
to stop the war and impose mediation by force. I have therefore suggested "en
temps opportun " at the end of the second paragraph, after word " mediation." With
that addition I have agreed to the proposal recognizing the great advantage of keeping
the Powers in consultation.

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 281) ; to Constantinople (No. 777) ; to St
Petersburg}! (No. 1034) ; to Vienna (No. 277) ; to Rome (No. 410).]
{') [v. supra, p. 15, No. 20. cp. Poincare, p. 259.]

No. 29.

Lord Granville to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Berlin, October 14, 1912.
F.O. 43192/33672/12/44. D. 6-25 p.m.

Tel. (No. 130.) K. 10-45 p.m.

Balkans.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs has received French proposal for conference,
but disapproves it, as he thinks that it would not prevent Balkan States fighting, and
would therefore put Powers in an undignified position. He thinks that the Balkan
States will gain successes at. first, as the Turks are always slow, but that the latter

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 579) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1045). Copies
were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

will gradually bring up overwhelming forces and gain the upper hand, and that that
will be the moment for intervention.

He is absolutely assured that Austria-Hungary will not move, even if Servians
invade the sanjak, although she will of course insist on their ejection at the end of
the war.

The Austrian Ambassador, whom I saw for a moment, denies newspaper reports
of Austro-Eussian mutual suspicions.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Granville.

F.O. 43631/33672/12/44.
(No. 510.)

My Lord. Foreign Office, October 14, 1912.

The German Charge d'AfEaires came to see me to-day, (^) and in the course of
some general conversation I observed that, though I had asked him on the 7th(^) to
let me know whether the German Government agreed to the proposals which were
being made, I had not heard anything from him since.

He replied that last week he had not heard anything from his Government
sufi&eiently important to be comm.unicated to me. They had just agreed to every
proposal as it came along.

I said that various proposals had been made to me lately, all with the object of
keeping the Powers together, and I was ready to agree to anything which would do
that. It was most important that Austria and Russia should not fall apart.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [For the important overture with Herr von Kiihlmann initiated by Mr. Tyrrell, Private
Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, on the evening of the 14th, v. Nicolson, pp. 384-6. cp.
E. Brandenburg: From Bismarck to the World War, (1927), pp." 437-9, and G.P., XXXIII
pp. 221-2.]

(2) [v. Gooch d: TemperJey, Vol. IX (1), p. 741, No. 794.]

No. 31.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Athens, October 15, 1912.

F.O. 43337/33672/12/44. D. 10-30 a.m.

Tel. (No. 63.) R. 12-30 p.m.

Greek Government addressed to Turkish Government yesterday ultimatum
demanding the release of Greek ships.

Sent Constantinople.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 32.

Sir H. Box-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia, October 15, 1912.

F.O. 43368/33672/12/44. D. 1-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 73.) Very Confidential. K. 2-50 p.m.

Bulgarian Minister at Athens has telegraphed to his Government report of a
conversation which he has just had with the King of Greece.

II [is] M[ajesty] stated that he had had an interesting conversation with the
Emperor of Austria. H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] had commenced by expressing
his great regret that Greece should have joined the Balkan alliance. (^) Would it not
be possible for H[is] M[ajesty] to induce his cabinet to keep peace? To this the King
replied that he was unable to gauge national feeling until he arrived at Athens, but
he would not fail to use all his influence in the cause of peace.

The Emperor who had shown considerable annoyance in the early part of the
interview, then became much more friendly ; and he informed the King that he had
explicitly instructed Austrian M[inister for] E[oreign] A[ffairs] not to engage
Austria-Hungary in a war, as he did not desire such a calamity in his declining years.

This report from their representative at Athens has had considerable effect on the
Bulgarian Cabinet.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(/) [cp. infra, pp. 1013-19, App. II.]

No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.O

Constantiyiople, October 15, 1912.
F.O. 43341/33672/12/44. D. 1-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 46.5.) ' E. 12-30.

My telegram No. 459 of October 13. (^)

Following is substance of reply of Porte. (^)

Governments are reminded that Ottoman Government has already recognised
necessity of introducing required reforms in Vilayets of European Turkey.

Ottoman Government has contemplated these reforms with all the more (? eager)
conviction that it intends to apply them without any foreign interference and it
anticipates that their execution cannot fail to contribute to the prosperity and economic
development of the country by (? assuring) harmony among heterogeneous elements
of these provinces.

If until now the various attempts at improving internal situation of these questions
have not produced expected results, it has been due to the state of insecurity produced
by all the agitators of whose real object there can be no doubt.

The Ottoman Government none the less appreciates the friendly intention of
communication of the Powers whose efforts in the cause of humanity it had
anticipated.

After referring to the fact that m.any articles of the Treaty of Berlin favourable to
Turkey have not been carried out either in the letter or in the spirit, the Ottoman
Government declares that it has of its own accord passed a resolution to present at

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(^) [v. supra, p. 16, No. 21.]
(^) [cp. Foincare, p. 2.58.]

next session of Parliament draft of law of 1880. The Powers may be assured that the
Ottoman Government will see to its prompt and scrupulous application once
promulgated. It would be unfair to conclude from past negligence and hesitation
which belonged to another regime that the Constitution of Turkey is incapable of
breaking with the errors of the past and adopt- (?gr[ou]p omitted : ing) measures in
the interests of the country and the population affected.

Contents of telegram No. 4G2 of Oct[ober] 14(*) would seem to preclude
possibility of Porte's above reply forming at present stage any basis for future peaceful
negotiations. (*)

(*) [Marginal comment by Mr. Maxwell: "Evidently a wrong reference. [R. P. M.]"
Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 462, of October 14, repeated a telegram from the British Consul
at TJskub: "Yesterday Montenegrins captured Bjelopolje." (F.O. 43187/33672/12/44.) No
other telegram which seems more suitable as a reference can be traced.]

(^) [cp. Foincare, p. 259.]

No. 34.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia. October 15, 1912.
F.O. 43406/33672/12/44. D. 9 p.m.

Tel. (No. 76.) Urgent. 9-30 p.m.

Turkish charge d'affaires has received communication from his Government
instructing him to leave with his staff without delay. Ottoman Government have
informed him that they do not propose sending a reply either to Bulgaria or to
Servia,(^) and that, as far as Greece is concerned, they have not received a note from
that Government.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]
{-) [cp. infra, pp. 3^, No. 42.]

No. 35.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 43461/43461/12/44. Pera, D. October 15, 1912, 10-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 477.) Confidential. E. October 16, 1912, 11-35 a.m.

As present complications between Turkey and Balkan States may develop into a
vital struggle, as in the Eusso-Turkish war, it is not impossible that Turkish
Gov[ernmen]t may be pressed to invite the Khedive to send a contingent as in
1876[7]. If peace is concluded(-) with Italy, and Greek fleet dominate the iEgean
Sea, presumably the neutrality of Egypt will be maintained.

I have had a hint that question may be raised, and would submit the advisability
that a decision be come to by H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment], so as to be prepared
if the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t should 'approach us.

In any case Egyptian troops would be valueless for a winter campaign in the
Balkans.

Eepeated to Cairo.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [Marginal comment by Mr. Maxwell: " It has been now concluded. [R. P. M.] "]

MINUTES

It seems to nio to be quite clear that we cannot in practice allow an Egyptian contingent to
assist the Ottoman army proper in the hostilities with the Balkan States which appear to be in
the act of breaking out.

I don't think that the precedent of 1877 need trouble us very much. A great deal of water
has flowed under the bridges since then : we are now in occupation of Egj'pt which we were
not in 1877 : and we must preserve the neutrality of the Khedivate when Turkey is at war
with the Balkan States just as much as wheti she is at war with Italy. If we were to allow
such a contingent to join the Turkish army we should be inviting an attack on Egypt by the
opposing joint belligerents and should in defence of Egypt be dragged into the fray.

It seems to me that if the Turkish Gov[ernmen]t approach us in the sense suggested our
answer is quite clear. The absolute neutrality of Egypt must be maintained.

W. E. D.

16.X.12.

Repeat to Lord Kitchener{^) and add " We must maintain neutrality of Egypt, but I should
like your opinion as to what it would be best to say to the Turks. Proper answer seems to be
that being in occupation of Egypt we must defend it from all attack and that Egypt must
therefore not provoke attack by breach of neutrality. This attitude has preserved Egypt
uninjured and intact during Italian-Turkish war and must be adhered to 'in future.["]

E. G.

As war with several States, notably Bulgaria, seems imminent, might it not be well to
supplement the message sent last night (see Sir E. Grey's Minute) by a further tel[egram] to
Lord Kitchener as follows : —

No. . My tel[egram] No. 72 of yesterday. I suggest, for your consideration, that on
outbreak of hostilities Rules similar to those issued in 1904 should be promulgated in Egypt:
See Lord Cromer's 5 Treaty of Feb[ruarv] 16 and 8 Treaty of March 3, 1904.

W. M.

Oct. 17. 12.

I think we should first wait for L[orjd Kitchener's reply to our tel[egram] of yesterday
before sending any additional observations. (*) Circ[umstance]s in the coming war are very
different from those in 1904, and, while keeping neutrality of Egypt, we must be very careful
as to the form in which this is done, and we must not unnecessarily excite Turkish or Moslem
opinion.

A. N.
E. G.

I should like to follow the precedent of the Italian-Turkish War as far as we can and I do
not see why that of 1904 should be substituted for it, if the two differ from each other. We
should however be careful now to keep to the obligations of the Hague Conventions.

E. G.

N.B. — In my minute of Oct[ober] 16th on 43461 I said nothing about the issue of the
Rules of 1904 because that question did not arise on Sir G. Lowther's telegram of
Oct[ober] 15th and I therefore confined myself strictly to the point raised in that telegram.

Mr. Maycock's subsequent minute of Oct[ober] 17th (on the other side of this sheet) I did
not see until to-day or I should have said before that I thought we should adhere to the
precedent of the late Italo-Turkish war which is absolutely on all fours with the present
situation in regard to the issue of Proclamations of Neutralitj' or Rules for the observance of
neutrality.

The question was considered when the Italo-Turkish war broke out and it was decided
rightly or wrongly — I think rightly — not to issue a Proclamation.

We should of course guide our conduct and decisions by the Rules of 1904, but that is not
quite the same point.

W. E. D.
18.X.12.

(») [This was done in telegram (No. 72), D. October 16, 1912, 8 p.m. (F.O. 43461/43461/
12/44.) This telegram was repeated to Constantinople (No. 829). (F.O. 43708/33672/12/44.)]
(*) [For Lord. Kitchener's reply, v. infra, p. 30, No. 39.]

No. 3G.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Belgrade, October 16, 1912.
F.O. 43556/33672/12/44. D- 8 p.m.

Tel. fNo. 37.) R- 7-35 p.m.

Under instructions from his Government, Turkish Minister left Belgrade to-day
with his staff.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 37.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edivard Grey.{^)
F.O. 44209/33672/12/44.

(No. 307.) St. Petershurgh, D. October 16, 1912.

Sir, R. October 21, 1912.

That the combined efforts of the Powers should have failed to avert war in the
Balkans has not taken the Russian public by surprise, as ever since the first order to
mobilise was issued war was regarded as inevitable. Now that the die has been finally
cast, the question is being asked will the efforts of the Powers to localise the war
prove equally unsuccessful and will the Statesmen who direct the foreign policy of the
Triple Entente show greater skill in dealing with the European crisis, should it arise,
than they had displayed in the handling of the Balkan problem. While the press has
been very free with its criticisms it has, with the sole exception of the " Novoe
Vremya," refrained from putting forward any suggestions of its own for the guidance
of the Statesmen whom it has taken so severely to task. The " Novoe Vremya,"
however, rushes in where its more cautious contemporaries fear to tread and declares
that the fire that is smouldering at Vienna must be extinguished before it lights up a
general European conflagration and that in order to accomplish this the Powers of the
Triple Entente must give the Austrian Government clearly to understand that there
must be no military intervention on her part.

As I have already reported by telegraph(^) Monsieur Sazonow has, through the
Russian Ambassador at Vienna, given Count Berchtold the categorical assurance that,
if Austria will abstain from an occupation of the Sanjak or of Servian territory, Russia
will not intervene in the war. The reply which he has now received from Count
Berchtold is so far satisfactory that it gives Monsieur Sazonow reason to believe that
Austria will restrict her action to cx)ncentrating troops near the Servian frontier. For
the moment, therefore, the efforts of the Powers to localise the war would appear to
have borne fruit. Count Berchtold's assurances, however, can hardly be held to
remove all danger as regards the future and it is always possible that some frontier
incident or some provocative action on the part of Servia may stir Austrian public
opinion to such a pitch that the Government will find itself forced to intervene. On
the other hand, were the Bulgarian arms to meet with any serious reverses, the
Russian Government would equally be unable to maintain a passive attitude. If not
as strong as at the time of the war of 1877, Russian sympathy with the Balkan Slavs
is still a factor that must be counted with and, when once fighting begins in real
earnest, is certain to show itself in one form or another.

(0 [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
{•) [v. supra, pp. 9-10, No. 13.]

There is also always the danger that, before the war is over, there will be local
massacres of Christians in Turkey, and incidents of this character will not fail to
inflame public opinion in this country. Already a considerable number of volunteers
have offered their services to the Bulgarian Legation, while arrangements are being
made for sending medical assistance to the sick and wounded. But it is in the press
that this sympathy chiefly finds expression, where it takes the form of violent attacks
on the present policy of the Russian Government. Monsieur Sazonow is told that he
ought to have seen that the only way to avert war was to insist both at Balmoral and
at Paris on full satisfaction being given to the lawful demands of the Balkan States
and the fact that he failed to do so and that war has ensued makes the public slow to
accept his assurances with regard to the policy of the Powers or to place much
confidence in the lasting co-operation of Russia and Austria. No single journal has
so far raised its voice in his defence and a report — for which, however, I believe there
is no foundation— is being persistently circulated that he will very shortly have to
resign his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He himself professes to doubt the genuineness of the movement in favour of the
Balkan Slavs and speaks of it as a press campaign engineered by the opponents of the
Government. The latter are no doubt making capital out of it, but Monsieur Sazonow
will, in my opinion, commit a great mistake if he continues to treat this movement as
a negligible quantity, and, if he does so, he may even end by compromising his
position. From the language used to me by the Emperor last winter there can be no
doiJbt but that His Majesty considers that Russian sympathy for the Balkan Slavs is a
factor that even he must count with while the tradition which he has inherited from
his grandfather, the Tsar Liberator, as well as the influence of those members of the
Imperial family who have contracted marriage with members of the Royal Houses of
Greece, Servia and Montenegro, may carry weight with His ]\Iajesty.

The scepticism displayed as regards the possibility of localising the war is not
altogether to he wondered at when account is taken of the many conflicting interests
which will have to be reconciled if an Austro-Russian conflict is to be averted. Even
if Austria refrains from crossing the frontier during the earlier stages of the war, it
is impossible to foresee what may happen when Europe decides that the moment has
arrived for mediating between the two belligerents. Unless, as is hardly possible, the
Balkan States suffer a crushing defeat at the hands of the Turks, they will not be
satisfied with any settlement of the Macedonian question that does not realise the
objects, to attain which they are now appealing to arms. They profess, indeed, to
have renounced all idea of territorial aggrandisement, but they have already mapped
out their respective spheres of influence, and will derfiand that the territories comprised
in these spheres shall form separate autonomous Vilayets. This is a claim, which
Turkey will no doubt resist to the last, as she would regard it as the first step towards
her eventual dismemberment. But supposing, for the sake of argument, that she is
seriously worsted in the war, the claim is one which Russia could hardly refuse to
support at a Conference of the Powers. It was Russia who inspired the conclusion of
the Alliance between Servia and Bulgaria and, though Monsieur Sazonow has now
told me that the text of the treaty was never submitted to the Russian Government,
until it was already initialled in the form in which it was to be finally signed, and
although the latter were careful to impress on the two contracting parties the fact that
it must bear a purely defensive character they welcomed the arrangement, under
which Servia and Bulgaria agreed to compose their long standing differences by an
amicable demarcation of their respective spheres of influence. In working for this
alliance Russia believed that it would prove to be a docile instrument in her hands :
and only two months ago Monsieur Kokovtsoff assured me that Bulgaria would never
move until the Emperor of Russia said the word. The fact that she has now done so
in spite of the utmost diplomatic pressure that Russia could brina to bear at Sofia,
will, however, be forgotten if the war ends favourably for Bulgaria. The feeling of
sympathy and pride which her victories would evoke in this country, provided always

that she does not attempt to lay her hands on Constantinople, would render it very
difl&cult for any Russian Government to join in depriving Bulgaria and her allies of
the fruits of the war.

It is then that the co-operation, temporarily established between Austria and
Russia, will be put to the test as the former is not likely to accept a settlement of the
Macedonian question that would erect a formidable barrier between her and Salonika.
France, England and Germany would no doubt lend their good offices for the purpose
of effecting a compromise between the rival claims of the two Powers more directly
interested; but the position of His Majesty's Government will be a very difficult one.
Their attitude will be watched with jealous apprehensions both by His Majesty's
Mahommedan subjects in India and by the Russian public. The former will expect
them to throw the weight of their influence into the scales in favour of their
co-religionists in Turkey, while the latter will look to England, as a member of the
Triple Entente, to support Russia in advocating the cause of the Balkan Slavs. A
leading Russian journalist recently told me that it was in order to secure England's
co-operation with Russia in the Balkan question, whenever the crisis came, that his
journal had consistently supported the idea of an Anglo-Russian Understanding and
the ultimate fate of that understanding was now in England's hands. If, he added,
England were to fail, the first time that she was appealed to, to support Russia in a
question in which she was so vitally interested as the present one, the understanding
would lose all its value in the eyes of Russians.

In submitting the above considerations, I have gone on the supposition that the
future of war would be on the side of the Bulgarians, not because I think that this
must necessarily be the case, but because I desire to draw attention to the difficulties
with which we would be confronted, should it prove to be so. I would only add that,
if Europe is not to be taken a second time unprepared, when the time comes for
convoking a conference to liquidate the war, it would seem urgently necessary that the
Powers should lose no time in considering between themselves how the conflicting
interests that will then hove to be reconciled can best be adjusted. Though it will no
doubt be very difficult to formulate any precise proposals for a final settlement until
after one or more decisive battles have been fought, we can hardly hope that our offers
of mediation will be accepted by the belligerents unless we are in a position to indicate
the general lines which that settlement will take.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

MINUTES.

The German Chancellor is of opinion that mediation sh[oul]d not be undertaken until all
belligerents are exhausted i.e. not before the spring.^)

A. N.

It is very doubtful whether the Russian Gov[ernmen]t would commit themselves now as
regards a settlement. Russian policy does not want aggrandized Balkan States and would
probably agree at this moment to a settlement that Austria could also agree with. But as
pointed out in this despatch Russian feeling may be so aroused in the course of the war that
Russian policy may have to give way to it and it would therefore be useless to commit Russia
too definitely in advance. That is however no reason why we should not try to steer a moderate
course as long as we can. Public feeling here as well as in Russia may become very anti-Turkish
• — it depends upon events.

E. G

(3) [cp. infra, p. 37. No. 47.]

[ED. NOTE— On October 16 Sir H. Bax-Irouside wrote to Sir Edward Grey a long
despatch (No. 114), received on October 23, embodying the contents of his telegrams (v. supra,
pp. 1-24, passim) and adding that the telegraph line to the Turkish frontier from Sofia
had been cleared to permit the Turkish Charge d'Affaires to communicate directly with
Constantinople; that the majority of the Headquarters Staff of the Bulgarian army had left

on October 12 for PhUippopolis, and that on tho same day Servian currency was made
legal tender m Bulgaria. He said that on October 14 a Turkish force was reported to have
attacked one of the Bulgarian frontier posts S.S.W. of Philippopolis, and that certain Servian
outposts had been attacked on the same day. Sir H. Bax-Ironside considered that these
incidents would doubtless be used as evidence that the Ottoman Government had commenced
hostilities while negociations were still in progress, but that they were probably of no greater
importance than the usual frontier incidents. On October 16 the Charge d' Affaires and
personnel of the Turkish legation left Sofia, thus definitely causing a rupture of diplomatic
relations. On the loth Sir 11. Bax-Ironside had been notified that in con.sequence of
mining operations all vessels bound for Varna must await instructions from the Turkish
Government tug before entering the mouth of the Kamchick river. (F.O. 44698/33672/12/44.)]

No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)

F.O. 43274/33672/12/44.
(No. 509.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October IG, 1912.

I M. Cambon asked me on Oct[ober] 11 wliether I had any new3.(-j

I said that niy information indicated that Bulgaria would declare war next week,
probably about Wednesday the 16th. It was quite plain in my opinion that the facts
of the situation were now what they had been for some weeks, ever since the Balkan
States came together. These States had made up their minds that the use of force
was absolutely necessary. If the Great Powers would not use force, they intended to
use it themselves, and nothing but the use of force on the part of the Great Powers
would prevent them from doing so.

M. Cambon agreed, and then told me that M. Poincare thought that a Conference
of Ambassadors might be useful, to study the question of reforms. The law of 1880
had more than 300 articles, and the whole subject required consideration.

I said that one great advantage of a Conference would be that Russia and Austria
would be kept working together. For this reason I should be favourable to it if all
the other Powers would agree. If the answer of Turkey to the collective communica-
tion made yesterday, (^) inviting her to discuss reforms with the Powers, was
I favourable, (*) the proposal of a Conference of Ambassadors might be launched at once.
I If Turkey's reply was unfavourable, it would perhaps be undesirable to launch the
' idea of a conference until after war had actually broken out. The meeting of the
I proposed Conference could have no influence now on the question of peace or war,
I but after war had broken out it might enable the Powers to arrive at some conclusion
as to what the settlement should be, and that would make it possible for them to
intervene with effect to. stop the war and impose that settlement.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. A
copy was sent to the Director of Militarv Operations.]
(^) [cp. D.D.F., 3"* Ser., Vol. IV, pp."'l09-10, No. 119.]
(^) [i.e., the 10th. The despatch was drafted on October 11.]

('') [v. supra, p. 12, No. 16, note ('), and for the replv of the Porte sent on 15th, v. supra,
pp. 23-4, No. 33.]

No. 39.

Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Cairo, October 17, 1912.

F.O. 43708/33672/12/44. D. 4-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 63.) E. 5-40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 72 of 17th October. (^)

Your proposed statement to Turkey re neutrality seems to me to meet the case
in the best way. Kiamil Pasha's statement to the press that Egyptian neutrality
prevented Turkey beating Italy has done some harm here, and is evidently an attempt
to place the responsibility on the wrong shoulders.

The Khedive goes to Bucharest to-morrow on the way to Constantinople. With
reference to your telegram No. 71 of 15th October, (^) he has been told that the com-
munication about (group undecypherable : ? Alexandrian defences) will be made by
the Ambassador.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations. Paragraph 1 of this telegram was sent
to Constantinople (as No. 830). Instructions were given " If any further allusion is made to
this matter, you sh[oul]d speak as proposed in my above-mentioned tel[egram]." Telegram
(No. 831) to Sir G. Lowther of October 21, D. 12.30 p.m.]

(-) I !'. supra, p. 25, No. 35, note (^). The telegram was dated October 16.]
(3) [Not reproduced. The telegram dealt with the proposed defences at Alexandria. Sir
Edward Grey stated that he wished Sir G. Lowther to make a communication to the Porte on
the subject. (F.O. 42670/35499/12/16.)]

No. 40.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Belgrade, October 17, 1912.
F.O. 43707/33672/12/44. D. 9 p.m.

Tel. En clair. E. 9-31 p.m.

War declared this evening.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 41.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)
F.O. 44215/33672/12/44.

(No. 313.) St. Petersburgh, D. October 17, 1912.

Sir, R. October 21, 1912.

Monsieur Sazonow informed me on the 15th instant that he intended to publish
an ofl&cial communique in the Press in regard to the situation in the Balkans. The
communique appeared yesterday in the " Eossia " in the form of a leading article a
full summary of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

Little reference is made to the communique in to-day's press but it will probably
be discussed in more detail in the course of the next few days. The " Eech " is

(0 [A copy of this despatch was sent to Vienna.]

sympathetic and attributes significance to the fact that the article was the joint work
of Monsieur Sazonow and Monsieur Kokovtsoff. It considers its pubHcation was
necessary in order to put an end to the alarmist rumours of a general conflagration in
Europe. The evening edition of the " Novoe Vreniya " was brief and sarcastic while
the Bourse Gazette is inclined to treat the communique with scepticism.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Summary of Leading Article in the " Rossia'' of October 16, 1912.

The leading article on the situation in the Balkans published in the " Rossia "
on October IGth. states that events in the Balkans as was to be anticipated have found
a most diverse and it may be said contradictory reflection in the various circles of
Russian public opinion. If in a portion of the Press attacks have been made on the
Government for not conducting a policy based on sentiment and impulse the Bourse
has clearly and unmistakably expressed the opposite fear that Russia will surrender
herself precisely to such a policy. Finally doubt has been expressed in different
quarters as to whether Russia will succeed in maintaining peace in Europe. Two
elements are discernible among these conflicting currents which are contributing to
the present political situation. First of these is the policy of Russia — her positive
problems and the means for their realisation : and the second — the relations of the
other great Powers in Europe to the crisis. The seriousness of the present moment
makes it obligatory to deal with both these points as fully as possible. As regards
Russian policy we cannot conceal from ourselves or from others, nor do we wish to,
that the sympathy of Russia at the present moment is where it always has been — on
the side of her kinsmen and brothers in religious faith. Only very impressionable or
very ill-informed persons can talk of any indifference towards the fundamental
covenants of our past. But sentiment and traditions, however respected cannot be
the sole factors in the determination of the course of policy which is the result of
complex interests and conditions between which it is necessary to establish a
])erspective. Examining this perspective of our interests, first in importance is the
vital need of all classes of the people, of all sides of our internal life for the
maintenance of peace without detriment to our real interests, and in adopting this
standpoint the Government feels itself solidly supported by an enormous majority of
the Russian people and no attacks by the Press will disturb it. In making the
preservation of peace its chief aim the Government nevertheless understands that the
wish alone is insufficient. But without undue optimism or exaggeration it can be said
that one of the most weighty pledges for the maintenance of peace in Europe is the
fact that Russia is not only pacifically inclined but represents in herself a very serious
and inspiring force. Russia's military strength is considerably greater than was the
case on the eve of war in the Far East. A series of good harvests and other favour-
able conditions have not only increased the productive life of the country but made
it possible for our Ministry of Finance to regard the future with tranquillity whatever
unforeseen circumstances may arise. Finally, the general political conjuncture could
not be more favourable for the maintenance of peace in Europe than the present, a
factor which cannot but be dwelt on in connection with the interests affected by the
present crisis. For us it is of course of the first importance to know that of herself
Russia is sufficiently strong to make her voice heard wherever it may be necessary
and this voice is sufficiently powerful to secure us from any actions infringing or
opposed to our interests. But no less reassuring is the circumstance that the general
political situation in Europe hardly gives any serious grounds for excessive fears in
this respect. First of all, there is no need for us to insist on the strength and
solidarity of the relations of Russia with France and England, constituting so in-

estimable a factor in the preservation of the general European peace. Its significance
was correctly assessed by German official circles last summer after the visit of the
Emperor WiUiam.(2) We regard with similar lack of all suspicion the Triple
Alhance completing the balance of Power in Europe. In particular our relations
with each of the Powers of which it is composed leave nothing to be desired.
We cannot but note with a feeling of profound satisfaction that at the very time
the crisis in the Balkans began to become acute a common fear of war and a common
desire to maintain peace formed the basis for a rapprochement and a frank exchange
of opinions between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna. It is impossible to
estimate the whole significance of this fact, both as regards the preservation of the
general peace and from the point of view of those positive results which were obtained
during the visit of Monsieur . Sazonow to London(^) Paris and Berhn. Thanks to the
efforts of Russian diplomacy supported so successfully by the initiative of the French
Government all the European Powers were united in recognising the two principles : —
one, the legality in principle of the desire of the Balkan States for reforms in
European Turkey to be secured by new guarantees and, two, the inviolability of the
territorial status quo should war in the Balkans not be averted. The force of this
statement is increased by the fact that it was presented to the Balkan States in the
name of all the Powers by those most interested in the situation — Eussia and
Austria. The " Rossia " goes on to say that it is true that the statement to this effect
was made in the Balkan Capitals but maintains that it retains to an equal extent its
significance for the two Powers which made it, and constitutes a fresh public con-
firmation before Europe and the Balkan States of the principles on which their policy
is based. This fact alone should suffice to put an end to hints of bad faith which have
of late been thrown at Russia and Austria, united in the common task of disinterested
pacification. In the relations which have now arisen between the two Governments
all who are interested in the preservation of the general peace of Europe and,
naturally connected with it. the localisation of the war should see a true barometer
as to the chances of the Balkan fire becoming a general European conflagration. In
conclusion the article says : "we are on the threshold of events in the Balkans the
outcome of which no one can discount. We believe that the efforts of all the Powers
will be directed towards the speediest possible cessation of bloodshed, both in the
interests of humanity and peace and of the belligerent parties. We feel under the
present circumstances that we are on firm ground in our relations with the Powers
and in the consciousness of our strength for the maintenance of which the necessary
means can be found at any moment. Without holding any illusions as regards the
seriousness of the situation we look soberly but boldly ahead in the calm ce)nviction
that we possess the means and power to defend the national interests and prestige
of Russia whenever occasion may arise."

(2) [v. Gooch d- Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 397-8, No. 409.]

(3) [v. ibid., Vol. IX (1), pp. 749-72, Chapter LXXVIII.]

No. 42.

Communication from Tewfik Pasha.

F.O. 43718/33672/12/44. Turkish Embassy, London, October 17, 1912.

L'Ambassadeur de Turquie presente ses compliments a Sir E. Grey, et a
I'honneur de communiquer a Son Excellence le texte de la Note Verbale ci-dessous que
Son Excellence Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de

I'Empire Ottoman, vient d'adresser aujourd'hui meme aux Legations Eoyales de
Serbie et de Bulgaria :

"La mobilisation generale et la concentration de forces bulgares (serbes) sur la
frontiere ottomane, les attaques journalieres des fortins et positions tout le long de
oette frontiere, I'ingerence dans les affaires interieures ottomanes et les exigences non
moins inadmissibles et inconcevables, ont rendu impossible le maintien de la paix entre
la Turquie et le Bulgaria (Serbie) que le Gouvernement Imperial etait desireux de
conserver toujours. En consequence le Chef de la Legation Eoyale de Bulgarie
(Serbie) et son personnel sont informes qu'ils doivent prendre leurs passeports et
quitter le territoire de I'Empire aussitot que faire se peut."

Par suite de cette Note Verbale, Tewfik Pacha informe Son Excellence Sir E.
Grey que la Turquie se trouve a partir d'aujourd'hui en etat de guerre avec la
Bulgarie et la Serbie.

Londres le 17 octohre 1912.

No. 43.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private. (^)

My dear Nicolson, St. Petersbrirgh, October 17, 1912.

Many thanks for your last letter.

The Balkan war is now virtually an accomplished fact, and I confess that I felt
all along that my old friends the Bulgars meant business this time. The occasion
was, for so many reasons, such a favourable one that I never thought that the Powers
could in the course of a few days find a solution that would satisfy them. Indeed
the Macedonian question is one of those problems which can only be settled by the
sword. Now that the fat is in the fire one is inclined to ask oneself who placed it
there ; and as without the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance there would probably have been
no Balkan war, Russia as the prompter if not the actual creator of that alliance
naturally incurs considerable responsibility. On my mentioning the matter to
Sazonow the other day, he remarked that it was but natural that Russia should have
tried to bring two Slav races together who had for years past been massacring each
other in Macedonia. The Russian Government, he declared, had taken no part
in the drafting of the Treaty and had only seen the text when it was already parafe.
They had all along insisted both at Sofia and Belgrade that the alliance must be
purely defensive in character and had never intended it to be used for offensive
purposes. I have no doubt but that this is perfectly true, and I rather imagine that
Russia, as at the time of the Declaration of Bulgarian Independence, overestimated
the strength of her influence at Sofia and Belgrade. In speaking of the Balkan
situation some two months back, Kokovtsof? assured me that Bulgaria would never
move till the Emperor gave the word and that His Majesty was far too prudent to
launch her on a policy of adventure. On the other hand Sazonow has ever since
the beginning of the year taken a most pessimistic view of the Balkan outlook. You
may remember that so far back at February(-) both he and the Emperor spoke to me
of the advisability of the Powers of the Triple Entente consulting together as to the
action they should take should war break out. This was before the Serbo-Bulgarian
alliance was actually concluded ; so that in encouraging it Russia was certainly playing
with fire. Ever since then Sazonow's pessimism has been pitched in an ever
crescendo key and we cannot accuse him of not having done his utmost to
avert the war.

Where he has been more successful is in his efforts to localise it. He has

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912. This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the
King and' to the Prime Minister.]

(2) [v. Gooch cfc Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 5i5, 549, Nos. 552-3.]

[6272] D

throughout maintained contact with Vienna and has approached Berchtold in a very
concihatory spirit. The assurances which Thurn brought back on his return from
leave two days ago are most satisfactory, and for the moment all danger of any
separate action by either Austria or Kussia is removed. We are, however, by no
means out of the wood, as the crucial moment will come when the day of settlement
arrives. I agree with Sazonow in thinking that there is no use talking of a Conference
till we are in a position to mediate after that one or more decisive battles have been
fought. We ought however, I think, to pave the way for that Conference by private
conversations between the Powers and to try to elaborate a basis of settlement.
Otherwise the psychological moment for mediation will find us unprepared. The
difficulty of reconciling the conflicting interests not only of the belligerents but of the
Powers themselves will be enormous, more especially if the Balkan States come out
victorious. It is a very risky thing to prophecy; but I have great confidence in the
efficiency of the Bulgarian Army, and if victory is on the side of the allies, the
minimum that will satisfy them will be the creation of a number of autonomous
vilayets. This will mean the first step towards the dismemberment of Turkey: and
while Eussia will, in such a case, inevitably have to support the cause of the Balkan
Slavs, Austria will never consent to a settlement that blocks the road to Salonica.
How we, France and Germany will be able to adjust the differences that are then
almost certain to arise between Eussia and Austria is more than I can see. We must
only hope that neither Turkey nor the Balkan States will gain any decided advantages
in the war, as then the settlement will be much easier to effect.

We have a very bad press here at present, (^) and His Majesty's Government are
represented as having been so anxious to spare the feelings of the Turks that they
would not countenance the exercise of any pressure at Constantinople, even when
war was the only alternative. The foreign editor of the " Novoe Vremya,"
Professor Pilenko, who is also Professor of International Law at the University, came
to see me about a fortnight ago and said that the reason why his journal had con-
sistently supported an Anglo-Eussian Understanding was in order that Eussia might
be able to count on England's support when the Balkan crisis came. We had, he
continued, refused to press at Constantinople for the application of Article 23 of
the Treaty of Berlin, as Sazonow had proposed, and he warned me that if England
failed Eussia now, the days of the Anglo-Eussian Understanding were numbered. I
told him that so far as I was aware Sazonow had never asked us to do this, and that
on the contrarj^ he had been quite satisfied with the support which we had given him.

Though I do not as a rule pay much attention to what the Eussian press says,
I think that on this Slav question it has public opinion behind it. If, therefore, when
the Conference eventually meets we find ourselves unable to give our whole-hearted
support to Eussia, I very much fear that a serious breach will be made in the Anglo-
Eussian Understanding.

For the past few days there have been persistent rumours that Sazonow will
shortly be replaced by Witte. I do not believe that there is any foundation for them
at present ; but he is the subject of daily attacks in the press, and not a single paper
has a good word to say for him. He has never attempted to conciliate journalists,
and is too much inclined to treat the present agitation in favour of the Balkan Slavs
as a press campaign engineered by opponents of the Government. I think that he
is beginning to see that he has gone too far in this direction, as he has to-day caused
an inspired article to be published in the " Eossia " on the Balkan question. He is
to go to report to the Emperor at Spala on Friday — as he has not yet seen His
Majesty, as stated in a telegram from Sofia. He will, I believe, find that the
Emperor considers that Eussian sympathy with the Balkan Slavs is a factor with
which even His Majesty has to count.

Sazonow is much relieved to hear that Turkey has concluded peace with Italy.
He was afraid apparently that Bulgaria might get altogether out of hand if Turkey

(3) [Marginal note by Sir Edward Grey: "I have spoken to Count Benckendorff about
the Russian Press. E. G."]

had still to deal with Italy as well, and he was also T think a little nervous lest the
ItaUan fleet might try to force the Dardanelles, while the Bulgarian Army was
marching on Constantinople. The Italians have much more luck than they deserve.
They are really the cause of all these troubles, and now the Balkan States have
pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for them. Louis seems rather to think that it
was they who egged the King of Montenegro on to begin the war : and they are
certainly the only Great Power, to benefit by His action. Sazonow assures me, and
I am convinced with truth, that it was not Russia who gave the word.

So far as one can judge at present the majority of the new Dtima will consist
of reactionaries and priests. The Octobrists have lost heavily ; and the result of the
elections is neither favourable to us nor to Kokovtsoff.

I have forwarded the King's letter to the Emperor through Sazonow.

Ever yours,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 44.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C)

St. Petershurgh, October 18, 1912.
F.O. 43907/33672/12/44. D. 8-15 p.m.

Tel. (No. 378.) ' ' R. 10-15 p.m.

In course of conversation with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, (^) I
observed that if eventual mediation of Powers was to be successful, it would be
necessary for them to be in a position to give belligerents some idea of the lines which
the settlement, which was to end war, would follow, as otherwise they might not listen
to us. His Excellency agreed, and said that, though it would be impossible to draw up
detailed scheme in advance, we ought, if possible, to agree on its general principles.
Russian Government were anxious that French Minister for Foreign Affairs should
initiate exchange of views between Powers on the subject, as any proposals which he
might put forward would probably meet with a better reception than if they came
direct from St. Petershurgh. He thought, however, that before they were officially
submitted to Powers there should be a preliminary consultation between . London,
Paris, and St. Petershurgh, as, while most anxious not to emphasise division of Europe
into two groups, it was most necessary that there should be no divergence of views
between Powers of the Triple Entente in any discussion in which all the Powers were
engaged.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 307) ; to Constantinople (as No. 825) ; to Paris
(as No. 602) ; to Vienna (as No. 297) ; to Rome (as No. 437). Copies were sent to the Admiralty;
to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(-) [Count Benckendorff appears to refer to this interview in a conversation with Sir
Edward Grey held on October 21, v. Siebert, pp. 371-2.]

No. 45.

M. Gennadius to Sir Edxcard Grey.
F.O. 43778/33672/12/44.

Monsieur le Ministre Greek Legation, London, October 18, 1912.

In accordance with instructions received from His Hellenic Majesty's Govern-
ment I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Greece, in common with
Bulgaria and Servia, addressed to Turkey, yesterday in the course of the afternoon, a
declaration of War.

The motives for this step are set forth in a Notification which I venture to hope
I may be permitted to hand in person to Your Excellency.

I have, &c.

J. GENNADIUS.

[6272]

[ED. NOTE.Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 487 of October 18, 1912, D. 3 p.m., R. 5-25 p.m.
(F.O. 43899/33672/12/44), reported the communication by Greece of a declaration of the state
of war owing to the failure of the Porte to reply to the identic notes of the three Balkan States,
the stoppage of Greek shipping, and the rupture of diplomatic relations by the Porte. The
"notification" mentioned at the end of the immediately preceding document was made to
the Foreign Office on October 21 and contained the text of the declaration of war. (F.O. 44376/
33672/12/44.)]

No. 46.

Communication from M. Paul Cambon.
P.O. 44085/33672/12/44. October 18, 1912.

1° Les Puissances se concerteront immediatement a reffet d'interposer en temps
opportun leur mediation entre la Sublime Porte et les Gouvernements des Etats
Balkaniques.

2° Si la mediation reussit les Puissances se concerteront pour 1' etude et
I'application des reformes a introduire dans la Turquie d'Europe.

3° Si la mediation echoue, le^ Puissances se concerteront pour prendre, a la fin
des hostilites, les mesures que commandent le souci de la paix generale et I'interet
commun de I'Europe.

4° Les Puissances s'accordent, d'ailleurs a ne rien entreprendre qui soit contraire
a la Souverainete de Sa Majeste Imperiale le Sultan et a I'integrite de I'Empire
Ottoman.

18 octobre 1912.

MINUTES.

Sir Edward Grey,

This is a fresh formula drawn up by M. Poincare in order to meet some German and
Austrian observations in regard to the inconvenience of holding a Conference during hostilities.
In this fresh formula anv allusion to a Conference has disappeared.

A. N.

I suppose wo can express consent.

[A. N.]

Yes.(i)

E. G.

(1) [A despatch (No. 518) was sent to Sir F. Bertie on October 24, authorizing him to inform
the French Government of the British concurrence in this formula. A letter to the same effect
was sent to M. Paul Cambon also on October 24. (F.O. 44085/33672/12/44.) For the instruc-
tions on which M. Cambon's communication was based, v. D.D.F., 3™* Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 199-200,
No. 192.]

No. 47.

Lord Granville to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private.(^) Berlin, October 18, 1912.

My dear Sir Arthur, . . . .(^)
October 19th.

I met the Chancellor last night at a big dinner given by M. Cambon in connection
with the Exhibitions Conference. After dinner he came up and talked to me for
nearly an hour. I suppose I ought properly to report some at least of his remarks
by despatch but I have not time to sift it out before the bag goes so I hope I may be
forgiven for taking the easier and quicker method of writin'g it all privatelv to vou.
- . . .C)

The conversation then turned to the Balkans. Herr von Bethmann regretted
that it had not been possible to stop the war but, as it had begun, he was convinced

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

(2) [The omitted paragraphs refer chiefly to the appointment of Prince Lichnowsky to the
Embassy at London ]

that it must be allowed to take its course and, brutal as it sounded, he hoped it would
be very severe and very bloody and that a hard winter would make it more severe.
I said I gathered from that that he thought the moment for intervention would not
come before the spring and he said he was sure it would not. I asked if it were not
possible that a decisive battle might be fought soon — he said yes — a so-called decisive
battle might be fought very soon but the Bulgarians would win it and it would not
really be decisive as the Turks would retire to some practically impregnable lines and
sit and wait there with Oriental patience. His opinion was that the Powers must not
intervene till both sides had suffered very heavily and things were pretty evenly
balanced, so that both would be ready and glad to accept mediation. I asked if he
thought there would be any question of intervention by force and he said most
decidedly not — we must wait till our peaceful mediation can be accepted. I said I
was not suggesting it as probable but was there not the possibility that his calculations
might be upset either by the Bulgarians being even more successful than he expected
and advancing so far that they would have to be stopped by Europe or by the Turks
winning the first decisive battle and smashing up their enemies in three or four weeks.
He considered both hypotheses entirely out of the question. The important thing for
the Powers, he said, was to keep in continual contact and above all to keep quiet — he
was convinced that there was no danger at all of either Austria or Kussia moving
unless we — England, France and Germany — set them going by some false move. I
asked if he meant that we must keep in continual contact but avoid too many proposals
and he said that was just what he did mean. I then asked if I was right in gathering
that he thought M. Poincare was being a little too active, but that he would not allow
and said that M. Poincare had shown very useful zeal and had deserved well of Europe.
I said I supposed Germany could exercise very beneficent influence on Austria, and
France and perhaps ourselves on Russia — at first by mistake I used the word
" Druck " which he jibbed at, but when I corrected it to " Einfluss " he agreed. He
said he didn't see that the interests of any of us need clash — of course as regards
England there were Suda Bay and the Dardanelles. I jumped at that and said he
surely did not imagine we wanted to take Suda Bay — we should no doubt object to
any other Great Power having it but I was certain we had not the smallest idea of
taking it ourselves. He said he did not mean that we actually wanted or meant to
take it but it was always agreeable to any Power to extend its possessions : I repeated
that I was quite sure he was wTong and that we should not dream of it. This came
as a revelation to me as I had imagined that no one but ' ' yellow ' ' pressmen could
accuse us of wanting Suda Bay. I did not take up his murmured hint of the
Dardanelles and the matter dropped.

The conversation then drifted to Anglo-German relations. 1 said I did not believe
much in the various "friendship committees" etc. and feared they were apt to do
more harm than good by raising opposition; that it appeared to me there were
practically no definite questions between us but only a general feeling of distrust and
suspicion. - He agreed to a certain extent but said the Naval Question was a pretty
definite one. He quite understood that England disliked the change in the situation
that had been brought about in the last thirty years. Germany had gradually grown
up to be a really great Power in every sense, especially commercially, and we naturally
did not like her competition. But we must learn to realise that the change had taken
place. A really great Power with a seaboard could not be a " Landratte " ; she must
have a fleet and a, strong fleet. Her fleet was not in the very least directed against
us, but it was an absolute necessity for a Great Power. I said the argument was
always used in Germany that she required her fleet merely to protect her commerce
! and not as a threat against us, but in that case what was the object of a mass of
; Dreadnoughts congregated at home? He said my answer was perfectly logical if the
I argument was a right one, but it was not — Germany required her fleet not merely for
I the purpose of defending her commerce but for the general purposes of her greatness.
I A man would be considered a fool who only developed his legs and left his arms alone
I because he was a postman or something of the sort and only required the use of his legs.

In exactly the same way Germany must develope her fleet as well as her army.
I said I was prepared to admit all that but he must remember that while a strong navy
was perhaps a necessary part of Germany's development it was not a question of life
and death to her as it was to us — if we lost our pre-eminence on the sea we ceased
to exist. He quite admitted that but maintained nevertheless the absolute necessity
of a very strong navy for Germany. He said we must disabuse ourselves of the really
insane idea that Germany would some day make a raid on England — the opposite fear
held by many Germans that we should rush them, though he did not in the least
believe it, was of the two far the more reasonable. The day would come, perhaps
sooner that I could imagine, when we should be very glad to have a strong German
fleet in existence. Surely we ought by this time, after all he had done and said, to
realise the honesty of his policy. I said, if he would allow me to speak very
indiscreetly and certainly quite personally, that people in England — not the Govern-
ment but the public — were I thought inclined to trust him but they were doubtful as
to the amount of power held by Herr von Tirpitz, that they were inclined to believe
that Herr von Tirpitz 's policy was not necessarily the same as his and that it might
possibly obtain the upper hand. He said Herr von Tirpitz, as the creator of Germany's
navy, naturally was sometimes rather carried away by the desire to foster his own
child, that they did not always see eye to eye and that Herr von Tirpitz had sometimes
used rather indiscreet and violent language — ^but after all, if it came to that, so had
Mr. Churchill. I said Mr. Churchill had used the very unfortunate word "luxury"
but I did not remember anything else — he said yes he had made some very violent
and provocative speeches ; but he did not want to complain of them or enter into
recriminations — he had only quoted him against my references to Herr von Tirpitz.
The important thing at present and the best hope of creating a better atmosphere
between the two countries was, in his opinion, that we should get into the habit of
talking more openly and frankly to each other and that we should work together when
questions of common interest arose. I agreed and said I hoped these Balkan troubles
might be of use in that respect. He said he always had the feeling that there was a
barrier between us and that even when we were exchanging views he did not feel
that we got as close to one another as he did with Russia or even France. He said
he was not speaking officially and he was not making a formal complaint — he had no
definite complaint to make but he always had the feeling he described. I said surely
that state of things had enormously improved — most of this year there had been no
questions to discuss but in the last two or three months I had had the feeling that the
way I had been instructed to speak to Herr von Kiderlen and the way His Excellency
had spoken to me both on the Balkan question and on the question of the Chinese
Loan had been entirely frank and consonant with thoroughly good relations. He said
yes things were much better but they were not right yet and he hoped Prince
Lichnowsky would make himself a position of confidence in England and be able to
do a great deal to improve this. I said I knew Sir Edward Goschen held the same
view very strongly.

The Chancellor was most civil and amiable to me all through ; he was very earnest
and at times very vehement about the absolute necessity of a strong navy for
Germany.

The Servian Charge d'Affaires has just called and told me that Kiderlen merely
took act of his communication of the declaration of war and that he had told liim that
Germany would maintain a strict neutrality but, as in the case of the Turco-Italian
war, would not issue a formal declaration of neutrality.

Yours very sincerelv,

' GRANVILLE.

MINUTES.

A very interesting letter.

E. G.

Lord Granville's account of his conversation with the Chancellor is very important.

H. H. A.

Very important; you observe that the Chancellor now gravitates towards the strong German
Navy policj'. He probably realises that the inevitable consequence is grouping of the other
Powers to maintain a balance of strength.

H. of C.

No. 48.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.

F.O. 44G93/33672/12/44.

(No. 69.) Belgrade, D. October 19, 1912.

Sir, R. October 23, 1912.

I had the honour in my telegram No. 31 of the 11th instant(') to state that it is
the impression amongst my Colleagues and that it is concurrently affirmed by Servians
that the present movement of the Balkan States is not spontaneous but is instigated
and fomented by Panslavist elements in Russia.

At a moment like the present every conceivable sort of theory is of course pro-
pounded in Belgrade each based more or less upon conjecture only but after taking
into consideration certain appearances I am inclined to believe that the above-
mentioned impression is, though not wholly, at least partially correct.

So far as I can gather there is no sufficient reason to believe that the movement
was originated from outside. I explained in my despatch No. 62 of the 7th instant(^)
that the agitation for combined action against Turkey was probably commenced by
Monsieur Spalaikovitch the Servian Minister at Sofia, Monsieur ToshefE the
Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade and Monsieur Yovanovitch, the Secretary General of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but on the other hand when Monsieur Pashitch came
into Office there was as yet no overwhelming excitement even among the Military
party and extremists and it seems probable that when opposed by Monsieur Pashitch 's
pacific ideas the agitation might have failed had not Panslavist encouragement from
Russia been invoked to its assistance.

Two features during the present crisis have been somewhat remarkable. In the
first place the Government are to all appearances going to war against their own
desires and secondly they are going to war in the face of strong remonstrances from the
Russian Government. These circumstances alone in a country where the Government
is usually able to direct public opinion at will and without the least difficulty and
where orders from the Russian Government have hitherto been blindly and unques-
tioningly obeyed almost force one to the conclusion that exceptional influences have
been at work. It is likewise somewhat remarkable that whilst the Balkan States have
themselves declared that they are not seeking any expansion of territory and whilst
the Great Powers have announced their intention that the status quo shall not be
interfered with, every Servian now states with absolute assurance and conviction that
Servia is about to reacquire her former possessions, that once she occupies territory
no one can dispossess her and that at the critical moment Russia will be found at her
side. The extent of Servian aims and ambitions is shown in the enclosed map
which has been widely circulated. (^)

I have reported in my despatch above referred to upon the equivocal attitude
lately adopted by Monsieur de Hartwig the Russian Minister. Since then, however,
he has gone further and has of late almost completely thrown off the mask. In a
recent conversation with the Roumanian Minister he expressed himself as disgusted
with Monsieur Sazonoff's pohcy in repressing a movement to which Russia had been
looking forward for years, whilst in speaking to myself a few days ago he enquired

(0 [Not reproduced, as its substance is given more fully in the above despatch.
(F.O. 42661/33672/12/44.)]

(2) [v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 742-4, No. 795.]
(^) [Not reproduced.]

with considerable impatience how, if the Balkan States occupied territory they were to
be tiirned out and who would undertake the task. It may perhaps be well to remember
that Monsieur de Hartwig has at various times been mentioned as a possible Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Under the circumstances it is to be feared that, although the war seems for the
present to be localized, should the arms of the Balkan States be successful against
Turkey the end of the war will mark the really dangerous moment for the peace of
"Europe.

I have, &c.

EALPH PAGET.

No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Constantinople, October 21, 1912.
F.O. 44456/33672/12/44. D. 4-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. .503.) Confidential. B. 10-45 p.m

Kiamil Pasha to-day sent me a private and confidential message to the effect
that, though war had unfortunately broken out despite endeavours of the Powers and
present Ottoman Cabinet, he thought it desirable, on humanitarian grounds, as also
because result would be disastrous to both sides, to stop it as soon as favourable
opportunity occurs, e.g., a considerable engagement on a large scale, and that he
hoped initiative would come from England, as it would be favourably received by,
and enhance her prestige in, Moslem world. His idea is apparently based on
assumption that first decisive engagement will be in favour of Turkish arms. His
Highness said that, while the Cabinet was determined to introduce broad and liberal
changes in administration of Turkey in Europe, the Balkan States had gone to war
to obtain autonomy, which they regarded as a stepping-stone to ultimate result in
Eastern Eoumelia. Apparently difference between contending parties was small,
but the Central Gov[ernmen]t must stop short of separating the local administration
from Central Government. His Highness said that, as regards Crete, he had had,
before the present situation arose, the idea of allowing Greece to administer Crete
in return for a general entente with Turkey, and he thought that it might still be
possible after the war to deal with problem on above lines.

Presumably such a solution must depend on issue of present struggle being in
favour of Turkey.

MINUTES.

Should Kiamil be asked to state more definitely what he would propose should the
contingency arise?

R. P. M.

I hardly think we should ask Kiamil P[ash]a for further details. The utmost we sh[ould]
do would be to ask Sir G. Lowther to let Kiamil P[ash]a know privately that we have
rec[eive]d his comm[unicatio]n and that we will bear his suggestions in mind sh[oul]d a
favourable opportunity arise. (2)

A. N.
E. G.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of NavaJ
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [A telegram was accordingly sent to. Sir G. Lowther (No. 840) on October 22 8 p ii
(F.O. 44456/53672/12/44.)]

No. 50.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. C)

F.O. 43907/33672/12/44. Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.

Tel. fNo. 1086.) D. 8 p.m.

Your telegram No. 378 of Oct[ober] 18.(')

I have told Russian Ambassador (^) that I agree with this view of "Russian
M[inister for] F[oreign] A[flFairs].

I have added that some real reform in Macedonia must be part of any settlement.
It need not be inconsistent with integrity of Turkey, but Powers will have to make
it certain that the old state of things in Macedonia does not recur. If however we
are to co-operate with Eussia as I assume we shall do in this object, it is essential
that Eussia should be very careful by her action in Persia, especially at such places
as Meshed, not to give offence to Mussulman feeling in India.

(') [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 609).]
(-) [v. supra, p. 35, No. 44.]

(^) [There is a much longer report of this interview by Count Benckendorff, and also of
one with Sir A. Nicolson in Siebert, pp. 370-3.]

No. 51.

Sir Edxcurd Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. {^)

F.O. 44791/33672/12/44.
(No. 352.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 21, 1912.

I spoke to the Eussian Ambassador to-day (^) about the way in which the Russian
Press was representing us as having obstructed M. Sazonoff's policy in the Near East,
through fear of offending ISIussulman susceptibilities.

I said that, as the Ambassador would remember, I had not opposed any proposals
which SazonofE had made; and, though I had spoken of the sensitiveness of
Mussulman opinion, and had asked SazonofT not to make things difficult for us by
action which must offend it, this had been in connection with Persia, especially the
bombardment of the Shrine at Meshed.

The Ambassador did not differ from anything which I had said, and observed
that he had been present, and remembered very well that my remarks had applied
to Persia. He said that the Eussian Press just now was attacking M. Sazonoff, and
he feared that there was a combination of the extreme Eight and the Eadicals to
assail the Government.

I am, &c.

E. G[EEY].

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
(^) [v. Count Benckendorff' s report in Siehert, pp. 370-3.]

No. 52.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Constantinople , October 22, 1912.
F.O. 44645/33672/12/44. D. 3-20 pm

Tel. (No. 510.) E. 7-45 p.m.

Cairo telegram No. 63 of Oct[ober] 17. (^)

I do not think that Kiamil Pasha's alleged statement was intended to put
responsibility on England.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Cairo (as No. 74).]

(2) [v. supra, p. 30, No. 39.]

Yesterday, in conversation with a member of this embassy, his Highness stated
that, while quit-e understanding England's attitude in the matter of neutrality of
Egypt during war with Italy, where belligerency of Egypt might have been put in
awkward position, involving risk of European complications, he thought that this
consideration need not apply to Greece, especially in matter of expulsion of Hellenic
subjects from Egypt. It was intimated to his Highness, in reply, that if England,
who is responsible for Egypt, took action which might he construed as intervention
against Greece, other Northern Powers might be tempted to intervene for or against
the other Balkan States either in north-west of Balkans or in Black Sea.

No. 53.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir 'Edward Grey.C)

St. Petersburgh, October '22, 1912.
E.G. 44650/33672/12/44. D. 8-10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 383.) E. 10-45 p.m.

I read to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who returned from Poland to-day,
paraphrase of ray telegram No. 378 of Oct[ober] 18.(-) His Excellency said that he
endorsed every word of what Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs had told me. I
then communicated to him substance of your telegram No. 1086 of Oct[ober] 21, (^)
pointing out how important it was if Russia wished us to co-operate with her on
Balkans question, that she should do nothing in Persia that might possibly add to the
difficulties of His Majesty's Government by exciting Mussulman feeling.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that no action of this kind was in con-
templation, adding that Meshed was a question of the past.

His Excellency then said that he was most anxious that the Powers should
intervene in the war at the first possible moment, and according to report just received
from Russian Minister at Sophia that moment might present itself very shortly,
perhaps within a week. He was, he said, in communication with French Minister for
Foreign Affairs on the subject.

I asked if he had yet thought out any scheme of settlement, and, on his replying
in the negative, I suggested that it might be well were he to draw up and submit to
French Minister for Foreign Affairs a rough draft of minimum reforms required in
that province that would serve as a basis of discussion. (■*) Otherwise if nobody took the
initiative in the matter, the favourable moment would pass, and war would continue.

His Excellency replied that two draft schemes would really be necessary to meet
the respective cases of Turkish or Bulgarian victory, and that he would at once discuss
question with his expert advisers.

MINUTE.

We could repeat to Paris — but we had better say nothing to M. Poincare till he applies.
M. Sazonow is approaching M. Poincare himself and we might confu.se matters if we took steps.
M. Sazonow will know, privately, our views — so we can await further developments. I gather
M. Sazonow hardly ex].5ects a Bulgarian success.

A. N.
E. G.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 35, No. 44.]

(3) [v. supra, p. 41, No. 50.]
{*) [cp. infra, p. 61, Ed. note.]

No. 54.

Sir G. Buchana7i to Sir Edward Grey.

St. Petersburgh, October 22, 1912.
Private. (') D. 8-30 p.m.

Tel. (Unnumbered. Private & Secret.) E. 9-15 p.m.

My telegram No. 383.(=')

I found Minister for Foreign Affairs very despondent about the future. He told
me in strict confidence that Bulgarians were most anxious that Powers should intervene
as soon as possible, and that he gathered from their change of attitude that something
had gone wrong. He expressed earnest hope that he could count on support of France
and England in any attempt which he might make at mediation, as, were things to
take a serious turn for Bulgaria, Russia might have to mobilise. If the two Power's
failed Russia when the crisis came, Triple Entente would not survive the shock.

I asked how the Emperor viewed the situation. His Excellency said that His
Majesty was quite calm, but had told him that, while anxious to avoid being drawn
into any entanglement, he wished Russian Government to do all they could to assist
Christian Slavs.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 35.]

(2) \_v. immediately preceding document.]

I No. 55.

Sir R. Payet to Sir Edicard Grey.C)
F.O. 45461/33672/12/44.

(No. 72.) Belgrade, D. October 22, 1912.

Sir, R. October 28, 1912.

During a conversation which I had with the Minister President this afternoon
His Excellency said he had good reason to believe Aiistria had no intention of
interfering with any operations Servia might find it necessary to carry out in the
! Sandjak. For the moment the Servian troops sent in that direction would maintain a
defensive attitude but as there were large bodies of Turkish Troops at Sienitza and
Novibazar and as it would be impossible for the right wing of the Servian Army to
operate further South with these troops in its rear it would probably become necessary
to assume the offensive and to occupy Novibazar. (I am inclined to think that this
information is incorrect and that Novibazar is merely held by'Arnauts.)
I In speaking of the future Monsieur Pashitch assumed a somewhat uncom-

promising manner and did not attempt to hide that, regardless of the declaration of
the Powers concerning the maintenance of the Status Quo, the Balkan States are bent
on territorial expansion. When I enquired whether this meant that Servia in case
I successful would, endeavour after the war to retain any territory she might occupy in
ij the Sandjak during the war he replied that this would depend on circumstances and
was a point which would not be settled between Servia and Austria-Hungary alone but
by the Great Powers. He added that if Austria was merely seeking a commercial
I outlet through the Sandjak some arrangement might be devised to suit her needs
! whilst leaving Servia in possession of the territory the population of which is Serb
j and which should therefore rightly belong to Servia.

I understand from some remarks recently made to me by Monsieur d'Ugron my
I Austrian Colleague that whilst Monsieur Pashitch may be correct in thinking Austria
[ will not intervene in the Sandjak during the war it would be well the Servian Govern-
I ment should realize that Austria cannot and will not tolerate Servian retention of any
I part of the Sandjak after the war. The Austrian apprehension is that were this

I (') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

permitted Servia and Montenegro would soon join hands and with Bulgaria at their
back would constitute a Slav combination extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic.
Such a combination besides blocking the Herzegovina frontier and shutting Austria
out from access to the Mgean Sea would through ceaseless intrigue and agitation
become a menace to Austrian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighbouring
provinces. At a moment like the present when the presence of Panslavist influences
in the Balkan States is very apparent the danger for Austria is by no means negligible.
Copy sent to Vienna.

1 have, &c.

EALPH PAGET.

No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. ,

F.O. 44820/33672/12/44.
(No. 354.)

Sir, Foreign- Office, October 22, 1912.

I told Count Benckendorff to-day that the Cabinet had considered the question of
the closing of the Straits,(^) but that we felt it impossible to take anything more than
diplomatic action before the Straits were actually closed: and, in any case, we must
not be regarded as being committed to action other than diplomatic, even if they were
closed, if the closing was a temporary result of some belUgerent operations we might
put up with the inconvenience, but if there was a prospect of their being closed for a
long time no doubt we must make some proposals for getting neutral commerce
through at certain times.

The Ambassador again impressed upon me that the reply of M. Venizelos to the
Eussian Minister in Athens had been a refusal to give any guarantee as to the Straits, ,
and a statement that the Greek Fleet would succeed where the Italian Fleet had not
been able to succeed. He asked whether I could not agree to make a renewed repre-
sentation in Athens as a result of this unfavourable reply.

T said that it was only yesterday morning that I had sent instructions to our •
Minister in Athens to speak on the subject. (i) I must wait to hear what reply the
Greek Government gave him. In the meantime, I had asked the Board of Trade
for figures as to the value of our shipping and cargoes involved, so that if necessary
I could strengthen my representation with this information. The next fortnight was
the time during which it was specially important to keep the Straits open. If they
could be kept open for that time, a great deal of shipping and a very large amount
of Russian grain would have been cleared away.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [cp. infra, p. 51, No. 63, note (i).]

No. 57.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. Buchanan.

Private. (^)

My dear Buchanan :— Foreign Office, October 22, 1912.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 17th, (^) which arrived by last
Messenger.

I am a good deal perturbed at the tone which the Russian Press has taken towards
us and I think that their criticisms are in reality based on a misconception of oar

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 33-5, No. 43.]

action. It is quite true that when Sazonoff was over here(^) the major part of his con-
versations with Grey dealt with Persian and other Asiatic questions, but as regards
the Balkans all that he desired us to do was to join with him in putting pressure upon
the Balkans to restrain them from, entering upon hostilities. We were quite ready
to agree to these proposals and when 1 questioned him as to whether he considered
that there was any prospect of a revival of pro- Slav feeling in Eussia he declared to
me that there was not a reasonable man in his country who would dream of going to
war on behalf of any of the Slav States. The only danger which he foresaw was the
possibility of an active policy on the part of Austria which might then arouse Kussian
feeling, but this feeling I understood from h'mx would not be pro-Slav, but in reality
anti-Austrian and anti-German. He evidently quite misunderstood the feelings among
his own countrymen and I think it is quite possible that finding that he was in error,
and that he was being reproached for having allowed the Balkan question to be almost
untouched upon when in England, that he endeavoured to throw the blame upon us.
It is quite true that we have to consider very carefully the feelings of our own
Mussulmans' in India and that we do not desire unnecessarily to take any action which
might possibly wound or even excite those feelings. At the same time we are as
determined as anyone else to do what is possible towards the introduction of reforms
and good administration in the European and Asiatic provinces of Turkey. 1 do not
think that Eussia or any country would find us at all lagging behind in that direction.
It would indeed be most disastrous were a serious breach to be made in the good
understanding with Eussia. I do not disguise from myself that this understanding
is of more vital interest to us than it is to Eussia, though of course it is not necessary
to let them know this. Were our ways to part we should be in a most awkward and
difficult position, as Eussia would then Kave a perfectly free hand to do what she liked
in the Mid and Far East and we should be quite incapable of restraining her. This,
fact alone would offend and arouse mussulman feeling in India more than any short-
comings on our part in not espousing the Turkish cause with that vigour and energy
which they desire us to do and which neither public opinion nor our own policy would
justify us in doing. Again, we could not, were we to break off from Eussia, maintain
our relations with France on the same intimate and amicable footing as that on which
they at present exist, and we should in fact be isolated or have to become the sub-
servient friend of Germany who would not be able to assist us in any way whatsoever
in restraining Eussian encroachments in the Mid and Far East, as in the first place
she would not be in a position to do so, and in the second place would have no desire
to do so, as her great object is to win and maintain a close friendship with Eussia.
I therefore consider that a good and intimate understanding with Eussia must be the
keystone of our foreign policy, and it w^ould be most unfortunate were any misunder-
standing to occur which would in any way weaken of impair that understanding. I
know you are quite as alive as myself to these considerations. I am very glad,
therefore, that at t?his moment the King has written to the Emperor of Eussia. His
letter was a most admirable one and will I am sure be very pleasing to his Imperial
cousin. It is very unlucky that the new Duma seems likely to be composed very
largely of Eights and Eeactionaries as this would certainly not raise a favourable
wind to our understanding. Grey spoke to BenckendorfJ in regard to our relations
with Eussia, and he expressed the hope that while we were quite ready and desirous
of associating ourselves with Eussia in all matters concerning the Balkans, the
Eussians would not unnecessarily excite moslem feeling by any untoward incident in
the Mid-East such as those which occurred not so long ago at Meshed. I daresay that
if Pilenko comes to see you again you will be able to tranquillise his mind and win
him over to a more favourable view of our good intentions. A little propaganda in
that direction would not be at all out of place at the present juncture.

I should doubt myself if the moment for mediation will arrive very soon. It
would be well if we were to allow all the belligerents to exhaust themselves con-

(3) [v. Gooch (& Temperley, Vol. IX (1), Chapter LXXVITI, pp. 749-72,]

siderably before we attempted to intervene, and we should then find them far more
reasonable than they would be at the present moment. Whenever the war is over
to my mind the real difficulties will then begin, and I should not be at all surprised
if the present Balkan allies were soon at loggerheads with each other as they have
always been in the past. I think that Austria at the present moment shows a very
conciliatory and moderate disposition and is evidently anxious to keep the war within
as narrow limits as possible. (*)

You may imagine that I am very busy at this moment and I trust that you will
excuse me if I do not write a longer letter by this Bag.

[Yours, &c.]

[A. NICOLSON.]:

(^) [Count BenckcndorfF gives a report by M. Paul Cambon of Sir A. Nicolson's views on
reform in Turkey on October 24, v. Siebert, p. 375, and cp.'also pp. 376-8. For M. Cambon's
report, v. D.D.F., 3""^ Set., Vol. IV, pp. 243-4, No. 235.]

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Tel. (Private.(') ) Foreign Office, October 23, 1912, 1-35 p.m.

Your private and secret telegram of yesterday. (')

I am resolved that outcome of the war must be to establish something in
Macedonia that will prevent the recurrence of the state of things that existed under
Abdul Hamid and the Committee regime that followed. I am sure that public opinion
here will support, and indeed insist as far as it is able, upon that point, so Russian
Min[ister] for For[eign] Af¥[air]s need be in no doubt as to our support for this
purpose.

It would be desirable that Russian Min[ister for] For[eign] Aff[airs]' should
draw up project of a scheme of reform which he thinks would be satisfactory. It seems
quite possible that his view and that of Austria respecting our project of reform would
not be very divergent and mediation could then be made effective. I would gladly
suggest mediation whenever he thinks support of other Powers can be obtained.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 35.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 43, No. 54.]

No. 59.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

St. Petershurgh, October 24, 1912.

D. 8-37 P.M.

Tel. (Private. (')) R. 9-30 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated to-day contents of your
private telegram of yesterday, (^) begged me to convey to you his warmest thanks, and
to say that he hopes to send his draft reform scheme to London to-morrow. (^) He was
adopting, he told me, certain suggestions made by you in a recent conversation with
the Russian Ambassador. (*) He remarked that it would not be so difficult to induce
Austria to agree to the scheme that would satisfy Bulgarian pretensions, but that
she would not easily consent to give satisfaction to Servian claims. The one thing
which Servia especially desired was to obtain direct access to Adriatic. He thought
it might be possible to conciliate Austria by securing for her trade unrestricted com-

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol 35.]

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

(3) [cp. infra, p. 61, Ed. note.]
(■*) [v. supra, p. 41, No. 50.]

munication with Salonica either by special guarantees with regard to rates, &c., or
by a railway more or less under her control.

Bulgarian Minister tells me that, as regards Adrianople vilayet, all that his
Government wants is that lives of the Christians should be rendered more tolerable
than at present ; and that, of the three autonomous vilayets demanded by them one
should include Old Servia without the sanjak as far as (?) Shar Cirmouns, another
Epirus, and portion of Thessaly still belonging to Turkey, and a third the greater
part of what is known as Macedonia.

I told him that only advice I could give him was to induce his Government to be
satisfied with any reform scheme that Powers could induce Porte to accept.

No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private. (^)

My dear Nicolson, Pera, October 24, 1912.

The present does not seem to be a suitable moment to attempt to write you
anything of a practical nature and the result of the battle which is now proceeding
may considerably modify the attitude of the Powers directly interested. Turkey full
well realizes that if in this war, which is none of her making, she gets the best of it
Russia will be down upon her. Giers has evidently been very straight in his language,
if not threatening and there are many Turks who are already saying that this may
be the last war they will wage in Europe.

The folly of the Turks in believing that they would detach Greece at the last
moment was beyond anything, but that is now a minor matter. I think however
public opinion jv'ill demand that the Turks should try conclusions with the Greeks
at sea, and I presume former will suffer, for their fleet has been laid up practically
for a year at the Dardanelles.

The Turks imagined that threats as to what would happen to the 55,000 Greeks
here would deter the Athens Gov[ernmen]t from making war. For the present the
Turks will probably practically leave them alone. No one believes now, if they ever did,
that Bulgaria would be satisfied with "reforms." The word, in my opinion, has for
a Idng time been a lie on both sides. The Bulgars did not want " reforms " and the
Turks did not propose to give them in a practical form, i.e. foreign control.

Unless the Powers, whose authority has been usurped by the Balkan States are
prepared to act with more vigour and not confine themselves to Notes it will be as
difiicult a fortnight or a month hence to impose peace as it was a fortnight ago, that
is if the result of the two weeks' encounter is not decisive on one side or the other.

Presumably the Slav feeling in Russia will daily gain ground and Russia will
be carried off her feet or say she is, and with Turkey weakened she will not be able
to oppose any resistance.

Naturally my voice here will get weaker and weaker as they find that we do not
hold the Russians back which presumably, will be impossible.

Bompard seems to be daily growing more anti-Turkish presumably pressed by
his ally.

Whichever ways things go, I fear we must look for a financial cataclysm or some-
thing like it and Turks, out of sheer desperation to keep their army alive, will be
tempted to lay their hands on something. The day will inevitably come when they
will be unable- to pay their officials and find difficulty in keeping their army from
starving and one cannot then tell what may happen. Gabriel says the Gov[ernmen]t
have a firm determination to adhere to International Law and the Treaties but he
says that in case of defeat Government would be powerless. lie is, as you know, an

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.1

Armenian, and therefore not distinguished for courage. As far as I am concerned
here you may rely upon it that I will try and keep close to my Eussian colleague.
He is inclined to push one very hard sometimes.

On paper the Turks have^ behaved admirably in contrast to the Eulers of the
Balkan States but it will be hard to keep 500,000 men within bounds when many of
them have not unnaturally been thirsting for Bulgarian blood for some years.

I hope Crete will not give trouble. Most of those who usually indulge in the
massacre of Moslems will be carried by enthusiasm to do it in a more legitimate
manner on the mainland.

Gabriel was very anxious H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnmen]t should advise
financiers in London to give money here now. I did not encourage him in this idea
and I don't imagine there would be much enthusiasm in that direction.

Yours ever,

GEEAED LOWTIIEE.

No. Gl.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Greij.C)
P.O. 45431/33672/12/44.

(No. 461.) Confidential. Berlin, D. October 25, 1912.

Sir, E. October 28, 1912.

I have the honour to report that the day following my return to Berlin I called
upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and had some conversation with him
on the subject of the war in the Near East.(') His Excellency said that personally
speaking he had no particular preference for any of the combatants, and that as far
as his sympathies were concerned it was a matter of indifference to him which side
gained the victory. From a political and international point of view, however, he
was inclined to think that if ultimate victory rested with the Turks the problems left
at the close of the war would be easier of solution. The States forming the Balkan
League would doubtless look, each one of them, for some addition of territory and
if they gained a decisive victory, it would be diflSicult for the Powers to insist upon
the exact status quo; whereas the Turks knew very well that they would not be
allowed any increase of territory in Europe and would therefore be more easily
restrained from pressing their victory beyond the danger point of forcible intervention.

In any case he hoped that the Great Powers, especially England, Germany and
France as the Powers least directly interested in the Balkan States, would keep in
close touch with one another so that when the time came for mediation or inter-
vention they could act without hesitation or delay. His Excellency thought that
rapidity of action on the part of the three Powers would be especially useful and
advantageous in the case of the Turks being victorious — a result which, notwith-
standing the latest news from the seat of war seemed by no means improbable. Should
the Bulgarians be badly beaten it was most probable that strong pressure would be
brought to bear upon the Eussian Government by Eussian public opinion to step in
and save their Slav brethren from destruction, and if warlike intervention took place
it was impossible to foresee where the war would stop. Bearing this great danger in
mind he felt that England, Germany and France, acting together, could under the

(1) [Copies of this despatch were sent to the King and Cabinet.]

(2) [The substance of this despatch had been communicated by Sir E. Gbschen in his
telegram (No. 134) of October 25, 1912, D. 1-5 p.m., R. 3-15 p.m. "^(F.O. 45116/33672/12/44.)
Sir Edward Grey replied in telegram (No. 307) of October 28, D. 1-15 p.m.: "I entirely
reciprocate view of M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] that Powers generally and Germany,
France and ourselves should keep in close touch. German Charge d'AfFaires was informed
by mo on Friday of my views and told me those of the German Chancellor and I expressed
to him willingness to keep in touch."]

above ciroumstanoes render the greatest service to the Russian Government in
particular, and Europe generally, by using their united influence to incline the Turks
to moderation, and thus effect by persuasion what Russia would probably only be able
to do by force of arms. Should on the other hand the Balkan League gain the
victory England, Germany and France were, from their geographical position, clearly
indicated as the Powers who could most naturally and disint-erestedly intervene for
the purpose of whittling down such demands as might be put forward by the Balkan
belligerent States.

His Excellency said that of course there was nothing to be done at the present
stage of the war, and the belligerents must be left to fight it out until something of a
decisive nature happened, but he hoped that I would bring his ideas to your notice
and tell you how important he thought it that the three Powers should keep in close
communication with one another and freely exchange their views. The relations
between Germany and France were so good at the present moment that he thought
the French Government would gladly act in accord with the Imperial Government in
this crisis, and he hoped he might say the same of Great Britain. The three Powers
were, it was true, competitors in finance and trade in the East, but it was to their
common interest that none of their customers should be irretrievably ruined, there-
fore the moment was most opportune for them to act together. His Excellency also
laid stress on the good effect which common action between England and Germany
would have upon Anglo-German relations and pointed out that a period of loyal
co-operation at a critical moment in international politics would draw public attention
away from questions where the two countries did not see eye to eye, and, once the
crisis successfully passed, would have created an atmosphere in which it would be
far easier than heretofore to make such questions matters of friendly discussion and
arrangement.

I told His Excellency that T would convey his message to you and that I was
sure you would appreciate the friendly language in which it was couched.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

MINUTE.

Para. 1. It is obvious that settlement w[oulJd be easier if the Turks held their own. But
such is far from being the case at present, and there is no reason to anticipate the first of
Herr von Kiderlen's hypotheses in para. 2. For the rest, the substance of this desp[atch] has
been rec[eive]d by tel[egram] and already considered. Herr von Kiderlen's language on p. 3
as to Anglo-German co-operation may be welcomed, but " conversations a trois " between
London, Berlin and Paris on the present crisis is an unpractical — even though it may not be an
insidious — proposal.

R. G. V.

Oct[ober] 29.
R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.

No. 62.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir E. Goschen.i'^)

F.O. 45603/42842/12/44.
(No. 266.) '

Sir, Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.

The German Charge d' Affaires informed me to-day that he had sent reports of
previous conversations to his Government, and he now had instructions to say that,
in the view of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. England and Germany ought to keep
closely in touch and proceed "pari passu," if they could, in the present Balkan

! (>) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.

I cp. G.P., XXXIII, pp. 244-7.]

I r6272T E

crisis. He would therefore be glad to have my views, and was ready to express certain
views of his own.

T said that I quite agreed that we should keep closely m touch, and 1 would
gladlv know what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's view was.

in reply the Charge d' Affaires said tha*, in the first place, Eussia and Austria
should be allowed to lead the Concert of Europe, as they were the parties most
interest-ed. In the next place, the present " status quo " should be maintained as far
as possible. I observed that 1 presumed this meant the territorial "status quo,"
for there must be change of the " status quo " in Macedonia in the shape of reform.

Herr von Kiihlmann said it was the territorial " status quo " that he meant, and
he added that if Turkey had the best of the war, it would be comparatively easy to
secure this second condition.

T agreed that this was so, as it had become an axiom of European politics that
Turkey was not to reoccupy Christian territory from which she had withdrawn.

The Charge d' Affaires went on to say that the Chancellor thought that it would
be more difficult to preserve the territorial "status quo" if the CoaHtion met with
success. He would be interested to know what I thought with regard to this.

I said that, if the Coalition met with success, everything would depend upon
Eussia and Austria : they, with Eoumania, could stop the, w-ar, and prevent any
disturbance of the territorial "status quo." But, if there was complete success for
the Allies, so that they practically occupied Macedonia and Albania and right up to
Constantinople, I did not see how any of the other Powers, except Eussia and Austria
and Eoumania, were to turn them out.

I then told the Charge d'Affaires that I welcomed both the fact that the
Chancellor had made this communication and the substance of it. As far as it went,
I was in entire agreement. I thought that the Powers ought to be ready for an
opportune moment of mediation, and for this they must be agreed as to what form
the settlement should take. An essential condition for such an agreement between
the Powers was that Austria and Eussia should come to an agreement. I had already
put this view before M. Sazonoff,(-) and had suggested that Eussia should make up
her own mind as to the settlement which she would consider satisfactory, and that
she should then come to an agreement with Austria about it, if possible. I also
showed Herr von Kiihlmann the record of my conversation of the 24th instant(^) with
Count Mensdorff, and pointed out that I had brought the same point to the notice
of the latter : so that everything I had done this week had been in the direction to
which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's communication pointed.

I went on to say that, since the news of the Turkish reverses, I had been reflecting
on the possibility that, if the Bulgarians won a big engagement at Adrianople, the
whole Turkish Army might become disorganised ; there might be a complete
"debacle"; and this would be follow^ed by all sorts of unpleasant consequences. In
this event, the present Turkish Government, if they were not swept away, might
make a sudden appeal to the Powers for mediation. Such an appeal would, I thought,
be of no use in enabling the Powers to stop the war, unless it was accompanied by
an intimation that the Turks put the settlement unreservedly in the hands of the
Great Powers. I thought that they should do this, if they appealed as the beaten
party. * This hypothesis was, however, an extreme one : and I did not mention it
except as such ; the result of the fighting during the next two or three days might be
quite different from the result hitherto.

The Charge d'Affaires asked me whether, in the event of such a collapse on the
part of the Turks, we would disinterest ourselves in the question of Constantinople?

I replied that I did not think any Power could say that. I understood the Eussian
view to be that Eussia could not allow Bulgaria to go to Constantinople, and that if

(2) [rp. supra, p. 10, No. 13, min., and note (■'').]

(3) [Not reproduced. The record is contained in despatch (No. 77) from Sir Edward Grey
to Sir F. Cartwright, D. October 24, 1912. The contents of the despatch are sufficiently
indicated above. (F.O. 45162/33672/12/44.)]

the Turks were turned out of it she could not stand seeing anyone else there, except
herself. What she contemplated was that the Turks should remain there.

In conclusion, Herr von Kiihlmann said that the Chancellor felt it would exert a
great moral force if it were known that England and Germany were acting together,
and I asked him to come again on Monday that we might discuss any further develop-
ments that had taken place in the situation by then.

I observed that France and Italy remained, the former was politically
disinterested, as we were, in a Balkan settlement.

Herr von Kiihlmann said that he did not suppose that the French view would
differ from the one which we had been discussing, and that Italy did not appear as
yet to have settled what her policy was to be.(^)

[I am, &c.]

E. G[KEY].

(•») [cp. infra, pp. 28-30, No. 172; p. 140, No. 182.]

No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bvchanan.

F.O. 44571/33672/12/44.
(No. 355.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 25, 1912.

C[oun]t Benckendorff communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on Oct[ober] 19 a
telegram from M. Sazonow recording a conversation which the latter had with the
Greek Ch[arge] d'A[ffaire]s in regard to the Dardanelles. M. Sazonow had pointed
out, seriously but in a friendly manner, that any attempts of the Greek navy on the
Straits would not only be a risky naval measure, but would also possibly lead to the
closure of the Straits to the grave detriment of neutral commerce and especially of
that of Russia. M. Sazonow would like the Greek Gov[ernmen]t to give assurances
that they would make no attempt on the Straits or take any hostile action in their
vicinity, as if the Straits were closed, there would be the greatest discontent in Russia
against the State who had provoked the closure. Moreover he would like a positive
assurance, as uncertainty as to whether the Straits would or w'ould not be kept open
to neutral ships was in itself and alone a serious hindrance to Commerce. M. Sazonow
made these observations very seriously, and said that Greece should not forget that
Russia had taken charge of Greek interests in the Ottoman Empire during the war.(*)

[I am, &c.

E. GREY.]

(1) [This despatch was based on a minute written by Sir A. Nicolson describing the
interview. The minute closed with the following sentence : —

" M. Sazonow enquires whether you would be disposed also to say something to the
Greek Gov[ernmen]t in the above sense : and he thinks that a word, a friendly word, might
also be said at Constantinople. A. N."

Sir Edward Grey added : —

" I had already said something to the Greek Minister I will repeat it to Athens on
Monday and also say something at Constantinople. Bring up on Monday.

E. G

20.10.12.

Count Benckendorff should be asked to come to see me on Monday afternoon. [E. G.]"

On October 21 Sir Edward Grey sent a telegram (No. 247) to Sir F. Elliot instructing him
to "take an opportunity of mentioning to Greek M[inister for] F[oreign] A[frairs], in a
friendly and unofficial way, that we hope naval operations will not be extended to the
Dardanelles or their immediate vicinity." (F.O. 44720/33672/12/44.) This telegram was
repeated to Constantinople and Sir G. Lowther was instructed to "express hope that closure
of Straits will not be contemplated unless urgently demanded by imperious necessity." For
Sir Edward Grey's conversation with Count Benckendorff on October 22 v. supra, p. 44, No. 56,
and for a later one infra, p. 91, No. 117.]

[6272]

No. 64.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Greij.C)

Vienna, October 26, 1912.

F.O. 45378/33672/12/44. D. 6-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 117.) ^- 9-12 p.m.

I saw Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning on his return from
Italy.

He declared that he was very satisfied with his visit there, but he assumed
attitude that nothing definite had been mentioned with regard to Balkan matters. He
admitted, however, that the Albanian question had been discussed. From his language
I gathered that he did not reject idea of creating under certain circumstances a
principality of Albania either great or small under the suzerainty of the Sultan. He
observed that both Greece and Montenegro would, however, stand out for a rectifica-
tion of frontier at the cost of Albania at the end of the war. I could get no definite
reply as to his Excellency's views as to the annexation of Scutari by Montenegro.
With regard to sanjak, I enquired if he would object to its being merged into an
Albanian principality. His reply was vague.

Minister for Foreign AfEairs said to me that he thought the moment for mediation
was rapidly approaching. On my enquiring whether he thought that Bulgaria would
accept an armistice before the TuVks evacuated Adrianople, he replied in the negative,
but from his language I gather that he looks upon an evacuation as likely to occur at
any moment.

Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that all the Powers still clung to the
principle of maintenance of status quo at the end of the war. When I pressed him,
however, he seemed to admit that it would be somewhat difi&cult to make the Balkan
League entirely give up their conquests, and that they would probably insist on some
rectification of their frontiers. He appeared to me also to have doubts whether Balkan
League would accept mere reforms in Macedonia under surveillance of Ambassadors
at Constantinople.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 309) ; to Constantinople (as No. 878) ; to Rome
(as No. 451); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1132). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the
Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 65.

■Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C)
F.O. 46351/33672/12/44.

(No. 333.) Rome, D. October 26, 1912.

Sir, E. November 2, 1912.

I had a visit yesterday from the Servian Charge d'Affaires, who informed me,
as I have had the honour to. report by telegraph, (^) that his Government had received
information that the Austro-Hungarian Government were mobilising the 15th and
16th Army Corps, the latter of which had its head-quarters at Kagusa. He was some-
what disconcerted by this report as well as by the information that the Dalmatian
seamen were being transferred to Buda-pesth in large numbers to equip a Danube
flotilla. He told me that Servia had accumulated a certain reserve as a war chest,
and that the Government could dispose of about five million sterling which would

(1) [This despatch was sent to Vienna; to Belgrade; to Constantinople.]

(2) [Not reproduced, as the contents are sufficiently indicated above.]

last for a month or so and that their hope was that the campaign would proceed
with such rapidity that active hostilities would be over before their resources were
exhausted. If this were not so he admitted they would be in a difficult position.

He as well as the Bulgarian Minister whom I met about the same time were much
c<^ncerned to know whether Italy would hand over to Turkey the capitahsed sum
representing the annuities she was undertaking to pay under the Treaty of Lausanne.
I understand that Turkey is making efforts to secure the early liquidation of this
debt, a considerable portion of which will however have to be handed to the Commis-
sion of the Public Debt.

I have, Sec.

RENNELL EODD.

No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)

F.O. 45740/33672/12/44.
(No. 524.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 26, 1912.

M. Cambon read to Sir A. Nicolson on Oct[ober] 26 a telegram from M. Poincare
recording a telegram from M. Jules Cambon at Berlin, which reported a conversa-
tion of the latter with Herr von Kiderlen. The substance was much the same as
that contained in Sir E. Goschen's tel[egram] No. 134 of Oct[ober] 25, (^) but it was
clearer in this respect viz. that Herr von Kiderlen' s idea was that France, Germany
and England should put their heads together and evolve some settlement likely to be
satisfactory to the Balkan States, always keeping in view the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. When the three Powers had come to an agreement Germany would
endeavour to procure Austria's assent, and France and ourselves were to obtain that of
Russia. At the same time Herr von Kiderlen saw no objection to our letting Vienna
! and St. Petersburg know that we three were examining the terms of a possible settle-
I ment. From M. Poincare's remarks Sir A. Nicolson gathered that H[is] E[xcellency]
is not enamoured of the proposal, as he had told M. Jules Cambon merely to tell
Herr von Kiderlen that M. Poincare was examining the proposal : and that he
intended to consult London and St. Petersburg.
; Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that his personal opinion was that the proposed
■ procedure was a very cumbrous and unpractical one. We had been of opinion that it
j was for Russia and Austria to take the initiative in drawing up a scheme of reforms
as being the Powers most directly interested : and in fact, a scheme was already on its
way from St. Petersburg. It would form a basis for discussion among all the Powers.
It seemed to Sir A. Nicolson absurd for France, Germany and England to draw up a
I scheme of reforms without the co-opej-ation of the two Powers most directly interested,
I, and then to endeavour by action at Vienna and St. Petersburg to obtain the consent
of those Cabinets.

[I am, &c.

E. GREY.]

! (1) [This despatch was repeated to Berlin on October 30 (No. 272). cp. D.D.F., 3""« Ser.,

Vol. IV,- pp. 258-9. No. 252.]
I (2) [Not reproduced, but cp. supra, pp. 48-9, No. 61, and note cp. also Poincare,

pp. 272-5.]

No. 67.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Belgrade, October 27, 1912.
F.O. 45372/33672/12/44. 12-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. 43.) 5-20 p.m.

Austrian Minister informs me that he learns that Balkan States now look upon
the result of war as certain. In the partition of Turkey in Europe which is to follow,
Servia is to take the sanjak, Old Servia, and port of Medua on the Adriatic;
Montenegro is to have Scutari, the surrounding territory, and a strip of littoral, Greece
receives Epirus, Thessaly, and the rest goes to Bulgaria. The four States are to enter
into offensive and defensive alliances for fifty years.

I could not ascertain from whom Austrian Minister had this information, but he
assured me that his informant was absolutely reliable and it came from an official
source. In any case it reflects the tone noticeable here at present.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

[ED. NOTE.— Count Benckendorff records conversations with Sir A. Nicolson on October 27
and 29. v. Siebert, pp. 376-8.]

No. 68.

Lord Kitchener to Sir Edivard Grey.C)

Cairo, October 28, 1912.

F.O. 45625/43461/12/44. D. 8-35 p.m.

Tel. (No. 71.) R. 9-25 p.m.

Prime Minister has received a telegram from Khedive suggesting the rupture of
relations with States at war with Turkey. Ministers have represented to me their
anxiety to have decision on the subject. They consider that rupture of relations,
particularly with Greece, would be welcomed by all Moslems everywhere. This could
be done quietly, as it would not be necessary to send Greek representative out of the
country, but merely to break off official relations with them, as was done during
1897 war. If neutrality has not been decided upon, I think that this course would be
best, as it would not look well, now that Turkey is hard pressed, if Egypt declared
neutrality. (^)

(1) [This telegram was sent to Constantinople (as No. 880).]

(2) [v. infra, p. 59, No. 73, for Sir Edward Grey's answer concerning the neutrality of

No. 69.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. C)
F.O. 45534/38672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 631.) Foreign Office, October 28, 1912, 9-15 p.m.

Your telegram No. 184. C")

French Ambassador gave me similar communication. (^) I informed him that
German Charge d' Affaires had told me of desire of German Gov[ernmen]t to keep in

(1) [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 1123) with the addition " You
should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ifairs]."]

(2) [Not reproduced, as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. Telegram (No. 184),
October 28, 1912, D. 1.42 a.m., R. 12.30 p.m. (F.O. 4.5534/33672/12/44.) cp. also infra, pp. 56-7,
No. 71, and note (i).]

(3) [cp. D.D.F., 3'"" Ser., Vol. IV, p. 271, No. 264.]

touch and that German view was that Austria and Eussia as being most interested
Powers should lead the Concert and that there should be as little disturbance as
possible of territorial status quo. I reciprocated these views but said that public
opinion here would not join in turning Balkan States by force out of what they proved
able to conquer unaided. I suggested that Russia and Austria should agree if possible
as to the maximum advantage they would concede to Balkan States if the latter
entirely defeated Turkey, which was not yet certain. French Ambassador said that
France and ourselves might communicate in this sense at St. Petersburgh and
Germany at Vienna and I agreed.

If war goes rapidly and decidedly in favour of Balkan States Russia and Austria
could if agreed propose some settlement to Balkan States as basis of mediation. If
Turks ask for mediation as beaten party they would have to do so on condition of
placing settlement unreservedly in the hands of the Powers.

No. 70.

Sir Ed^vard Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^)

F.O. 45926/33672/12/44.
(No. 271.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 28, 1912.

I told Herr von Kiihlmann again to-day that I was anxious to keep in touch with

I the German Government with regard to the Balkan war, as the German Chancellor
desired. Herr von Kiderlen had also approached France and had told Sir E.
Goschen(^) that he thought France Germany and England should keep in touch. The
news of Balkan successes still continued. As the Chancellor had said, Austria and
Russia must lead the Concert of Europe. They could not lead unless they were in

j agreement, and it would be desirable that they should make up their minds, on the

j assumption that the Balkan States were going to win, what was the maximum
disturbance in the territorial ' ' status quo ' ' that Austria and Eussia would regard as
reconcilable with their interests.

I Herr von Kiihlmann suggested that it might be possible to invite the Balkan
States to say what was the minimum which they would accept.

5 I observed that this might be a very useful suggestion, and if the Balkan States

' had a great victory in Thrace and the Turks were completely beaten, Austria and

t Eussia might follow up the step which they had taken together before the war by
asking the Balkan States to formulate their minimum demands. This was however
all on the assumption that the Balkan States would be victorious : everything would

; be changed if the Turks won a big battle. (^)

' Herr von Kiihlmann asked me about our attitude.

I said that I was sure that British public opinion would not be a party to any
attempt to turn the Balkan States by force out of territory which they actually
conquered by their own arms, and we had not sufficient political interest to insist upon
interfering in the results of the war. Austria and Eussia might feel differently, and

:, that was why it was essential to promote agreement between them.

Herr von Kiihlmann asked me whether what I had said about our attitude would

I ^PPly even to a conquest of Constantinople.

1(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It
was repeated to Paris (No. 530) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 363). cp. G.P., XXXIII, pp. 259-60.]
(^) [Thus in original draft. In the Confidential Print it is altered to "Your Excellency.'']
j (^) [This may be the phrase reported by Count Mensdorff on October 31. cp. O.-U.A.,

' IV, p. 735, No. 4215.]

I replied in the negative, saying that a change in the ownership of Constantinople
would be a large European question.

I concluded by remarking that this was all I could say at the moment. There
might still be Turkish successes which would give the problem quite a different com-
plexion. All we could do for the present was to discuss possibilities, and I was giving
him my views as a contribution towards keeping in touch with each other.

In the course of the conversation Herr von Kiihlmann said that Austria would
probably want to make some reserves about the Sandjak and about the way to Salonica
not being completely closed ; Albania too could hardly be absorbed : Albanians both
Christian and Moslem would combine against Serbs, but Albania might become an
autonomous unit of some sort. This would still leave a great deal of Macedonia for
Bulgaria and Servia. He asked me whether we should object to Bulgaria getting to
the Mediterranean.

I said I saw no reason why we should, as far as ourselves were concerned, make
any reserves.

Herr von Kiihlmann made it clear that in these suggestions respecting the settle-
ment he was speaking his own personal opinion only, and I said that I was doing the
same as I had not consulted my colleagues on these points.

[I am, &C.1

E. G[REY].

MINUTE.

Sir F. Bertie and Sir G. Buchanan should for their information have copies of the record
of my conversation of last week with Kuhlmann('') about the Balkans as well as of the second
conversation of yesterday which I have marked for them.(^)

E G.

28.10.12

(^) [v. supra, pp. 49-51, No. 62, and cp. pp. 54-5, No. 69.]

(5) [The reference appears to be to the present document, although the conversation was
on the 28th. Sir Edward Grey had marked this in his own hand as to be sent to Sir F. Bertie
and Sir G. Buchanan.]

No. 71.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.C)
Private and Confidential. (^)

My dear Grey, Paris, October 28, 1912.

Poincare was at Nantes yesterday making Ministerial declarations. He was due
to return late in the evening and he sent me a message asking me to be at the
Quai d'Orsay at 10-30 p.m. The message stated that the Eussian Ambassador would
be there at the same time.

I saw Poincare alone at first. Iswolsky was called in after Poincare had explained
to me the situation created by the communication made to the French and British
Ambassadors at Berlin by M. de Kiderlen Wachter.(^) He said that the German
proposal that the German French and British Governments should discuss matters
without consultation with the Russian Government was for the purpose of isolating
Russia and ought to be resisted by England and France. The German Press had lately
been full of soft words and praise of France and it foreshadowed another of the
frequent attempts to create a coldness between Russia and France and Russia and
England.

(-) [A shorter report of the conversation recorded in this letter was sent by Sir F. Bertie
in his telegram (No. 184). v. supra, p. 54, No. 69, note {').]

(2) [Grey MSS., Vol. 14. This letter is endor.sed in Sir Edward Grey's hand as having
been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to Sir A. Nicolson.]

(3) [cp. supra, pp. 48-9, No. 61.]

M. Iswolsky was then asked to join us and during the conversation of nearly an
hour which ensued much of what was said was to be considered merely as the private
opinions of those present.

Throughout the interview Iswolsky showed very great distrust as to the real
intentions of Austria backed up by Germany and Poincare was suspicious.
Poincare observed that the European Press generally and even in Germany appeared
to have abandoned the possibility, in view of the collapse of the Turks, of adhering
to the status quo and he asked whether the opinions expressed to a " Le Temps"
correspondent, wlio was a reliable person, by Russians stated to be men of position
were to be taken as those held generally by many people in Russia, and if so whether
the Russian Government would be able to resist the force of such public sentiment.
Iswolsky confessed that the views so expressed were largely held but they did not
represent the policy of the Russian Government who were perfectly sincere in their
desire to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Everything
depended on the conduct of Austria. He then went back to the deceptions of 1908
in the matter of Bosnia and Herzegovina which I need not repeat.

Neither Poincare nor Iswolsky appeared " au fond" to think that the territorial
status quo can be preserved. The Balkan States will expect some rectifications at least
for themselves in addition to the constitution of further portions of Turkish territory
as practically autonomous Vilayets under the nominal Sovereignty of the Sultan.
How should such territories be constituted? Geographically or ethnographically?
What is to become of Albania? What is the least that will satisfy Greece, Servia and
Bulgaria territorially if the status quo be abandoned? Iswolsky recalled the fact that
the Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano did not include Salonika and had not barred
the way of Austria but that if there were annexations by the Balkan States and
especially if Servia and Montenegro claimed to shake hands viz make their
territories contiguous Austria would consider herself free to act in her own interests
only and this would create such a feeling of resentment as to be a grave danger to the
maintenance of peace between her and Russia. The plan which the German Govern-
ment had in mind in proposing consultations with France and England to the
exclusion of Russia was to go to Petersburg with a ready made scheme concerted
privately with the Austrian Government and to say. If you agree to this well and
good. If not we cannot restrain Austria and if she go to war we must of necessity be
with her. To the Turks they would say we have kept back France and England and
we have prevented Russia from making the terms worse for you. We are your only
friends and Poincare interposed "Give us more concessions in Asia Minor."

I asked Poincare whether he had reason to think that the Porte would accept
mediation, whether the Turkish Array and public feeling would allow of it and whether
the Balkan States in the midst of their victories would Hsten to proposals for depriving
them of anything to which they lay claim. He said that he had good reason to believe
that the Turks would gladly accept. As to Bulgaria which State was the only one
really to be taken seriously into consideration he thought that M. Gueschoff's language
reported in " Le Temps" indicated a readiness to listen to reason and he asked
Iswolsky his opinion. The latter had no opinion and at Poincare's request he under-
took to ask Sazonow to sound the Bulgarian Government on the subject. Iswolsky
stated that the Russian Government know that the x\ustrian Government have made
serious military preparations Poincare is very much perturbed at the proposal of the

German Government and fears that there is evil intention behind it (*)

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

{*) [The letter concludes with an unimportant reference to Italy.]

No. 72.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.(^)

Private. (')

Dear Sir Edward, Sofia, October 28, 1912.

In view of the grave crisis which will soon confront Europe, I think it perhaps
advisable to write to you direct as I have certain facilities here for judging the
situation. I know you will understand that I personally have no feelings as to where
the line of demarcation between the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the Balkan
States will be drawn. You will note that I take it for granted that some alteration
in the " status quo" is inevitable.

In the event of the Allies proving successful, we shall be faced with their
determination to hold and keep a large portion of Turkey in Europe. Most probably
the Bulgarians will claim a line drawn approximately from Cape Kuri to Seres. The
Servians the Sandjak of Novi Bazaar and the Vilayet of Kossovo ; (future arrange-
ments to be made later with Montenegro). The Greeks hope for an extension of
territory both in the direction of Janina and towards Salonica.

The "crux" of the question is the Sandjak. This territory is at present prac-
tically in the hands of the Servians ; some Bulgarian and Montenegrin troops will be
despatched there later, and the Allies will in all probability refuse to evacuate it unless
driven out by force. They estimate that the Province can be held successfully
against any numerical numbers by a force of 25,000 men.

Should Austria declare war, Belgrade and the North and West of Servia would
be evacuated, and a joint appeal would then be made to Russia for assistance, and
subsequently to the other Great Powers, asking them to persuade Austria to refrain
from a campaign against Christian Nations. This I believe to be the programme
up to date.

It is just a year since I was able to report the first sign of the present Aniance,(^l
which is now changing the features of South Eastern Europe. The transformation
has been extremely rapid, even more so than was at first foreseen.

The war on the side of the Allies is national to a degree difficult for us, resident
in a safe Island home, to realize. This so-called small State has mobilized
434,000 men out of a population of some 4 millions, and the number of men mobilized
by the Servian and Greek armies have also both been superior to any given by Military
Attaches, or newspaper correspondents.

I would venture to point out the danger which would confront an European
Conference for the settlement of this Question in the event of the success of the
Allies. They will not, in my opinion, accept the conclusions arrived at by any such
European Conference, unless these are largely in accordance with their own wishes
and ideas. At the most the Allies can only be threatened with armed intervention,
and this they would welcome rather than give up what they have acquired.

They are already arguing that no European Nation can attack them with the
exception of Austria; they do not anticipate an Austrian declaration of war and,
should it come, they will be prepared to meet it in the way above described : they would
make an appeal to Russia to place herself at the head of the Slav cause and rightly
or wrongly, they believe that she would throw her final weight on their side. They
realize the weakness of Greece, lying as she does, practically defenceless, to *a
bombardment by the Powers, but. even then, thev will not vield the Sandjak or the
major portion of the territory already gained.

How then can a satisfactory arrangement be come to?— Possibly through influence
brought to bear upon the Allies by Russia from the very Highest Quarters, and
eventually if necessary, backed up by the friendly and judicious counsels of His
Majesty s Government, which would perhaps induce them to evacuate a portion of
(1) [cp. infra, p. 100, No. 131.]

hpJlST ^J^^T^-^°\^-.J^l'-^^"^" ^"^"'•^^d Sir Edward Grey's hand as having
been sent Jo the K.ng; to the Pnn^ Minister; to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.] ^
e) [V. Gooch Temperley, Vol. IX (II), pp. 513-4, No. 525; cp. infra, pp. 1006-19, App. II]

the occupied territory. They will not listen to the separate counsels of France,
Austria or Germany, and they thoroughly despise Italy and Italian policy. For these
reasons I am convinced that they will disregard any decisions arrived at by an
European Conference.

The above is the plan of the Allies in the event of success; in case of defeat,
they will still be very difficult to deal with.

Yours sincerely,

H. 0. BAX-IKONSIDE.

No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Lord Kitchener. {^)
F.O. 45625/43461/12/44.

Tel. (No. 78.) Foreign Office, October 29, 1912, 6-30 p.m.

Your tel[egram]' No. 71 of Oct[ober] 28.(=)

In my tel[egram] to you No. 72 of October 16(^) I stated that Egyptian neutrality
must be maintained and that we must adhere to the attitude adopted in Turco-Itahan
war. I thought therefore that it was understood that Egypt was to remain neutral.
We do not propose to issue any proclamation or public declaration of Egyptian
neutrality. The Egyptian Gov[ernmen]t could not break off relations with Greek
representative without departing from neutral attitude, and such a course should be
deprecated. The observations on this subject which were made to Kiamil Pasha as
recorded in Sir G. Lowther's tel[egram] No. 510 of Oct[ober] 22(*) repeated to you
might if necessary be impressed on Egyptian Gov[ernmen]t,

I cannot see what reason we could give why Egypt should not follow her own
precedent of the Turco-Italian war.

(^) [This telegram was repeated to Constantinople (No. 881).]

(2) [v. supra, p. 54, No. 68.]

(^) [v. supra, p. 25, No. 35, note (3).]

(*) [v. supra, pp. 41-2, No. 52.]

No. 74.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1912.
F.O. 45843/33672/12/41. 8-30 p.m.

I Tel. (No. 393.) E. 10-30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 1123 of Oct[ober] 28. C)

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated contents of your telegram
I No. 631 of Oct[ober] 28 to Paris, expressed great satisfaction at^ language which you
j had held to French Ambassador.

j As regards question of Austria and Eussia leading the concert, his Excellency
said that he had consented to act with Austria as the mandatory of Europe in the
representations made to Balkan States, and had, in consequence, exposed himself to
jj violent attacks in Eussian press. He could not tranquillise public opinion by pro-
' claiming that his motive in so acting was to neutralise any possible intervention on
Austria's part, and he would therefore prefer that French Minister for Foreign Affairs
I should continue to take initiative in the future. He would gladly continue his
I conversations with Austria in private and endeavour to come to an understanding with
I her, but he did not wish to advert to the fact that Austria and Eussia were going
I hand-in-hand.

j (0 [This telegram instructed Sir G. Buchanan to inform M. Sazonov of Sir Edward Grey's

I telegram to Paris, No. 631 of October 28. v. supra, pp. 54-5, No. 69, and note (i).]

Bulgarian Minister, whom he had sounded on subject of intervention, now held a
very different language to what he had done at the beginning of the war, and his
Excellency was convinced that Balkan States would only accept mediation on the
condition that the territorial status quo should be modified. Programme of reforms
which he had telegraphed to London and Paris could therefore only now apply to those
portions of territory with a Christian population which were left to Turkey. He feared
that Bulgaria would demand accession of territory on lines of Treaty of San Stefano,
subject to satisfaction of Servian claims in Kossovo vilayet. He had warned Bulgarian
Minister that in event of Bulgarian aggrandisement both Austria and Eoumania would
demand compensation. Minister had replied that he thought Eoumania would be
satisfied with Silistria. Minister for Foreign Affairs doubts this, though he thinks that
it may be possible t-o overcome Austrian opposition by promise of free commercial
access to the Adriatic. It will be more difficult, he fears, to obtain consent of Germany.

No. 75.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.
F.O. 46051/42842/12/44.

(No. 180.) Vienna, D. October 29, 1912.

Sir, ' R. October 31, 1912.

I have the honour to report that the semi-ofl&cial ' ' Fremdenblatt ' ' publishes a
leading article to-day in which an attempt is made to define the meaning of the term
"status quo" in the Balkans as it should be interpreted at the. present moment. (^)
Until now the point has been severely left alone and it is, I think, only due to a
generally expressed desire for some authoritative explanation that the present article
has been published.

After laying stress on the unanimity prevailing among the Great Powers as
evidenced by the recent speech of the French Prime Minister and the assurances of
the Statesmen of the other countries of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente
the " Fremdenblatt " proceeds as follows : —

" The principle of the status quo has evoked of late a volume of violent censure.
We believe that this adverse criticism is due to a mistaken conception of the term
" status quo." It has been looked upon as merely an expedient of diplomacy intended
to dissipate momentary difficulties. Such a narrow significance must however not be
ascribed to the principle of the maintenance of the status quo. In the Balkan
Peninsula there are not only the interests of the Balkan States for which they have
just cast their swords into the scales, but also the very important interests of the
European Great Powers and of Eoumania. The undisturbed continuance of these
European interests in the Balkans forms the status quo for which Europe is con-
tending. With all the sympathy therefore which the Balkan States have justly earned
by their manly and vigorous attitude in the war, European interests in the Balkans
can not and must not be forgotten."

It will be observed from the above that the term ' ' status quo ' ' in this obviously
officially inspired article is being employed with regard to interests only and not, as
has hitherto been customary, to territory. It would seem to indicate that the idea
prevalent here is the maintenance of an equilibrium between the interests of the
Powers and those of the Balkan States in the Near East.

I have, &c.

FAIEFAX L. CAETWEIGHT.

(0 [The information contained in this despatch had already reached the Foreign OflSce by
telegram, v. infra, pp. 62-3, No. 77.]

[ED. NOTE — On October 29, Count Benckendorff called at the Foreign Office and had
an interview with Sir A. Nicolson which the following minute records. The reference in its
opening paragraph to information already sent by Sir G. Buchanan relates to a telegram
(No. 389 of October 26, 1912, D. 8-35 p.m., R. 10.30 p.m., F.O. 45365/33672/12/44). This
telegram gave, as the "present idea" of the reforms, a "large measure of self-government
for the five vilajets of Adrianople, Salonica, Monastir, Kossovo, and Jannina. It was not
proposed to mention word autonomy nor to insist on valis being Christians." It further
stated that the text of M. Sazonov's draft scheme of reforms would probably be sent to
London and Paris on October 28. The communication at Paris was made on October 29,
1 1 and it is printed in B.D.F., 3™' Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 283-5, No. 274. No written communication
at London can be traced in the British archives. There appears to be no record in existence
other than the following minute, cp. Siebert, pp. 376-8. Count Benckendorff's report, there
given, states that he communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on October 29 M. Sazonov's telegram
of October 27. For this telegram v. J)er Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis, II, pp. 319-20.

MINUTE.

F.O. 45914/33672/12/44. October 29, 1912.

Sir Edward Grey,

Count Benckendorff informed me to-day, quite confidentially, of the contents of two
telegrams which he had received from M. Sazonow. The first gave a sketch of his Reform
, |j scheme — which was fairlj' similar with that telegraphed by Sir G. Buchanan, though there were
I some additional details. But what was of importance is the fact that it was provided that the
reform scheme was not to be applied to what would practically amount to the whole of the
Adrianople Vilayet, which was to remain under the direct rule of the Sultan. The second
, j| telegram, which was marked very confidential, and was for Count Benckendorff's own
' |l information, explained that as it was to the interest of Russia, and presumably of all the
Powers, that the Sultan should remain at Constantinople, it would be necessary to allocate to
H[is] M[ajesty] a certain territory around the capital for the maintenance of his dignity.
And, therefore, the district between the Maritza and the Black Sea should be reserved for the
purpose (a Patrimoine de St. Pierre). Furthermore it was clear that the principle of the
I maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was rapidly vanishing, even in
I Austria-Hungary : and it was psychologically impossible for Russia to oppose any additions to
S the territories of the Balkan States (should of course they win the final victory), as it would
be also impossible for Russia to admit any compensation to any Great Power. M. Sazonow
thought that the moment for mediation should be seized as soon as possible, and he thought that
France should make the offer to the belligerents. A necessary basis to such mediation was that
each and all of the Great Powers should make a formal declaration of complete disinterestedness
as regards territorial expansion or compensation. The reservation of the above-named
territory for the Sultan should also be a condition of mediation.

A. N.

I E. G.

Not only a formal declaration of disinterestedness, but also the positive assent of Austria
I to additions to territory of the Balkan States is a necessary basis for mediation.

E. G.

This minute was marked in Sir Edward Grey's own hand to go to the King ; to the Prime
I Minister; to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.]

I No. 76.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget. C)

, F.O. 45739/33672/12/44.
1 (No. 18.)

S^^' Foreign Office, October 29, 1912.

The Servian Ch[arge] d'AfE[aire]s communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on
j Oct[ober] 25 the paper of which I transmit a copy to you herewith. M. Grouitch
I assured Sir A. Nicolson that the information was quite trustworthy and accurate. He
I commun[icate]d it to Sir A. Nicolson merely " a titre de renseignement." He added
I that, though not instructed to do so, he wished to state positively that he knew for

(') [This despatch and enclosure were repeated to Vienna.]

a certainty that if Austria Hungary endeavoured to intervene in the Sanjak the
Servian troops would resist her. This had been definitely decided upon by his
Gov[ernmen]t.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[KEY].

Enclosure in No. 76.
Communication from M. Gruic.

October 25, 1912.

L'Autriche-Hongrie a mobilise le XV Corps d'Armee a Sarayevo et le XVI'
Corps d'Armee a Eaguse. Des troupes ont ete envoyees a Vishegrad et a Chajnitche;
une brigade a ete disloquee a Fotcha et tout est pret pour la marche en avant.

Sept bataillons d'infanterie et un bataillon du genie ont ete envoyes en Bosnie, ou
deux classes d'otficiers de reserve ont ete appelees. Tous les jours quatre trains
remplis de troupes sont diriges sur Uvatz.

500 marins ont ete envoyes de Pola a Buda-Pest pour la flotille du Danube.

25 Octohre 1912.

No. 77.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Vienna, October 30, 1912.
F.O. 46025/42842/12/44. D. 8-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 119.) Confidential. E. 10-30 p.m.

From a conversation I had this morning with a well-informed person I have
obtained following information with regard to the views held here as to the Near
Eastern crisis : —

A change appears to be taking place as to the views held in official circles with
regard to the meaning of the status quo. The principle of its maintenance is still held
officially, but new interpretation is beginning to be given as to the meaning of the
phrase. Status quo is now said to signify maintenance of a state of equilibrium
between interests of the Great Powers and of the Balkan States in the Near East, and
not merely territorial integrity. Events are succeeding each other so rapidly that it
is being recognised here that the Powers will be compelled to accept new situation
and to realise that wishes of Balkan States will have to be taken into greater account.
I gather that little objection is likely to be raised here to reasonable territorial
alterations. There seems to be a disposition at present even to admit a Servian
aggrandisement, and utriiost conciliation will be shown her, but I am told informa-
tion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is that Servian pretensions are growing
excessive, and possession of this information probably explains Prime Minister's
words in Parliament yesterday that Austria was peacefully disposed, but would
not buy peace at any price. Austria seems disposed at present to concentrate her
attention on safeguarding her economic rather than her so-called political interests
in the Balkans and keeping open the road to Salonica for trade. I believe now Austria
would admit retention of Scutari by Montenegro and of Janina by the Greeks. As
to the Albanian question, I understand that little anxiety is felt, as it is said that
Italy and Austria by their arrangement have laid down basis of an amicable under-
standing as to their spheres of influence. (-)

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is very reserved in expressing his views
as to what should be done in the present crisis, but the Eussian Ambassador, who

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [cp. Pribram, Vol. I, pp. 196-201, pp. 240-3, pp. 256-9; cp. also infra, p. 81, No. 100;
p. 252, No. 339.]

saw him yesterday, tells me his impression was that Minister for Foreign Affairs
favours direct negotiations being carried on between the Balkan league and Turkey as
soon as an armistice can be arranged. Russian Ambassador thinks that if general
outline of peace conditions can be arrived at rapidly between belligerents, Germany
might then not object to taking part in conference called to ratify and correct peace
conditions. All the information in my possession tends to make me believe that
Austria will not advise Eoumania to mobilise, but will probably support Roumanian
claims to compensation if Bulgaria should acquire much new territory.

From a good source I learn that unofficial negotiations are being carried on
between Servia and Austria with a view to seeing whether they cannot come to terms
amicably. Russian Minister at Belgrade came to see Russian Ambassador here a few
days ago. Russian Ambassador told me that he had advised him to use his influence
at Belgrade to counsel moderation.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)
F.O. 40613/33672/12/44.

(No. 322.) St. Petersburgh, D. October 30, 1912.

Sir, R. November 4, 1912.

With the single exception of the "Retch," the organ of the Kadet Party, which,
since an interview that its editor, Monsieur ]\Iiliukof recently had with
Monsieur Sazonow, has joined hands with the Paris "Temps" in protesting against
the inflamniatory language of the " Novoe Vremya," the tone of the Russian press
has undergone but little change during the past fortnight. The French press is still
being taken severely to task for the views to which it has given expression on the
Balkan crisis, while the attitude of journals of all shades of political opinion is still
distinctly unfriendly to France and England. They are, however, now more inclined
to admit that the Governments of those two countries are not so directly responsible
for the present situation as is Russian diplomacy, and they consequently throw the
chief blame on Monsieur Sazonow for having failed to bring home to those Govern-
ments the true nature of the Russian interests which are at stake.

In the account published in the "Daily Telegraph" of a conversation which
Dr. Dillon recently had with Monsieur Sazonow, the latter is represented as having
spoken of the identity of views that existed between the Cabinets of Vienna and
St. Petersburg and having expressed the determination to uphold the territorial status
quo in the Balkans. (-) Suspicion of Austria is so deep rooted in the minds of all Russian
journalists that these two statements have been received with a chorus of disapproval
by the press in general. The satisfaction which they have caused at Vienna is,
according to the " Novoe Vremya," to be explained by the fact that Monsieur Sazonow
will only guarantee the execution of reforms for the Southern Slavs on the condition
that the existing political frontiers in the Balkans remain unaltered. Austria, the
"Novoe Vremya" declares, is determined to prevent the territorial junction of two
branches of the Servian race, in order that she may move more freely along the inter-
vening passage to the ^gean and by cutting off Servia from the Adriatic continue to
play with her as a cat with a mouse. In conclusion the " Novoe Vremya " asks where
is the iron hand that will preserve the territorial status quo, if the Slavs and the Greeks
prove victorious, and that will snatch from them the fruits of the victories which they
will have purchased with their blood?

Mr. A. P. Stolypin, the well known publicist, writing in the same paper, says
that to talk of the maintenance of the status quo is unthinkable and that any proposal
to that effect would be a direct act of hostility towards the Slavs. The same note is
struck in other papers.

(1") [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
(2) [v. Daily Telegrnph, Octohev 23, 1912, pp. 11-2.]

The " Golos Moskvy," Monsieur GutckofE's [sic] organ, declares that, as the
Franco-Russian AUiance is solely directed against Gei-many, with whom Russia can
easily come to terms, that Alliance is perfectly useless for Russia and that, as the
latter cannot count on either French or British support, she is entirely isolated in the
present crisis.

While the attacks thus levied against Monsieur Sazonow continue unabated, the
^reports, which were persistently circulated a fortnight ago, of his approaching resigna-
tion have, since he was received by the Emperor at Spala entirely ceased. In a
conversation, which I had with him on the 22nd instant, the day on which he returned
to St. Petersburg, His Excellency gave me to understand that he had every reason to
be satisfied with the reception accorded to him by His Majesty : and there can, I think,
be no doubt but that his policy of keeping in close contact with Austria and the other
Powers for the purpose first of averting and then of localising the war met with His
Majesty's full approval. The orders which, as His Excellency told me, he had received
from the Emperor were to give the Balkan Slavs all the assistance in his power,
without involving Russia in any serious entanglements. What struck me most in the
course of this conversation was the despondent view which His Excellency took of the
future. Monsieur BobtchefE, the newly arrived Bulgarian Minister, had apparently
been pressing him in such urgent terms to bring about an intervention of the Powers
at the first possible moment that Monsieur Sazonow was under the impression that
the Bulgarian Government had discovered some grave defect in their military prepara-
tions and that their army would in consequence suffer serious reverses. Should, he
said, this prove to be the case Russia might find herself forced to mobilise ; and he
was therefore most anxious to seize the first favourable opportunity that offered for
mediation. He expressed the earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would
support him when that moment came, and dwelt on the serious consequences that
might ensue were England and France to fail Russia in the crisis, with which she was
being confronted. The assurances which I was authorised to give him by your private
telegram of the 23rd instant caused His Excellency the greatest satisfaction. (^)

That the Bulgarian Government, at one moment after the outbreak of war, enter-
tained misgivings as to possessing the staying power necessary to bring- it to a
successful termination, is also apparent from the appeals which Monsieur Bobtchefi
more than once made to me to use my influence with His Majesty's Government with i
a view to inducing them to propose mediation without delay. Even on the day on
which he received the news of the fall of Kirk Kilisse, he urged that the time had
come for putting a stop to a carnage in which the flower of Bulgarian manhood was
gradually perishing. The conditions of peace which he then put forward were the
creation of three autonomous Vilayets, of which one was to comprise Old Servia,
between the Sanjak and the Shar mountains; another Epirus and Turkish Thessaly;
and the third the rest of Macedonia from Lake Ochrida to the river Mesta. With
regard to the Adrianople Vilayet all that his Government would ask would be that
something should be done to render the lives of the Christian population more tolerable
than they are at present.

The programme of the reforms to be eventually introduced into Turkey in Europe,
which Monsieur Sazonow drew up and telegraphed to London and Paris as a basis
of discussion between the Powers, (*) did not go nearly as far as this, as its underlying
principle was self government by Sanjaks, instead of autonomy by Vilayets. Now,
however, that, in consequence of their victories, the Bulgarians have declared tljat ■
they cannot return home empty handed and that there must be a modification of the '
territorial status quo, Monsieur Sazonow has been quick to recognise that his reform
proposals are already out of date and that they can, at the most, be applied to those
districts where the Christian population is in the majority, which will remain Turkish i
after the war. Though His Excellency has not yet put forward any fresh proposals

(') [v. supra, p. 46, No. 58.]
(••) [v. supra, p. 61, Ed. note.]

to meet the altered situation created by the war, he has given me to understand that,
unless the Turks are able to retrieve their fallen fortunes, Bulgaria will reject any
ofFer of mediation except on the understanding that she is to receive the accession
of territory contemplated in the Treaty of San Stefano.(^) She would however have
to satisfy the claims which the Servians are sure to advance in the Kossovo Vilayet;
and it remains to be seen whether she will be prepared to abide by the delimitations
of the respective spheres of influence, that is said to have followed the conclusion of the
Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance. The line of delimitation then agreed upon was, I believe,
to run from some point on the Servian frontier through Kumanovo and Uskub to
Lake Ochrida ; while, from what Monsieur Bobtcheff told me, the Bulgarian Govern-
ment would now like to restrict these claims to Old Servia and to fix the future Serbo-
Bulgarian frontier at the Shar Mountains, When, therefore, the day of settlement
arrives, this question is not unlikely to prove a serious bone of contention between
the two allied States.

Then there is a further claim that Servia seems determined to put forward to
which Monsieur Sazonow has more than once called my attention, and that is her
desire to obtain access to the Adriatic by acquiring a strip of Albanian territory which
would enable her to build a railway to San Juan di Medua.

Monsieur Sazonow told me that he had warned Monsieur Bobtcheff that all these
claims to territorial aggrandisement on the part of the Allies would inevitably give
rise to counter-claims for compensation on the part of Austria and Eoumania, and
that he had enquired how Bulgaria proposed to compensate the latter.
Monsieur Bobtcheff had replied that Bulgaria might perhaps cede Silistria and that
this would probably satisfy Boumania. I reminded Monsieur Sazonow that when,
some years ago, Eoumania had suspected Bulgaria of contemplating an attack on
Turkey, she had let it be known that any expansion of the former on the side of
Macedonia would have to be paid for by the cession of a slice of Bulgarian territory,
bordering on the Dobrudscha, and that two lines had then been spoken of — one
running from Ruostchouk to Varna and the other from Silistria to Baltjik — His
Excellency in reply said that he doubted very much whether Bulgaria would entertain
even the lesser of these two alternatives.

The position in which Monsieur Sazonow now finds himself placed, is not a very
enviable one and will hardly enhance his reputation for diplomatic foresight. He has
announced to the world, through Dr. Dillon, that he is entirely at one with Austria
I and that he is determined to maintain the principle of the territorial status quo. He
I has accepted unreservedly the explicit assurances, given him by the Bulgarian
I Minister, that there were to be no territorial changes after the war and he has more
I than once hinted that he did not wish to see the Bulgarian arms achieve too decisive
, a victory. He has told me from the first that were the Bulgarian army to threaten-
. Constantinople, Russia would have to cry "Hands off," and he encouraged the con-
j elusion of peace between Turkey and Italy, not only because he feared that a oon-
I tinuanee of the war might entail the closing of the Straits, but also because he was
[ afraid that Bulgaria might get out of hand. It. would almost appear as if he belonged
to the school of politicians, that holds that the Balkan States must be kept in Russia's
leading strings ; that they must hope for no benefits, save those which she is pleased
j to bestow on them ; and that they must wait for the fulfilment of their national
aspirations till Russia tells them that the hour to strike has arrived. Circumstances
have now proved too strong for him. After treating the Slavist propaganda carried
on in the press as a purely personal attack against himself, he has now made a
1 complete volte face, and has, at the eleventh hour, adopted the policy of his critics,
i Not only has he abandoned all idea of maintaining the principle of the status quo,
j but he will probably find himself forced to support the extreme territorial claims of
j the Balkan States before Europe. He is, moreover, so impressed by the anti-Austrian
• utterances of the Press that, while anxious to keep in close contact with Vienna and

(5) [cp. infra, p. 71, No. 85.]
[6272] F

to come to a friendly understanding with Austria as regards the eventual settlement
of the Balkan question, he declines to be seen keeping company with her in public
and prefers that France, and not Austria and Russia, should lead the European
concert.

I have, &c.

GEOEGE W. BUCHANAN.

No. 79.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)
E.G. 46910/33672/12/44.

(No. 77.) Belgrade, D. October 30, 1912.

Sir, R. November 5, 1912.

Probably no one has been more surprised than the Servians themselves at the
turn events have taken during the last fortnight. Although of course the Military
party and a certain number of Chauvinists were loud in their clamour for war the
Servian nation taken as a whole unquestionably looked upon the prospect with con-
siderable dififidence. Even after the issue of the mobilization decree there were
unmistakable signs that the Servian Government would have welcomed any excuse
sufficient to extricate them from the position into which Bulgaria had manoeuvred
them. This diffidence resulted partly from the fear of the superiority of the fighting
qualities of the Turkish Army, partly from apprehension lest, even should the Servian
Army be fortunate enough to gain a few successes Servia would in the end be deprived
of the fruits of her victories by Austrian jealousy. To find the Servian Army in
possession of Uskub and masters within a few days after crossing the frontier of all
the territory which has formed the object of Servian aspirations for years past is an
event which rational Servians scarcely contemplated. This event has indeed come
about in the only manner possible but in a manner which it was difficult to conceive
namely by the retreat of the Turkish Army practically without a blow being struck.
So far as can be gathered from reports which have reached Belgrade the only place
where the Servian Army was confronted by Turkish regulars in any numbers was at
Kumanovo on which occasion about thirty thousand Turks opposed some eighty
thousand Servians. Except in this battle resistance against the advance of the Servian
columns was conducted by Albanians alone and although the latter operate merely as
untrained bands and have no artillery the Servian troops, judging by their losses
appear to have found the task of overcoming them none too easy. It is not therefore
unreasonable to suppose that had Turkish regulars co-operated in any degree with the
Albanians the Servian Army might have fared very differently.

That Servians should entirely lose sight of this fact and should attribute their
success to military superiority and prowess alone is perhaps not unnatural but it is
a circumstance liable to be unfortunate in its effect and to render them intractable
when the moment arrives for deciding upon future territorial arrangements in the
Balkan Peninsula.

I had the honour in my telegram No. 43 of the 27th instant(^) to report infor-
mation given me by the Austrian Minister according to which the Balkan States
already regard the wholesale partition of European Turkey between them as a
certainty. Servia's share is to be the whole of the Sandjak, Old Servia (a somewhat
indefinite desigiiation comf)rising the whole of the Vilayet of Kossovo and probably
parts of Monastir) and the port of San Giovanni di Medua on the Adriatic. Though

(1) [Copies of this despatch were sent to the King; to the Cabinet; to the Director of
Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 54, No. 67.]

Moneieur d'Ugron assured me this information came from an absolutely reliable
source I am unable to say whether these extreme views are really those of the Govern-
ment but when I recently spoke to Monsieur Pashitch concerning the territory which
had been occupied his tone was decidedly uncompromising and it is impossible not
to be aware of the spirit of ambition and determination which is coming over the
country and which so far as Turkish territory is concerned appears to be limited only
by the ambitions of the other Balkan States. It is now constantly conveyed to one
in a variety of ways that Servia is prepared to fight against no matter what odds for
every inch of territory she has now conquered.

From the Austrian point of view the unqualified success .of the Servian Arms has
created a situation of exceeding perplexity. My Austrian Colleague tells me he has
no precise instructions from his Government as to the attitude he is to adopt. It is
evident, he says, that they intend to make every possible effort to settle matters
amicably as the consequences of an attack on Servia would be incalculable but Austria
had also to consider her own immediate safety. The effect which the retention of the
Sandjak by Servia and her consequent junction with Montenegro would have upon
the Austrian position in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighbouring provinces
Croatia and Dalmatia was referred to in my despatch No. 72 of the 23rd instant (^)
and there is some evidence that Austrian apprehensions are not unreasonable inasmuch
as the possibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming part of Servia at no very distant
date is already openly discussed.

Austria is now placed before this dilemma ; either she drives Servia out of the
Sandjak by force of arms with the practical certainty of Russia intervening, or she
remains inactive allowing Servia to enlarge herself at will when Servia by Pan-serb
intrigues and propaganda will in time cause such unrest and ierment in the Austrian
Slav provinces that Austria will be compelled to take energetic measures against
Servia for her own protection, — a proceeding which will again bring her into conflict
with Russia.

Very probably at the present moment the Russian Government will give every
assistance to Austria in the solution of this problem by giving counsels of moderation
to the Servian Government but it is open to doubt whether these will produce much
effect. The Servians are fully alive to the strength of their present position. They
were impelled to war by Panslavist influences, they feel these at their back and they
mean to exploit the situation to its fullest extent. They know that the Russian
Government dare not face the threat of Servia going over to Austria. Incidentally I
may mention that the fact of the Czar recently telegraphing his congratulations to
King Peter on the success of the Servian Arms is not likely to make the Servian
Government more modest in their ideas.

The remarks which I have made above are not intended in any way as a forecast
but merely to delineate the position as, judging by appearances, it now presents itself
between Austria and Servia. At any moment factors may arise to modify the present
aspect. Possibly when the first elation of success has passed Servia may come to the
conclusion that it is more politic to arrive at some modus vivendi with Austria than
to drive her to extremes, possibly also although everything seems at present to be
going smoothly between the allies jealousies may later creep in which will afford
Austria an opportunity of readjusting a situation which just now is by no means in
her favour.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Copy sent to Vienna.

(■■') [v. supra, pp. 43-4, No. 55. The despatch was dated October 22.]

[6272]

No. 80.

Communication from M. Paul Camhon.

F.O. 47381/42842/12/44. French Embassy , London, October BO, 1912.

Les Puissances reconnaissant que Theure approche ou elles pourront exercer
leur mediation entre les belligerants de la Peninsule Balkanique et, continuant de
placer au premier rang de leurs preoccupations le maintien de la paix Europeenne,
declarent qu'elles s'appliqueront a leur oeuvre commune dans un esprit d'absolu
desinteressement.

Le 30 Octobre 1912.

No. 81.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. C)

F.O. 46526/42842/12/44.
(No. 536.)

Sir, Foreign Office, October 30, 1912.

M. Cambon showed me to-day the following formula, on which M. Poincare
wished to have my opinion. If I was favourable to it, he would suggest it in
St. Petersburg. (See formula herewith.)

Having read it, I said that I was sure we should be prepared to agree to it, and I
thought that it would probably meet the Russian view as well.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

Enclosure in No. 81.

1°) Les Puissances interviendront coUectivement aupres des Etats belligerants
afin qu'ils suspendent les hostilites.

2°) La souverainete de Sa Majeste Imperiale le Sultan sera integralement
maintenue a Constantinople et aux environs.

3°) Pour les autres parties de la Turquie d' Europe, le statut national, politique ou
administratif sera modifie, selon les regions, et de telle sorte que les interets de tous
les Etats en cause soient impartialement equilibres.

4°) Afin de regler, dans un esprit de parfaite entente, ces diverses questions, les
Puissances se reuniront sans retard dans une Conference ou seront egalement convies
les Etats beUigerants et la Eoumanie.

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.
On November 1, 1912, a telegram (No. 650), D. 1-10 p.m., from Sir Edward Grey to
Sir F. Bertie gave the four points included in this despatch, and stated that the communication
had been made by the French Charge d' Affaires. Sir Edward Grey added that he was replying
that he raised " no objection to the Powers being consulted, but that thou'gh Powers may all
accept this proposal to-morrow events move so rapidly that views expressed one day have to
be modified the next. It will be very important to have some idea of Austrian and Russian
views before any Conference meets." (F.O. 46426/42842/12/44.) cp. B.D.F., 3'"^ Ser., Vol. IV,
p. 323, No. 302; p. 326, No. 306.]

No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Private. (')

My dear Bertie, Foreign Office, October 30, 1912.

Your letter of the 28th, (^) giving an account of your conversation with Poincare
and Iswolsky, is interesting.

You will see by the records that my path in the conversations with Germany
was made smooth by the fact that the German Chancellor put in the forefront of his
views that Austria and Russia should lead the Concert. I have stuck to this as a
text, and therefore no question arose in my conversations with Kiihlmann as to leavmg
Russia out,

Poincare continually talks of mediation, but mediation will be of no use unless
the Powers are agreed upon the settlement. If Turkey were to win, an agreement
would be easy. The prospect of a Turkish "debacle" and the complete victory of
the Balkan States makes things more difficult. Public opinion here will be dead
against turning the Balkan States out of what they may show their ability to conquer
by their own forces. If Russia and Austria do agree upon a settlement, public opinion
here will not push its own views and force the Government to assert them. But if
Austria were to attack the Balkan States, and Russia said " Hands off," it would be
impossible for a British Government, even if it desired, to side diplomatically with
Austria against Russia. I propose to work for agreement between Russia and Austria,
but it will have to be with the limitation that Austria is reasonable. (^)

I think it is rather a good idea that, when the time for mediation comes,
assuming that the Balkan States have Turkey at their mercy, mediation should take
the form of a proposal by Austria and Russia to the Balkan States of a settlement to
which Austria and Russia would agree, and which might content Bulgaria. The
Balkan States will not claim to keep every thing if they find that their extreme
demands would entail war with Austria. I do not suppose that Russia would insist
that Austria must not make any reserves, and that the Balkan States must have every
thing. But they will have to get a good deal ; and whatever they do not get, as far
as Macedonia and Albania are concerned, will have to be reserved as some sort of
autonomous units.

Unforeseen developments of the war may upset these calculations, and they
contain very uncertain factors. But they are as definite as I can make them at
present.

Yours sincerely,

E. GREY.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 14.]

(2) \v. supra, pp. 56-7, No. 71.]

(3) [fp. Poincare, p. 297.]

No. 83.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Vienna, November 1, 1912.

F.O. 46308/42842/12/44. D. 12-18 p.m.

Tel. (No. 120.) Confidential. R. 3-30 p.m.

French Ambassador told me last night that he had invited Austrian M[inister
for] F[oreign] A[fEairs] to adhere to a protocol of " desinteressement " with regard
to the Balkans.(^) H[is] E[xcellency] told me that M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]

(') [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 644); to Berlin (as No. 315); to St. Petersburgh
(as No. 1145); to Constantinople (as No. 911); to Rome (as No. 461).]

(2) [cp. B.D.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. IV, p. 295, No. 284; pp. 315-6, No. 297.]

had declined to do so, using the words, that as an honest man he could not commit
himself to signing such a paper under present circumstances.

This step has I gather been undertaken at instigation of Russia : it was bound
to fail. To expect Austria to disinterest herself — territorially or otherwise — in the
Balkans, if the status quo cannot be maintained, is as hopeless as it would be to expect
Russia at the instigation of Powers interested in China, to disinterest herself in
Mongolia.

Confidence is felt here that Austria can adjust her interests in the Balkans by
direct negotiations with the Balkan states, and a direct arrangement with Servia is
thought possible if Russia does not use her influence at Belgrade to raise Servian
aspirations and demands. Here they desire to be most conciliatory in dealing with
Balkan problem, but they will never admit that Russia shall score some diplomatic
success which can be interpreted as a recognition that Russia has a right to play the
role of protector of Slav rights and ambitions in the Balkans. Austria considers that
she possesses special claims and interests there, as she claims to be a Balkan State
herself through the possession of Bosnia, and any attempt which may be made to
coerce her, where defending what she considers to be her vital interests, will only tend
to increase the strain already existing between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and perhaps
lead to war.

No. 84.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Paris, November 1, 1912.

F.O. 46323/42842/12/44. D. 2-55 p.m.

Tel. (No. 186.) Confidential. R. 5-35 p.m.

President of Council sent for me this morning. He informed me of the com-
munications which he made to you yesterday(^) in regard to the attitude of Austria on
subject of French proposals of mediation between Turkey and Balkan States, and for
a conference.

His Excellency is greatly preoccupied at Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs'
refusal to be a party to a declaration of territorial disinterestedness. He considers this
refusal and the desire of the German Government to avoid or postpolie a conference
are indications that Austria, supported by Germany, intends to negotiate with Servia
and Bulgaria, putting her own pressure on Servia, using that of Roumania on Bulgaria
to gain her own ends in the matter of territorial acquisitions, and then to present other
Great Powers with a fait accompli as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

President of the Council says that if Austria obtains territory other Great Powers
may require territorial compensations.

MINUTE.

My telegram No. 467 to Sir R. Rodd yesterday, (^) which was to be repeated to Berlin and
acted upon by Sir E. Goschen deals with this point.

E. G.
2.11.12.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 68, No. 81. The proposal was communicated on October 30,]

(3) [v. infra, p. 72, No. 87.]

No. 85.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edicard Grey.O)

St. Petersbnrgh, November 1, 1912.
P'.O. 46318/42842/12/44. D. 3-10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 401.) E. 4-45 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that if Bulgarians won battle then
proceeding Treaty of San Stefano(') must be taken as basis of the future settlement.
Russians could not, however, consent to Bulgaria retaining any territory comprised
in Adrianople vilayet beyond the districts assigned to her by that treaty, and that the
rest of the vilayet, including Adrianople, must be left under the effective sovereignty of
the Sultan.

As it was for Russia to take the initiative in telling this to Bulgarians, he hoped
that His Majesty's Government and the French Government would, when the time
came, make it clear at Sophia.

His Excellency is sending to London copy of agreement under which Servia and
Bulgaria recognised each other's spheres of influence in Macedonia. (^) He said that
Bulgaria would make no difficulties about ceding Uskub and a line to Lake Ochrida
to Servia ; but that we ought to consider how we can induce Austria to consent not only
to this, but also to cession to Servia of a strip of territory through Albania to the
Adriatic.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 325) ; to Paris (as No. 654) ; to Rome (as
No. 469) ; to Vienna (as No. 323) ; to Constantinople (as No. 921.) Copies were sent to the
Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. Hertslet : Map of Euro-pe. hy Treaty, (1891), Vol. IV, pp. 2672-96.]

(3) [This is the "contested zone" agreement, which formed a secret annex to the Serbo-
Bulgarian alliance of February 29/March 13, 1912. v. Gooch d: Temperley, Vol. IX (1),
pp. 781-2, App. V. An extract from it marked " Tres secret et strictement confidentiel " was
communicated by Count Benckendorff on November 5. (F.O. 47532/33672/12/44.) A copy
was sent privately to Sir G. Buchanan by Sir A. Nicolson, and Sir Edward Grey commented
on it in his secret despatch (No. 373) of November 8, 1912. (F.O. 47531/33672/12/44.) cp. infra,
pp. 1010-11, App. II.]

No. 86.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Belgrade, November 1, 1912.
F.O. 46320/42842/12/44. D. 7-30 p.m.

I Tel. (No. 45.) E. 10-0 p.m.

I find from a conversation which I have just had with Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs that information given m.e by my Austrian colleague concerning
ideas of Balkan States on eventual division of Turkey (see my telegram No. 43 of
Oct[ober]i 27 C) is practically correct. In addition, however, he told me that both
the Servian and Bulgarian idea is to hand over Salonica, and quite a considerable area
surrounding it, to Great Britain, and to neutralise both Constantinople and
Dardanelles.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 326); to Constantinople (as No. 923); to Paris
j (as No. 655) ; to Rome (as No. 470) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1154) ; to Vienna (as No. 324).
I Copies were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of

Military Operations.]

(2) [i;. supra, p. 54, No, 67. J

Speaking of the sanjak, he said that if Austria showed a disposition to hve
amicably with Servia an arrangement could no doubt be made 'about the sanjak itself,
and she would find the Servians glad to be good friends, but Austria must once and
for all give up the idea of getting to Salonica or preventing Servia from having a port
on the Adriatic. If Austria showed herself to be aggressive, she would be resisted
to the last drop of Servian blood, and he had litttle doubt that Bulgaria would fight
by their side.

•No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.C)
F.O. 46428/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 467.) Foreign Office, November 1, 1912, 11 p.m.

Italian Ambassador informed me that he heard from a source on the Continent
that there was some loose talk of notifying Austria that there must be no interference
with certain points such as the acquisition by Servia of territory across the Sanjak to
a port on the Adriatic : he said that to lecture Austria in this manner would make
things impossible.

I said that such a method of approaching Austria would be criminal. I hoped
Austria would make as few reserves as possible respecting the gains of the Balkan
States, but it ought to be made easy for her to be moderate.

Balkan States had apparently conquered all Macedonia and Bulgaria was at the
gates of Constantinople.

Question now was should any limits be set to the territory to be acquired by them
and if so what limits? A change of ownership of Constantinople was a large European
question, but exc-ept as regards that, public opinion here would make no reserves
and would be against any attempt to deprive Balkan States of fruits of victory.

Eussia I thought would be ready to state what reserves she had to make : it was
very important that Austria should do the same and make her reserves as small as
possible — economic reserves would probably be easy to agree upon. If Germany could
ascertain from Austria what reserves she wished to make, so that friendly Powers
could know both the Russian and Austrian views, we should have a little ground
to work upon.

Italian Ambassador informed me that Italian M[inifiter for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]
was going to Berlin to-morrow and he would telegraph to him what I had said.

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 321) ; to Paris (No. 651) ; to St. Petersburgh
(No. 1151); with a supplementary instruction "You should inform M[inister for] F[oreigu]
A[ffairs] of my views." It was repeated to Vienna (No. .321), for Sir F. Cartwright's
information only.]

No. 88.

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Tel. (Private. )(') Foreign Office, November 1, 1912, 11-30 p.m.

Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople may now become a fait accompli any day.
It is important to know whether this would modify view of Russian M[inister for]
F[oreign] A[ffairs] expressed in first paragraph of your telegram No. 401. (')

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 35.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 71, No. 85.]

As regards second paragraph I am sure public opinion here will be cordially and
entirely in favour of contemplated gains to Servia and Bulgaria. But it is important
not to approach Austria with a sort of ultimatum as Italian Ambassador feared (see
my tel[egram] to Sir R. Eodd No. 467(^)) but to give her an opportunity of agreeing
without loss of prestige. Much will depend upon whether Germany responds to sug-
gestions I have made that she should sound Austria.

You should express the above privately to M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs].

(3) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 89.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
F.O. 46597/42842/12/44.

(No. 465.) Berlin, D. November 1, 1912.

Sir, E. November 4, 1012.

I have the honour to report that yesterday, the 31st ultimo, my French colleague,
acting on instructions from his Government, submitted to the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs the following form of declaration to be made by the Great Powers : —

" Les Puissances reconnaissant que I'heure approche ou elles pourront exercer
" leur mediation entre les belligerants de la peninsule balkanique, et continuant de
I "placer au premier rang de leurs preoccupations le maintien de la paix europeenne,
' " declarent qu'elles e'appliqueront a leur oeuvre commune dans un esprit d'absolu
" desinteressement."

The Secretary of' State for Foreign Affairs made, I understand, no comment on
the proposed declaration, only saying that it was a matter that required careful con-
sideration and that he would furnish M. Cambon with the reply of the Imperial
Government as soon as possible, probably today or tomorrow. (V)
, I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

(1) [In his telegram (No. 145) D. November 4, 1912, 11-48 p.m., R. November 5, 11-45 a.m.,
1 Sir E. Goschen stated that the German Government " expresses agreement with the views of the
French Government respecting mediation, but makes no reference to desinteressement."
(F.O. 46925/33672/12/44.)]

No. 90.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^)
F.O. 46600/33672/12/44.

(No. 468.) Berlin, D. November 1, 1912.

I Sir, R. November 4, 1912.

Immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 312 of the 30th ultimo(^) I called
upon Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter and informed His Excellency that in consequence
of the disquieting reports which you had received from Salonica, His Majesty's
I Government had decided to send one or more of His Majesty's ships to that port for
the protection of British subjects in case of any dangerous disturbances.

His Excellency said that he also had received similar reports but that
I unfortunately they had no cruisers to send there. The only vessels available being a

i (') [This despatch was sent to Belgrade ; to St. Petersburgh.]

j (2) [Not reproduced as the contents are exactlv indicated above. The telegram was sent

I also to Paris (No. 636) ; to Vienna (No. 310) ; to Rome (No. 454) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 1136).

' (F.O. 45840/33672/12/44.)]

gunboat that was on its way somewhere — he did not quite know where — but which
was too small to be of any use, and the German stationnaire " Loreley " which
happened to be at Salonica itself for the purpose of bringing the Ex- Sultan Abdul
Hamid to Constantinople. I notice however that according to newspaper reports
that vessel has already left Salonica.

In speaking of the war, he said it seemed to be all up with the Turks and that
the Powers would therefore shortly be face to face with an exceedingly difficult and
complicated situation. The maintenance of the exact territorial status quo seemed,
after the wonderfully successful campaign of the four Balkan States, to be out of the
question, and the victorious States might be somewhat difficult to deal with. He had
been in close communication with Vienna during the last few days and he was glad
to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government seemed to be peaceably inclined and
disposed to deal with Servia — so long as the latter was reasonable — in a conciliatory
spirit. That was to say that they would not object to a larger Servia, so long as the
Servian Government showed a disposition to be friendly both in commercial and other
matters. In answer to a question from me Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter said that he
was under the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Government would prefer to see
the Servians in the Sandjak than to see them on the Adriatic or stretching in a
southerly direction.

His Excellency expressed the hope that a Conference would be avoided or at all
events postponed as long as possible. The Balkan States could, under present
circumstances, hardly be excluded, and it would be a great anomaly if, owing to the
Great Powers not having had time to come to an unanimous decision, the smaller
States would be, with their four solid votes, in a position to exercise a disproportionate
influence.

In conclusion His Excellency stated that events were marching very rapidly, and
that he thought that if the Turks lost the battle which now appeared to be in progress,
the Ottoman Government could easily be persuaded to demand the mediation of the
Great Powers. In this case he thought that the latter should propose an armistice,
during which the Balkan States could be sounded separately as to their demands.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

MINUTES.

The German Embassy has since informed us that they are sending ships to Constantinople
The inform[atio]n resp[ectin]g the Austrian attitude, confirming that which we have fronv
other sources, is on the whole as satisfactory as c[oul]d be expected.
We now know the Austrian views.

The German Gov[ernmen]t has been curiously out in its judgment as to the war. See last
two para[graph]s. The Balkan States won't come into a conference. The proposal for an
armistice w[oul]d be all in Turkey's favour, and has already been negatived bv the French.

R. G. V.

Nov[ember] 5.
R. P. M.
A. N.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey tu Sir G. Buchanan. {^)

F.O. 46296/42842/12/44.
(No. 365.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.

Count BenckendorfT discussed the Balkan situation with me on October 30. He
said that, if the Balkan States were completely victorious, Russia could not adhere
to the preservation of the territorial "status quo."

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King.]

I observed that public opinion here would not side with any attempt to turn the
Balkan States by force out of what they had conquered.

Count Benckendorff agreed with me that, if the Turks were victorious in the war
the settlement would have to be the ten'itorial "status quo" with thoroughgoing
reforms for Macedonia. He said that, if the Balkan States were completely victorious,
M. Sazonoff would make no reservations as to what they should obtain in Macedonia,
except that there should be some balance between the gains of Servia and of
Bulgaria : otherwise one of them would be very discontented, and would be thrown
into the arms of some one else. M. Sazonoff also stipulated that the part of Thrace
bounded by the Eiver ]\Iaritza must be left to the Sultan, to enable him to retain
possession in security of Constantinople. (^) In addition, M. Sazonoff wished that there
should be a declaration of disinterestedness on the part of the Great Powers.

I said that everything must depend on the result of the war; but, if the Balkan
States were successful, I saw no reason why we should n6t support such a settlement
as M. Sazonoff proposed. We had no reason for making reservations, and the only
criticism which I made on what Count Benckendorff had suggested was that some
reforms to secure the position of the Christian population xnight be necessary in the
part of Thrace left to Turkey. I wished, therefore, to leave this point open.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

(2) [cp. Count Benckendorff's report of November 1, Siebert, p. 382.]

No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Benckendorff.

Private. (^)

Dear Count Benckendorff, Foreign Office, November 1, 1912.

Since you were here I have had further information from Sophia from which I
gather that the Bulgarians are pressing on and have made up their minds that they
cannot stop their advance. (^) They may very likely have military reasons for not
giving the Turkish army time to collect itself at Tchataldja.

I have also received proposals from M. Poincare including one for collective inter-
vention by the Powers to suspend hostilities. f^) In these circumstances I think it is
too late to give further advice to Sophia. (*)

I have telegraphed to Berlin saying that I hope any reserves that Austria may
I make will be as small as possible : that economic reserves would probably be easy to
agree upon, and that it is very important to know what the Austrian views are. If
friendly Powers knew what reserves Eussia and Austria had to make respectively
there would be some ground to work upon.

I have not said anything as to what Eussian views are.

Yours sincerely,

E. GEEY.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 35.]

(2) [Sir Edward Grey had received three telegrams from Sir H. Bax-Ironside on October 31,
giving military information, and a further telegram on November 1, stating that the late battle
had been a crushing blow for the Ottoman forces, and that it was the determined intention of
the Bulgarians to march into Con.stantinople. Telegram (No. 112), November 1, 1912,

; D. 1-30 P.M., R. 1-35 P.M. (F.O. 46274/33672/12/44.)]
1 (3) \v. supra, p. 68, No. 81.]

(■*) fcp. infra, p. 95, No. 122.]

(*) [v. supra, p. 72, No. 87, and note (')■]

No. 93.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.

Private. (»)

My dear Grey, Paris, November 1, 1912.

As I reported to you by my telegram of today (186 conf[idential](^) )
Poincare sent for me this morning. I found him in an agitated state on account of
a telegram from the French Ambassador at Vienna giving the answer made by Count
Berchtold to Monsieur Poincare 's suggestion that the Powers should mediate between
the belligerents in the Balkans at the earliest opportunity possible making a
preliminary declaration of territorial disinterestedness. (^) Count Berchtold had given
a free hand to Monsieur Poincare so far as representations to the belligerents were
concerned but his honesty forebad him to make a declaration of absolute
disinterestedness for it would be in disregard of Austrian public sentiment.
Moreover the Powers would lose all means of pressure on the Balkan States if the
Powers gave them the impression that they give up the defence of their own interests
in the Balkans. Count Berchtold had asked how M. Poincare proposed that mediation
should be carried out. Were the belligerents to be allowed to negotiate between
themselves a peace which the Great Poweis would then revise? or would the Powers
ascertain the wishes of both sides and then propose such an arrangement as they
might consider equitable.

M. Poincare described this reply to his suggestion as very disquieting. He had
not received the German answer and I therefore communicated to him the informa-
tion contained in the telegram which you received yesterday from Berlin (No. 137)(*)
which indicated that the German Gov[ernmen]t hoped that a Conference might be
avoided or deferred as long as possible for the Balkan States could scarcely be
excluded and M. de Kiderlen Wachter disliked the idea of their four combined votes
until all the Great Powers had decided what was best to be done.

M. Poincare considers the answer of Count Berchtold and the desire of the
German Government to avoid or postpone a Conference to be indications that Austria
supported by Germany intends to negotiate with Servia and Bulgaria putting her own
pressure on Servia and making use of Eoumania for pressure on Bulgaria to gain her
own territorial objects and then to present the other Great Powers with a fait accompli
as she did in the case of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As M. Poincare found great fault with Count Berchtold for declining to bind
Austria to absolute territorial disinterestedness I pointed out to him that the Balkan
States had embarked on the war with such a declaration but they had since their
victories given up talking of adhering to the status quo and that being so it must be
expected that Austria would not be satisfied to be excluded from some share in the
spoil.

M. Poincare observed that Kussia would equally expect something if Austria got
anything to which I replied that they were not quite in the same position for Austria
was limitrophe to Montenegro, Servia and Turkish territory in Europe and Russia
was not. The conversation then turned to what territorial demands Greece Servia
and Bulgaria would be likely to make. M. Poincare thought that Greece might be
satisfied by a considerable rectification of frontier and Crete. If there were a question
of Austria or Greece at Salonika he would prefer Greece there. He feared that the
demands of Bulgaria would be large. He hoped that she would not enter
Constantinople for there might as a consequence be a massacre of Christians there.
The Ambassadors had asked that . Ships should prepare to go thither for protection
purposes and this had been agreed to by the French and British Governments.

(') [Grey MSS., Vol. 14. This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to
the Prime Minister.] '

(2) [v. supra, p. 70, No. 84.]

(3) [cp. D.D.F., S""^ Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 315-6, No. 297.]

{*) [Not reproduced, as the contents are sufficiently indicated above. cp. also supra,
pp. 73-4, No. 90, where the information is given in a despatch.]

1 asked M. Poincare whether he thought that Greece would lay claim to any of
the Aegean islands that she occupied. M. Poincare said that in such case, which he
hoped "vvould not occur, there would be an entire change in the position in the
Mediterranean for not only would Russia claim compensation (by this he meant the
Straits) but Germany and Austria would expect islands and if far reaching changes
were to take place territorially in the Balkan Peninsula giving to Austria and con-
sequently to Germany easy access to Salonika France would expect compensation
and when I suggested"^ that she could not wish to get anything in Syria he said no for
that was not Turkey in Europe. It would be an island that she would desire as
compensation.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 94.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Berlin, November 2, 1912.

F.O. 46558/42842/12/44. D. 6-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. 139.) Confidential. R. 8-55 p.m.

Your telegrams Nos. 321 and 322 of Nov[ember] l.(^)

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that he knows the reserves contem-
plated by Austria-Hungary, but that he does not feel authorised to communicate them.
He will, however, move Austro-Hungarian Government to inform you of them directly.
I could, in the meantime, tell you confidentially that they are surprisingly moderate
and almost entirely of an economic character. Austria had no objection to an enlarged
Servia so long as guarantees were given that Austria's commercial interest should not
suffer thereby.

His Excellency thought it extremely important at the close of the war that Servia
should address herself directly to Austria without any intermediary, and he seemed to
think that it would be useful if His Majesty's Government could give a hint to Servian
Government that if they do, and approach Austria in a conciliatory and moderate
manner, they will be met in a very friendly spirit.

His Excellency asked me to thank you for your communication,

(1) [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 82); to Constantinople (as No. 934); to
Paris (as No. 662); to Rome (as No. 476); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1164); to Vienna (as
No. 331). Copies were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the
Director of Military Operations.]

(^) [These telegrams repeated to Sir E. Goschen Sir Edward Grey's telegram No. 467 of
November 1 to Sir R. Rodd, and instructed him to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
V. supra, p. 72, No. 87, and note (*).]

No. 95,

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.(')

Paris, November 2, 1912.
F.O. 46540/42842/12/44. D. 7-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 190.) Confidential. R. 10-25 p.m.

Your telegram No. 652 of last night. (^)

I have this afternoon informed French Minister for Foreign Affairs of your
conversation with Italian Ambassador recorded in your telegram No. 467 to Piome of
yesterday, f^i

His Excellency concurs in your views as therein stated.

With regard to acquisition by Servia of a port on the Adriatic, French Minister
for Foreign Affairs suspects that Italian Government are the objectors quite as much
as, if not more than, Austrian Government, for the Italian Ambassador here has
advocated to His Excellency the desirabihty of Servia having territory accessible to
the iEgean Sea, which, French Minister for Foreign Affairs takes it, was with a view
to diverting Servia from the Adriatic. French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested
to Italian Ambassador that such a claim on the part of Servia would create difficulties
for her with Bulgaria.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 335); to Constantinople (as No. 933); to
Rome (as No. 475) ; to Vienna (as No. 329) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1162). Copies were
sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

(2) [Sir Edward Grey's telegram No. 652 of November 1 instructed Sir F. Bertie to
"inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]."]

(3) [v. supra, p. 72, No. 87.]

No. 96.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Paris, 'November 2, 1912.

F.O. 46556/42842/12/44. D. 7-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 188.) Confidential. R. 9-45 p.m.

Balkans.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have seen this afternoon, concurs in
views which you expressed to the French charge d'affaires as recorded in your telegram
No. 650 of last night. (-)

At the instance of Russian Government His Excellency has substituted " rayon "
in the ' ' environs ' ' round Constantinople within which the sovereignty of Sultan is to
be maintained (see No. 2 of his proposals).

His Excellency has not been able to elicit at Vienna anything definite as to views
of Austrian Government, but the Austrian Ambassador informed political director at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day that Austria has no territorial designs in Balkan
Peninsula, and Russia has declared that she has none.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs had suspected negotiations between Austria
and Servia and made enquiry of the Servian Minister here. On 30th October
M. Vesnitch said that, so far as he was aware, no such negotiations were taking place.
To-day he assured French Minister for Foreign Affairs by order of Servian Govern-
ment that they had not negotiated with Austrian Government and would not settle
anything with Austria without consulting Russia, France, and England. Servian
Minister added in reply to an enquiry by French Minister for Foreign Affairs that he
felt sure that there had not been any negotiations between Bulgaria and Austria.

(') [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 84). Copies were sent to the Admiralty;
to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [y. supra, p. 68, No. 81, note (>).] j

No. 97.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Paris, November 2, 1912.
F.O. 46557/42842/12/44. D. 8 p.m.

Tel. (No. 189.) Confidential. R. 11 p.m.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day of the proposal made
bv Russian Government that the French and British Governments should join them
in a warning to Bulgarian Government that Bulgaria vpould not be allowed
j'ermanently to retain Adrianople.

French Minister for Foreign AfEairs had, he told me, pointed out to the Russian
Ambassador that the Bulgarian Government were at present well disposed towards
Russia, France, and England, and to make such a communicaiton to them as was
suggested would be calculated to change their sentiments, and might not be listened
to, and he asked how such a warning was to be enforced.

M. Isvolsky said that he entirely concurred in French Minister for Foreign Affairs'
opinion, which he would report to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave Russian Ambassador to understand that
French Government could not join in making to Bulgarian Government the
communication suggested.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Di'-ector of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 98.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.

St. Petershurgh, November 2, 1912.

D. 8-27 P.M.

Tel. Private. (^) R. 10-30 p.m.

M. Sazonow whom I sounded as instructed in your private tel[egram] of
yesterday, (^) adhered to view expressed in 1st paragraph of my tel[egram] No. 401. (^)
He said that Constantinople and district referred to in above-mentioned telegram
must either remain Turkish [or] become Russian and that Russia would regard any
attempt made by another Power to take permanent possession of them as a casus belli.
; On my enquiring whether he still had intention reported in my despatch
i No. 283(*) to arrest march of Bulgarian army on Constantinople by presenting an
I ultimatum at Sofia, he said that he had not yet taken any decision, though he had
hinted at Sofia that Bulgaria had better not do so. I remarked that it might be
difficult to stop her and that my personal opinion was that any sort of intervention
I by a single Power might have dangerous consequences while coercive pressure
exercised by Russia at Sofia might have the effect of throwing Balkan States into the
arms of Austria.

H[is] E[xcellency] admitted this and after remarking that he had received no
recent news from the seat of war, said that Russia would in any case join other Powers
in sending ships of war to Constantinople, and that we must make Bulgarians clearly
to understand that if they occupied Constantinople their occupation must be of very
short duration.

I am reporting the resf of our conversation oflleially.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 35.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 72-3, No. 88.]
(^) [v. supra, p. 71, No. 85.]

(*) [v. Gooch (& Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 693-5, No. 722.]

No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.O
F.O. 46768/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 139.) Foreign Office, November 2, 1912, 8-30 p.m.

A communique having appeared in the Times that Bulgaria would have no
intention of retaining Constantinople (-) I have observed to the Bulgarian Minister that
if that was the opinion of his Gov[ernmen]t it would be well for them to reassure
the Eussian Gov[ernmen]t on this point. I knew that Kussia desired to support
Bulgaria and the possession of Constantinople seemed to be the one point that would
make a difficulty between them.

Bulgarian Minister said that communique represented his personal opinion ; he
held strongly that Bulgaria should not retain Constantinople. As to settlement
generally he asked whether Bulgaria had our sympathy. I said public opinion here
would not side with any attempt to deprive Balkan States of fruits of victory but
"would resent it.(^) I was speaking to hira as a friend confidentially who desired to see
Bulgaria have as little difficulty as possible in securing a settlement after her victorious
campaign.

Bulgarian Minister expressed satisfaction. You may inform M[inister for]
F[oreign] A[ffairs].

(1) [This telegram was repeated with No. 120 from Sir H. Bax-Ironside, v. infra, p. 86,
No. 109, and note (i).]

(2) [cp. supra, p. 75, No. 92, note (2), and infra, p. 83, No. 102 ; p. 86, No. 109. The
statement in The Times gave information from Renter's Agency, v. The Times, November 2,
1912, p. 5.]

(*) [This interview is reported by Count BenckendorfF. v. Siebert, pp. 384-5.]

No. 100.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.O

F.O. 46565/42842/12/44. St. Petersburgh, D. November 2, 1912, 10-40 p.m.
Tel. (No. 405.) E. November 3, 1912, 9 a.m.

Your telegram No. 467 of Nov[ember] 1 to Eome.(^) ;

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had formulated following (
reserves with regard to any changes in the territorial status quo : —

Turkey must retain possession of Constantinople and of territory to the east of
the Eiver Maritza, comprised in a line drawn from that river somewhat to the north
of Adrianople, and running to a point on the Black Sea, namely, neighbourhood of
Media. He added that Eussia might possibly consent to Bulgaria retaining
Adrianople if fortifications were razed.

As, however, there was considerable Greek and Bulgarian population in this
territory, the Powers must see that reforms were introduced into it.

Peninsula of Mount Athos, which is exclusively a monastery settlement, in which
all Orthodox churches are represented, must be made neutral and independent.

(>) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 342) ; to Constantinople (as No. 944) ; to Rome
(as No. 483) ; to Vienna (as No. 340) ; to Paris in sections. Copies were sent to the Admiralty ;
to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 72, No. 87.]

Administration to be left in the hands of the monks, who might employ small force
of gendarmerie to maintain order.

As regards Macedonia, his Excellency thought that Servia and Bulgaria might
be left to delimit their respective claims. Greeks would receive Crete, Epirus, and
Thessaly. Austria, he had heard, would consent to cession of sanjak to Montenegro.
Albania should become autonomous Turkish province, but it should be confined as far
as possible to the coastal districts and should not have an extensive hinterland. As
Italy and Austria were the Powers most directly interested in Albania, they might
consult together to effect settlement on the lines of their agreement of 1904 [sic] ; but
neither of them must establish anything in the shape of a protectorate over it.

His Excellency still holds that Servia must be given access to the Adriatic at
San Juan di Medua.

If Austria will not consent to this, the only alternative would be that she should
be allowed to reach that" sea more to the south at Valona. This would, however, render
the configuration of her territory most unsatisfactory, and he could only accept this
alternative if Servia accepted it.

With regard to Salonica, he said that he thought that it ought to be made a
neutral free port. He did not suppose that we should require to see it a possession of
Austria, and Russia certainly (group omitted : ? would not agree) to this. His
Excellency also did not seem to wish to see Bulgaria established there, though he
raised less objections to it becoming Greek.

With regard to step taken by French Ambassador at Vienna, reported in Berlin
telegram No. 140 of November 2(^) Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Ambassador
ought to have made it clear that all that was asked was a declaration of territorial
" desinteressement." Russia was asking for nothing for herself, and the sooner that
the Powers all declared their complete territorial disinterestedness the better, as then
Austria would be left alone if she declined to do the same. He had no wish whatever
to adopt a domineering attitude towards Austria. He had in conversation with Austrian
Ambassador said that Austria ought to treat Servia "en bon prince," and had
impressed on him the importance of our effecting a final settlement of the Balkan
question which would leave no friction or bitterness behind it, as the Berlin Congress
had done, so that Powers should not every spring have to ask themselves whether

I war (? was) imminent. He would be grateful if you would use somewhat similar
language to Austrian Ambassador in London. His Excellency further said that if

i Austria could come to a direct understanding with Balkan States he would make no

I objection but he added that if Austria tried to bully Servia the consequences might be

' very serious.

! Minister for Foreign Affairs had heard from Berlin that German Government
were using all their influence at Vienna to bring about a peaceful settlement, and that
j they were ready to consent to a conference, but also to admit participation of Balkan
j States at it.

1 With regard to latest French mediation proposals, his Excellency had proposed
I to substitute "rayon" for "district round Constantinople," and had expressed
1 opinion that presence of Balkan States at conference would complicate matters,
j He told me Roumania was mobilising, but said that he was convinced that
Bulgaria and she would come to terms, and that former would consent to small cession
of territory. I remarked that if his expectation was disappointed, and if Roumania
t adopted a menacing attitude towards Bulgaria Russian public opinion might force the
Government to take action. His Excellency admitted that this was not impossible. (*)

(3) [Apparently this reference should be to the Vienna telegram (No. 120) of November 1,
V. supra, pp. 69-70, No. 83. The Berlin telegram (No. 140) refers to the sending of ships to
Constantinople for the protection of foreign communities, cp. supra, p. 74, No. 90, min.]

{*) [cp. Siebert, pp. 386-7, where Count Benckendorff states that Sir Edward Grey read
him a telegram from Sir G. Buchanan on November 4. This is probably the present telegram.
cp. also infra, p. 91, No. 117.]

[6272] G

MINUTE.

We have the Russian views pretty fully here. It is more and more desirable that Austria
sh[oul]d show her hand too.

Q[uer]y Repeat to Vienna.

R. G. V.

Nov[ember] 4.

This might be repeated to Embassies.

R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.

No. 101.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)
F.O. 46911/33672/12/44.

(No. 78). Belgrade, D. November 2, 1912.

Sir, E. Noveviber 5, 1912.

In the absence of Monsieur Pashitch at Uskub I yesterday saw
Monsieur Yovanovitch, the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
and told him that according to despatches I had received the Servian Charge d' Affaires
in London appeared to be holding rather uncompromising language on the subject of
the Sandjak. I enquired whether Monsieur Grouitch's language correctly reflected
the sentiments of the Servian Government. The gist of Monsieur Yovanovitch 's reply
was as follows : It is almost an absurdity now even to refer to the old Status Quo.
The unqualified successes of the Servian Army have introduced an entirely new order
of things and it would be well everyone should realize this fact without delay. There
is no reason why Austria and Servia should not be able to come to terms concerning
the Sandjak. Everything will depend upon the spirit in which Austria approaches
the question. If Austria merely desires part of the Sandjak some arrangement could
doubtless be found as there would be no great objection to ceding a small piece of
territory but if she had ulterior aims and Salonica is her objective or she endeavours
to prevent Servia from getting an outlet upon the Adriatic Servia will take up arms
and will shed' the last drop of her blood in defending he[r] rights. " L'Autriche
n'entrera au Sanjak que par dessus nos cadavres " is a phrase I have recently heard
more than once.

I reminded Monsieur Yovanovitch that although he spoke thus airily of living in
amity with Austria a good deal of the trouble experienced in Croatia originated through
Servian intrigue and that Austria's position at the present moment was by no means
easy. This he readily admitted but said that the troubles in Croatia and other Serb
provinces were due to Austria's aggressive policy against Servia.

I then asked what exactly was understood under the name ' ' Old Servia ' ' and
said I should be glad to be enlightened more or less upon the subject of Servia's
present territorial pretensions. Taking a map Monsieur Yovanovitch traced a
'boundary rather vaguely but running approximately from the present Servian-
Bulgarian frontier in a south-westerly direction to Prilep, thence almost due west
taking in northerly end of Lake Ochrida to Durazo on the Adriatic. This would give
to Servia about 40 miles of coast including the port of St. John of Medua. I asked
what, under the circumstances, the other Balkan states intended to claim.
Montenegro it appears wants part of the Sandjak, the town of Scutari and a con-
siderable extension of her frontier towards the East. Concerning Greek claims he
was not very certain but thought probably Greece would want Thessaly and Epirus,
Greek wishes were however of minor importance. The Greeks had indicated that
Salonica should by rights fall to them but Bulgaria and Servia had in mind to hand ,

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. A
copy was sent to St. Petersburgh ]

over Salonica and the surrounding country to Great Britain. Bulgaria would take
what remained of Macedonia up to the Servian frontier and the whole of Roumelia
except a narrow strip comprising the Bosphorus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles
which should be made neutral territory. I pointed out that although the Balkan
States for the moment did not seem to be afflicted with shyness there still remained
a considerable amount of territory between the Adriatic and lake Ochrida, also further
South and I should be glad to know how that had been disposed of.
Monsieur Yovanovitch thought the Powers w^ould probably find some use for this.

In making these statements to me Monsieur Yovanovitch did not appear to feel
that there was anything premature or uncommon about them ; they were made quite
simply as though the partition of Turkey was the natural and only possible outcome
of the war and I have always found Monsieur Yovanovitch exceptionally straight-
forward O

I have, &c.

Copy sent to Vienna. EALPH PAGET.

(2) [A personal comment is omitted here.]

No. 102.

.Sir Edu-ard Grey to Sii- G. Buchanan. (^)

P.O. 46929/42842/12/44.
(No. 368.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.

The Russian Ambassador pressed me very earnestly again to-day to say some-
thing in Sofia to dissuade the Bulgarians from going to Constantinople.

I urged that military reasons might make it essential for the Bulgarians to
prevent the Turkish Army from reforming at Tchataldja, and to push on to
Constantinople.

As the Ambassador still pressed me to say some thing, I said that I would see
the Bulgarian Minister this afternoon, and would sound him as to whether Bulgaria
had any idea of retaining Constantinople. (^)

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

(2) [cp. supra, p. 80, No. 99, and infra, p. 86, No. 109.]

No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^)

I P.O. 46930/42842/12/44.
(No. 274.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.

I I told Herr von Kiihlmann to-day that there had been two things in yesterday's
news that had rather disquieted me. One, which I had heard through the Italian
Ambassador, was to the effect that there was some loose talk on the Continent, — in,
I 1 thought, not very responsible quarters, and I was sure that it did not represent the
( feeling of the Russian Government, — that Austria should be told definitely that
[ Bulgaria must have this and Servia must have that : as if Austria was to have no say
\ in the matter at all. If this reached the ears of Austria, it would be very unfortunate.
' The other thing which disquieted me was an impression left by news from Vienna
I that Austria was making up her mind to settle with Servia and Bulgaria direct, and

[This despatch is endor.sed as having been sent to the Ring and to the Cabinet,
cp. G.P., XXXIII, pp. 268-9.]

[6272] G 2

might take the line that a settlement with them was something in which no one else
should have any say. Of course, an amicable agreement between Austria, Servia,
and Bulgaria would not endanger peace. But what I feared was that Austria might
apply some pressure, perhaps using Roumania also for this purpose. Bulgaria and
Servia would then appeal to Eussia, and we should be confront<?d. perhaps suddenly,
with a situation in which Austria was the declared opponent and Russia the protector
of the Balkan States. Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg's desire that Austria and Russia
should lead the Concert, a desire which I shared, would then be blown to the winds.

Herr von Kiihlmann said that the Concert would, in fact, have disappeared.

I then urged the importance of ascertaining what the Austrian views were, and
what reserves Austria was likely to make. I thought that it was possible to ascertain
what the intentions of Russia were. If the views of the two countries were divergent,
we could at least gain time, while we tried to prevent the views from being publicly
contrasted, and endeavoured to find some means of reconciling them. If, on the other
hand, there was not much difference between them, we should know where we were,
and have good ground to work upon. I repeated what I had said so often, about the
feeling of British public opinion being against any attempt to deprive the Balkan
States of the fruits of victory. I could, however, imagine reserves which Austria
might wish to make and which would be quite reasonable : such as economic conditions,
and the preservation of Albania as a separate Principality. The desire to preserve
the peace of Europe was my motive in speaking.

Herr von Kiililmann said he thought Austria could hardly have pledged herself
to ' ' desinteresseraent ' ' and I observed that to ask her to state her reserves was a
different matter.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REYJ.

No. 104.

Sir R. Paget to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private.

My dear Nicolson, Belgrade, November 2, 1912.

I think my despatches Nos. 72, 77, 78(^) and my telegram No. 45(') will more or
less have answered the question you ask me in your private letter of Oct[ober] 29th. (*)■
My own impression now is that the Servians . iriW refuse to evacuate the Sandjak if
requested by Austria and this is based on information obtained from more sources
than one. There is an old man here, Novakovitch by name, who is leader of the
Progressists in the Skupstchina and who, having been a long time out of Servia,
usually takes a wider and more common sense view of things than most Servians.
He has to my knowledge recently told both the Austrian and French Ministers here,
with whom he is on very friendly terms, that if Austria wants to get the Servians
out of the Sandjak she will have to fight for it. To say the least of it and to use a
hackneyed expression the ' ' situation is obscure ' ' and I cannot think what Austria
will do. It seems to me she has the choice between attacking Servia with the practical
certainty of an European war or giving up for good all her ambitions Salonika way
and exposing- herself to endless worries in her own Serb provinces. It is all very well
for the Servians to pretend that they will not interfere with Austria if she leaves
them alone but they simply cannot keep off intrigue and now, that they have become
inordinately conceited over the war, the prospect of forming a Southern Slav
Kingdom will be almost irresistible to them. Already things are none too comfortable
for Austria in Croatia. Moreover one must remember that where Servia is there

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1912. This letter is endorsed in Sir Edward Grey's hand
as having been sent to the King; to the Prime Minister; to Lord Crewe; to Lord Morley.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 43-4, No. 55; pp. 66-7, No. 79; pp. 82-3, No. 101.]

(3) \v. supra, pp. 71-2, No. 86.]

{*) [Not reproduced, as the letter cannot be traced.]

Russia is and even if official Russia is correct other Russian influences are always at
work and do not make for Austria's security and peace of mind. On account of her
own position it must be a matter of much concern to her to have the eastern littoral
of the Adriatic in the hands of people whom she can either trust or dominate
entirely (*)

Yours sincerely,

RALPH PAGET.

(^) [The rest of the letter refers to Serbo-Bulgar and Serbo- Albanian relations, and Servian
losses in the war.]

No. 105.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.

Rome, November 3, 1912.

F.O. 46545/42842/12/44. D. 2-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 153.) R. 5-30 p.m.

Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 120 of Nov[ember] l.f^)

A similar question was addressed by French Ambassador to Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who replied that, as far as he was concerned, he was quite ready to
adhere to " desinteressement " proposal, but that before answering he would have to
consult allies, and he did not apprehend that Austria would view proposal with favour.

MINUTE.

We now know that Austria will not adhere.(i)

R. G. V.

Nov[ember] 4.
R. P. M.
A. N.

(1) [v. supra, pp. 69-70, No. 83.]

No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 46769/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 657.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1912, 4-45 p.m.

French Charge d' Affaires informs me that Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign]
A[ffairs] having now deprecated mediation unless a belligerent asks for it French
M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] drops his proposals to Powers, but suggests that
France and England should let Austria know that economic guarantees and even some
special conditions about the Sandjak, when transferred to Servia would be easily
agreed to but that in our opinion it would be very undesirable for any Great Power
to acquire new territories.

I said I would reflect on this proposal but that prima facie it seemed to me that
it would lead to much the same reply as Austria had given about ' desinteressement,'
and a second refusal might make things worse instead of better. I suggested that we
might await result of communication I had made at Berlin as to importance of knowing
Austrian views. (')

(1) [v. supra, pp. 83-4, No. 103.]

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 46557/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 658.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1912, 4-45 p.m.

Your telegram No. 189. (^)

I concur in view of French M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fTairs] and spoke in
similar sense to Russian Ambassador here who asked me to urge Bulgarian Gov[ern-
men]t not to attack Tchataldja. Bulgarian Minister here having spontaneously made
a communique to Press that Bulgaria would not retain Constantinople I- suggested in
course of very friendly conversation with him that if that was view of his Gov[ern-
men]t they might reassure Russian Gov[ernmen]t on this point.

I regard it as impossible to expect — and very undesirable to suggest — that
Bulgarian Gov[ernmen]t should not press home military success, while war is pro-
ceeding, to the utmost of her power.

(1) [v. supra, p. 79, No. 97.]

No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
F.O. 46558/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 329.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1912, 4-45 v.m.

Your telegram No. 139. (M

Information as to views of Austrian Gov[ernmen]t is a great relief and most hope-
ful. You should thank Mfinister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] and say that as it is given
confidentially I am not communicating it, but that the sooner Russian and French
Gov[ernmen]ts know it the better. Suspicion will thereby be disarmed and undesirable
language or manoeuvres in Press and elsewhere avoided.

Private. I am telegraphing separately about Servian views. (^)

(1) [v. supra, p. 77, No. 94.]

(2) [v. infra, p. 87, No. Ill, and note (i).]

No. 109.

Sir H. Bax-Irovside to Sir Edward Grcy.(^)

Sofia, November 3, 1912.

F.O. 46537/33672/12/44. D. 8-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 120.) R. 9 p.m.

Your telegram No. 139 of Nov[ember] 2.(^)

Prime IMinister has asked me to thank you warmly for words you spoke to
Bulgarian representative. He begs me to assure you that Bulgaria has no intention
whatever of retaining Constantinople, and he is instructing Bulgarian representative
at St. Petersburgh by telegram to speak to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in this
sense.

(>) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 337); to Constantinople (as No. 936); to Paris
(as No. 664); to Home (as No. 478); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1166); to Vienna (as No. 332).
Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of
Military Operations. Telegram No. 139 to Sofia was repeated at the same time. v. supra,
p. 80, No. 99, and note (i).]

{-) [v. supra, p. 80, No. 99, and note

No. 110.

Sir G. Lou-ther to Sir Edu-ard Grey.C)

F.O. 46564/42842/12/44. Constantinople, D. A/'ouemter 3, 1912, 8-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 576.) E. November 4, 1912, 8 a.m.

French Ambassador informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has just been
to him to say that Turkish Government consider that moment is now opportune for
the intervention and mediation of the Powers.

MINUTE.

The Turkish Ambassador here has already sent us an urgent communic[atio]n, on which
we have acted. (2)

R. G. V.

Nov[ember] 4.
R. P. M.
A. N.

(^) [This telegram was sent to Paris fas No. 661); to Berlin (as No. 334); to Vienna (as
No. 328) ; to Rome (as No. 474) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1161). Copies were sent to the
Admiraltj'; to the Director of Military Operations; to the Director of Naval Intelligence.]

(2) [v. infra, p. 89, Ed. note. The action of Great Britain was apparently only a reference
to the other Powers, cp. infra, p. 89, No. 114, and note (i).]

No. 111.

Sir Edward Greij to Sir F. Bertie. C)
F.O. 46772/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 660.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1912, 10-30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 188. (-)

Servian Charge d' Affaires came to F[oreign] 0[ffice] yesterday to inform us
officially that reports of Servia negotiating with Austria separately were unfounded
I and that they were probably circulated to create impression that alliance of four
I belligerents could be broken up. This alliance he said was absolutely solid and they
all intended to maintain it unimpaired. Servian demands were whole of Vilayet of
Kossovo, Sandjak and access to Adriatic. Information from Sophia confirms view
that four allies intend to act as one nation.

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 332) and to St. Petersburgh (No. 1159).]

(2) [v. supra, p. 78, No. 96.]

No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
F.O. 46772/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 333.) Foreign Office, November 3, 1912, 10-30 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram. (^)

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] and say that in view of
this it seems useless to ask Servia to approach Austria directly and alone.

The moral, seems to be that Great Powers should also have solidarity and after
your telegram No. 139(^) I am hopeful that this may be brought about.

(1) [r. immediately preceding document and note (*).]

(2) [v. supra, p. 77, No. 94.]

No. 113.

Lord Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.

Private. (*)

My dear Sir Edward, Cairo, November 3, 1912.

Events have been moving very rapidly, and the Turkish debacle seems complete.
However much Turkey may be bolstered up by the Powers, her former position in
Europe and elsewhere is apparently gone.

A Moslem said to me the other day, ' ' If the Turks cannot maintain themselves
in Europe by force of arras, they have no right to rule Islam." I think we must
expect trouble later in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, now that the central
Government has received such a severe blow.

The people here are quiet. They really do not care very much, as they dislike
the Turks, but the failure of Moslem arms depresses them.

I know how busy you must be, and do not wish to take up your time, but I think
circumstances may arise out of all this, that will give you the opportunity, if it is not
even forced upon you, to come to some arrangement about the future of Egypt. The
Nationalists use Turkish suzerainty as a means of making trouble in this country
and creating difficulties in carrying out our policy. The present Ministry do the
same. I have had two examples of this lately, viz., the fort at Alexandria, and the
question of neutrality. In both cases they made out (though without any
foundation) that their position with their own people would be impossible if they did
not apply to Turkey for permission, and even threatened to resign on this. I need
not remind you how often the Khedive uses the Turkish position here to make
difficulties. I think, therefore, at the present juncture, it would be useful to you to
know how this state of things might conceivably be improved by arrangements with
Turkey which would guarantee us against the intrigues that complicate the existing
situation.

The following points, which I have only very roughly indicated, are those that
I consider of importance.

1. The suzerainty of the Sultan being admitted, that it should not be exercized
without the advice and consent of His Majesty's Government.

2. That the appointment of the Khedive should be made, either by His Majesty's
Government after consultation with the Suzerain, or by Turkey acting on the advice
of His Majesty's Government.

3. That EgjT^t should in future issue all Berats to Consuls.

4. That the Grand Kadi should be appointed by the Egyptian Government. CNow
Turkey always appoints a Turk, and the present holder does not know Arabic[)].

5. That the post of Turkish High Commissioner should be abolished : any
interests that Turkey may have in Egypt to be entrusted to His Majesty's represen-
tative.

6. That any rights that Turkey may still claim in the Soudan should be
transferred to England. (As far as is known, none exist since the conquest of the
country [)].

If these points were settled in a satisfactory manner, we should be fairly clear
of Turkey, and any question of annexation might, I think, be avoided, at least for
the present.

I hope I have not unduly taken up your time by placing this before you.(^)

Yours very sincerely,

KITCHENER.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 9. This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the Prime Minister
and to Lord Crewe.]

(2) [Sir Edward Grey's reply to this letter is given infra, p. 156, No. 204.]

[ED. yOTE. — Two urgent telegrams from Gabriel Effendi, dated November 3 (omitted
here for reasons of space), were communicated to Sir Edward Grey by Tewfik Pasha on
November 4. Thej- explained the circumstances that forced Turkey to ask for the immediate
intervention of the Powers, emphasizing especially the dangerous position of the Turkish Army
near Chataldja (cp. infra, pp. 98-4, ' No. 120). In his second telegram, Gabriel Effendi said
" Nous sommes presses d'obtenir sans aucun retard I'appui et I'intervention des Puissances a
I'effet de faire arreter tout d'abord la marche en avant des troupes bulgares, faire cesser les
hostilites et cntamer ensuite les negociations en vue de la paix a conclure."

The same telegram went on further to saj' that the Ottoman Government was prepared
to authorize the admission into the Bosphorus of one man-of-war of each Power, on the
demand of their respective Ambassadors, to reassure their subjects settled in Turkey.
(F.O. 46843/42842/12/44.)

The rumoured mobilization of British ships led to some misconstruction in the Press, and
on November 3 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir F. Bertie (No. 6-59) and to all the Embassies
a denial of the report, and stated that no movement of ships in home waters was in
contemplation (F.O. 46770/42842/12/44). Communications from the Admiralty to the Foreign
Office on November 6 showed the recent movements of His Majesty's Ships in the Eastern
Mediterranean. (F.O. 47101/33672/12/44. F.O. 47184/33672/12/44. F.O. 47197/33672/12/44.
cp. infra, p. 121, Ed. note, note (M.) On November 4 Sir E. Goschen had informed Sir Edward
Grey by telegram (No. ]42) that the German cruisers " Goeben " and " Breslau " were ordered
to the Mediterranean to strengthen the small German force, two training ships and a light
cruiser, already there. Thej' arrived at Malta on November 11 (F.O. 46767/33672/12/44). The
" Goeben " and " Breslau " were still in the Mediterranean in August 1914. {v. Julian
Corbett : Official History of the War, Naval Operations, Vol. I, pp. 33-4.)]

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)
F.O. 46564/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 661.) Urgent. Foreign Office, November 4, 1912, 12-30 p.m.

You should ask M[inister for] F[oreign] A[£Eairs] his view of Turkish appeal

for intervention of the Powers to bring about cessation of hostilities(-) and avert the
1 consequences that would follow from entry of Bulgarians into Constantinople and
j abandonment of the capital by the Central Government. (^)

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 334) ; to Vienna (No. 328) ; to Rome
(No. 474); to St. Peter.sburgh (No, 1161.)]

(2) [v. immediatelj' preceding Ed. note.'}

(^) [For Sir F. Bertie's reply to this telegram, r. infra, p. 90, No. 116, note (^).]

No. 115.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Belgrade, November 4, 1912.
F.O. 46859/33672/12/44. D. 1 p.m.

Tel. (No. 47.) K. 5-50 p.m.

, Bulgarian Minister came to see me yesterday, and speaking of the sanjak said
that this would not be a question between Austria and Servia alone, but between
Austria and the Balkan Alliance. The allies were determined to retain the territory
they had taken and only force would dislodge them. If the Powers combined to
compel evacuation it would cause implacable resentment and continued unrest. He
admitted the difficulty of Austria's position, but said that unless she intended to bring

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

about an European war her ambitions in Albania and in the direction of Salonica
would have to be abandoned. As regards the probability of a Pan- Serb movement
resulting from the growth of Servia, Austria could do much to avoid this danger by
according to the Serbs in her dominions proper treatment. Moreover, Bulgaria
would see to it that Servia should not by agitation endanger the peace, and Austria
could look to Bulgaria to be a counterpoise to any Pan-Slavist schemes.

M. Toshef seemed particularly anxious to find out what would be the attitude of
England now, and laid stress on the fact that Austrian policy and public opinion are
looking for an indication as to what line we shall take towards Servia 's claim to retain
the sanjak and the pretensions of the allies generally, and will be influenced
accordingly.

My impression is that it was specially to say this that the Bulgarian Minister
came to see me.

(Sent to Vienna.)

MINUTE.

My conversation with the Bulgarian Minister here will be sufficient for the moment. (^)

E. G.

(2) [v. supra, p. 80, No. 99.]

No. 116.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.O

Berlin, November 4, 1912.

F.O. 46862/42842/12/44. D. 4-6 p.m.

Tel. (No. 143.) E. 8 p.m.

Your telegram No. 334. (^)

Opinion of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is that Great Powers should
inform belligerent Balkan States of Turkish appeal and enquire their views. He
thinks that any idea of pressure must be carefully avoided, and that therefore, if
Powers should decide on above step, their communication should not be made
collectively, but as nearly simultaneously as possible.

He would be glad if you would let him know whether His Majesty's Government
and the other Powers agree in the course suggested.

MINUTES.

The French have already answered. (3)

R. P. M.
A. N.

I have drafted a reply separately. ("*)

E. G.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(-) [v. supra, p. 89, No. 114, and note (O ]

(3) [In his telegram (No. 191) of November 4, D. 6-10 p.m., R. 8-30 p.m., Sir F. Bertie
stated that the French Government had replied already to the Porte. (F.O. 46864/42842/
12/44.) cp. infra, p. 97, No. 126. cp. D.D.F., 3'"^ Ser., Vol. IV,yp. 363, No. 349.]

(■*) [v. infra, p. 97, No. 126.]

No. 117.

Sir Edivard Grcjj to Sir G. Buchanan. {^)

F.O. 47142/42842/12/44.
I Tel (No. 1172.) Foreign Office, November 4, 1912, 6-30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 405. (^)

Russian Ambassador has made similar but less full communication to me ; he
I added however that Bulgaria would have to go to Constantinople unless she got some

pledge of what Powers would do for Balkan States and that M. Sazonow's proposals

might be sufficient in this respect.
I I said that when Turkey asked Powers to intervene to suspend hostilities I felt it
I would be impossible to do more than ask Bulgaria on what terms she would suspend
j them, though pending opinion of other Powers I had not yet expressed any view.

I had no objection to raise to M. Sazonow's proposals. I suggested that
" M. Sazonow should ascertain through whatever channel he thought most favourable

whether Austrian views differed from his. If as M. Sazonow said Austria was

prepared to let Montenegro have Sanjak the only doubtful points appeared to be
I whether Austria would object to Servian port on the Adriatic and whether Bulgaria

would make difficulties about Adnanople.(^)

Suggestion of making Salonica a free port was of course agreeable to our

commercial interests,

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 669).]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 80-1, No. 100.]

(^) \v. Count BenckendorflF's account in Siebert, p. 386. It will be noted that nothing is
here said of Sir Edward Grey's favourable reference to Russia having the Straits, which
Count BenckendorfT reports in a further despatch. v. Siebert, pp. 386-7. For previous
discussion v. supra, p. 44, No. 56; p. 51, No. 63.]

No. 118.

-Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grcij.C)

Berlin, November 4, 1912.

F.O. 46863/42842/12/44. D. 7-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 144.) R. 9-8 p.m.

Your telegram No, 333 of Nov [ember] 3.(^)

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agrees that it would be useless to advise
Servian Government to treat separately with Austria-Hungary, and that only thing to
be done is to try and persuade them to avoid anything which may give Austria
impression that her commercial interests may suffer. As regards Servian demand, his
personal opinion is that it would be ill-advised to oppose any territorial arrangements
contemplated by victorious States unless the Powers were prepared to enforce their
opposition by arms, and that he was certain no Power wished to do. Possession of
Constantinople was, of course, question apart.

He still thought it preferable that Servia should have access to the Mgean Sea
rather than through Albania to Adriatic, as it would suit Austria-Hungary better. He
had telegraphed to Vienna to advise Austro-Hungarian Government to communicate
its reserves to you as soon as possible.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(=) [v. supra, p. 87, No. 112.]

No. 119.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edtcard Grey.C)

St. Petersburgh, 'November 4, 1912.
F.O. 4G85G/33672/12/44. D. 8-38 p.m.

Tel. (No. 408.) R- H p-m.

My telegram No. 405 of Nov[ember] 2.(^)

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the question of Adrianople had
been discussed yesterday at a meeting in which he, President of the Council, and
Ministers of War and Marine had taken part. Minister of War had said that in opinion
of his military advisers war had shown, owing to its geographical position, that fortress
did not command the road to Constantinople, as it could easily be turned. Kussian
Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, would therefore reserve their
decision, and might eventually consent to it being retained as fortress by Bulgarians.
In that case frontier line would be drawn to the south instead of to the north of
Adrianople. Orders, his Excellency said, had been sent to Sebastopol for a ship to
proceed to Constantinople as soon as Sultan's irade had been obtained.

I asked whether he thought that, if Powers accede at once to Turkey's request
for mediation, it would be possible to stop further advance of Bulgarian army were
the Powers to guarantee execution of Treaty of San Stefano.(^)

His Excellency replied that though such a (?)(*) declaration might be preferable to
Bulgaria it would not content other allies, who could claim nothing under that treaty,
and we could not at present say what Servia was to have. Bulgarian occupation of
Constantinople caused him much preoccupation, as a theatrical Sovereign like King
of Bulgarians might insist on placing the cross on St. Sophia, and the Turks might
then blow up the mosque as they had threatened to do in 1877.

Minister for Foreign Affairs was also afraid that Austria would refuse French
proposal for a conference and for participation of Balkan States. He himself did not
see how we could dispense with conference, as we could not allow Balkan States
to settle whole question direct with Turkey. Though he thought that presence of
former at conference would complicate matters, he would not oppose it. Austria,
he said, had during the last few days gone back on her attitude. Austrian Ambassador
had at first talked of nothing but her commercial interests, and now great stress was
being laid on her political interests. He did not know whether she had had her eye
on Albania, the sanjak, or Salonica. Russian public opinion would not tolerate even
the acquisition of the sanjak, and if she claimed Salonica Russia would have to
demand Constantinople.

I remarked that Austria might say that, as Russia even formulated reserves with
regard to Adrianople vilayet, she was entitled to do the same with regard to territory
in which she was interested. His Excellency, however, would not admit this, and
insisted that Russia was asking for nothing for herself.

Though I did not mention it to his Excellency, I think that Russia might argue
that Austria had acquired Bosnia and Herzegovina as a consequence of Russo- Turkish
war, and that she cannot now expect to obtain further territory as the result of a
settlement of Balkan question, under which Russia will obtain no territorial expansion.
If Austria tries to do so situation will, I fear, become acute.

His Excellency told me that the Emperor, when he returns to St. Petersburgh in
a fortnight's time, will send a Grand Duke to Bucharest to present King Charles with
the baton of Russian field-marshal. His Excellency has suggested that His Imperial
Majesty should send Grand Duke at once. He is also urging Bulgarian Government
to come to terms with Roumania.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 80-1, No. 100.]

(3) [v. supra, p. 71, No. 85, noie (2).]
(*) [Thus in original decypher.]

MINUTE.

But from language of Austrian Ainba[ssado]r Russia's suspicions have some ground.

A N.

No. 120.

Sir G. LoivtJicr to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 46854/33672/12/44. Constantinople, D. Noveinher 4, 1912, 8-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 579.) Urgent and- Confidential. E. November 5, 1912, 1-30 a.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day stated that, though his news from the front
was not very pessimistic, infoimation given him by some of my foreign colleagues —
apparently Austrian and German Ambassadors — pointed, if true, to an impending
disaster. According to them Turkish ('? troops) to the east of Viza had been cut off
or surrendered, while Nazim Pasha's troops had been broken up and general himself
made prisoner. There could be no defence of the line of Tchatalja, and Bulgarians
might enter capital. Minister said he had telegram sent to Nazim Pasha and was
awaiting the result. According to his previous information Tchatalja would be able
to make a stout defence and events were not likely to be precipitated for three or
four days.

He said that if the King of the Bulgarians and troops would stop at San Stefano
a catastrophe might be averted, but if they persisted in entering the capital the
Government and Sultan would have to leave, possibly for Broussa ; the city would be
in a state of absolute anarchy, and the thousands of unruly elements among the
boatmen, &c., of the lower class and Moslem Softah clergy, enraged at centre of the
Caliphate with all its mosques, tombs, &c., falling into the hands of infidel, would
take advantage of the interlude between the departure of the Government and the
arrival of the Bulgarian forces to pillage and burn the city, as happened at Moscow,
and try to perpetrate a complete massacre of the Christians, mainly owing to King of
^ilgarians' proclamation of a war between the Crescent and the Cross.

Jacobin element of the committee would probably be the prime movers, their
motto being " committee shall succeed or destroy everything."

Accordingly, if the informa,tion is as bad as some of my colleagues would make
it, and if King of Bulgarians cannot be induced to stop at San Stefano, for example,
by the Russian Government, it would seem imperative in the interests of humanity
that Bulgarian army should arrange to push on as fast as possible after the Turkish
final military collapse, and march in by east so as to reduce as far as possible, perhaps
by a matter of hours, interval between break up of Turkish Government and re-
establishment of order by Bulgarians, and to protect foreign Christian quarters of Pera,
where embassy, consulates, &c., are situated.

I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs if the Government decided to leave that
it ought to give information immediately after the decision to the heads of the missions
accredited to the Porte, so as to give them time to look after their colony. His
Excellency promised to do so. It would perhaps then be possible for foreign ships
partially to isolate Pera, destroying the bridges connecting it with Stamboul, and
thus mitigate untoward situation. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave as his personal
view that each Power should send up a second ship, and will submit question of firman
to Cabinet to-night. Austrian Ambassador tells me that there are three large Austrian
ships on the way.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

In the event of Ottoman Government having temporarily to evacuate capital,
Enssian Black Sea fleet would be the quickest to reach the capital, and would perhaps
ignore the principle of Straits. The Austro-G-erman idea is apparently to tend
towards internationalisation of control, as opposed to leaving it to Eussia and the
Balkan States.

Temporary or permanent disappearance of Ottoman Government from
Constantinople would raise the question as to whether foreign representatives should
remain, follow it, or proceed on their stationnaires.

It has been particularly noticeable that news from Austrian sources is more
prematurely alarmist than from other quarters, and my Austrian colleague tells me
that he has already hinted to his colony to proceed on board an Austrian ship. This
course would tend to start a panic before the real necessity arose, and I have preferred
to await further advices from Minister for Foreign Affairs.

MINUTE.

The M[inister for] F[oreigri] A[fFairs] has promised to give the warning. Sir G. Lowther
will no doubt tell us if a second ship will be allowed to go up. ? No action necessary. (=)

^ R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.

(2) [y. infra, p. 105, No. 137, and note (■*).]

No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.C)
F.O. 47311/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 338.) Foreign Office, November 4, 1912, 9-30 p.m.

Austrian Ambassador having come to the Foreign Ofl&ce to-day(-) 1 observed that
as his Gov[ernmen]t gave him no instructions to tell me their views or ask for mine
I thought they might perhaps not wish to be sounded. I therefore left it to his
discretion whether to report anything I said to his Gov[ernmen]t and I observed
that if it were known what reserves Austria and Eussia had to make we should have
some ground upon which to go. Ambassador could only discuss matter on his own
personal opinion, but thought there would be difficulty in giving Servia San Juan di
Medua— the country behind was too hilly for a railway and part of it was
Mahommedan. I observed that the first objection was the risk of Servia alone.
Ambassador thought there would be no difficulty in Servia having outlet through a
Montenegrin Port. I observed that this would involve question of the Sanjak.
Ambassador said it was a barren place and he did not think there would be difficulty
on this point.

I urged upon Ambassador that there was opportunity for a great settlement of
Balkan question that would secure peace there for generations ; that difficulty
appeared to be how to secure for Servia an outlet to Adriatic, and that it was worth
some effort to overcome this difficulty.

(1) [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (No. 1175) with the addition " You
should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]."]

(2) [cp. O.-U.A., IV, p. 769, No. 4269.]

No. 122.

Sir Edward Greij to Sir G. Buchanan. O

K.O. 46655/33672/12/44,
mo. 367.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 4, 1912.

Count Benckendorff informed me on Nov[ember] 1 that M. Sazonoff had given
friendly but earnest advice in Sofia that the Bulgarians should not attack Tchataldja.
He had urged that they would meet with a fierce resistance there. They might cause
an upset in Constantinople with disastrous consequences, under which the Powers
most interested financially and economically there could not remain passive ; and by
pressing on to Constantinople the Bulgarians might cause a movement in Eoumania.
He had added that Kussia felt that Bulgaria must have substantial acquisitions, and
if Bulgaria accepted her advice Russia would support her in acquiring these.
Count Benckendorff asked me whether we and France would also say something in
Sofia. He wished that we should speak, not together, but separately, and that we
should do so quite independently of Russia.

I told Count Benckendorff that I would reflect upon this suggestion.

Later in the evening, I wrote to him(-) to say that since he had been here I had
had further information from Sofia, from which I gathered that the Bulgarians were
pressing on, and had made up their minds that they could not stop their advance.
They might very likely have military reasons for not giving the Turkish Army time
to collect itself at Tchataldja. Also, I had received proposals from M. Poincare
including one for collective intervention by the Powers to suspend hostilities. In
these circumstances, I thought that it was too late to give further advice in Sofia.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

(>) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
(-) [v. supra, p. 75, No. 92.]

No. 123.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edivard Grey.C)

P.O. 48401/33672/12/44.
Private.

My dear Grey, Paris, Novemher 4, 1912.

You will have learnt by my telegrams of the 2nd(^) that Poincare has not been
able to extract from Berchtold a formal declaration of territorial disinterestedness, but
that the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Political Director at the
Quai d'Orsay that Austria has no territorial designs in the Balkan Peninsula ; and
that the Servian Minister has given a formal assurance to Poincare that there have
not been any negotiations between the Servian and Austrian Governments.

The Italian Ambassador has impressed on you the danger of rubbing up
Berchtold the wrong way in regard to Austrian objections to Servia having a port
on the Adriatic, but Poincare thinks from observations made by Tittoni as to the
desirability of Servia having access to the Mgean Sea that the objections to Servia
appearing on the Adriatic Coast are quite ais much Italian as Austrian and possibly
more so.

Poincare is very suspicious of Austria, thereto encouraged by Iswolski, and I do
not feel sure that he would much regret her claiming something territorial if the
Turks are to withdraw altogether from their European Provinces except from
Constantinople and a rayon round it. When I drew a distinction between the positions

(0 [Copies of this despatch were sent to the King and to the Prime Minister. The original
MS. is in Grey MSS., Vol. 14.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 78-9, Nos. 95-7.]

of Austria as a limitrophe State of the Balkan Peninsula and Russia, France and
England which are not in that position Poincare said that if Austria claimed any-
thing it would be a reason for France and England to claim compensation. He spoke
of the Ottoman Debt being almost entirely held in France and England. He said
that Russia would certainly expect compensation. I think that he has a hankering
for an island in the ^Egean Sea partly to redress the change in the Mediterranean
due to the acquisition by Italy of Tripoli and partly to be there before the Germans.
I told him that the Germans in an iEgean island would be very much " en I'air"
without points d'appui between it and Germany. He said that Russia would make
no claim not even for the passage of the Straits and therefore Austria ought to make
none. I suggest-ed that it did not seem to be a propitious moment for Russia to make
such a claim as supposing that Bulgaria as a result of the war reached down to Kavala
on the ^gean she would consider herself as much entitled as Russia to pass her
Ships of War backwards and forwards between the Black Sea and the ^Egean Sea.

Poincare is very much i)ut out at Sazonow asking him to join in a warning to
the Bulgarian Government that Bulgaria will not be allowed to permanently keep
Adrianople. He told Iswolsky that it would alienate Bulgaria and might not have
any effect and if so how was it to be enforced. Iswolsky concurred in Poincare's
objections and said that he would report them to Sazonow. Poincare explains the
Russian desire to keep the Bulgarians away from Adrianople as due partly to affection
for the San Stefano Treaty and partly to keep the way to Constantinople barred by
the Turks so that the Russians might get there before the Bulgarians on some
future occasion.

Yours sincerely.

FRANCIS BERTIE. |

No. 124.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1912.
F.O. 46908/33672/12/44. D. 9-45 a.m.

Tel. (No. 410.) Urgent. R. 11-45 a.m.

Since dispatching my telegram No. 408(') I communicated contents of your
urgent telegram No. 1161 of that date(^) in a private letter to M[inister for]
F[oreign] A[ffairs].

In a telephonic communication which I have since had with him he said that he
had told Turkish Ambassador that Turkey must place herself unreservedly in the
hands of the powers and must be prepared to sacrifice greater part of her European
territory. If Turkey consented to do this we might he thought communicate her
decision to Balkan states and say that Bulgaria would receive accession of territory on
the lines of treaty of San Stephano and that the other allies would also be granted
territorial expansion on a proportionate scale. H[is] E[xcellency] has but sUght
hope that Balkan states will accept our intervention at present moment. Turkish
ambassador gave him to understand that after its recent defeat the Ottoman army
would not be in a position to offer serious resistance behind the lines of Tchataldja
while he hears from another source that Bulgaria will not make peace till Adrianople
has fallen.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
{-) [v. supra, p. 92, No. 119.]
(3) [v. svpra, p. 89, No. 114, and note (M l

MINUTE.

We can wait to see if Turkey acts on this suggestion or that of M[iiiister for] F[oroignJ
A[ffairs], and in what form.

The German Gov[ernmen]t have made another suggestion (see Sir E. Goschen's tel[egramj
No. 143.)(*)

R. G. V.

Nov [ember] 5.

R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.

(■«) [v. supra, p. 90, No. 116.]

No. 125.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grcy.{^)

Belgrade, November 5, 191"2.
F.O. 47040/42842/12/44. D. 2 p.m.

Tel. (No. 49.) R. 4-30 p.m.

Paris telegram No. 188. Nov [ember] 2.C)

Roumanian Minister who is usually well informed told me yesterday that he
heard negotiations were in progress between Austria and Servia at Vienna. I sounded
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who denied the report categorically. He
said that in present circumstances it was not for the Servian Government to go to
Austria but for the Austrian Government to approach Servian Government first if
they desired any arrangement and this had not been done either through Austrian
Minister here or through the Servian Minister in Vienna. But he told me that a
certain Dr. Redlich professor at the Technical High School in Vienna probably an
emissary of Austro-Hungarian Government had recently called on him and had mooted
idea of a Customs Union saying that if Servia would indicate her willingness to enter
into such an arrangement it would be possible to influence Austrian public opinion in
favour of not interfering with the territorial changes resulting from the war.

U[nder] S[ecretary] of Sftate] for Foreign Affairs had not yet had an opportunity
of consulting Prime Minister but did not seem at all well disposed towards the idea.
He feared that in dealing with Austria an economic arrangement would develop into a
political instrument. From an economic point of view also he thought that it would
be to Servia's advantage to be free and not tied to Austria.

Sent to Vienna.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
f ntelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 78, No. 96.]

No. 126.

Sir Edxcard Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
F.O. 46862/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 343.) Foreign Office, November 5, 1912, 2-55 p.m.

Your telegram No. 143. (')

I think the utmost Powers could do would be to ask Balkan States on what terms
they were prepared to suspend hostilities ; I agree that there could be no pressure
used. French Gov[ernmen]t have already replied in the negative to a somewhat
different proposal made, apparently to them only, and I have not heard views of other
Powers. I do not see how Powers can stop the march of events.

(1) [v. supra, p. 90, No. 116, and note (3).]

j 6272

No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Constantijiople, November 5, 1912.
F.O. 47045/42842/12/44. D- G-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 584.) 7-15 p.m.

My telegram No. 576 of Nov [ember] 2.C)

French Ambassador to-day explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it
was useless for him simply to ask for intervention of the Powers. If Turkey desired
peace she must ask the Powers for mediation and for a statement of the conditions
whieh allies demanded.

Turkish Government have now telegraphed to the Turkish Ambassador at Paris
instructing him to make a communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on those
lines.

MINUTE.

We have now received the Turkish communication to M. Poincare.(3)

11. P. M.

[November 6.]
A. N.
E. G.

(>) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 87, No. 110. The date of the telegram was November 3.]

(3) [This was transmitted in a communication from Tewfik Pasha on November 5, and ran
as follows: " Le Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman demande aux Grandes Puissances leur
mediation collective en vue de la cessation immediate des hostilites et la fixation des conditions
de paix." (F.O. 47376/42842/12/44.) cp. D B F., 3'«« 8er., Vol. IV, p. 366, No. 353.]

No. 128.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Berlin, November 5, 1912.

F.O. 47053/42842/12/44. D. 7-55 p.m.

Tel. (No. 147.) ' K. 9-20 p.m.

I saw Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs for a few minutes to-day. He observed
that he had gathered from conversation with German Minister for Foreign Affairs
that the German Government desired that Balkan settlement after the war should be ;
as radical as possible, in order that future trouble might be avoided. Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs thought that matters would go smoothly if only Servia did not
press for access to the Adriatic; on this point he did not think Austria would give i
way. He reiterated this several times, adding that there would not, in his opinion,
be equal objections on the part of Austria to Servian access to the iEgean. i

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 129.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1912.
F.O. 47048/33672/12/44. D. 8-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 411.) R. 10-30 p.m.

Your telegram No. 338 of Nov[ember] 4(-) to Vienna.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language which you
had held to the Austrian Ambassador, and expressed the hope that you would continue
to speak in the same sense.

In conversation with the German Ambassador to-day he had urged that Servian
port on the Adriatic could not in any way prejudice Austrian interests, as Servia would
never become a naval State, while such a port would, in the event of Austro- Servian
conflict, be at Austria's mercy.

His Excellency had received a telegram from Russian Ambassador at Vienna
reporting that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had advanced him most categorical
assurances that Austria had no territorial ambitions. This has tranquillised his
apprehensions on this point.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs does not deem it feasible to give Servia access to
the ^gean instead of the Adriatic. (See Rome telegram No. 151 of Nov[ember] 3,(^)
and Paris telegram No. 190 of Nov[ember] 2.)(*)

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Militarj' Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 94, No. 121.]

(3) [Not reproduced. In it Sir R. Rodd reported a conversation with the Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, who said that Austria would adhere to her objection to Servia
obtaining a port on the Adriatic. (F.O. 46543/42842/12/44.)]

(■>) [v. supra, p. 78, No. 95.]

No. 130.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C)

St. Petersburyli, November 5, 1912.
F.O. 47049/42842/12/44. D. 8-22 p.m.

Tel. (No. 412.) R. 11 p.m.

Sophia telegram No. 120 of Nov[ember] 3.(^)

Bulgarian Minister has given promised assurances about Constantinople, but has
urged retention of a larger portion of Adrianople vilayet than was contemplated in the
Treaty of San Stefano.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has consented to a frontier line drawn from Enos to
the River Ergene, which, after following course of that river for some distance, will
strike off in a north-easterly direction to a point on Black Sea near Media. Bulgarians
will thus hold both banks of the River Maritza.

His Excellency had not heard Balkan States did not wish to partake in a con-
ference, but he had told Bulgarian Minister that they ought to submit to the Powers
as soon as possible a statement showing the manner in which they proposed partition
among themselves of territory which they had conquered.

(') [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 350); to Constantinople (as No. 959); to Paris
(as No. 677); to Rome (as No. 488); to Vienna (as No. 346). Copies were also sent to the
Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 86, No. 109.]

[6272] H 2

100

Bulgarian Minister had informed him that his Government would not make peace
till Adrianople had fallen, and his Excellency fears that it will be impossible for
Powers to mediate before Constantinople is occupied.

Bulgarian Minister had also told him that Bulgaria could not consent to any
cession of territory to Koumania. Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded him that he
had himself spoken of ceding Silistria, but Bulgarian Minister replied that in doing
so he had only expressed his personal opinion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then urged very strongly the necessity of
Bulgaria and Eoumania coming to terms, saying that, in view of her large accession
of territory in the south, Bulgaria could easily afford to make this small sacrifice. His
Excellency would not, he said, suggest any particular line of territory to be ceded.
Bulgaria might make the best terms which she could get Eoumania to accept, but it
would be a fatal mistake for Bulgaria to come before the Powers with an acute conflict,
pending between her and Eoumania.

His Excellency would be very grateful if you could see your way to giving similar
advice to Bulgarian Minister in London.

No. 131.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.
F.O. 49510/38672/12/44.

Tel. Private & Secret. Sofia, November 5, 1912.

My private letter of October 28, due in London to-day. (')

Following is the draft of the programme which the Allies propose to communicate
to Europe. At the present moment, however, it has not yet received the approval of
the Greek Government.

(1) The suzerainty of Turkey in Europe, being already irrevocably abolished by
the success of the allied forces, is replaced, within the territorial limits hereafter
mentioned, by a Condominium of the four Balkan States.

(2) The Condominium will extend to territory situated between limits which I will
telegraph later.

(3) The Balkan States have decided to take immediate steps to apply all the
necessary measures for establishing order and peace in the conquered provinces ; they
will occupy and administer them in order to guide them in the way of progress and
civilisation, and generally for their welfare.

(4) For this reason, the four Governments reserve to themselves the discussion
of all details.

Numbers (1) & (2) mean the negation of Turkish suzerainty in Europe, and
(8) _& (4) the negation of the right of the Great Powers to interfere in the adminis-
tration of the provinces taken from Turkey; these two latter are drawn up
mtentionally in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, respecting the
occupation and administration .of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (^)

The Allies will submit points (1) & (2) only of the above programme for the con-
sideration of the Turkish Government.

Further telegram follows. f')

(1) r^^- supra, pp. 58-9, No. 72.]

(2) [cp. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. V, p. 412, Ed. note. ]

(3) [v. immediately succeeding document.]

101

No. 132.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir E. Grey.

Tel Private & Secret. (') Sofia, November 5, 1912.

The extension of territory referred to in my previous telegram of to-day(^) under
Heading (2) will include all the possessions of Turkey in Europe except Constantinople
and its Vilayet.

The Allies propose to leave the question of the Dardanelles to the decision of the
Triple Entente, demanding guarantees that Turkey will not be allowed in future to
use them for offensive purposes.

It is their fixed determination to hold the Sandjak at all costs.

In my opinion, they will agree under pressure to the creation of a small
autonomous Albania, bounded on the north by the Bay of Nottozzo, extending south
to a point on the coast opposite Ck)rfu, and on the east from the Struga valky by
lake Ochrida to Koritza. They may also agree to Salonica being made a free port,
and administered internationally.

As regards the policy of the Allies towards each other, they intend to divide the
conquered territory into four portions for purposes of administration, until they are
free from all outside interference- They will then settle their differences amongst
themselves. They will have difficulties as, for example, both Bulgarians and Greeks
want Monastir and Salonica; the jealousy about the latter is so great that I believe
they would both prefer to see it internationalised rather than handed to their rival.

There is so far no talk of a money indemnity.

I will endeavour to acquaint you with any variations made in their programme.
The information contained in this and my previous telegram is (groups onjitted).

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 4.]

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. {^)

F.O. 47363/42842/12/44.
(No. 871.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.

Count BenckendorfE informed me to-day of the views of M. SazonofE as to the
reply to the Turkish request for intervention, as reported in your telegram,
number: 410(^j; and said that M. Poincare was being asked to take the initiative in
saying this officially to the Porte and the other Powers. M. SazonofE maintained the
opinion that mediation was possible only on the lines which he had laid down for a
settlement : that it was possible to prevent the Allies from occupying Constantinople
only if the Powers were to declare at once to the Allies that European Turkey would
be open to division on the lines proposed, subject to the economic interests of Austria.
M. Poincare was being asked to approach the Powers in this sense. M. SazonofE
believed that the key of the situation was in Berlin, and that everything depended
upon the influence exercised by Berlin on Vienna. In order to avoid complications,
it would be desirable for France to use all possible efforts in Berlin and Vienna.
Count Benckendorff then asked me whether we would support the idea that
M. Poincare should make this proposal to the Powers.

I replied that I did not think that we could stop the march of events and the
Bulgarian advance by making this proposal, but I would reflect upon it in the interval
before I received it from M. Poincare. (^)

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
(2) [v. supra, p. 96, No. 124.]

(') [v. supra, p. 95, No. 122, and infra, p. 106, No. 139.]

102

Count Benekendorff told me privately, on his own account, that he was sure his
Government contemplated some serious step to prevent the Bulgarians from going into
Constantinople.

I observed that it would be very serious to do anything which would throw
Bulgaria into the arms of Austria.

Count Benekendorff admitted this, but adhered to his statement.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.{^)

F.O. 47362/42842/12/44.
(No. 84.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador informed me to-day that he was instructed to
make the following communication to me, not as a cut and dried scheme, but as the
general conditions necessary to secure Austro-Hungarian interests in a Balkan settle-
ment. Austria-Hungary must fix certain points which, if a formal partition of 1
European Turkey or an extension of neighbouring countries took place, must be the '
basis of future Austro-Hungarian policy, to safeguard the most vital interests of the ,
Monarchy : —

(1) The assent of Austria-Hungary to the extension of the power and territory
of a neighbouring State must be conditional upon guarantees that the State would
not pursue a policy directly hostile to Austria-Hungary. Guarantees would be ,1
required that Servia would maintain friendly and neighbourly relations. Fine words i
and promises only would not be enough : there must be closer economic connection.
This would bring many advantages to Servia, and would create a community of
interests that would secure for a long time to come a peaceful existence side by side, ||
The closer this connection was, the more could Servia count upon Austro-Hungarian
sympathy with plans of aggrandisement.

I observed that this suggested a reflection which of course was not serious : that
the closest connection of all was annexation, when both countries were aggrandised '
together.

Count MensdorfE replied that, of course, nothing of this sort was meant.
He added that the stipulations as to Montenegro were the same as those for
Servia.

(2) A Servian claim to the addition of territory as far as the Adriatic, and
covering Albania proper, would have to be rejected " ad limine." Such a claim would
be a proof that Servia did not contemplate relations of friendship and confidence with '
Austria-Hungary, and did not intend to avail herself of the latter's friendly disposi-
tions in economic questions. If Servia based herself upon the principle of nationality,
she could have no right to take purely Albanian territory, and to do so would be an
unjustified injury to legitimate Albanian claims.

(3) Albania must be allowed to develop freely. This meant that there must be '
created an independent body large enough to live : if it was too small, it would have
no safeguard for its continued existence.

(4) Such desires of Koumania as were just must be satisfied.

(5) The Austro-Hungarian frontier must be rectified, but only on a small scale.—
This, said Count Mensdorff, probably referred to some small rectification of the frontier
on the Sandjak.

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. The
conversation described here is reported in (^.-U.A., IV, p. 769, No. 4269; p. 776, No. 4280, but
the account is inadequate.]

]()}}

(6) Parts of Turkey-in-Europe that had up to now formed important markets for
Austro-Hungarian industry must not be totally lost in a commercial sense when
absorbed by one or other of the Balkan States.

(7) There were also several other Austro-Hungarian economic interests in the
Balkans that would have to be safeguarded, such as the importance of Salonica and
of a railway line to this port. Austria-Hungary could view with equanimity the with-
drawal of Turkish sovereignty from Salonica, and the passing of this port into other
hands, only if Austro-Hungarian interests were fully secured : as might be done by
making Salonica a free port, with sufficient safeguards for Austria-Hungary, besides
giving by means of a convention a very complete safeguard for railway communica-
tion with that port.

I thanked Count Mensdorff cordially for this connnunication, and said that as
it was confidential I supposed that I must not make any use of it with others.

He thought, though he was not sure, that the same communication was being
made to other Powers. But I should soon be able to ascertain whether this was
the case.

I said that, in any case, it was very useful to have the information which he had
given me. Proposals were being made every day, and it was only by knowing what
everyone wished that one could see where to steer with the best prospect of helping
a solution.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

No. 135.

Sir A. Nicolso7i to Sir G. Buchanan.

Private. (')

My dear Buchanan, Foreign Office, November 5, 1912.

Many thanks for your letter which I received by the last Bag.(^) Events are now
moving with still greater rapidity and we are now face to face with one of the most
serious and difficult problems which have perhaps been presented to Europe for many
generations. Personally, — but mind you I am only expressing my own views and
which I know are not shared by many others, and which I can also say I do not think
will be accepted, — I think that every effort should be made to induce King Ferdinand
to abstain from entering Constantinople. There is of course the danger that would
ensue to the European colonies in that capital, a danger upqn which I do not how-
ever lay particular stress, and there is also the danger which I think far more serious
and that is the very serious massacres which would occur in the interior of Asia Minor
which would without doubt be provoked were it known that the Bulgarians had entered
Constantinople and that the Sultan and the Turkish Government had abandoned
their capital. Therefore it seems to me most desirable that an appeal should be

I made to King Ferdinand to abstain from creating these very serious risks and dangers

i and from imperilling the lives of so many thousands of hapless Christians in the
interior of Asia Minor. I can quite understand that at the end of such a marvellous
campaign it is exceedingly tempting to enter the capital of one's adversary and
dictate terms. Apart from all sentimental and humanitarian reasons we then come
face to face with the problem that if the Sultan does leave his capital it is more than
doubtful that he would return or indeed that he would ever care to return. We would

I then have to deal with the heritage of Constantinople. For myself I do not consider
that the internationalisation of Constantinople and its creation into a free port is a

I measure which, when examined carefully, would be found to be a very practical one

I (1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

j (=) [The reference is to Sir G. Buchanan's letter of October 31, 1912 (Carnock MSS.,
I Vol. VII of 1912). It is not reprod uced, as the contents are practically the same as those
I in his despatch of October 30, v. supra, pp. 63-6, No. 78.]
I

104

or one which would have any duration. Moreover, if King Ferdinand found himself
in Constantinople and the Turkish Government had deserted the capital it would not
be so easy to get him to move out, especially with himself as a kind of latter day
Emperor, which would have many attractions to his personal vanity and love of
display. Moreover, were he to leave it, the only other occupant could and should
be Russia, so that look at it as one may the case presents very serious difficulties on
every side. I always think that Sazonoff's project of leaving the Sultan there with a
certain district around the capital is the only sensible solution. If the Bulgarians
enter there would be no Sultan to leave there and that is why personally I am so
extremely anxious that the Bulgarian entrance should not take place if possible.
Before this letter reaches you. telegrams will have been sent you showing a little
more clearly our views, and I should not be surprised if they took the line of sounding
Sazonoff as to turning Constantinople into a free port under international control,
which, according to Lowther's telegrams(^) as far as I can gather, seems to be the idea
of Germany and Austria. I do not believe Russia would accept this, and personally
I regret that it should be put forward by us. You will understand that all I have
written is simply my own personal views, which I admit are not at all likely to be
adopted (*)

[Yours, &c.]

[A. NICOLSON.]

(3) [cp. supra, pp. 93-4, No. 120.] '
('') [The omitted paragraphs refer to personal matters.] .

No. 136.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.

Vienna, November 6, 1912.

F.O. 47181/42842/12/44. D. 12-10 pm

Tel. (No. 129.) Confidential. E. 1-55 p.m.'

I am inclined to believe that real reason why the Austro-Hungarian
Gov[emmen]t, decUned to sign the " protocole de desinteressement " is that in
military circles here the hope is held that in return for the recognition by Austria
of Servian and Montenegrin territorial expansion at the close of war, Austria will
obtain slight rectifications of her present frontier towards the (? Sanjak) and
Montenegro. The military party here have always desired for strategical purposes
to push Austrian frontier to the crest of the mountains above Cattaro, and at certain
other points.

MINUTE.

This rather dangerous, idea may also be at the back of the feelers already thrown out by
Austria for separate negociation with Servia.(i)

R. G. V.

Nov[ember] 6.
R. P. M.
A. N.
E. G.

(1) [Sir F. Cartwright, in his despatch (No. 191) of November 6, 1912, received November 9,
enclosed a translation of a speech delivered by Count Berchtold on November 5, before the
Austrian Delegation at Budapest, in which he stated the policv of Austria-Hungary in
connection with the new situation created by the victories of the Balkan States, and said that
she had no expansive tendency,, but would endeavour to combine her desire for peace with due
preservation of her interests. He particularly emphasized the friendship of his country for
Rumania. The Viennese newspaper Reichspost summed up his speech in the following formula:
Let the conquerors have what is their due, but not at the expense of Austria-Hungarv and
her friend Roumania." The Neue Freie Presse warned Servia that she could not hope to
bring about changes on the Adriatic Coast without the consent of Austria-Hungarv and Italy.

105

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.{^)
F.O. 4C854 '33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 951.) Foreign Office, November 6, 1912, 12-40 p.m.

Your telegram No. 579 of Nov[eraber] 4.(-)

Turkish Amha[ssado]r here comm[unicate]d yesterday morning(^) proposals for'
intervention of Powers and an urgent appeal that Bulgarian troops should not enter
Const[antino]ple. I am in comm[unicatio]n with the other Powers on the subject.

As to cours'e to be adopted by you in the event of Ottoman Gov[ernmen]t leaving
the capital I think that you should remain(^) unless danger to life makes it desirable
for British community to be embarked, in which case I presume British ship of war
would take Embassy on board.

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 346) ; to Paris (No. 674) ; to Rome (No. 485) ;
to St. Petersburg}! (No. 1180); to Vienna (No. 343).]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 93-4, No. 120.]

(3) [Actually on November 4, v. supra, p. 89, Ed. note.]

(*) [Marginal comment by Sir A. Nicolson : — " I would propose that this tel[egram] should
be sent, as Sir G. Lowther has no knowledge that the Turks have applied here. A. N."]

No. 138.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Vienna, November 6, 1912.

F.O. 47206/42842/12/44. D. 7-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 130.) R. 9 P.M.

My .telegram No. 125 (^) : Turkish mediation proposal.

In the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs told me to-day that, before answering, Austro-Hungarian Government
will consult Berlin and Rome. In his own opinion, Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs said reference to peace terms in the Turkish proposal was too vague,
and that it would be necessary to ask for further explanations. He thought that
Turkey would have done better to have announced at once willingness to accept
boundaries fixed by the Treaty of San Stefano as basis for peace negotiations. He
told me that Austria-Hungary will do nothing which might be construed as a coercion
on Balkan States.

^') [Copies of this telegram were sent to Paris, by Bag ; to the Admiralty ; to the Director
of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [Not reproduced. Sir F. Cartwright stated that he had asked the Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs to give him Count Berchtold's views on the subject of mediation.
(F.O. 46865/42842/12/44.)]

106

No. 139.

.Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)

F.O. 47378/42842/12/44.
(No. 541.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.

M. de Fleuriau informed Sir A. N[icolson] to-day that M. Sazonow had pro-
posed to M. Poincare that the latter should take the initiative in suggesting to the
Powers a mediation on the basis of the Eutssian programme. (^)

M. Poincare thinks that it would be better if he confined himself to the proposal
which he is at present circulating among the Powers i.e., to ask the Balkan States if
they are disposed to accept mediation ; and that it is rather for the Triple Alliance to
propose a basis for a general settlement. (^j

If, however, M. Sazonow still urged that M. Poincare should take the initiative,
as stated above, the latter considered that the initiative should not be left to France
alone, but that Russia and Great Britain should associate themselves with her.

As to the Russian project or programme, M. Poincare accepts it as a whole (" dans
son ensemble "), but he thinks

(a) That Adrianople should be given to Bulgaria.

(b) That the guarantees to be given to Austria Hungary are too restricted, and

put in a form which Austria Hungary could not well accept.

Sir A. N[icolson] told M. de Fleuriau that I agreed, provided other Powers
agreed, that the Balkan States should be informed of the Turkish appeal, and that
they should be asked whether they are prepared to accept mediation and on what
terms, that I could not go further, and that no form of pressure should be exercised :
further that I doubted if Bulgaria would accept mediation until Adrianople and
Constantinople had fallen. ('*)

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.
Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 676) of November 6, 1912, D. 7-30 p.m., contained the
substance of this despatch. It was repeated to all the Embassies. (F.O. 47316/42842/12/44)
cp. infra, p. 142, No. 185. cp. D.D.F., a"'" Sir., Vol. IV, p. 383, No. 366.1

(2) [cp. supra, pp. 80-1, No. 100, and pp. 101-2, No. 133.]
(^) \cp. Foincare, p. 309.]

(^) [An interview with Sir A. Nicolson on this day as well as with Sir Edward Grey on
the 7th is given in Siehert-Benckendorff, II, pp. 479-80.]

No. 140.

Sir Eduard Greij to Sir E. Goschen.(^)

F.O. 47560/42842/12/44.
(No. 278.)

^i""' Foreign Office, November 6, 1912.

Herr von Kiihhnann informed me to-day that Herr von Kiderlen had received a
Turkish appeal for mediation, but doubted whether any "demarche" to the Balkan
States should be collective. Herr von Kiderlen would like to know my view.

I said that I had already had a request for my view from M. Poincare, and had
replied that I would agree, if the other Powers agreed, that the Balkan States should
be mformed of the Turkish appeal, (^) and should be asked whether they were prepared
to accept mediation, and if so, on what terms ; but any semblance of pressure should

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet 1

(2) [v. immediately preceding document.]

107

be avoided. I gathered, from what you had told me of Herr von Kiderlen's view of
the first Turkish appeal, that his opinion was much the same.

Herr von Kiihlmann confirmed this, and observed that the situation which I had
contemplated some time ago,(^; of Turkey putting herself unreservedly in the hands of
the Powers, had now arisen.

I agreed, but said that, since I had first suggested that, the Balkan States had
won a great many victories, and I doubted whether the Bulgarians would accept
mediation until they had taken Adrianople and had defeated the Turks at Tchataldja.
The eommu«ica;ion now suggested would, however, enable the Bulgarians to state
their terms.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(3) [v. supra, p. 50, No. 62.]

No. 141.

Sir Edicard Greij to Sir E. Goschen.{^)

F.O. 475G1/42842/12/44.
(No. 279.)

Sir, Foreign Office, 'November 6, 1912.

I told Herr von Kiihlmann to-day that the Austrian Ambassador had com-
municated to me yesterday the terms of his Government with regard to a Balkan
settlement.

Herr von Kiihlmann said that he thought this communication had been a circular
one. There had been an idea that Austria might make her views known through'
Germany; but this might not have been convenient, as Germany might not have
wished to endorse all the Austrian views.

I remarked that it was a great relief to find that Austria was putting forward no
territorial claims : this put one great difficulty out of the way. That Salonica should be
a free port commended itself, I thought, to everyone. (^) So far as I could see, the
point on which there would be the greatest difficulty would he the determination of the
limits of an autonomous Albania ; or, to state this in another way, the question
whether Servia should have access to the Adriatic. The Servian Charge d'Affaires
had just come to see me, and had said that this access was a matter of life and death
to Servia. (^) Nothing was worth anything to her without the economic independence
for which a port on the Adriatic was essential, and the Servians would fight to the end
to obtain such a port.

Herr von Kiihlmann suggested that, if economic independence was what Servia
wished to have, then surely, just as Austria desired to an-ange for a railway to Salonica
for her economic advantage, so a railway to the Adriatic might be arranged for Servia
on economic terms.

I said that if, as seemed possible, this point turned out to be the only outstanding
difficulty in the way of a Balkan settlement, then the fact that there was agreement
as to the whole of the great field of European Turkey, except with regard to this one
point, would be a great make-weight in favour of peace and of finding some solution
of the difficulty.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.
V. supra, pp. 102-3, No. 134. cp. G.P., XXXIII, pp. 291-2.]
(2) \cp. infra, p. 121, Ed. note.]

[v. immediately succeeding document.]

108

No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget. C)
F.O. 47559/42842/12/44.
(No. 27.)

Sir, Foreign Office, }}ovemher 6, 1912.

The Servian Charge d'Affaires informed me to-day that, as a result of the Balkan
war, Servia would claim Old Servia, which included the Vilayet of Kossovo, the
Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, and the north-west part of the Vilayet of Scutari, including
the Old Servian ports of Durazzo, San Juan di Medua, and Alessio. Servia, owing
to her geographical position, could not escape, and did not wish to escape, special
economic relations with Austria; but she could not submit to being made dependent
upon Austria economically. During the past ten years Austria had, as a matter of
fact, treated Servia much worse commercially than Servia had treated her. Servian
exports to Austria, and even the transit of Servian produce through Austria, had
sometimes been prohibited. Servia had had great difficulty in finding other markets
at such times. A port on the Adriatic was therefore essential to her. Otherwise, she
would be shut off from the sea, and could have no economic independence. To
suggest that she might have a port on the ^gean was only to try to make difficulties
between her and other States, and she did not wish to have a port on the ^gean. It
was alleged that there must be Albanian autonomy, because of Albanian national
feeling. There was really no Albanian national feeling. There were" Servians in
the north of Albania, they had been oppressed before, and the danger of their being i
oppressed again was a reason against Albanian autonomy. The Albanians themselves I
were divided, especially in the northern part. Servia hoped that we would see that
what she asked was just, and a matter of life and death to her. A port on the
/Adriatic meant to her all'or nothing. She must make every effort, and use all her i
force to secure it.

I asked what Montenegro was to have, if Servia had all this which was claimed.

The Servian Charge d'Affaires could not say exactly; but he was sure that the
matter had been settled so that the Servian demands would not give rise to difficulties
between Servia and Montenegro.

In reply to some questions as to Albanian nationality, he made it clear that his
remarks on that point applied more especially to the northern part of Albania.

I told him that I was very glad to have the views of his Government. Our public
opinion would not side with any attempt to deprive .the victors of the fruits of their ;
victories. We ourselves had no reserves to make, but we wished to promote a settle-
ment peaceably. The settlement of practically the whole of the European dominions
of Turkey was a very large affair. The first step was to learn the views of all the
parties who were most interested. We could then see what divergencies there were
between all the parties interested and how these could be reconciled.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

No. 143,

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.

Private & Confidential. (')

My dear Grey, Paris, November 6, 1912.

. Today was Poincare's receiving day. Iswolsky was with him when I arrived and
he remained for nearly an hour. The Austrian and German Ambassadors had already
had their interviews.

Poincare told me that Sazonow wanted him to father a fresh scheme of mediation

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 14. This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to
the Prime Minister.]

109

which he had telegraphed to the French Embassy in London with an unfavourable
opinion on it for your information. (^) Cambon is due back in London this evening and
will discuss it with you.

Poincare says that having burnt his fingers in putting forward Eussian proposals
he is unwilling to expose the French Government to fresh rebuffs and he considers,
and his colleagues in the Cabinet concur, that if Eussia is unwilling to take an
initiative, any scheme that she may desire to propose should be examined by France
and England and if they concur in it it should be put forward by the three Powers
together.

The particular scheme which Sazonow now propounds would call upon the
Bulgarians not to enter Constantinople, would not allow them to retain Adrianople
and would give to Servia a port on the Adriatic and would concede to Austria merely
customs facilities. Poincare naturally asks how the Bulgarians are to be stopped from
entering Constantinople supposing that they refuse to listen to a demand or request
that they should abstain. Moreover he has been informed this afternoon by the
German Ambassador that in no circumstances will Austria consent to Servia having
a port on the Adriatic. This fact confirms Poincare in his objection to the Eussian
Scheme. Besides which he considers that it is offensive to Austria.

Poincare further told me that he had received from the French Charge d' Affaires
in London this afternoon a telegram stating that Mr. Asquith had in a private
(" intime ") conversation — evidently with the Eussian Ambassador — expressed the
opinion that Constantinople and Salonika should be internationalized after the manner
of Tangier and that this suggestion had been telegraphed to Petersburg. (^) Poincare
said that the suggestion as regarded Const [antino]ple perturbed him very much as
he felt convinced from the conversation which he had just had with Iswolsky that it
would not be at all acceptable to the Eussian Government who desire to keep the Turks
there.

I told Poincare that in my personal opinion if Bulgaria obtained an Aegean Sea
front she would expect the same privileges for passage for her warships through the
Straits as Eussia might obtain. Austria as on the navigable Danube and Eoumania
as a Black Sea State would do the same ; and what would be fairest for everybody
would be the razing of the fortifications at both ends of the passage between the
Mediterranean and Black Sea and the establishment of the Suez Canal regime.
Poincare said that Eussia would never consent to other Powers than those riverains
of the Black Sea passing in and out for it would mean a great increase of naval
expenditure for her if the ships of the Great Powers could go into the Black Sea.

Yours sincerely,

FEANCIS BEETIE.

(2) [v. supra, p. 106, No. LS9.]

(3) \v. D B F.. 3""^ Ser., Vol. IV, p. 381, No. 364. Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 1176)
of November 5, D. 12-50 p.m., asked Sir G. Buchanan how M. Sazonov would "view a
settlement that would neutralize Constantinople and make it a free port on lines proposed
for Salonica," should a new settlement be made necessary by the entry of the Bulgarians
into Constantinople. (F.O. 47008/33672/12/44.)]

No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
F.O. 47533/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 351.) Foreign Office, November 7, 1912, 2 p.m.

Your telegram No. 148. (')

I do not anticipate that there will be difficulty between Eussia and Bulgari{
about Adrianople, and the fact that Austria makes no t-erritorial claims makes it quite

(') [Not reproduced. In it Sir E. Goschen stated that the Austro-Hungarian Government
were determined that Servia should not have access to the Adriatic. Tha German Government
would do their best " to facilitate matters for Austria by dissuading Bulgarians from claiming
Adrianople." (F.O. 47199/42842/12/44.)]

110

possible that over the whole field of European Turkey there may be no acute difficulty
in final settlement except about Servian access to Adriatic. If this turns out to be so
the very large measure of agreement will when it becomes apparent be a great make-
weight on the side of a peaceable solution of the one outstanding acute difficulty. It
would be well therefore to do all that is possible to prevent question of port on
Adriatic becoming acute question of discussion by itself before whole settlement is
under consideration.

When that time arrives T should hope some means might be found of reconciling
Servian desire for an independent economic outlet with Austrian Gov[ernmen]t'8
view of Austrian interests.

I propose in discussions with other Powers to advocate this view.

I have not dealt with Eoumanian claims which perhaps may be settled by her
alone with Bulgaria.

No. 145.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. {^)
F.O.. 48386/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 1187.) Foreign Office, November 7, 1912, 2-5 p.m.

Servian Charge d'Afi^aires in communicating to me Servian claims yesterday
said a port on the Adriatic was essential to Servian economic independence and matter
of life and death.

I said I was very glad to know Servian views because it was only by having before
us views of all Powers interested in the settlement that disint>erested Powers could
form an opinion as to what divergencies of view there were and how they might be
reconciled.

It is however clear to me that question of a port on the Adriatic will be
subject of acute difficulty with Austria. I trust some means will eventually be found
of reconciling Servia's very natural claim for an independent economic outlet with
Austrian view of Austrian interests but it would be well if possible to prevent this
becoming subject of acute discussion by itself before whole settlement of European
Turkey is under consideration. Apparently there is now probability of agreement
between Russia and Bulgaria as to settlement, and the fact that Austria makes no
territorial claims gives prospect of a very large measure of general agreement about
settlement of European Turkey.

Roumanian claims and Servian port on Adriatic may thus turn out to be only
difficulties and if that is so it should not be impossible to find a fair and peaceable
solution. You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs].

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 678). cp. infra, p. 115, No. 152.]

No. 146.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Vienna, November 7, 1912.

P.O. 47410/42842/12/44. D. 3-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 132.) Most Confidential. R. 5-5 p.m.

I learn from a confidential source in close contact with Austro-Hungarian
Ministry for Foreign Afifairs that the Austro-Hungarian Government will abstain from

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

Ill

making any declaration as to their reservations with regard to alterations of the status
quo in the Balkans until the close of the war. It is thought here that to formulate
reservations at present would be a breach of_ neutrality and an interference with the
beUigerents' rights of the Balkan States. When peace terms are being negotiated
Austria will formulate her demands. With regard to these, I have obtained the
following information : —

Austria's minimum demands will be that Albania shall remain an autonomous or
independent State, and that no part of the Adriatic coast shall be held by Servia.
Secondly, that the railway route to Salonica and the freedom of that port be secured
to Austria as a right for her trade ; in other words, that the railway to Salonica shall
be internationalised. A third condition, I am informed, will be put by Austria but
will not be insisted upon absolutely. It is that Servia should give guarantees that she
will live in future en hon voisin with Austria and pursue a reasonable commercial
policy towards her,

I am informed that at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs they have the impression
that Servia contemplates following the example of Italy and annexing by decree all
the territory she has conquered an j. a strip of territory on the Adriatic. Should she
do this, I am informed that it will have no effect in changing Austrian determination
to prevent Servia from getting a foothold on the Adriatic.

No. 147.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Constarttinople, November 7, 1912.
F.O. 47396/33672/12/44. D. 4-10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 593.) K. 8-15 p.m.

Following is identic telegram which is being sent by Ambassadors of Austria,
Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany : —

Minister for Foreign Affairs, having invited Ambassadors of the five Powers to
the Porte this morning, made following declaration : —

" Turkish Government is decided to defend lines of Chataldja up to the last
extremity, and it hopes to do so successfully, but it must consider opposite eventuality.
In this case, situation would be one of extreme gravity if Bulgarian army did not stop
at gates of the town, and if the King of the Bulgarians decided to enter the capital
at head of his victorious troops. The King has declared present war to be a crusade.
Bulgarian bands are massacring Moslems on their path ; refugees who arrive here
are relating heart-rending stories on this subject, and the population of Stamboul is
showing signs of excitement. Now, Constantinople is the seat of Caliphate, and

! Mussulmans number 650,000 against 350,000 non-Mussulmans; we are thus going

I straight towards a catastrophe.

j ' ' Council of Ministers deliberated at length yesterday ; all suitable measures have
been taken to ensure public order and protection of minority, but such arrangements
' will be unavailing should Bulgarian troops enter capital. On the other hand, the
I Sultan and the Imperial Princes have decided not to leave their palaces ; Ministers will

also remain in their departments, and we have all decided to die at our posts.
I "We have thought it necessary that Europe should be informed of the actual
! situation and of our decisions. This is the object of our meeting. It is now for the
I Powers to take counsel, and, by stopping Bulgarian army, to avoid horrors which are
I imminent.

j (^) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
j Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

112

" Grand Vizier then came in and confirmed Minister's declaration in more urgent
and impressive manner : ' I will await the enemy at the Sublime Porte at my post.
I cannot be responsible for your lives or those of your communities no more than those
of Christians ; let Europe hasten ; let her hold back Bulgaria ; let her send her fleets,
for which we will open Straits.'

" We replied that we would immediately inform our Governments of the above."

I gather from my colleagues tliat while making some little allowance for an
element of bluff in their extreme desii-e to see the Bulgarians kept out, yet they
generally regard the situation in eventualities foreshadowed as likely to be fraught
with extreme danger, and for the most part they have no confidence in the Turks
being able to resist at Chataldja despite German opinion to contrary, as reported in
my telegram No. 588 of yesterday. (^)

(2) [Not reproduced. In it Sir G. Lowther stated that the German Military Attache
thought that the Turkish Army would be able to hold the lines of Chataldja. (F.O. 47202/33672/
12/44.)]

No. 148.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Berlin, November 7, 1912.

F.O. 47407/42842/12/44. D. 5-44 p.m.

Tel. (No. 149.) E. 7-15 p.m.

Most of my colleagues and I were invited yesterday afternoon to meet the Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Italian Embassy.

Following is a resume of what his Excellency said to my French and Eussian
colleagues and myself in the presence of the Austrian Ambassador : —

He thought that only danger point in the settlement after the war was the question
of Adriatic. Austria-Hungary could not yield to Servia's desire to have access to that
sea because such an arrangement could only be made at the expense of Albania. The
latter country was in no way Serb, and the only alternative to Turkish rule which
afforded prospect of durable tranquillity in the Balkans was a settlement on the basis
of nationality.

These were his general remarks. To my French colleague he mentioned a secret
agreement between Austria and Italy dated 1901, (^) according to which the two Powers
bound themselves to keep Albania intact under Turkish flag, and in case of
disappearance of that flag to maintain the independence of Albania, and to prevent
its occupation by any other Power whatsoever. He added that if Servia obtains footing
in Albania that agreement would fall to the ground, the balance of power on the
Adriatic would be upset, and Austria and Italy would have to make other arrange-
ments, of which it was impossible at this .moment to foresee the consequences. It
seemed to him that it was almost indispensable for the peace of Europe that Servia
should, abandon her desire to have access to the Adriatic.

My Italian colleague held much the same language to me.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Constantinople (as No. 975); to Paris (as No. 686); to Rome
(as No. 492); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1196); to Vienna (as No. 353). Copies were also sent to
the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. Pribram, Vol. I, pp. 196-200.]

113
No. 149.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Rome, November 7, 1912.

P.O. 47411/42842/12. D. 6-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 160.) Secret. E. 11 p.m.

I learn that Italians have unofficially represented at Belgrade danger of Servia
pressing for Adriatic port in view of determination of Austria to oppose its acquisition.
Reply of Servian Government was firm. They could accept no dictation on this point,
and were determined to have an Adriatic port. They would fight to maintain it, and
their allies would stand by them.

Port contemplated is Durazzo ; Medua being the port of Scutari, which is assigned
in league programme to Montenegro.

From an observation made this morning by Prime Minister to French Ambassador
that Servia should be content with free use of a Montenegrin port as outlet, I gather
that Austria has bespoken united opposition of Triple Alliance to Servian ambitions.

MINUTE.

There are 2 "friendly Powers "(^) — at least I think so.

1. Italy who represented at Belgrade that Servia sh[oul]d be cautious.

2. M. de Hartwig who told them Austria w[oul]d never let them have a port and therefore
induced the Servians to come forward with this notification.

A. N.
E. G.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 85) ; to Berlin (as No. 357) ; to
Constantinople (as No. 972) ; to Paris (as No. 682) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1192) ; to Sofia
(as No. 145) j to Vienna (as No. 350). Copies were also sent to the Admiralty; to the Director
of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [cp. the use of this term in the immediately succeeding document, and infra, pp. 140-1
No. 183.]

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Berlin, November 7, 1912.
F.O. 47408/42842/12/44. D. 8-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 150.) Secret. R. 12 midnight.

Servian charge d'affaires transmitted to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a
message from his Government to the effect that a friendly Power had been advising
them not to push their demand for access to the Adriatic, but that this demand was
i part of settlement determined upon by belligerent States and that they could not do
otherwise than proceed with it.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed his regret, as in this question
Germany would have to support Austria.
I Latter was most conciliating and had abandoned many of her former aspirations,
her only reserve being this question of Servian access to the Adriatic. Secretary of
State added that it was evident that Servian Government were urged on in this fatal
j course, as alone they would not hold such language.

i Servian chfirge d'affaires then asked whether Austria would have German military
J support. Secretary of State said that if Servia and her friends received military
J support from Russia Germany would march with her ally, otherwise not.

I (1) [This telegram was sent to Constantinople (as No. 973) ; to Paris (as No. 684) ; to
I St. Petersburgh (as No. 1194); to Vienna (as No. 351). Copies were also sent to the Admiralty;
j to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

I [6272] I

114

Secretary of State was then asked whether, in case of Russia not being joined by
France, Germany would still feel called upon to move. Secretary of State replied,
" Certainly." He also told Servian charge d'affaires that Austria was working for an
independent Albania, and in this she would also have German support.

MINUTE.

This is plain speaking. A similar communic[atio]n was made by the Servian Charge
d'Affaires here. (2) Qfuerly Repeat Embassies.

R. G. V.

Nov[ember'J 8.
R. P. M
A. N.
E. G.

(2) [v. supra, p. 108, No. 142.]

No. 151.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.(^)

Berlin, 'November 7, 1912.
F.O. 47409/42842/12/44. D. 8-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 151.) R. 10-15 p.m.

My immediately preceding telegram of Nov[ember] 7.(")

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent for me this evening to tell me of his
conversation with Servian charge d'affaires. His account corresponded with that :
which I have already reported. He added, however, that on his explaining to Servian
charge d'aflfaires that both Austria and Italy were against Servian access to Adriatic
because it would divide Albania, Servian charge d'affaires had replied that Servia |
desired the whole of Albania. On the Secretary of State pointing out that this was
mad, Servian charge d'affaires replied that their plans for settlement had been
submitted to Russia, who had approved them. Secretary of State said to me that he
presumed that in this case " Russia " meant Russian representative at Belgrade. His ,
Excellency added that this attitude on the part of Servia was bad, but that what
disquieted him most was that Russian Ambassador in Paris had held somewhat
similar language to that of the Servian charge d'affaires to Baron Schoen at Paris,
and had said that if Servia failed to get access to Adriatic owing to opposition of
Austria it would mean fresh humiliation of Russia. Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs said that he did not believe that Russian Ambassador was speaking in name '
of Russian Government, but it was very dangerous language, and he was ■
instructing the German Ambassador to St. Petersburgh to report to Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs and ask him what were the real views of Russian Government.
He was of opinion that if war was to be avoided it would be advisable for Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs to instruct Russian representatives at Paris and Belgrade
to moderate their tone. He intended to give Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
discreet hint to this effect, and thought it would be very useful if England and France
could do the same, as the matter seemed really serious. He held similar language to
my French colleague.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 683); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1193). Copies
were also sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of
Military Operations, cp. infra, pp. 120-1, No. 162, and note (1).]

(2) [u. immediately preceding document.]

115

No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. C)
F.O. 48386/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 680.) Foreign Office, November T, 1912, 9 p.m.

In reply to enquiry by French Ambassador as to my views I informed him of my
telegram No. 1187 of to-day to Sir G. Buchanan. (^)

I added that in my opinion it would be much better that Balkan States should
formulate the general settlement than that a Kussian settlement should be proposed
to Austria. It would be easier for Russia and Powers generally to discuss amicably
an Austrian objection to a settlement formulated by Balkan States and under common
consideration by all of us.

If a port on the Adriatic is then the chief difficulty we must consider motives
of Austrian objection and Servian demand. Austrian objection may 'be due to fear
of a naval base being established on Adriatic that may eventually come under the
influence of a Great Power, either Russia or a powerful Federated Balkan State.

Servian demand is probably not due to naval ambition, but to desire for
independent economic outlet ; if this analysis is correct and Austrian objection and
Servian demand are inspired by these motives alone, which are on each side simple
and natural, it ought not to be impossible to find a solution that will dispel Austrian
apprehension and secure to Servia in substance what she wants.

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[£fairs].

(0 [This telegram was repeated to St. Petersburgh (^o. 1189) ; to Berlin (No. 354). Sir E.
Goschen was instructed "to inform the M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] of substance of
last two paragraphs only, beginning at ' if a port.' E. G."]

(2) \v. supra, p. 110, No. 145. cp. D.D.F., 3"^" Sir., Vol. IV, p. 393, No. 378. v. also
Count Benckendorff 's report, Siehert, pp. 391-2.]

No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)

F.O. 47656/33672/12/44.
(No. 542.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.

M. Cambon spoke to me to-day of the possibility that Russia might send a naval
squadron to Constantinople, and asked what we should do in such circumstances.

I said that we had one ship already at Constantinople ; we should probably send
three to Besika Bay, and we should send on whatever number might be required to
protect the British community against mobs and massacres in Constantinople ;(^) but
we should not make a naval demonstration there.

[I am, &c.]
E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet on
November 12.]

(^) [On November 8 Sir G. Lowther was informed that other ships were on their way to
Besika Bay, and that if further force were needed he was to ask for one or more of them to
come up to Constantinople, with the consent of the Ottoman Government. Two battleships
and the cruiser " Dartmouth " had been ordered to Besika Bay, where the cruiser
"Hampshire" had alrei^dy arrived. (F.O. 47396/33672/12/44.) cp. supra, pp. 111-2, No. 147.]

[ED. NOTE. — Count Mensdorff records an interview with Sir A. Nicolson on November 7,
in which the latter stressed the importance of Constantinople. v. O.-U.A., IV, p. 793,
; No. 4307. No trace of this can be found in the British archives.]

[6272]

IIG

No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. (^)

F.O. 47654/33672/12/44.
(No. 375.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.

The Eussian Ambassador informed me to-day(^) that Russia did not oppose a
temporary occupation of Constantinople by the Allies ; but M. Sazonoff drew attention
to the difficulties of subsequent negotiations. The Turkish Government, once with-
drawn into Asia, safe from attack, able to collect an army there, and having nothing
more to lose, would be less conciliatory. The resources of the Allies were limited and
the unanimity of the Powers was not yet sufficiently estabhshed. If the negotiations
dragged, the first consideration would have disadvantages for the Allies, and the
second might become dangerous for the peace of Europe. It would be difficult to hope
for an early conclusion of the negotiations. This would entail a prolonged occupation
of Constantinople by the Allies, and Russia would be obliged to send a naval squadron
to Constantinople, to remain there as long as the Allies were in occupation.

Count BenckendorfE seemed to desire some observation from me as to a Russian
squadron being sent to Constantinople, and said how vital it was that, if the Turks
withdrew from Constantinople, Russia should not let it fall into the hands of someone
else that might be a strong Power. He expressed a hope that we might side with
Russia.

I said that the circumstances he contemplated had not yet arisen : but it seemed
to me quit€ natural that, if they did arise, Russia should wish to send ships to protect
her interests. (^) ■

[I ari, &c.] I
E. G[REYj.

(^) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.] '
(2) [For the text of Count Benckendorff 's communication, v. infra, p. 162, No. 215, end. •
The instruction of M. Sazonov, dated November 6, on which the communication was based,
opens " We wish to oppose," according to text given in Siebert, p. 387. It is clear that it
should run "We do not wish to oppose." cp. Siebert-Benckendorff, p. 480, note, and Der
Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Isvolskis, Vol. II, p. 334, No. 552.]

(^) [Two telegrams from Count Benckendorff reporting this interview are given in Siebert,
pp. 388-9.]

No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. {^)
F.O. 47655/33672/12/44.
(No. 376.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 7, 1912.

Count Benckendorff informed me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador in
St. Petersburg had declared to M. Sazonoff that Austria excluded for herself the idea
of territorial compensation. On M. Sazonoff asking why then she had refused to make
a declaration of disinterestedness, the Ambassador had replied that it had not been
understood that this disinterestedness was only territorial. — Count Benckendorff
mentioned that the French Government were to correct this misunderstanding in
Vienna. — M. Sazonoff had urged that it was necessary to take into account the very
serious claims of Servia to access to the Adriatic, and that it was in the interest of
Austria not to oppose this. The Austrian Ambassador had promised to telegi-aph
to his Government, but had said that they must take into consideration the public
opinion of Austria, which was very adverse to a Servian port on the Adriatic. The
Ambassador had also said that Austrian interests must be guarant-eed by something
more important than a commercial treaty. M. Sazonoff had asked what could be
better than a commercial treaty.

O) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

117

The impression left on M. Sazonoff's mind by his interviews with the German
Ambassador was that the German Government were inclined to influence the Austrian
Government to be more conciliatory ; and he hoped that British and French diplomacy
mip^ht endeavour to influence Vienna in the same sense.

I told Count Benckendorff of my telegram number: 1187(-) to Your Excellency,
and said that I had already spoke in this sense in Berlin. (^)

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

(-) [v. supra, p. 110, No. 145.]

(■') [v. supra, p. 115, -No. 152, note (i).]

No. 156.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.

Private. (^)

My dear Grey, Paris, November 7, 1912.

Poincare does not at all like being dragged along by Sazonow and Iswolsky and
relies on you to put the skid on the Russian coach.

The Sazonow Iswolsky policy of opposing Bulgarian desires — barring of course
the retention of Constantinople, appears to me to be very short sighted; and will it
be approved by Russian public sentiment?

The Russians cannot expect the majority of the Great Powers to. concur in
Constantinople being held by the Turks merely to await a moment when Russia may
think it a good opportunity to take it herself. They had best substitute for the dream
of Constantinople the dream of having the opposite side of the Bosphorus.

The Russian Government do not seem to realize that Austria backed up by
Germany with Italy would prefer to see Bulgaria close to Constantinople rather than
that it should become an easy prey to Russia.

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS BERTIE.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 14.]

No. 157.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Private. (^)

My dear Bax-Ironside, London, November 7, 1912.

The information which you obtain is most interesting and useful.

The idea of the Balkan States to confront the Powers with a Condominium, not
dividing the conquered territory for separate administration until they are sure of
being free from outside interference, is an ingenious device for preventing Austria
and Russia separating them from each other.

I am not in love with the proposal that there should be a Conference : if a settle-
ment is easy, it can be arranged without a Conference : if it is difficult, a Conference
might make it worse. Besides this, unless the Balkan States, who are the victors,
took part in a Conference, it would not really have the settlement in its hands.

I thought that a friendly conversation on my part with the Bulgarian Minister
here, and a report of it to you, might smooth your path a little : so I spoke to him the
other day. Also, I took advantage of a lie started in Vienna, to the effect that we had
given a warning to Bulgaria, to tell you to communicate to the Bulgarian Government
the actual instructions given to our ships(^) : this, I thought, might help you too, in
your relations with the Government.

(1) [Grey MSS., Vol. 4.]

(2) [rp. supra, p. 115, No. 153, note and p. 89, Eel. note.]

118

The difficult point is going to be the access of Servia to the Adriatic. At present,
the Austrians are just as stiff against it as the Servians are resolute for it. Much will
depend upon whether the Balkan States all hold together on this point.

Roumania still remains as a possible difficulty.

Yours verv truly,

E. GREY.

No. 158.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edicard Grey.i'^)

Berlin, November 8, 1912.

F.O. 47583/42842/12/44. D. 3-15 p.m.

Tel. (No. 154.) R. 4-25 p.m.

Tel[egram] to Paris No. 680 Nov [ember] 7.(^)

S[ecretary] of S[tate] for F[oreign] A[ffairs] generally shares your views. He
passed lightly over the idea of naval base.

He is of opinion that, territorially speaking, a port for Servia on the Adriatic is not
possible, but he thinks that lines on which we should work with a view to reconciling
the Servian demands with Austrian apprehension are, railway for Servia with every
guarantee that commerce should have free access to the Adriatic, railway to be under
Servian control and perhaps port to which it would be run a free port. Latter would
be a question for experts to decide, but he would be ready to advise Austria to take
an arrangement somewhat on these lines into favourable consideration.

H[is] E[xcellency] still thinks that Servian access to the ^gean simplifies the
solution, but he admits that Bulgaria and Greece would strongly object.

He stated again that Servia demands the whole of Albania, with the exception of
small portion to the south, which was to go to Greece. This demand was, of course,
out of the question.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris (as No. 688); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1199). Copies
were sent to the Admiraltj' ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

(2) [r. supra, p. 115, No. 152.]

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.
F.O. 47541/33672/12/44.

Tel. (No. 971.) Foreign Office, November 8, 1912, 5-30 p.m.

S[enior] N[aval] 0[fficer] Salonica reported on November 8 that the Turkish
commander had refused Greek terms and intended to fight. (')

(1) [cp. infra, p. 121, No. 163, and Ed. note.]

119

No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.{^)
F.O. 47316/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 147.) Foreign Office, November 8, 1912, 6-40 p.m.

My tel[egrain] to Sir F. Bertie No. 676 (Nov[ember] 6.(-) Turkish request
for mediation).

You sh[oul]d make communication in question to the Gov[ernmen]t to which you
are accredited when your French, Russian, German, Austrian, and Italian colleagues
have rec[eive]d similar instr[uctio]ns.(^)

Turkish appeal for mediation is in following terms : —

The Imperial Ottoman Gov[ernmen]t asks the Great Powers for their collective
mediation with a view to the immediate cessation of hostilities and the settlement of
conditions of peace."

(') [This telegram was repeated to Berlin (No. 359) ; to Rome (No. 493) ; to St: Petersburgh
(No. 1198); to Constantinople (No. 976); to Vienna (No. 354); to Athens (No. 274); to
Belgrade (No. 87); to Cettinje (No. 129).]

(2) [The contents of this telegram were stated more fully in Sir Edward Grey's despatch
to Sir F. Bertie (No. 541). v. supra, p. 106, No. 139, and note (i)-]

(3) [cp. infra, p. 180, No. 239, note (2).]

No. 161.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 47713/33672/12/44. St. Petersburgh, D. Novembers, 1912, 8-51 [p.m.]

Tel. (No. 420.) R. A^ot;e?n6er 9, 1912, 11 • 15 [a.m.]

I communicated to M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] substance of your telegram
No. 1187 of Nov [ember] l(-) and of your telegram No. 680 of Nov [ember] 7 to
Paris. (')

His Excellency said that he quite agreed with you that Balkan States should
themselves formulate the scheme of general settlement, but that it was very difficult
to find a solution acceptable to both Austria and Servia. He had spoken very
seriously to Austrian and German Ambassadors as to necessity of final honest and
straightforward settlement. Triple Alliance had now declared themselves against a
Servian port on the Adriatic, and, if they had their way_they would leave door open
to future conflicts. It was not fair to deny to Servia access to the sea, and Austria
should remember that Servia, supported by Balkan Confederation, was a factor that
would have to be reckoned with, while her own position in Bosnia and Herzegovina
with the large Servian population was not all that could be desired. I observed that
both Servia and Bulgaria, and more especially the latter must be exhausted by the
war and would have quite enough to do restoring order and establishing themselves
in the territories which they were respectively annexing. Bulgaria moreover, had to
settle matters with Roumania and could not wish to quarrel with Austria as well.
Servia had no right, on ethnographical grounds, to claim a slice of Albania and I
should have thought her economic interests would be sufficiently safeguarded by
reviving the old idea of a Trans-Balkan railway, that was to have its terminus at a
port on Adriatic, and by guaranteeing her commercial access to it in the same way as
H[is] E[xcellency] had suggested that Austria should be guaranteed commercial
access to the ^gean.

M[inister for] F[oreign] A[fTairs] replied that he had already thought of it, but
that Servia would never consent. I repeated that she could not hope to impose her

(^) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [v. supra, p. 110, No. 145.]
(') [v. supra, p. 115, No. 152.]

120

wishes on Austria while were she to provoke Austria to war, she could hardly expect
Russia to support her by force of arms merely on account of desired port. H[is]
E[xcellency] replied that public opinion in Russia might compel the Gov[ernmen]t to
action.

H[is] E[xcellency] then said that plan of Triple Alliance evidently was to
establish an Austro-Italian protectorate over Albania, under the guise of autonomous
province, under a Turkish prince. Such a condominium would in the end lead to war
between Italy and Austria. That was their affair, but the question was were we bound
to recognise such an arrangement if Austria refused to meet Servia's wishes. We
might make our consent to it conditional on the consent of Austria to a Servian port
on the Adriatic.

MINUTES.

M. Passitch in an interview with a Temps corresp[onden]t intimated clearlj- that Servia
w[oul]d ask for the greater part of Albania giving Greece a portion. The Servians have giddy
heads at present, and of course they have no right whatever to anj' portion of Albania except
possibly near the Sanjak. I am afraid there is no compromise likely as regards the possession
of a port though commercial access w[oul]d doubtless be granted. It was I think Sir G.
Buchanan who suggested the compromise, and M. Sazonow said Servia w[oul]d never consent
to it.

A. N.

I sent a further telegram yesterday(*) which will have given my views at St. Petersburgh
by this time.

E. G.

9.11.12.

(*) [In his telegram (No. 1201) of November 8 to Sir G. Buchanan, Sir Edward Grey
instructed him to urge upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs the view expressed in Sir Edward
Grey's telegram (No. 360) to Sir E. Goschen (v. immediatel.y succeeding document). He said
also that he proposed to speak in the same sense to the Bulgarian Minister at London, but he
added that much of Sir E. Goschen's telegrams (Nos. 149, 150, 151) of November 7 (v. supra,
pp. 112-4, Nos. 148, 150 and 151) was not suitable for communication to the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and must therefore be u.sed with discretion. (F.O. 48163/42842/12/44.)]

No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosc}ien.{^)
F.O. 48162/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 860.) Foreign Office, November 8, 1912, 10-15 p.m.

German Charge d' Affaires has given me from the Chancellor the same informa-
tion as in your telegram No. 151 (-) but added that Austria would be willing to see
that Servia has the use of a railway and all possible guarantees for uninterrupted
commercial outlet at any suitable port on the Adriatic.

I expressed my concern at the serious news in your telegrams. I said it was
a great mischief that this question of a port on the Adriatic was being discussed at all
at this moment : it ought never to have been discussed till the Balkan States
formulated their terms of peace in common at the end of the war. If it was true that
Russian Minister at Belgi-ade had been urging and Italians as I heard had been
deprecating at Belgrade acquisition by Servia of an Adriatic port, it was a gr^at pity
that either had discussed it with Servian Gov[ernmen]t at all. The mere mention
of it either way excited them at this moment. I urged very strongly that all that
Servia did or said should be treated as part of the war with Turkey and therefore
provisional pending terms of peace : even if she entered Albania that might for the

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Paris (No. 689); to St. Petersburgh (No. 1200). cp. also
immediately preceding document. The information was also given to the Austro-Hungarian
and Italian Ambassadors on November 9. (F.O. 48165/42842/12/44.) cp. G.P., XXXIII,
pp. 297-8, pp. 301-2. cp. also Poincare, p. 317, and D.D.F.. 3'"« Sir., Vol. IV, pp. 412-3,
No. 394; p. 414, No. 396.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 114, No. 151.]

121

present be so treated, as Albania was still a province of Turkey. If Austria could be
influenced to take this view it would be very desirable. It would be intolerable if rash
action or provocative language on part of Servia in her excited state were to be allowed
to provoke a war between any Great Powers on a point which I believed could be
settled peaceably if only it could be dealt with as part of the whole terms of peace,
when the war with Turkey was concluded instead of being brought up now by itself.

I said I would urge same point of view at St. Petersburgh and ask Russian
Gov[ernmen]t to use all their influence in the same direction.

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs].

No. 163.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 48096/33672/12/44. Constantinople,!}. November 8, 1912, 11 -10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 598.) E. A^ovember 9, 1912, 8 a.m.

Following by wireless telegraphy :—" Consul-General, Salonica, reports that
Salonica capitulated, negotiations fallen through, and Turkish forces capitulated."

(J) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

[ED. NOTE.— On October 28 Consul-General Lamb had addressed to Sir G. Lowther a
telegram from Salonica in the following terms: "Situation deplorable. Troupes turques en
pleine deroute partout. Demoralisation complete. Anxiete croissante parmi Europeens."
(F.O. 47817/33672/12/44.) A copy of this telegram was received by Sir Edward Grey on
October 30 (F.O. 45840/33672/12/44), and on November 5 the Admiralty sent orders to the
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to proceed to Salonica in his flagship, the " Good Hope,"
without delay — he sailed on 6th from Malta — and to order the 1st Division, 3rd Battle
Squadron, to proceed there immediately without stopping at Malta. (i) (F.O. 47044/33672/
12/44.) This order was given because a squadron of four Austrian men-of-war left Fiume on
November 4 for Salonica. If the Austrian squadron were diverted from Salonica, the
Commander-in-Chief was told that he might proceed there alone in the "Good Hope," as he
would thus be in a central position, disposing of the remainder of his battleships according to
circumstances. The cruiser " Hamjishire " was already there, but had been ordered to Besika
Bay. (F.O. 47101/33672/12/44.)

The Crown Prince, Constantine, of Greece was reported by Sir F. Elliot (Athens telegram
I No. 107) to have entered Salonica on November 6.(2) (F.O. 47593/33672/ 12/ 44.) On November 8
I a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief to the Admiralty reported that the Turks had
capitulated (F.O. 47658/33672/12/44), but a telegram (No. 108) from Sir F. Elliot, dated
November 9, stated that the capture of Salonica by the Greeks was not yet officially confirmed
(F.O. . 47657/33672/12/44). Later in the day he' telegraphed (No. 109) that Salonica had
I surrendered on the evening of the 8th and that there were 25,000 prisoners. (F.O. 47774/33672/
12/44).

It was known later that the Greek army had continued to advance until between 5 and
6 P.M. on the 8th, when Hassan Tahsin Pasha, the General-in-command of the Turkish army-
I corps at Salonica, sent word that he consented in principle to the Greek terms. , After a
discussion with the ofiBcers on the staff of the Crown Prince, which lasted all night, the protocol
of surrender was signed at about 6 a.m. on the 9th. The Crown Prince made his official entry
into the town to take possession on November 10. The terms of the protocol were reported in
full in Sir G. Lowther's despatch (No. 987) of November 23. (F.O. 50521/33672/12/44.)

Serious differences arose later between Bulgaria and Greece concerning Salonica and other
territorial claims, cp. infra, p. 194, No. 259.]

(') [The 3rd Battle Squadron had been ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean at the
, beginning of November to protect British subjects in Ottoman ports (F.O. 46298/33672/12/44).
In the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty at the Lord Mayor's Banquet at the
Guildhall on November 9, in mentioning the state of affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean, he
I said that "More than 20 battleships and cruisers are found where they are wanted, and when
I they are wanted, in those classic waters, now the theatre of such tremendous events." — The
I Times, November 11, 1912, pp. 9, 10.]

(2) [This telegram was dated November 6, 6-30 p.m., but was not received until November 8,
6-12 P.M. It was noted at the time that there was probably a mistake in the date of the
I telegram.]

122

No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.C)

F.O. 47734/33672/12/44.
(No. 259.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 8, 1912.

The following I understand to be the pith of instructions sent to the ItaHan
Ch[arge] d'Af¥[aire]s at St. Petersburg in regard to the Servian claim to a port (San
Juan de Medua or Durazzo) on the Adriatic, which Austria Hungary will not admit
or permit : —

The Italian Charge d'Af¥aires is to inform M. Sazonow that : —

1. The claim of Servia violates the principle of nationalities on which a general
Balkan settlement is to be based.

2. It impairs seriously the autonomy or independence of Albania, for the
maintenance of which Austria Hungary and Italy have engagements.

3. It would inflame the feelings of the Albanians, the enemies of the Serbs, and
would provoke continual disturbances, revolutions and dangerous to peace.

4. Austria Hungary has shown remarkable moderation in admitting other Servian
claims.

5. Servia can find an outlet to the sea elsewhere than on the Adriatic.

[I am, &c.]
E. G[EEY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent' to the King and to the Cabinet.]

No. 165.

Sir F. Catiwriglit to Sir A. Nicolson. '

Private. (M

My dear Nicolson, Vienna, November 8, 1912.

The diplomatic event of importance which has occurred since I last wrote to you,(^)
has been the move made by M. Poincare in inviting Austria and the other Powers to
sign a " protocole de desinteressement " as to Balkan affairs. (^) I am positively told
that the wording of the written communication made by the French Embassy here
to Count Berchtold was "desinteressement absolu " and no mention was made of I
"desinteressement territorial." The French Ambassador subsequently gave verbal
explanations, that by "desinteressement absolu" was meant "desinteressement
territorial." Both terms are considered here to be equally objectionaHe and clumsy
in themselves and have given rise to great irritation in Vienna against France, who L
is accused of having allowed herself to become the mere "cat's paw" of Isvolsky. n
Considering that Sazonoff has publicly recognised in an interview which he recently
gave to a newspaper correspondent that Austria-Hungary has special interests in the
Balkans, it was absurd at that moment for Poincare to expect that Count Berchtold '
would — by an official act — declare himself to be less solicitous of defending Austrian '
interests than Sazonoff himself. When Poincare discovered his mistake he tried to '
put it right by instructing the French Ambassador here to declare verbally that the
desinteressement ' ' alluded to in the French Note had a merely territorial meaning.
This change did not improve matters for it was immediately pointed out here that it
could not be an indifferent question, either to Austria or to any other Power, what
might be the final territorial changes which would be made by the Balkan States with
regard to the old possessions of Turkey in Europe at the close of the war. For

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1912. This letter is endorsed in Sir Edward Grey's hand
as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister.]

(2) [Letter of October 24, 1912, not reproduced for reasons of space. Carnock MSS.,
Vol. VII of 1912.]

(3) [cp. supra, p. 73, No. 89; p. 76, No. 93, and note (3).]

123

instance could it be expected that Russia should disinterest herself territorially as to
the fate of Constantinople? Could it be expected that Austria should likewise dis-
interest herself territorially as to the fate of Albania? . . . .(") The immediate
result of Poincare's proposal has been that the Powers of the Triple Alliance
are standing firmly together to resist Eussian pretensions, and Germany and
Italy, as well as Austria, are finding that they cannot disinterest themselves
absolutely as to the future arrangements which the Balkan League may try to impose
in the Near East.

The attacks recently made upon Austria in the French press, and the big
talk at present being indulged in at Belgrade, have produced a very disagree-
able impression here, as Austria's attitude since the beginning of the Balkan War
is considered as having been marked by singular moderation. Here they wish to
show entire confidence in the good sense of Sazonoff, believing that he will not attempt
to push Austria into a tight corner for the purpose of extorting from her concessions
for Servia which she cannot grant without humiliation to herself. However, Russian
pan-Slavist circles are believed to be at the back of recent Servian utterances, and I
have been told that at the " Ballplatz " they are aware that M. Hartwig. the Russian
Minister at Belgrade, ofl&cially tells Servia to keep quiet, but privately urges her to
claim and to seize all the territory which she possibly can. This double-dealing is
most unfortunate as it gives ground to the military party here to say that nothing
will teach Servia to keep her place and reduce her ambitions than [sic ; but] a good
drubbing. At the beginning of the war Servia hoped to secure merely the Vilayet of
Kossovo; after her first successes she claimed to retain Ueskueb [-sic; Uskub] and
Monastir ; now she talks of halving Albania with Greece ; to-morrow she will want to
annex Bosnia and the Herzegovina. It is being thought in many influential quarters
here that the moment is rapidly coming that — if the Powers will do nothing — Austria
by herself will have to erect a dam against Servian ambitions, just as Russia, it is
understood, has placed a veto on Bulgaria's desire to hold Constantinople.

As regards the Sanjak question I think it may be taken that it has ceased to be
a serious danger to the peace of Europe. Since the beginning of the war Austria
has greatly modified her views with regard to this territor}^ and I am inclined to
think that the idea prevails that Austria should barter her claims and her rights in
the Sanjak in return for efficient guarantees that the railway-line to Salonika shall
be internationalized, or at least rendered secure for the free passage of Austrian
merchandise to the iEgean Sea. That would reduce the Sanjak problem from its
original position as a political one to that of an economic one.

The success of the Balkan League in the war has brought to the forefront of
political problems the question of Albania. The growing pretension of Servia to
annex a large portion of that Turkish territory is considered here to be absolutely
unacceptable. The view held at the " Ballplatz " for the present with regard to this
question is decided, namely that Albania must remain practically intact as an
, autonomous or as an independent State, presumably ruled over by a Mahometan
I Prince. I understand that Italy and Austria are in practical agreement upon this
point and they can count on the unreserved support of Germany. Russia, however,
is suspected of using the French press to support Servia 's desire to get to the Adriatic
Sea, and in doing this it seems to me she is playing a dangerous game, for here they
; cannot afford to allow Russia to appear before the world as a successful patron of
Servian interests. And even if Austria were willing to allow Montenegro to slightly
extend her seaboard, it would be difficult for her to agree to this now that it would
j have the appearance as if she were yielding to pressure brought to bear upon her from
I the Russian side. The unfortunate jealousy of Austria which is to be found in Russia
j is the greatest source of danger to the maintenance of peace in Europe which exists
I at present. It seems at moments almost hopeless to attempt to do anything to
I reconcile the divergent aims of Austrian and of Russian policy in the Balkans. Let
I

j (^) [The sentence omitted here is entirely personal.]

124

us hope, however, that the great moderation which is being shown by the Govern-
ment here will be appreciated in St. Petersburg, and that the Russian Government
will not encourage the ambitions of Servia to overstep the last limits of Austrian
patience {^)

Yours truly,

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

(5) [The rest of this letter deals chiefly with suggestions for giving Servia access to the
Adriatic by railway.]

No. 166.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Sofia, November 9, 1912.
F.O. 47767/42842/12/44. D. 4-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 131.) Very Confidential. R. 10-30 p.m.

Rome telegram No. 160 of Nov[ember] l.C).

Bulgarian Government dispatched M. Danef early in week to Vienna to see
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was instructed to inform his Excellency
that Bulgaria would support Servian Government in their determination to have an
Adriatic port. The King gave M. Danef polite messages to deliver to gild the pill.
The President of the Sobranje is now at Belgrade on his return journey. Medua has
not yet been assigned to Montenegro, and it is not impossible Servia would be satis-
fied with that port if no other solution of the question be found.

MINUTE.

With a lot of Servian troops fighting by the side of Bulgarians in Thrace, Bulgaria is bound
to support Servia at this moment.

E. G.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 113, No. 149.]

No. 167.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C)

F.O. 47771/42842/12/44. Rome, D. November 9, 1912, 7-25 p.m.

Tel. (No. 162.) R. November 10, 1912, 8 a.m.-

From a conversation which I had this morning with the President of the Council.
I feel positive that Italy's support has been definitely secured to Austrian views |
regarding a Servian Adriatic port, and that the Triple Alliance is solid in opposing-
it. President argued that if the integrity of Albania was touched Austria would claim
her share, and Italy could not afford to risk an Austrian extension in the Adriatic.
His argument is, however, no doubt (? due) to fear of opposition of Austria. He said
that Austria would stand firm, and if Russia intervened to support Servia or the
Balkan League the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance would rise. It was not to be:
believed that Europe could be plunged into war on such an issue, and he felt that!

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 363) ; to Vienna (as No. 360) ; to
Constantinople (as No. 994); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1210); to Belgrade (as No. 89); to;
Sofia (as No. 152). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence;
to the Director of Military Operations.]

125

Servia must be content to have access to the JSgean Sea and an Adriatic outlet by,
using a Montenegrin port under a Customs union.

Meanwhile the Russian Ambassador has received information that the Russian
Government support Servian claim and said he would (? see) President of the Council

The Minister for Foreign Affairs returns to-night.

No. 168.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edicard Greij.C)

F.O. 47770/42842/12/44. Belgrade, D. November 9, 1912, 9-30 p.m.

Tel. (No. 61.) R. November 10, 1912, 8 a.m.

Your telegram No. 87 of Nov[ember] 8,(^) and Rome telegram No. 160 of
Nov [ember] 7.(')

Reuter's correspondent, who came to see me this morning, told me that the
Prime Minister had recently declared that there could be no question of mediation
until Servia had taken possession of a port on the Adriatic. This was confirmed to
me this afternoon by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On my
referring to the tone of the Austrian press, (*) he said that the Servian Government
realised the situation was becoming very serious. He also told me confidentially
that they had been warned by the French charge d'affaires on behalf of Austria, and
he thought, after consultation with Germany, that the occupation of an Adriatic port
by Servia would not be tolerated, but Servia would not give way except to force, and
Bulgaria would stand by Servia.

He asked me what the attitude of His Majesty's Government would be. I replied
that I had no indication whatever. I asked why Servia could not be content with
outlet for her commerce to the .^gean Sea. He gave as his reason that route to
jEgean Sea would not lie wholly in Servian territory and Servia must have a port of
her own in order to develop freely and satisfy her requirements ; but the insistence of
Servia of [sic : ? on) an Adriatic port is here attributed to Russian instigation.

(Sent to Vienna.)

MINUTE.

C[oun]t Benckendorff has comin[unicate]d a tel[egram] from M. Sazonow recording the
warning he has given to Scrvia^ — bu£ through M. de Hartwig.(5)

A. N.
E. G.

(>) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 119, No. 160, note (i).]

(3) [v. sxipra, p. 113, No. 149.]

(*) [cp. supra, p. 104, No. 136, note (').]

(5) [cp. infra, pp. 170-2, No. 228. The text is in Siebert, pp. 395-6. According to Siebert-
Benckendorff, II, pp. 485-6, this telegram was shown to both Sir Edward Grey and Sir A.
Nicolson, and the latter reported that Sir Edward Grey had minuted it "I am fully of your
opinion." The actual wording of Sir Edward Grey's minute is as follows: "I have told
Count Benckendorff and M. Cambon that I agree to the preliminary discussion suggested in
the last paragraph but one: when Count B[enokendorff ] drew my attention to the last
paragraph I said that it was true but that Servia first provoked the discussion and Austria
would no doubt retort by calling attention to the published interview given by M Hartwig
E. G. 13.11.12." (F.O. 48632/42842/12/44.)]

( [ED. NOTE. — An important speech was made by Mr. Asquith at the Guildhall on
j November 9. v. infra, pp. 136-7, No. 178 ; p. 176, No. 234. The chief points that he mentioned
were that the Great Powers of Europe were working together in the consideration of the
i Balkan problem, in a manner which he described as remarkable, and that the general opinion
I of Europe was unanimous that the victors were not to be robbed of the fruits which had
! cost them so dear. The map of Eastern Europe had to be recast. The Times, November 11,
I 1912, pp. 9-10. For the effect abroad v. Poincare, jip 32;i-4.]

126

No. 169. .

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grerj.C) |

Berlin, November 9, 1912.

Yourtelearam No. 360 :(^) Your conversation with German charge d'afiaires.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that it has been impossible to avoid
some exchange of views on Adriatic Coast owing to communication of Servian Govern-
ment to Powers ; but he entirely shares your view that proper moment for its discussion
h not during excitement caused by war, but after conditions of peace have been
definitely formulated, when the Powers will naturally have to consider enormous
pbantyps which are in contemplation. „ .

This was Austria's view also, and all she had said related to a definite occupation
by Servia of any portion of Albania and not to a temporary inroad on her part during
the war into that countrv, which, as you had rightly pointed out, was still a Turkish
province. As he knew this to be the view of the Austro-Hunganan Government he
did not think that it was necessary to approach them again on the subject. He stil
thinks however, that it would be useful if the attention of the Russian Government
could be called to danger of over-zeal of Russian diplomatists speakmg as if Russia
made it a point of honour that Albania should be incorporated m the new Servia. He
considers !hat, as Russia has attained her object by practic^ally giving Slav nations
the whole of Turkey in Europe, including some portions which are only partially Slav
there remains for her no more necessity to support excessive demands in the case of
a countrv like Albania, which has no Slav population whatever. His Excellency is
informing German charge d'Aff[aires] in London of these views, but wished me to
telegraph them to you in the meantime.

MINUTE.

The Russians have now sent instructions to Belgrade telling the Servians in effect that they
must not invoke the name of Russia for extravagant demands.^) ^ ^

11.11.12.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(=) [v. supra, pp. 120-1, No. 162.]
(3) [cp. infra, pp. 127-8, No. 171.]

No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.C)

F.O. 48293/42842/12/44. . o iqio iopm

Tel (No 148) Foreign Office, ^ovemher 9, 1912, 10 p.m.

■ I said speaking unofficially to the Bulgarian Minister to-day that it was a great
pity the Servian- Adriatic question was being discussed separately. It would be mucn
better for the Allies to formulate their terms of peace with Turkey as a whole, bo
far as I could see, unless there were difficulties with Roumania-a point of which i
could not judge and which Bulgaria no doubt had in mind-the question of Servian
access to the Adriatic might be the only difficulty in the whole settlement. I believed
if dealt with later as part of the whole it could be settled peaceably but if bervia
provoked a quarrel with Austria about it now, the whole settlement of European

(i)[This telegram. was repeated to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburgh.]

127

Turkey which the Allies desired might be imperilled. Austria was now apparently
prepared not to put forward any territorial claims of her own. but if she went to war
with Servia before the war of the Allies with Turkey was over her attitude towards the
whole settlement of European Turkey might be altered.

The Bulgarian Minister said he was entirely of my opinion : he deprecated the
interview which M. Pashitch had published, (-) and said he would tell M. Gueshoff who
had influence with M. Pashitch what I had said.

(2) [cp. supra, p. 120, No. 161, mm.]

No. 171.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

F.O. 47787/42842/12/44. St. Petcrsburgh, D. November 9, 1912, 10-50 p.m.
Tel. (No. 424.) R. November 10, 1912, 12-40 a.m.

I have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as in the terms of your
telegram No. 1201 of Nov[ember] 8,(^) and of your telegram No. 360 to Berlin. (^)

He said that he quite agreed with you that we ought to try and prevent the
question of port on the Adriatic being discussed separately, and to leave it to form
part of general settlement to be sanctioned at a conference after the war. He had
never encouraged the Servians to put forward a claim for the whole of Albania, and,
on Servian Minister speaking to him yesterday about Durazzo, he had told him that
this was a matter on which Servia could not count on Russian support. The Russian
Minister at Belgrade had received no instructions to urge Servia to demand even
H San Giovanni di Medua, though, as he was aware that the Russian Government were
supporting the latter' s claim, he may have said something which Servian Government
may have regarded as an encouragement. His Excellency told me that the Austrian
I Ambassador had informed him some days ago that his Government desired to see a
1 closer commercial connection established with Servia, and had at the same time
I enquired his views with regard to the proposed Adriatic port. His Excellency had
replied that the Russian Government supported Servian claim to port and would raise
no objections to an improvement of Austro-Servian commercial rel'tions by means
, of new treaty, but that they could not consent to anything in the shape of a Customs
} Union. He had impressed on the Ambassador the necessity in Austria's own interests
' of having a contented Servia as a neighbour, which would not be the case were Servia
j refused access to the Adriatic. He had not seen either the Austrian or German
I Ambassador since.

I I said that, if Russia were to let it be known that she was determined to support
at all costs Servian claim she would expose herself to the danger of contributing to
, facilitate war with Austria, if not to other risks of fresh humiliations. I could not
, believe that the Emperor would allow himself to be dragged into war merely to give
, Servia a slice of Albanian territory, when Servia's economic interests might be safe-
i guarded by a railway under proper guarantees. It would be, moreover, nullifying
I the (group omitted : ? efforts) which his Excellency had made during the Turco-Italian
i war to keep Italy as a counterpoise to Austria in the Balkans, as in- Albanian question
I Austria and Italy were equally interested. If Bulgaria supported Servia in such a war
Roumania would join in on other side and make good her pretensions to serious
rectification of her frontier.

J His Excellency replied that personally he would be quite satisfied were Servia
'to be given commercial access to the Adriatic in the same way as Austria to the ^gean

I (^) fThis telegram was sent to Paris, Rome and Vienna. Copies were sent to the Admiralty ;
to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) \v. supra, p. 120, No. 161, note (4).]

(3) [v. supri, pp. 120-1, No. 162.]

128 I

Sea. Servia, however, would never accept this. Servians, he feared, were losing
their heads and had told foreign consuls at Uskub that the Capitulations no longer
existed. He trusted that His Majesty's representatives at Belgrade and Sophia would
be instructed to speak in the same sense as you proposed speaking to the Bulgarian
Minister in London. He had told the Servian Minister yesterday that Servia must
not count on Eussia's armed support; Russian public opinion, however, had to be
reckoned with, and, had Austria to attack Servia in order to make her abandon her
claim to the Adriatic port, nothing could prevent Russia taking part in the war.

His Excellency told me yesterday that the language which he had held to the
Austrian and German Ambassadors was so serious that, had he said another word,
it would have partaken of menace, I therefore thought it advisable to warn him
of the grave consequences which might ensue.

Servian Minister, who has just been to see me, said that Austria was blufdng and
forgot that Triple Entente was behind Servia. I replied that, speaking purely person-
ally, Servia need not think that we were going to war on such a question and that if
she 'provoked Austria she might risk losing the fruits of her victories. I impressed
on him the necessity of leaving the question to be discussed with all the others after
the war.(*)

(4) [Sir G Buchanan's language was approved in Sir Edward Grey's telegram No. 1212 to
Sir G. Buchanan, D. November 12, 1912. (F.O. 47787/42842/12/44.)]

No. 172.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.C)
F.O. 48766/42842/12/44.

(No. 352.) Confidential. Rome, D. November 9, 1912.

gij. R. November 16, 1912.

' I have the honour to report that the President of the Council returned to Rome
a few days ago and, as I had not seen him since the conclusion of peace between Italy
and Turkey, I called upon him yesterday to congratulate him on the termination of
hostilities. . .

Signor Giolitti said he was well satisfied with the result of the peace negotiations.
He had been a great deal criticised for the Decree of Annexation but, as things had
turned out, perhaps it was just as well as it rendered future conditions so much more
easy. He then went on to speak, as was inevitable, of the situation in the Balkans
and said the only dark point seemed to lie in the aspirations of Servia to obtain a
seaport on the Adriatic, and explained to me what the attitude of Italy was bound !

to be. . ;

The Russian Ambassador was with him when I arrived and on comparing notes i
subsequently with the former, I found we had both of us derived the same impression, i
namely that Italy's support was definitely engaged for the Austrian veto, and that the
Triple Alliance Powers would stand together in insisting on the autonomy of Albania, ■
without any deductions from her sea coast area in favour of Servia. \.

For the education of public opinion here various arguments are being put forward \
in the Italian press and by the Foreign Department, to demonstrate the disadvantages '
which an occupation of a portion of the Adriatic coast by Servia would entail upon
this country. It is argued that a reinforcement of the Southern Slav element on the
eastern shore of that sea would affect detrimentally the position of the considerable
ItaUan population settled there. It is hinted that it may not be long before Russian

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

129

fleets appear in the Mediterranean, and that for this reason also it is preferable that
the Albanians should constitute a counterpoise to the Slavs. And finally it is
contended that even if the Servians were allowed to obtain a strip of territory
conducting them to 1-hat sea, it remains always possible that in the future a conflict
will arise between Austria and Servia and that if the latter were hereafter compelled
to surrender an acquired sea line to the former, Italy would no longer be able to
oppose the transfer, if she had once abandoned the principles laid down in her under-
standing with Austria, whereas it is a primary object with her to prevent any extension
of the Austrian Adriatic dominions.

The agreement with Austria is now more than ten years old and its provisions
have never been made public. (^) But I have reason to believe they are of a purely
negative character, and that it is hardly justifiable even on the grounds of implication
to claim as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to have done at Berlin, that
they pledge Austria and Italy to defend Albanian territory against a third party (see
Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 149 of the 7th of November(^) ). These provisions are
generally understood to include (a) a reciprocal undertaking on the part of Italy and
11 Austria-Hungary to disinterest themselves so far as territorial acquisitions in Albania
are concerned; (b) the maintenance of the status quo there, that is to say Ottoman
Sovereignty ; (c) in the event of a change in that Status quo becoming inevitable a
ij reciprocal engagement to secure the autonomy of Albania. There is now an apparent
i tendency to amplify this agreement into a sort of Monroe doctrine.

Signer Giolitti in volunteering his views on the subject, did not enter into any
hypotheses, but with that directness which is characteristic of him, put the case for
Italy bluntly thus : — if any part of the Albanian coast could be transferred to another
state, we know that Austria-Hungary would claim a portion for herself, and this would
not suit Italy at all. It is therefore our interest to stand out for the integrity of
Albania.

While the supposed Servian aspirations to the port of Durazzo, would, if realised,
reduce the remaining Albanian coast line to insignificance, a strip of territory giving
her access to San Giovanni di Medua, if this could be arranged with Montenegro, would
not greatly reduce the rather undefined area of what may be regarded as Albania, and
it would really seem rather to Italy's advantage to widen the interval separating
Austria from the debatable frontier of Albania. I am therefore inclined to think that

' Italy's determination to oppose the Servian seaport is less dictated by interest than

j by the fear of the consequences which might follow if she did not support her ally.

I Italian politicians are longheaded, and they probably reason that, though their

I attitude may for the moment excite some resentment in Servia, the real responsibility
for opposition will be justly attributed to Austria, and they can look forward with some

I complacency to an exacerbation of the rivalries and animosities between the Empire

I and the Slavs which the determination of the former will inevitably occasion.

Signor Giolitti, who has of course been in constant communication with the

I Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Berlin, seemed to entertain no doubts that
Germany would stand by her ally if Eussia intervened to support Servia and the
Balkan League, and he said quite definitely that in such an event the casus foederis

1 arising under the Triple Alliance would present itself.

As I was not then in possession of your views T did not feel justified in offering

! my observations, but after listening to his, confined myself to saying that it seemed
inconceivable that over a matter of this kind, if all the other difficulties were
surmounted, the Great Powers should come to loggerheads. He replied with some
apparent assurance of optimism that this was also his view. Servia must content

I herself with having access to the .^gean, and the use in the Adriatic of a Montenegrin

I port under a Customs Union.

(2) [v Pribram, Vol. I, pp. 196-200.]

(3) [v. supra, p. 112, No. 148.]

130

Somewhat later in the day the Russian Ambassador told me that a telegram which
he had received from St, Petersburgh made it clear that Russia would not again
abandon Servia in her difficulties, and in the meantime the declarations which
Monsieur Pasich is stated to have made at Belgrade regarding the unwillingness of
Servia to agree to an autonomous AlbaniaC) indicate an acute conflict of view.

I have. &c.

RENNELL RODD.

(•') [cp. supra, p. 120, No, 161, mm.]

No. 173.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Vienna, November 10, 1912.
E.G. 47788/42842/12/44. D. 8-10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 133.) R. 10 p.m.

Albania.

Ismail Kemal, the Albanian chief, called on me to-day, and informed me that he
was shortly going to Valona to attend a meeting of the Albanian chiefs, who int-end to
draw up a memorial of their wishes to be sent to the Powers. (^) " He told me that
Albanians were determined to maintain the country, i.e., district where their
language is generally spoken, shall not be absorbed by any Balkan State. They would
fight to the bitter end rather than allow their country to be dismembered. If Servia
is allowed to absorb a large portion of Northern Albania it will be followed by continual
state of unrest and insurrection until Austria and Italy are forced to intervene. He
suggested that Albania might be divided into tribal cantons somewhat on the Swiss
model, with a Prince at the head chosen by Europe.

(Very Confidential.)

I pressed Ismail Kemal to tell me what the views of the Albanian chiefs were with
regard to what the future foreign policy of an independent Albania would be. He
replied that the inevitable consequences of the new arrangement in the Balkans would i
be that Bulgaria would try and dominate the other States so that before long the
Balkans would be divided into two groups, composed of Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro
on the one side and Roumania, Albania, and Greece on the other. This would
produce a balance of power in the Near East, and it may be one of the reasons why
Austria is so determined to maintain independence of Albania.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [cp. infra, p. 183, Ed. /^o^e.]

No. 174.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

St. Petersburgh, November 10, 1912.
P.O. 47784/42842/12/44. D. 8-15 p.m.

Tel. (No. 426.) R. 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 148 to Sofia. (-)

Minister for Foreign Affairs is very grateful for language which you held to the
Bulgarian representative, as well as for what he had heard from the Russian
Ambassador, that you had said to the Austrian Ambassador respecting the danger of
Austria taking military action should Servia occupy an Adriatic port during the course

(1) [This telegram was sent to Paris by bag; to Sofia (as No. 151); to Berlin (as No. 361);
to Rome (as No. 498) ; to Vienna (as No. 359) ; to Pera (as No. 117). Copies were sent to the
Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 126-7, No. 170.]

181

of the war. He intends speaking in the same (? sense) to the Austrian Ambassador
here. He told me that since I saw him yesterday the German Ambassador had come
and asked him whether Russia intended making this question a trial of strength. His
Excellency had replied that both Russia and Germany had had experience of such
trials of strength in 1909 and last year, and that if Germany were to have recourse
to her Agadir policy in the present case it might have very serious consequences. This
had, he said, made impression on the Ambassador, and his Excellency had then
proceeded to say that it was absolutely necessary that Servia should be emancipated
from her present dependence on the surrounding States, but that the question how
this was to be effected, whether by a railway or otherwise, was one which ought to be
left to be discussed by the Powers as a part of the whole settlement when the war
was over.

The step reported to have been taken by the Triple Alliance at Belgrade(^) has
made a very bad impression here, and the tone of the press is very hostile to Austria.
Should the latter resort to mihtary pressure on Servia, Russian Government would
be forced to take action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had heard, presumably from the German
Ambassador, that Servian representative at Berlin had stated that Servia would be
supported by Russia as well as by the allies. He has caused the Servian Government
to be informed that Russia has an Ambassador at Berlin through whom the Russian
Government communicate with German Government, and that Servian representative
had no business to speak as he did.

He is telling the Servian Minister that it is useless for his Government to count
on the support of Bulgaria, as the latter has lest 50,000 killed and wounded and is
incapable of taking part in a new war.

His Excellency hears from Minister of Finance that Bulgarian Government may
consent to cede Silistria and a small strip of surrounding territory to Roumania and
to guarantee that no fortifications shall be erected along the frontier.

His Excellency seemed less inclined to insist on a conference at the end of the
war in view of the opposition of Balkan States.

MINUTE.

There is no question of Germany reverting to " her Agadir policy. "(^) Opinion in Germany
is as much against war over this as in any country. If Russian Gov[ernmen]t will continue
to discourage Servia, it is all to the good. The danger is that Servia may bo reckoning on
driving power of Russian public opinion or sentiment — as they undoubtedly did in going to
I war at all

I R. G. V.

Novfember] 11.

i R. P. M.

I A. N.

' E. G.

(3) [cp. infra, p. 133, No. 176, and note (i) ; p. 149, No. 195, and note (s).]
('') [For the Agadir question generally, v. Gooch & Temperley, Vol. VII.]

No. 175.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir A. Nicolson.

Private. (')

My dear Nicolson, Berlin, November 10, 1912.

It was very kind of you in these fearfully strenuous and somewhat anxious times
to write to me at all and I am much obliged to you for your letter. (^)

The important events of the week are that Germany has declared to Servia that
she will give military support to Austria if Russia moves, even though the latter

(') [Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1912. This letter is endorsed in Sir Edward Grey's hand
as having been sent to the King and to the Prime Minister.]

(^) [Letter of November o, 1912, not reproduced for reasons of space. As the writer
himself said, it contained "little of interest." Carnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

[62721 K 2

132

receives no such support from France : and the utterances of Iswolsky to Schoen.
On the latter subject Kiderlen said to me finally that it was difficult for him to say
anything about it at St. Petersburg, but that we and France, who, he assumed, would
not like the idea of being drawn into a war for the sake of Iswolsky's amour propre,
for to that such utterances might lead if unchecked, might very well say a few words
of warning.

He admitted that it was a delicate matter, but there was no doubt such a warning
would be useful. Of course his opinion is, though he has not said so in so many
words, that Iswolsky wants to pay out Austria for Buchlau and Bosnia. He does not
think that Sazonow holds Iswolsky's opinions in the very least.

It is indeed difficult to say how these things will end. Personally I think thai
things will be peacefully arranged, and for the reason that if Bulgaria gets all she
wants she won't care to have another war for Servia's interests : and also because I
can't help thinking that, remembering how often King Ferdinand has been to Vienna
lately, Austria and Bulgaria are on far better terms than Servia has any idea of.
This is only a vague and personal thought, but it is at the back of my head that both
here and in Vienna there is no great dislike at the idea of the Bulgars sitting tight
at Constantinople. It seems to me almost a pity, considering that Turkey has lost,
or is going to lose, nearly all her possessions in Europe, that there can't be an
absolutely clean sweep. For then the Balkan nations could fight amongst each other
— which I should think they are certain to do ultimately — without disturbing Europe
at all. Albania is the difficulty. An independent Albanian Principality (Who is to
be the Prince?) will need a military organization if it is to exist at all, and who is to
organize it? The question bristles with difficulties, and if, as Giuliano hinted,
" Austria and Italy had to make arrangements of which no one could see the extent
or the consequences," which I suppose pointed to a division, there would still remain
a fruitful source of friction in a part of the world where everyone wants rest. But as
regards the burning question of Servia's access to the Adriatic, or rather, as seems
to be now the idea, her annexation of the greater part of Albania, I do hope that
Eussia will not be led by her Pan-Slavists to drag everyone into a war for the sake
of supporting a demand which seems excessive and which Austria would appear to
have good grounds for refusing. Can't she be told that if she goes to war on such a
question she will have to do it alone and at her own risk? By the way SverbiefE asked
me yesterday whether it was my impression that Germany would give military support
to Austria in case Russia moved. I told him that I had the strongest possible
impression that she would do so. I did not tell him that Kiderlen had told me so,
but I thought it best to let him gather that I had no doubt on the subject.

The Servian Charge d' Affaires here is a very sensible man, and he thinks it
madness for Servia to persist in her demand for Albania when she has got so much
and Austria has shown herself so 'large.' "But," he says, "we are puppets in the
hands of Russia. She has approved our Programme, and as long as she supports us
we must go on with it. Having brought us into this ' impasse ' with Austria she will
probably throw us over ultimately. Cela ne sera pas pour la premiere fois! If she
does and we go on with our allies alone we stand to lose all that we have gained by
this war with Turkey." He asked Cambon the other day whether he might ask
Kiderleii whether Germany would march with Austria even if France did not march
with Russia. Cambon replied that as French Ambassador he could give him no advice
on the subject, but that if he did put the question to Kiderlen he would be very glad
to hear the answer! . . . .(^)

Yours verv sincerelv.

W. E. GO'SCHEN.

(^) [The rest of this letter contains references to Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's conciliatory
attitude towards the Balkan States.]

183

No. 176.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)
F.O. 50329/42842/12/44.
I (No. 85.) Belgrade, D. November 11, 1912.

Sir, R. November 26, 1912.

Within a period of less than ten days the relations between Austria-Hungary
;|j and Servia which during the course of the war have remained, considering all
circumstances, amicable, have undergone an unfortunate change.

Towards the middle of last week Monsieur d'Ugron the Austrian Minister here
was summoned to Budapesth by Count Berchtold. On his return he immediately
sought an interview with Monsieur Pashitch and acquainted him, though in an
unofficial manner, with the views of the Austrian Government concerning Servia's
desire of acquiring a port on the Adriatic. He stated that his Government are quite
prepared to admit the principle, originally enunciated by the allies themselves, of
the Balkans for the Balkan people according to ethnical divisions and consequently
raise no objection whatever to Servia occupying the whole of old Servia and those
regions where the Serb population is predominant but on the other hand in accordance
with this principle they are also firmly resolved not to admit that Servia should
permanently acquire any portion of Albania, which it is the purpose of Austria-
Hungary as well as of Italy to make into an Autonomous State either independent
or under Turkish Suzerainty.

The realization of this project would naturally completely exclude Servia from the
Adriatic, and although the Servian Government no doubt apprehended opposition from
Austria to their acquisition of an Adriatic port they probably did not expect this
opposition to be based on the ethnic considerations which they had themselves pro-
claimed. Monsieur Pashitch therefore appeared at first somewhat taken aback by
Monsieur d'Ugron's statement, he replied, however, that he must consult the King and
Servia's allies hut that speaking for himself he feared that the Austrian and Servian
views would be found altogether irreconcilable.

As a result of this interview a feeling of considerable tension has arisen in Servia
and if to day the situation were to be judged from the point of view of Austrian and
Servian relations alone the possibility of war would not seem remote.

So far as I have been able to gather in conversations with my Austrian colleague
and with Monsieur Yovanovitch the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign
j Affairs, the contentions on the one side and the other which owing to the importance
I the dispute threatens to assume I give at some length are as follows :

On behalf of Austria it is urged :
j 1. That the Albanians wish for autonomy; that there are no Serbs in Albania
I and there is hence no reason why Servia should be permitted to annex

any part of the Province.

2. That "hands off Albania" both for themselves and every other nation has
' been a recognized principle of Austrian and Italian policy for some time

past.

3. That Servia is incapable of governing Albania which would consequently

become a source of unrest in the Balkans.

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. Its
substance was reported bv Sir R. Paget in two telegrams of November 11, 1912 (Nos. 53-4,
! |D. 3.30 P.M., R. 10.25 P.M.,"" and D. 8 P.M., R. 1115 P.M.). (F.O. 48068-9/42842/12/44.) Telegram
No. 53 contains the following paragraph which is not included in the extended version : —
He anxiously enquired of me what was likely to be the attitude of His Majesty's
Government, and I understood that some indication is anxiously looked for in Vienna.
Not that British sympathy with Servian pretensions could alter the decision of the Austrian
Government about Albania, which is considered fully justified, and is backed by Italy and
, Germany, but that a mere sign to the effect that His Majesty's Government do not feel

! called upon to mix themselves up in this question, and do not intend to be drawn into it
by Russia, would be sufficient to at once bring Servia to reason. So far as I can judge from
I symptoms here 'this impression is correct, cp. G.P., XXXIII, pp. 308-9, where Herr von
[ Ugron's action is reported by the German Minister, Baron von Griesinger.]

184

4. That Servia being entirely under Russian influence her possession of an

Adriatic port might become a danger for Austria.

5. That Austria-Hungary has shown forbearance and friendhness towards Servia

during the war and Servia should show some appreciation of this attitude
by not trespassing where the Monarchy's interests are genuinely con-
cerned.

6. That an Adriatic port is not a necessity for Servia' whose commerce — the

railway being already construct-ed — would find a more ready outlet via
Salonica or another port on the iEgean.

The Servian contentions in reply to these several points are :

1. That Servia being at war with Turkey can claim to take and retain any part

of Albania by right of conquest regardless of ethnical considerations.

2. That as Turkey in Europe has ceased to exist Austria and Italian arrange-

ments regarding Albania no longer hold good.
8. That the Albanians are incapable of governing themselves that if Albania
be given Autonomy it will come under Austrian influence and will be a
centre whence will be stirred up disaffection against Servia in her new
territory.

4. That Servia is not under the influence of Russia but merely looks to Russia

for support against the aggressive policy of Austria.

5. That Servia has expended hves and money and has a right to the fruits of

her victory.

6. That an Adriatic port is a necessity for Servia her way to the iEgean being

barred by territory now belonging to her allies. (It is said that under
an arrangement between the allies made previous to the war Servia
renounced all claim to an outlet upon the ^Egean.)

In a consideration of the several objections which are urged by Austria, although
each point undoubtedly contains some truth, probably no great weight need be
attached to these arguments which imply solicitude on her part for an ethnical
principle, for the welfare of the Albanians and for loyalty to arrangements with Italy.
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that Austria is not squeamish in
such matters when it is to her advantage to overlook them. The Servian Govern-
ment therefore see nothing in these arguments except a desire to thwart Servia, to
stir up trouble and make use of the Albanians to harass Servia in her new territory
and finally to take over Albania herself. ]\Ionsieur Yovanovitch recently prophecied
to me that within one year Austria and Italy would be at war over Albania. But the
question arises supposing for the sake of argument Austria were to abandon Albania
would the alternative of Servia and Greece taking over Albania be at all preferable?
The Servians have neither the men nor the means for keeping order and taking over
the administration in such a country as Albania where practically the whole population
is of a different religion and hostile to them and where Austria would continually stir
up the Catholic tribes against them.

So far as future conditions in Albania are concerned therefore there seems little
to choose between the Austrian intention of making it an Autonomous province and
the Servian desire of partitioning it between Montenegro, Servia and Greece.

Of the motives which are influencing the Austro-Hungarian attitude the one upon
which most stress is laid and which I am inclined to think is the most genuine is the
apprehension lest the admission of Servia to the Adriatic should be tantamount to the
admission of Russia. Possibly this fear may at first sight appear unreasonable,
Austria could no doubt safeguard herself against the establishment of a Russian naval
base by stipulations concerning the non-fortification of a Servian port, but I am
inclined to think that Austrian opposition proceeds more from uneasiness concerning
the aspirations of unofficial Russia than from any well-defined fear of the influence
exercised in Servia by official Russia and when the extent and growth of the Slav

135

elements both in and around Austria and the extent to which Slav ideals have latterly
gained momentum are considered, the Austrian attitude must at least appear compre-
hensible. Whether a policy of repression or conciliation towards the Slav nations with
which Austria comes in contact would be the wiser is a matter of opinion. Probably
repression will only hasten a struggle which sooner or later is bound to come. But,
however this may be, the acquisition of an Adriatic port is a question which to Austria
must present itself in other than a purely commercial light and her contentions on this
score cannot therefore be dismissed as altogether fantastic.

The Servian Government start from the premise that Austria's only purpose is to
hem in Sorvia in such a manner that she remains more or less commercially dependent
upon Austrian goodwill and as a proof of this they state that the Austrian Government
at tirst made an offer to permit Servia to acquire a port on the Adriatic if she would
enter into a Customs Union with the Monarchy.

I have not been able to verify whether an offer in this form was ever made but
seeing that Austria's principal aim is to guard against an aggressive policy by a Servia
penetrated with Russian influence and that the result of a Customs Union would be
to supplant Russian by Austrian influence there seems nothing very inconsequent now
that the Customs Union idea has been dropped in Austria also opposing Servia's
acquisition of an Adriatic port.

So far as I am aware, and notwithstanding assertions to the contrary by the
Servian Government Austria does not contest Servia's claim to have an outlet to the
Sea for her commerce. But the difficulty lies in reconciling the diametrically opposite
views as to the nature of this outlet. Servia desires absolutely unrestricted possession
of a port on the coast of Albania whilst Austria declares that this is from her point of
view inadmissible.

If Servia honestly desires nothing further than merely an unhindered exit and
entry for commerce some arrangement should be found easily enough and indeed it
is not clear why if Salonika were made a free port and there were a Customs Union
between the Allies, Servia should need any further outlet.

Four suggestions are stated by the Servian Government to have been made by
the Austrian Minister, namely :

1. That Servia should connect her railways with the Bosnian railways and be
given special facilities for commerce at Spalato or Metkovitch.

2. That Austria should endeavour to obtain for Servia special facilities of transit
I through Montenegro and at a Montenegrin port.

I 3. That Servia should construct the Danube-Adriatic Railway but the Adriatic
I line and likewise the port would be in Albanian territory and Albanian,
j 4. That Servia should seek an exit for her commerce on the Mgean.

These suggestions are apparently without any due consideration set down by the
■ Servian Government as being impracticable and it is becoming evident that with
I success desire for territory has increased and Servia will no longer be contented by
merely securing means of free communication with the Sea for her commerce but
wishes to possess also a strip of coast with hinterland. As matters stand at present
there is a very manifest disinclination on the part of the Servian Government to admit
I the possibility of any interference with their plans. They would, they assert, meet
' such interference with resistance to the bitter end and in this attitude they look not
only for the unqualified support of their allies but hope, should Austria and Italy
endeavour to thwart them, to be able to draw in Russia and the other Powers on
[sic; of] the Triple Entente. Should the latter fail them and Servia be humiliated
I they announce that their policy \vill be one of unveiled hostility towards Austria-
Hungary whose Slav population they will endeavour to stir up and whom they will
harass in every conceivable manner.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Copy sent to Vienna.

186

MINUTE.(2)

It is curious that the main reason, at least in my opinion, why Austria so stoutly opposes
Servian entry on to the Adriatic is overlooked. After the revival of the "Great Serb" idea,
now become an active and living force, Servia's estab[lishmen]t on the Adriatic and with a
band of territory running thereto would soon develop into a large Serb Kingdom including
Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and the Banat. This w[oul]d be disastrous to the Dual Monarchy,
and to me it is clear that Austria cannot, and from her point of view should not, permit Sorvia
to establish herself in any shape or form on the Adriatic.

See too, p. 9, that the port on the Albanian coast is to be Albanian. (3)

A. N.
E. G

(2) [There is a reference to views expressed by Sir Edward Grey in Count BenckendorfF's
report of November 11. Siehert, p. 397.]

(3) [v. immediately preceding page, suggestion 3.]

No. 177.

Sir F. Carticright to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Vienna, November 12, 1912.
F.O. 48236/42842/12/44. D. 12-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 135.) Most Confidential. E, 2-15 p.m.

With reference to Belgrade tel[egram] No. 53 of Nov[ember] 11(*) in which
allusion is made to the calming effect which would be produced in Servia if H[is]
M[ajesty's] G[overnment] made it known that they disinterested themselves in
Servian pretensions to obtain an Adriatic port, I may mention that the Eussian
Ambassador here has confidentially said to me that he would be very glad if England
could see her way to say a moderating word to the Servian Prime Minister. Eussia's
position made it, he said, very difficult for her to exercise moral pressure on Servia.

MINUTES.

Have we not said enough? Servia is "bluffing."

A. N.

Let me have this telegram for the Cabinet to-morrow

E. G.
12.11.12.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. immediately preceding document, p. 133, note (i).]

No. 178.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Berlin, November 12, 1912.
F.O. 48263/33672/12/44. D. 7-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 159.) E. 11-30 p.m.

Secretary of State for Foreign AfEairs told me to-day that he quite concurred
with the views expressed by Mr. Asquith that isolated views should be reserved for
discussion at general settlement.

His Excellency added that, in view of the statements of Servian Prime Minister
and Servian representatives, he hoped that any time gained might be utilised for
counselling more prudence and reticence at Belgrade.

(') [This telegram was sent to Constantinople (as No. 1004); to Vienna (as No. 365); to
Paris (as No. 694) ; to Rome (as No. 503) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1216). Copies were sent
to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

187

He used the same language to French Ambassador, who had informed him,
under instructions, that the views of the French Government were in complete accord
with those expressed by Mr. Asquith.(^)

(^) [v. supra, p. 125, Ed note.']

No. 179.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Vienna, November 12, 1912.
F.O. 48264/42842/12/44. D. 8-10 p.m.

Tel. (No. 136.) Confidential. R. 10-45 p.m.

Bulgarian Minister told me to-day that the demand made by Turkey to the
European Powers for mediation was not sympathetic to the Bulgarian Government.
According to him, Bulgarian Government would prefer that a Turkish officer should
appear in the Bulgarian headquarters expressing willingness of the Porte to conclude
peace, asking for conditions. Bulgarian Minister said to me that within a few hours
the reply would be given stating main lines of Bulgaria's demands. If these were
accepted in principle, arrangements for armistice could easily be made. He said that
he expected his Government would ask for surrender of Adrianople and for guarantees
that no further troops should be brought from Asia during the armistice. He added
that Bulgaria fully recognised that European Great Powers would have to approve
final peace conditions.

Bulgarian Minister pressed me very hard to know whether His Majesty's Govern-
ment would support Servian demands for a port on the Adriatic.

I said that England wished to keep out of Balkan complications, and, above all,
desired to maintain concert of Europe intact.

He asked me whether I thought that Austria would yield on the question of
Adriatic port.

I replied that my personal impression was that she would not, and I pointed out
that if trouble was to be avoided Bulgaria should use her influence at Belgrade to
tone down Servian ambitions, which he himself confessed were becoming a source of
anxiety to Bulgaria.

Bulgarian Minister said that he would telegraph my views to the King of
Bulgarians.

He added that Servia could not be allowed to keep Monastir, and enquired
whether England would propose Bulgarian annexation of Salonica. I replied that I
had no information on this subject.

MINUTE.

Thev are already opening up direct negotiations — and let us hope they will be successful.

A. N.
E. G.

(•) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

188

;no.- ISO.

Sir G. Buchanan tg^Sir Edward Grey.C)

St. Petersburg}!, November 12, 1912.
F.O. 48258/42842/12/44. D. 8-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 428.) R. 11-50 p.m.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is alarmed at the language held to him by Bulgarian
Minister, who declared by the terms of alliance Bulgaria is bound to support Servia
under any circumstances.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that it would be madness on Bulgaria's part
to join Servia in attacking Austria, were the latter to occupy Durazzo or any other
port on Turkish territory with the object of forestalling Servia. Were she to do so
Turkey would recommence the war and attack her in the rear, while Roumania would
join Austria. His Excellency hopes that you will continue to give good advice at
Sophia, as unless assured of Bulgarian support Servia will think twice before engaging
in war with Austria.

His Excellency said that he would do all he could to effect peaceful solution of
the question. He had begged Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to persevere in
conciliatory policy which he had pursued since outbreak of the war, and not to have
recourse to any military action, as that would place Russia in a very difficult position.
He told me that, if Austria was going to occupy any of the Albanian ports, he wished
that she would do so at once, before the Servians got there, as the situation then
would not be so dangerous as if she were to expel Servians by force from a port which
they had occupied.

He was glad that M. Danef had gone to Vienna, as he would find out for himself
that Austria was not bluffing, as Bulgarian Government imagined. Roumania has
requested Russia's mediation with regard to the question of rectification of her
frontier. Minister for Foreign Affairs is sounding Bulgarian Government on the
subject. Bulgarians find it difficult to consent to Ihe cession of any territory whose
inhabitants have taken part in a victorious war.

MINUTES.

It would so simplify matters if we could ascertain from Vienna what are her views in
regard to an occupation, in the course of hostilities, by Servia of a port. We well know Servia
will not be allowed to retain such port permanently — but if Austria would look with calmness
on a temporary occupation perhaps the nerves of Europe would calm down.

A. N.

Count MensdorfF has made a communication to me this afternoon which I have taken as
covering this point. I took down his words and have put them in a telegram to Sir F.
Cartwright.(-)

E. G.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [v. infra, p. 147, No. 193.]

No. 181.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.(^)
F.O. 50314/42842/12/44.

(No. 126.) Confidential. Sofia, D. November 12, 1912.

Sir, R. November 26, 1912.

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Prime Minister on the
1st instant(') His Excellency informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Minister had

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

(2) [This conversation was reported shortly by Sir H. Bax-Ironside in his telegram (No. 114)
of November 1, D. 1-11 p.m., R. November 2, 8 a.m. (F.O. 46345/33672/12/44.)]

139

suggested to him unofficially that his Government would be very pleased to come to
an arrangement with the Bulgarian Government " sur le terrain economique."
M. Guechoff had replied that he could give no answer to this suggestion until he had
discussed the question with the Servian Government ; he added that, up to the present,
the two Governments had not touched upon the subject as their time was completely
taken up with the war. The Prime Minister understood that the Austro-Hungarian
Minister in Belgrade had spoken in a similar sense to M. Pashitch.

His Excellency considered this aciion on the part of Count Tarnowski as a new
departure. He judged from it that Austria-Hungary had decided to resign their
pretensions to Novi Bazar and he expressed a hope that no difficulties would be put
in the way of Servia's desire to obtain an extension of territory to the Adriatic coast.
I told M. Guechoff that I thought he was somewhat optimistic on the latter count as it
appeared from several signs that the Servian Adriatic question would be a point of
danger which must be carefully guarded against.

In the course of a few days I received a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's
Ambassador at Eome,(') which you were good enough to supply me with, reporting
that the Italian Minister at Belgrade had represented unofficially the danger of Servia
pressing for an Adriatic port in view of the determination of Austria to oppose its
acquisition. It appeared that the Servian Government not only informed the Italian
representative that they could accept no dictation on this point but the Servian Prime
Minister appears to have discussed the matter with a correspondent of the " Temps "
and others. Thus it was that the Servian Adriatic question was being discussed
separately, and prior to any other question, by the entire European press. This, as
you. Sir, are aware, is exactly contrary to the policy of the Allies whose intention it
was, and still is, to act as one nation, both towards Europe and towards the Ottoman
Government, until an arrangement with the latter is definitely concluded.

The Bulgarian Government are fully aware of the mistake that has been made
in this instance, and they will in the future deprecate any discussion with the Great
Powers respecting the future of Monastir, Salonica, the question of Servian access to
the Adriatic or other thorny points in their programme, until the whole settlement of
European Turkey has been arranged en bloc.

I had the honour to report to you on the 12th instantf) that the Austrian Govern-
ment had taken steps at Belgrade to inform the Servian Government that they could
not permit of their being allowed to take possession of a port on the Adriatic and that
the Triple Alliance was solidly agreed on this point. The Servian Prime Minister did
not, however, on this occasion allow himself to be drawn, and he informed M. de Ugron
that the Balkan programme had not yet been agreed to by the Allies, and it would not
be completed until they had formulated their terras of peace with Turkey, as a whole.
At the same time the Servian Government instructed their Minister to ask the
Bulgarian Government if they could rely upon the support of the Bulgarian army in
case of hostilities.

With reference to the above I have the honour to state that the Bulgarian
Minister of Finance, who is the most able and most determined member of the present
Cabinet, told me that the Bulgarians would stand by their Allies, on the question of
access to an Adriatic port, to the last soldier.

The chief reasons for the alliance between Bulgaria and Servia were : —

On the part of the Biilgarians for the purpose of freeing the Christians in
European Turkey from Turkish domination, and for extending their own territory.

On the part of the Servians for the purpose of occupying the Sanjak of Novi Bazar
and of obtaining free access to a port on the Adriatic Sea ; thus liberating themselves
from Austrian commercial and political domination and opening a path to the free
market of the world.

(2) [v. supra, p. 113, No. 149, note (i).]

(*) [This telegram (No. 140), D. November 12, 12-5 p.m. R. November 13, 11-10 a.m., is not
reproduced, as the substance is given in the despatch above. (F.O. 48311/42842/12/44.)]

140

It is my personal conviction that European diplomacy will again fail if such free
access is not granted to Servia. Weakened as they will be with their severe contest
with the Turkish Empire the Allies would involve Europe in another war rather than
cede their point. They well know that the limited autonomous Albania which they
will be obliged to concede to Austrian and Italian aspirations, will create a " foyer " of
discontent in the Balkan peninsula and that the larger Albania is, the sooner another
war will ensue for its possession. The Allies are most anxious to enter at once upon
an era of peace but they fully realise that an unsatisfactory settlement of their
territorial aims and claims at the present time would oblige them at an early date to
take up arms, even against another Great Power.

In view of this contention, the visit of M. Daneff, President of the Sobranie, to
Budapest, (^) where he has had audiences with the Emperor of Austria and the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand must not be lost sight of. M. Daneff was dispatched by
the King direct from the Headquarters at Stara Zagora and he was instructed to
inform Count Berchtold that Bulgaria would support her Ally in her determination to
have a port in the Adriatic.

At the time of writing, M. Daneff' s Mission is not yet concluded.

I have, &c.

H. 0. BAX-IRONSIDE.

(=) [cp. infra, pp. 142-3, No. 186.]

No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.C)

F.O. 48636/42842/12/44.
(No. 263.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.

The Italian Ambass[ado]r read to Sir A. N[icolson] on Nov[ember] 12 a
telegram from M[arqu]is di San Giuliano, in which the latter summarised the results
of his recent visit to Berlin as follows —

That a perfect and complete agreement existed among the members of the Triple
Alliance. That the Balkan States should not be deprived of the fruits of their victories.
That Austria-Hungary was immovable in her determination not to admit of a Servian
port on the Adriatic : and that the three Gov[ernmen]ts are animated by a profound
desire for peace, especially the German Emperor of whom the M[arqui]s di San
Giuliano had a lengthy audience.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget. C)

F.O. 48133/42842/12/44.
(No. 28.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.

The Servian Charge d' Affaires called at this Office on November 7th and was
received by Sir A. Nicolson.

Monsieur Grouitch said that a ' ' friendly Power ' ' had informed the Servian
Government that Austria-Hungary would never in any circumstances permit Servia
to have an access to the Adriatic. Monsieur Passitch had replied to this information

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

141

by saying that Servian troops were on their way to occupy Durazzo — and that Servia
intended to hold that port permanently against all comers and that she would on no
account abandon it. He was instructed to announce formally this decision to His
Majesty's Government.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that Servian troops were still, he understood, some
little distance from Durazzo, and that a considerable portion of Albania would have
to be traversed to reach it.

However these were military considerations. Sir A. Nicolson had no remarks
whatever to make on Monsieur Grouitch's communication : but he understood (1) it
was a formal notification to all the Powers that Servia intended to take possession of
Durazzo and to hold it permanently — even at the risk of hostilities with any Power who
wished to drive her out (2) that this notification was in consequence of a communica-
tion from a "friendly Power," and not on account of any official declaration from
Austria-Hungary.

Monsieur Grouitch replied in the affirmative to both these questions.

[I am, &c.

E. GREY.]

No. 184.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir H. Bax-Jronside.

Private. (M

My dear Bax-Ironside : — Foreign Office, November 12, 1912.

Thank you for the letters which you wrote me by the last Messenger. (^) Though
you write me privately I may tell you your letters are shown to the King and also
to Sir Edward Grey and I do not keep your communications to myself, so you can
write very freely and fully and as frequently as you feel inclined to do.

I am not going to enter into all the details of the military operations as it would
be a waste of time to do so. The questions with which we are at present face to face
are those of Mediation and the possible entry of the Bulgarian troops into Constan-
tinople. I do not intend to enter upon the present Servian question as I do not
think that it will develop into any serious consequences, as I much doubt if Servia
would be supported by her allies Bulgaria and Greece, if she resorted to force. She
will get all that she requires in the way of an outlet to the sea if she acts reasonably
and sensibly and she would gain absolutely nothing if she pursues the course which
j she announces she will take. Russia has spoken very seriously, and I trust that her
I warnings will be heeded. I heard very similar language on the part of Servia in
1909, and though I daresay they have more grievances at the present moment than
I they had on that occasion I do not think that even Servia would be so foolish as to
I risk a war with Austria after having been practically exhausted by her present military
efforts, which no one can deny have been most praiseworthy and successful,

I hope that we shall be able either this evening or to-morrow to get our com-
1 munications made to the Balkan States. We are waiting at the present for the
adhesion of Germany. For some inexplicable reason there seems to have been some
confusion or misunderstanding at Berlin in regard to what the Turks proposed. You
of course would know far better than I do, but I have a suspicion that an offer of
mediation would not be entirely unwelcome to Bulgaria. It would be an enormous
thing if we could stop any further sacrifices on both sides, for the loss of life even
up to now has been almost too appalling. Moreover, I do view with the very gravest
misgivings the entry of the Bulgarian troops into Constantinople. Of course it is
impossible for us to endeavour to dissuade a victorious army from putting the final
crown on their achievements, but I am much afraid that their entry will have very

(1) rCarnock MSS., Vol. VTI of 1912.]
1 (2) [The reference is to Sir H. Bax-Ironside's letter to Sir A. Nicolson of October 28.
j (Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1912.) This is not reproduced, as it covers much the same ground
' as his letter of the same date to Sir Edward Grey (v. supra, pp. 58-9, No. 72). There appears
I to have been uo messenger between October 28 and November 14.]

142

far reaching consequences and might lead to the massacre of many thousands of
hapless Christians in the interior of Asia Minor. Moreover, I do not prebend to be
able to estimate what effect it would produce throughout the moslem world when it
was known that the Capital of the Khalif had fallen into the hands of the infidel. I
feel pretty sure that the calmer heads at Sofia would be glad to abstain from such
a step and I daresay if proposals for mediation were accepted now it might be possible
to cause hostilities to cease or to be suspended, and the great danger would then
be averted.

I have not time to write you further to-day. but you will understand how glad I
am to receive any letter you may have time to write to me. Your telegrams and
despatches have been exceedingly appreciated here.

[Yours, &c.]'

[A. NICOLSON.J

No. 185.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Greij.i^)

F.O. 48379/42842/12/44. Sofia, D. Novemher 13, 1912, 1 p.m.

Tel. (No. 144.) R. November 14, 1912, 12-55 a.m.

Your tel[egram] to Paris No. 676 of Nov[ember] 6(^) and your telegram No. 147
of Nov [ember] 8.(^)

Mediation proposals. All my colleagues except German Minister have received
their instructions. As Ottoman Government have now expressed wish to enter into
direct communications with allies may I presume that general mediation proposals
will be dropped ?(^)

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) \v. supra, p. 106, No. 139, note V).]

(3) [v. supra, p. 119, No. 160.]
(J) [v. infra, p. 146, No. 191.]

No. 186.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grcy.{^)

Sofia, November 13, 1912.

F.O. 48426/33672/12/44. D. 6 p.m.

Tel. (146.) Secret. R. 8 p.m.

My telegram No. 131 of Nov [ember] 9.(^)

Bulgarian Government received last night a telegram from M. Danef from
Budapest.

He says on 10th November he had prolonged audience with Emperor and Arch-
duke Francis Ferdinand ; latter remarked he had come expressly to Budapest to see
President of Sobranje. They both spoke very flatteringly of Bulgaria, and notably
the Archduke. They declared that they were ready to (? help) in every way towards

(1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 372) ; to Constantir le (as No. 1111) ; to
Paris (as No. 699); to Rome (as No. 507); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1^26); to Vienna (as
No. 374). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the
Director of Military Operations.]

(^) [v. supra, p. 124, No. 166.]

143

reasonable settlement; only, as far as Roumania was concerned, Emperor said that
Bulgaria must make her some small territorial concessions, as the position of the
King of Eoumania was a very difficult one. M: Danef replied that position of the
King of the Bulgarians was even more difficult. The Emperor and the Archduke both
looked unfavourably on the question of Servian access to the Adriatic. The Archduke,
however, after discussing the matter at some length, added, "This will not
however, be a casus belli for my country. "(^)

At the conclusion of these audiences M. Danef had a conversation with the
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he energetically and warmly defended
Slav cause, and he told Minister for Foreign Affairs that Roumania had not asked for
anything officially.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that Greek Minister at Vienna had discussed
with him question of cession of Salonica to Greece; he had, however, made evasive
reply. M. Danef was of opinion that the Austro-Hungarian Government would
prefer that Salonica should be made an international town, unless the alhes preferred
to hand it over to Servia, which did not seem probable.

MINUTE.

I sh[oul]d not place absolute reliance on M. Danef's accuracy.

A. N.

E. G.

(3) [cp. infra, p. 180, No. 240.]

No. 187.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edicard Greij.{^)

Sofia, Noveviber 13, 1912.

F.O. 48420/42842/12/44. D. 7-18 p.m.

Tel. (No. 145.) Confidential. R. 11-0 p.m.

My telegram No. 140 of Nov[ember] 12(^) : Servian Adriatic question.

Prime Minister has informed Servian Government that he considers above as the
most important of all Balkan questions. Bulgaria would remain absolutely solid with
Servia on this point and would assist her in case of necessity with her military support.
This would be as agreed upon in military convention existing between the two
countries. Prime Minister has also telegraphed in above sense to Bulgarian
representative at St. Petersburgh.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

MINUTE.

Bulgaria cannot say less than this while Servian troops are fighting by the side of
Bulgarians in Thrace.

E. G.

(1) [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 139, No. 181, and note (^).]

144

No. 188.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Paris, November 13, 1912.
F.O. 48428/48428/12/44. D. 8-40 p.m.

Tel. (No. 196.) Very Confidential. R. 10-30 p.m.

Greek Minister informed Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening that he has good
reason to believe that during the recent visit to Berlin of the Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs it was arranged with German Government, with concurrence of
Austria, that Italy shall retain Rhodes and another Mgean island. Italian Govern-
ment are to come to terms with the Porte on subject. This information tallies with
that contained in private letter which French Minister for Foreign Affairs has received
from French Ambassador at Berlin.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that France cannot admit possession by Italy
of any island or islands in ^gean Sea. He is of opinion that British and French
Governments should take an early opportunity of reminding Italian Government of
the assurances given by them in regard to islands, and of the terms of the treaty by
which Italo-Turkish war was brought to an end, and subject to which France and
England recognise Italian annexation of Tripoli. (-)

Minister for Foreign Affairs will bring matter to the notice of Russian Govern-
ment, but, Russia not being a Mediterranean Power, question is not of such
importance to her as it is to France and England, and he does not consider that the
Russo-Italian friendship should be a consideration in the question of French and
British representations to Italian Government. His Excellency says that if Italy, on
one pretext or another, retained an island, Germany and Austria might each attempt
to obtain a like possession.

MINUTE.

I am a little puzzled as to the best modus procedendi. We have to think of islands in
Greek and Italian hands — and very seriouslj' think. As to the Islands in the hands of Italy
I think (1) Sir R. Rodd might be told to hint privately to Italian M[inister for] F[oreign]
A[ffairs] that inform[atio]n has reached us that there is some project or idea afloat that Italy
is thinking of retaining one or two — that we hardly give credence to the report — as we are
sure Italy would abide by her engagement towards Turkey and also towards us — and that we
could not admit their transfer to a great European naval Power ;

or (2) leave to France the initiative in approaching Italy — as she and not we received the
reports. I do not like a combined and rather formal representation to Italy. I am inclined
to No. 2.

Russia will certainly be interested and we should tell M. Poincare so.

I don't like addressing the Porte by giving warnings as suggested. The whole distribution
of European Turkey is of international concern — and we had better not at this stage fix on one
portion for warnings or representations. We would give occasion to others to put in caveats
to Turkey on other points — and confusion would arise. The islands in Greek hands are of
more serious import to us and Russia than those in Italian hands — and we should speak with
Paris and St. Petersburgh as to these islands.(3)

A. N.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. Gooch <fc Temperley, Vol. IX (1), pp. 4.30-48, Nos. 457-68, passim. The text of the
Treaty is in ibid., pp. 438-42, No. 466, end.]

(^) [Sir Edward Grey drafted on this paper a telegram to Sir F. Bertie (No. 674) which
was sent on November 15. v. infra, p. 158, No. 206.]

145

No. 189.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grcy.^)

F.O. 48477/42842/12/44. Cettinje, D. Noi-emher 13, 1912, 9 p.m.

Tel. (No. 43.) E. November 4, 1912, 11-15 a.m.

Austrian Minister tells me that by order of his Gov[ernmen]t he has made a
verbal communication to the King to the following effect.

"With reference to occupation of Medua and Alessio, we draw the King's
attention to the fact that we do not wish to disturb military operations in any way ;
but that a permanent occupation of the Albanian coast, either by Montenegro or
Servia could not be brought into harmony with creation of an autonomous Albania,
which we have in view."

Italian Minister is to make a similar communication to-morrow.

(') [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 273) ; to Constantinople (as No. 1113) ; to
Paris (as No. 670) ; to Rome (as No. 508) ; to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1227) ; to Vienna (as
No. 371). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the
Director of Military Operations.]

No. 190.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget. {'■)

I F.O. 48069/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 93.) Foreign Office, November 13, 1912, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 54. (^)

I had hoped that special claims of individual States would not be discussed till
Balkan Allies formulated their whole terms of peace in common. Any points of
difl&culty could then be discussed as parts of the whole with much better prospect
of favourable settlement.

I have not therefore discussed Servian claim hitherto. You should explain this
to Servian Minister and add that I perfectly understand how important it is for Servia
to be sure of outlet for her .commerce on the Adriatic but that there is more than one
method of securing this and that for Servia to reject peremptorily in advance all

j consideration of possible methods except her own that may be suggested for securing
the substance of what she requires will alienate the sympathy and weaken the hands
of those who wish to support her. And for Servia to provoke a quarrel separately
with Austria on one point before claims of Balkan Stat>es are formulated as a whole
may jeopardize the whole settlement under which it is quite certain that Servia in
common with her allies will secure enormous advantages with the consent of all the
Great Powers. The right therefore of those of the Great Powers, who are most directly
interested in the pending change of the map of Europe, to have some say in the matter,

[ should not be rudely challenged.

(') [This telegram was repeated to Sofia (No. 156) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 1222) ; to Paris
(No. 697); with the following addition: "You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign]
A[ffairs]." It was also shown to Count Benckendorlf, v. Siehert-Benckendorff, II, pp. 487-8;
and to Count Mensdorff, v. O.-U.A., IV, p. 864, No. 4404.]

(2) [v. supra,, p. 133, No. 176, note (i).]

6272

146

No. 191.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.
F.O. 48379/42842/ 12/44.

Tel. (No. 155.) Foreign Office, November 13, 1912, 10 p.m.

Your telegram No. 144. (')

Communication should still be made when all your colleagues have received
instructions. Ottoman Gov[ernmen]t have not withdrawn their appeal to the Powers.

(') [v. supra, p. 142, No. 185.]

No. 192.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.O

F.O. 48516/33672/12/44. Vienna, D. November 13, 1912, 12-0 midnight.

Tel. (No. 139.) K. November 14, 1912, 11-45 a.m.

I have seen Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] who came to Vienna
to-day for a few hours from Buda-Pesth, whither he returns to-night. I enquired
whether he could tell me anything with regard to M. DanefE's mission. (^) He gave me
to understand that he was very fairly satisfied with its results. I gather Bulgaria will
use her influence at Belgrade to render Servian aspirations acceptable to Austria-
Hungary. H[is] E[xeellency] also told me Russian M[inister for] F[oreign]
A[ffairs] had spoken to Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg in a manner which
tended to bring about a " detente " between Russia and Austria. Austrian M[inister '
for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] did not believe Russia was mobilising, though she was taking
some precautionary measures. Austria had only slightly strengthened her military ,
position in Bosnia. II [is] E[xcellency] said to me that in his opinion the height jj
of the crisis was now over and that with a little common sense and goodwill on all M
sides a solution could be found for the chief present difficulties. I

From what M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] told me I gather that M. Daneff |l
was anxious for conclusion of peace before Bulgaria was forced by circumstances to ||
•enter Constantinople. Bulgaria is apparently encountering strong opposition from ||
Russia to her entering Constantinople. M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] told me J
that he was afraid that Turkey would be unreasonable and would refuse conditions of ■
peace and of armistice, and he hinted to me that the moment might come when it ■
might be well for Europe to put pressure [on] Turkey to yield. V

With regard to Servian demand for an Adriatic port on Albanian coast I enquired
of H[is] E[xcellency] whether he had any information tending to show that Servian
army was advancing towards the Adriatic. He said reports were contradictory but,
on my pressing, he seemed to imply that if Austro-Hungarian Gov[ernmen]t were
convinced that a large body of Servian troops were deliberately marching towards
the Adriatic Austria-Hungary would have to give a warning to Servia, so that the
latter may not declare later that she received no official intimation that Austria
absolutely objected to her occupying Adriatic port.

. (1) [This telegram was sent to Berlin (as No. 376) ; to Constantinople (as No. 1116) ; to
Paris (as No. 673); to Rome (as No. oil); to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1230); to Sofia (as
No. 158) ; to Belgrade (as No. 98). Copies were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of
Naval Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [cp. supra, pp. 142-3, No. 186.]

mid

147

With regard to Salonica Austrian M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs] inclined to
the idea that it should be made a free port for the general use of Balkan states, by
which term he evidently means Austria-Hungary to be included.

]\r[inister for] F[oreign] A[£fairs] told me that he has advised M. Daneff to
use his influence to bring about a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of Roumanian
claims for compensation.

No. 193.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.O
F.O. 49147/42842/12/44.

Tel. (No. 369.) Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

Austrian Ambassador informs me that Count Berchtold shares my view that as
long as war with Turkey lasts actions of the Allies can be looked upon as war opera-
tions and that he does not intend to interfere with them. He cannot however share
my view that discussion of questions that affect Austrian interests should be deferred
to a moment when Europe finds itself confronted with a fait accompli, especially as it
is not Austria but Servia that began it.

It is Count Berchtold's earnest wish that every question arising out of this war
should have a peaceful solution ; it is however desirable that creation of an autonomous
Albania should not be prejudiced through occupation of part of Albania by Servian
troops without a preliminary warning.

I said I supposed this meant a warning that any occupation by Servia of Albania
would be regarded as provisional and the Ambassador said he understood it in this
sense.

I told the Ambassador that I was instructing the British Minister at Belgrade (^) to
explain to the Servian Minister that I perfectly understood how important it was for
Servia to be sure of an outlet for her commerce on the Adriatic but that there was
more than one method of securing this and that for Servia to reject peremptorily in
advance all considerations of possible methods except her own that may be suggested
for securing the substance of what she required would alienate the sympathy and
weaken the hands of those who wished to support her.

I told the Ambassador that I knew Russia had spoken quite as strongly in this
sense at Belgrade and that as everyone was counselling moderation there a peaceable
and favourable solution was eventually certain. The only thing that might prevent
it would be an outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia ; I hoped therefore
that Austria would not resent anything- that Servia was doing now as being a
provocative gesture and I was very glad of the communication he had just made from
Count Berchtold, which T took to confirm this hope.

The Ambassador said he regarded the communication that I was making at
Belgrade as very satisfactory and valuable. (^)

(') [This telegram was repeated to Paris; to Berlin; to Vienna; to Rome; to St.
Petersburgh; with the addition: "You shotild inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]."]

(2) [v. supra, p. 145, No. 190.]

(3) [This interview is reported in O.-U.A., IV, pp. 864-5, Nos. 4404-5. It is also mentioned
in Siebert-Benckendorff, II, pp. 488-9.]

[6272]

148

No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.^)

F.O. 48687/33672/12/44.
(No. 551.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

M. Cambon told Sir A. N[icolson] on Nov[ember] 13 that M. Poincare had
informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambas[sado]r at Paris that, in the opinion of the
French Gov[ernmen]t, the actual occupation by the Allies during hostilities of this
or that locality or point in no wise established a claim to the permanent possession
of such localities, as the Powers would at the end of the war have a word to say on
that subject. The Austro-Hungarian Ambas[sado]r was much pleased with this com-
munication. (^)

I"! am, &c."l

E. G[EEY].

(1) [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. It is
printed from' the original draft by Sir A. Nicolson. Sir Edward Grey added the following note:
" This should decide the answer of the French about Capitulations at Uskub. E. G."]

(2) [cp. D.D.F., 3""^ Ser.. Vol. IV, p. 435, No, 419.]

No. 195. .

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.{^)
F.O. 48944/42842/12/44.

(No. 334.) St. Petersburgh, D. November 13, 1912.

Sir, R. November 18, 1912.

In my despatch No. 322 of the 30th ultimo(^) I called attention to the fact thatj
since his audience with the Emperor at Spala, Monsieur Sazonow had begun to
realise that Russian public opinion on the Balkan question is a factor that has to be
counted with and that a Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot defend himself against
the attacks of the press by the simple expedient of not reading its articles. His
Excellency has since then so far departed from his original attitude of aloofness as to
grant interviews to Representatives of certain leading journals ; but, if by so doing
he hoped to silence his critics, he must have been grievously disappointed, as but
little notic-e has been taken of the reports of these interviews. He now seems to have
made up his mind that, as he cannot hope to lead public opinion, he must, in framing
his foreign policy, allow himself to be influenced by the sympathies and the antipathies
of his countrymen. While the tone of the press towards England has undergone a
marked change since His Majesty's Government have declared in Parliament that no
one would be disposed to deprive the Balkan States of the fruits of their victories, its
attitude towards Austria is becoming every day more hostile. This has been
particularly the case since it has become known that the Austrian Government have
placed their veto on Servia obtaining a port on the Adriatic.

In my recent conversations with him Monsieur Sazonow has repeatedly asserted
that this is a question on which the Russian Government would be powerless to resist
the pressure of public opinion. He has from the very outset taken the line that Servia's
claim to such a port was perfectly legitimate and that it was one that must be satistied.
Though he did subsequently assure me that the Russian Minister at Belgrade had
never been instructed to encourage the Serbs to put forward this demand, his own
attitude on the question has been a direct encouragement to the Servian Government
to persist in it, when once it had been formulated. He told me himself on the

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
(2) [v. supra, pp. 63-6, No. 78.]

149

8th instant that, in his conversations with the German and Austrian Ambassadors,
he had spoken to them in such serious language of the necessity of arriving at an
honest and final settlement of the Balkan question — a result which could not be
achieved were Servia's legitimate claims to be ignored — that, had he added another
word, his language would have been almost a menace. He, indeed, gave me the
impression that he had wished to convey to the two Ambassadors the fact that, if the
present settlement was to leave causes of friction behind it, that might endanger the
maintenance of peace in the future, he would prefer not to postpone the inevitable
conflict but to settle the matter once for all with the sword.

On his reverting to the subject on the following day, I took occasion to warn His
Excellency of the danger of committing himself too far by an uncompromising support
of this Servian claim, as he might in such case have to choose between a war with
the Triple Alliance or a solution of the question, that would be represented as a fresh
humiliation for Russia. The Emperor, I ventured to think, could hardly contemplate
embarking on such a war for the sole purpose of giving a strip of Albanian territory
to Servia, when the latter 's economic interests might be safeguarded by means of a
railway under proper guarantees and when, apart from this one point, the Balkan
question was about to be settled in a manner so advantageous to the Balkan States
and to Russia. His Excellency admitted that, so far as he was personally concerned,
a railway such as I had suggested would offer a satisfactory solution ; but unfortu-
nately it would not satisfy Servia. Albania was Turkish territory and Servia would
be acting within her rights as a belligerent in occupying a port on the Albanian coast.
He could tell me privately that he had only the day before warned the Servian
Minister that Servia must not count on Russian military support, should she provoke
a war with Austria ; but, though he had thought it right to administer this warning,
he well knew that, were Austria to attempt to expel Servia from a port at which she
had established herself, Russia would be^ obliged to come to the latter's assistance.

His Excellency at the same time expressed himself as in entire agreement with
what you had said to the German Charge d'Affaires(^) as to the advisability of leaving
this question of a Servian port on the Adriatic to be discussed later on by the Powers
as part of the general settlement, instead of treating it as a separate matter to be
dealt with at once. He observed however that closely connected with this question
was that of the future status of Albania. Were it to be erected into an autonomous
province, its frontiers would have to be delimited and while, in his opinion, they
ought to be drawn at no great distance from the coast, Austria and Italy would
endeavour to give the new province as large a hinterland as possible : and this would
again conflict with Servian aspirations.

Monsieur Sazonow is so prone to see things in the light in which he would like
to see them, that he at first easily persuaded himself that the opposition of Austria
could be bought off by an arrangement, under which she would be guaranteed
unrestricted railway communication with the Adriatic. He has also been disposed to
believe that, even if Austria did prove troublesome, Germany was so bent on main-
taining peace for the present that she would not support her ally in any step that might
give rise to international complications. The assurances which he had received from
Monsieur Bethmann Hollweg at Port Baltic, (*) were still fresh in his mind : and the
declaration made by the Triple Alliance at Belgrade, (^) came on him as an unpleasant
surprise. While most anxious to find a pacific solution of the question. His Excellency,
like the majority of his countrymen, has not forgotten the humiliation to which
Russia was subjected in 1909, and will not tamely submit to anything of the kind
in the present instance. It was, therefore, rather unfortunate that the German
Ambassador should have been instructed to enquire whether it was Russia's intention
to treat this question as a trial of strength — Kraftprohe — as this tactless form of
enquiry only elicited the reply that both Russia and Germany had had experience of

(*) [v. supra, pp. 120-1, No. 162.]

(■») [v. Gooch cfc Temperley, Vol. IX (1), p. 417, No. 4.33.]

(') [cp. supra, p. 133, No. 176, and note (i), and infra, p. 174, No. 232.]

150

such trials of strength in 1909 and 1911, but that if the latter contemplated repeating
her Agadir policy in the present case the consequences might be very serious. After
this exchange of compliments the conversation resumed a normal course; and
Monsieur Sazonow gave Count Pourtales to understand that, while Russia held that
Servia must be emancipated from her present position of dependence on other States,
the question of how this result was to he attained was one which should be left to be
discussed by the Powers as forming part of the general settlement which must follow
the war.

In my subsequent conversations with Monsieur Sazonow I found His Excellency
most pacifically inclined. He desired, he said, to do all that was possible to prevent
international complications, but he was alarmed at the fact that Bulgaria considered
herself bound by the terms of her Alliance to support Servia under all circumstances.
He had tried to impress on the Bulgarian Minister the madness of placing so large
an interpretation on these treaty obligations ; and he trusted that His Majesty's
Government would speak in the same sense at Sofia, as, were Bulgaria to refuse to
support her, Servia would think twice before engaging in a war with Austria. He
had pointed out that the occupation by Austria of Durazzo or Alessio, even if under-
taken for the purpose of forestalling the Servians, could not be regarded as an attack
on Servia, as both these ports were on Turkish territory.

On my asking him whether any communications had recently passed between the
Austrian and Russian Governments, His Excellency said that he had let Count
Berchtold know how much he had appreciated the conciliatory attitude adopted by
the Austrian Government sinc/e the beginning of the war and had expressed the hope
that this policy would be pursued to the end, as, were Austria to have recourse to
military intervention, the Russian Government would be placed in a very difficult
position. If Austria intended to intervene he would, he told me, much prefer that
she should seize the Albanian ports before Servia had time to occupy them, as the
forced eviction of Servia from these ports would rouse Russian public opinion to
danger point.

As regards Russia's attitude towards Bulgaria, it is only necessary to state that
during the past fortnight Monsieur Sazonow has withdrawn from the position which
he originally took up. He has, much to his regret, tacitly consented to the temporary
occupation of Constantinople and he has acquiesced in the retention of Adrianople as
a fortress, as well as in a frontier line that will bring the Bulgarians much nearer to
Constantinople than he had at first intended. This last concession was, as he told the
Bulgarian .Minister, his final word on the subject ; but, from a remark which
Monsieur Neratoff recently made to me, I am by no means sure that the Bulgarians
will regard it as such. His views with regard to the rectification of frontier demanded
by Roumania have varied from day to day. He at one moment assured me that
Bulgaria would meet Roumania's wishes and at another that she would not cede an
inch of her territory. He has, however, consistently urged the Bulgarian Government
to settle the question amicably, but without indicating the precise lines which such a
settlement ought to take. The Russian Government has now been invited by
Roumania to act as mediator between her and Bulgaria; and His Excellency is
enquiring at Sofia whether such mediation would be agreeable or not. I personally
have always felt that this will be a very difficult matter to arrange, as cession of
territory means the transfer to Roumanian nationality of a certain number of
Bulgarian subjects, who have fought in a victorious war; and it will not be easy to
induce the Bulgarian Government to make this sacrifice.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

151

No. 196.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

F.O. 47453/42842/12/44.
(No. 377.) Confidential,

Sir, Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

The Russian Amb[assado]r called at this Office on the 8th inst[ant] and left with
me the accompanying memo[randum] showing the views of his Gov[ernmen]t as to
the ultimate partition of Turkish territory among the allied Balkan States in the
event of their being victorious.

[I am, &c.

E. GRE^.]

Enclosure in No. 196.

Memorandum communicated by Count Benckendorff.
(Confidentiel.) November 8, 1912.

A notre avis 1 'intervention des Puissances ne peut avoir de succes que si elle a
Ueu sans retard. En vue de sauvegarder la securite de. Constantinople, il est dans
I'interet general de maintenir un rayon sous la souverainete reelle du Sultan. Les
limites de ce rayon sont deterrainees par une iigne partant de I'estuaire de la Maritza
et aboutissant, par Andrinople, a la Mer Noire. Toutes les autres provinces de la
Turquie d'Europe devraient, a notre avis, etre reparties a I'amiable [sic] entre les
Etats allies en vertu de leur droit de conquete. Dans ces limites nous sommes prets a
appuyer aupres des Puissances le maximum du possible.

Nous estimons que de cette fa^on une paix durable serait assuree dans les Balkans
alors que les difficultes d'une mediation se trouveraient en meme temps sensiblement
amoindries.

C'est uniquement par 1' acceptation immediate et unanime de ces conditions de la
part des Puissances qu'il sera possible d'obvier au danger d'une occupation de
Constantinople par les allies et aux complications Europeennes qui pourraient en
resulter. Car, si les alhes n'obtiennent pas des Puissances des garanties serieuses
pour la realisation de leurs demandes, il est a craindre que leurs ressources limitees,
ne leur permettant pas d'attendre, ne les obligent a occuper Constantinople afin de
s'assurer un gage reel.

II va sans dire qu'il s'agirait egalement de prendre en consideration plusieurs
questions importantes.

Nous admettons en principe la creation d'une Albanie maritime autonome sous
la souverainete du Sultan. En meme temps on ne saurait perdre de vue la necessite
de satisfaire aux aspirations Serbes vers la Mer Adriatique.

Une rectification de frontiere entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie devrait avoir lieu
afin de donner a cette derniere 'une compensation equitable pour son attitude loyale
pendant la guerre. Nous sommes prets a appuyer a Sofia des conseils en ce sens.

Nous serions egalement tout prets a admettre entre I'Autriche et la Serbie la
conclusion d'un arrangement d'ordre economique qui assurerait a la premiere le libre
transit de ses produits par les nouvelles possessions Serbes.

MINUTE.

There is a later communication(') I think proposing the Enos-Ergene-Midia line but
perhaps this had better be recorded.

R. P. M.

(') [There was an earlier communication from Sir G. Buchanan, in his telegram (No. 412)
bf November 5, in which he said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had consented to a
frontier line for Bulgaria drawn from Enos (a port on the ^gean Sea) to the river Ergene
and thence to a point on the Black Sea near Midia. (F.O. 47049/42847/12/44.) cp. also infra,
pp. 172-3, No. 229, end]

152

No. 197.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir R. Paget.

Private. (M

My dear Paget : — Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

I am extremely obliged to you for your letter by last Messenger. (^) It was an
exceedingly interesting one and I trust that you will always let me know privately
anything which you would hesitate to put into an official despatch. I am curious to
hear what your Military Attache will give you on his return from Uskub. I do not
know exactly what your opinion is, but it seems to me that Servia is going to very
great lengths and has become so inflated with her own importance and military
strength as to believe that she can dictate to the whole of Europe. I see no reason
whatever why this Adriatic question should disturb the peace of Europe. Whether
Servia occupies a port now or not is not a matter of essential importance. It is quite
clear that neither Austria nor Germany will allow her to retain possession of it, though
they are quite ready to give her free and unimpeded access to the sea. I can hardly
imagine that when the war is once concluded she will find her allies at all disposed
to recommence another serious campaign on her behalf. If her commercial and
independent freedom can be secured, I feel pretty confident that no European Power
would spend men and money to favour her pretensions to a settlement in Albanian
territory. I am glad that Russia has spoken in such a decided voice and it would be
well for her to realise that she really must be reasonable and modest or otherwise
she may find herself in an exceedingly difficult position.

I am afraid I cannot write further to-day, but I wished to acknowledge your letter
and to thank you for it.

[Yours etc.]

[A. NICOLSON.]

(1) rCarnock MSS., Vol. VII of 1912.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 84-5, No. 104.]

No. 198.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Belgrade, November 14, 1912.
F.O. 48586/42842/12/44. D. 2 p.m.

Tel. (No. 58.) R. 5-55 p.m.

Prime Minister being absent at the front, I read a French paraphrase of your
telegram No. 93 of Nov[ember] 13(-) to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.

He said it was not Servia who had begun discussion about Albania and the
Adriatic port, but that Austria was assuming the right to impose certain restraints
upon Servia in her military operations in Turkey, and had then made certain
suggestions which were inacceptable.

Servia would have willingly left the question to be raised subsequently, but cannot
submit to being limited in her action at present. At the same time, Under-Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs pointed out that in his opinion no Other settlement than
full possession of an Adriatic port could be considered as the military party, who had
now completely lost their heads, would not be amenable to reason and Prime Minister,

(1) [This telegram was sent to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1234) ; to Paris (as No. 678). Copies
were sent \o the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 145, No. 190.]

153

who has gone to consult with the King and Minister of War upon subject of Austria's
attitude, might .find himself placed before the choice of resigning or defying Austria.

The Servian troops are believed to have already reached the Adriatic.

I gather that even full possession of an Adriatic port would not now satisfy
Servian ambitions, and that military party who are at present the rnasters will not be
content except with a division of Albania between Servia and Greece.

Meanwhile Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave me following
information : —

Austria has placed 15,000 picked men on Drina between Vishegrad and Ratcha.
IVth Army Corps at Budapest is mobilising. One battery of howitzers and 4 search-
hghts have arrived at Semlin.

There seems to be increased military activity in Belgrade.

(Sent to Vienna.)

MINUTE.

This arrogant language on the part of Servia is fatiguing and ridiculous.

A. N.
E. G.

No. 199.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.(^)

Vienna, November 14, 1912.
F.O. 48593/42842/12/44. D. 3-20 p.m.

Tel. (No. 141.) Confidential. R. 5-25 p.m.

Balkan League.

The Greek Minister here told an intimate friend that Greece would not support
(except perhaps academically) Servian pretensions to a port on the Albanian coast.
This would indicate possibility that the Balkan League, as a whole, will not do any-
thing which will complicate the situation as against Austria.

Greek Minister told my informant that the league was originally concluded for
three years, during which period war with Turkey was to be carried through ; but he
intimated that division of the spoils, which exceed all expectation, was left vague.

(') [Copies of this telegram were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 200.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

F.O. 48599/42842/12/44. Belgrade, D. November 14, 1912, 8 p.m.

Tel. (No. 60.) E. November 15, 1912. 8 a.m.

My telegram No. 58.(')

I found Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw again this
evening, exceedingly pessimistic. He had just received a telegram from the Prime
Minister to the effect that he has been unable to induce military authorities to refrain

(>) [This telegram was sent to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1231); to Vienna (as No. 372). A
copy was sent to the Director of Military Operations.]
(2) [v. supra, pp. 152-3, No. 198.]

154

from making preparations to defend the positions they have taken on the Adriatic
and also the western frontier of Servia against Austria. I understand that some of the
troops are already coming north again.

Prime Minister is for moderation and for being content, if necessary, with free
outlet, but the military party and the press are altogether uncompromising, and insist
on the partition of Albania.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thinks that Prime Minister will
resign.

No. 201.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.C^)

St. Petersburgh, November 14, 1912.
F.O. 48585/42842/12/44. D. 9 p.m.

Tel. (No. 432.) K. 10-35 p.m.

Your telegram No. 93 of Nov[ember] 13(^) to Belgrade.

I informed Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of the instructions sent to
Sir E. Paget. He said that they were excellent, and expressed the hope that you
would cause them to be communicated to the Bulgarian Government. (")

Speaking of Austrian suggestion to give Servia commercial access to the Adriatic
through Bosnia and Herzegovina, his Excellency said that if Servia was wise she would
accept such political penetration into country inhabited by Serbs. He fears, however,
that Servian Prime Minister will not recede from his original demand.

His language to-day was very pacific, but he talked of using our eventual
recognition of autonomy of Albanian province as a means to extract concessions from
Austria. He looked to France and England to support him when the question of
delimiting the boundaries of that province should come up for discussion.

He is rather preoccupied by the squabble which has arisen between the Greeks
and Bulgarians over Salonica,(') and has told the latter that the allies must settle all
these questions between themselves, and not wash their dirty linen in public.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Belgrade (as No. 102) ; to Sofia (as No. 161) ; to Paris (as
No. 675). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the
Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 145, No. 190, and note (i). A further telegram (No. 163) was sent to Sir
H. Bax-Ironside on November 15, instructing him to inform Bulgarian Minister of the
substance of Sir Edward Grey's telegram (No. 93) to Sir R. Paget. It was repeated to
St. Petersburgh (No. 1235). (F.O. 48585/42842/12/44.)]

(3) [cp. supra, p. 143, No. 186.]

No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan. C^)

F.O. 48717/42842/12/44.
(No. 379.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 14, 1912.

Count Benckendorff pressed me to-day for an answer as to what our attitude
would be if Austria attacked Servia. (")

I said that one could not give a decision about a hypothetical contingency which
had not arisen, especially when that on which a very great deal depended, the attitude
of other Powers, was not yet known for certain.

(1) [Copies of this despatch were sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]

(2) [For this interview v. Siebert, pp. 398-9; cp. D.D.F., S""' Sir., Vol. IV, p. 461, No. 445,
and infra, p. 159, No. 209, and notes.]

155

Count Benckendorff reminded me that Germany had declared her intention to
march with Austria if Russia came to the assistance of Servia.

I observed that this declaration had been made in answer to a direct question
from the Servian Minister in Berlin, and that it was the sort of thing which Germany
was bound to 'say to the Servians in reply to such a question. It was, however, con-
ceivable that, if the occasion arose, Germany might say to France and ourselves that
she would remain neutral if our neutrality could be counted upon. I explained that
I was speaking quite unofficially and personally, merely to show how impossible it
was to give a reply in advance.

Count BenckendorfiE said that he quite understood that it was impossible for us
to give an answer, but he had to put the question, as he had been instructed to do so.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.{^)

F.O. 48709/42842/12/44.
(No. 281.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 14, 1912.

The German Ambassador came to see me to-day, and, as he spoke of the Servian
difficulty, I told him what I had said in Belgrade, as described in my telegram
. number: 369. (^) to Sir Fairfax Cartwright. I also told him what I had said to the
Austrian Ambassador, deprecating any outbreak of hostilities between Austria and
Servia, and I emphasised the importance of this.

The Ambassador said that his Government hoped that we would influence
St. Petersburg to counsel moderation.

I replied that the Russian Government had already done this.

The Ambassador told me that, if we, could influence Servia to be moderate, the

■ German Government were quite prepared to use their influence to help us in preventing
{ the Bulgarians from retaining Constantinople.

' I said that I understood that the Bulgarians had no intention of retaining
I Constantinople.

I The Ambassador remarked that they might acquire the appetite for this if they
I entered the town.

■ As the Ambassador gave me a friendly message from Herr von Bethmann-
Hollweg, I took the opportunity of expressing pleasure that there had been no
friction between Germany and this country all through the present crisis, and that I
had received very friendly communications from the German Chancellor. I hoped

I that it was felt that I had reciprocated them in the same amicable spirit, for this had
I been my intention. ■

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet. For
Prince Lichnowsky's report, v. O.P., XXXIII, pp. 331-2.]
. (2) [v. supra, p. 147, No. 193.]

156

No. 204.

Sir Edioard Grey to Lord Kitchener.

Private. (')

My dear Kitchener, London, November 14, 1912.

I take note of your six "desiderata" for Egypt, as described in your letter of
the 3rd instant. (^)

I doubt, however, whether the settlement between the Balkan States and Turkey
will provide any opportunity for other Powers to get any thing out of Turkey. At
present, all the Great Powers are practically sworn to " desinteressement " so far as
Turkey is concerned. Our position would be very much weakened if we were trying
to get any thing for ourselves, and there would be a general scramble.

There may be other opportunities of some deal with Turkey, I do not yet see
how they are to arise but we are living in a world of surprises.

Yours sincerely,

E. GREY.

(1) [Grey MSS, Vol. 9.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 88, No. 113.]

No. 205.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir A. Nicolson. I

Private. (M

My dear Nicolson, St. Petersburgh, November 14, 1912.

Many thanks for your last letter. (^)

I have reported so fully by telegraph all that I have been able to learn about the
situation during the past fortnight that there are only a few special points on which
I need to touch in my private letter.

Sazonow, I fear, has mismanaged the question of a Servian port on the Adriatic
as, by giving it the prominence which it has now assumed, he has placed the Russian
Government in a very difficult position. Though it may be true that the Russian
Minister at Belgrade was never instructed to encourage the idea, Sazonow has given
it the most direct encouragement. He gave me to understand from the first that,
after all her victories, Servia had the right to such territorial compensation and that
Russia would have to support her demand. I presume that he held the same sort of
language to the Servian Minister when the latter first approached him on the subject.
If, instead of taking up such an uncompromising attitude, he had told Popovitch that
the Russian Government would do all that they could to assist the Serbs to get what
they wanted, but that, in view of the opposition which Austria was almost sure to
offer, they could not promise anything beyond diplomatic support, the question would
not have acquired its present acute character. He deluded himself into believing that
Austria's opposition might be bought oi¥ by guaranteeing her economic access to the
Mgean, though he might have anticipated that Austria would reply that, if she was
to be contented with this, Servia might quite well be satisfied with some similar
arrangement as regards her future access to the Adriatic. Where, however, he made
his chief mistake was in believing that Germany was at present so peacefully inclined
that she would not support Austria should international complications arise. Acting
on this belief he pressed the acceptance of the Servian claims on the Austrian and
German Ambassadlors in language which, as he told me, only just stopped short of a
menace. He emphasised the necessity of our effecting a final settlement of the
Balkan question and said that no settlement would be final which did not take account
of Servia 's legitimate demands. In telling me all this, he gave me the impression

(1) [Carnock MSS., Vol. VIII of 1912. This letter is endorsed as having been sent to the
King; to the Prime Minister; to Lord Morley ; to Lord Crewe.]

(2) [v. supra, pp. 103-4, No. 135.]

157

that he had wished to make the Ambassadors understand that Russia would not be
a party to an arrangement which would leave the door open to a future conflict and
that, if that conflict had to come, he would prefer that it should come at once. I
therefore thought it advisable to pour a little water into his wine and warned him
that, if he committed himself too far, he might have to choose between war with the
Triple Alliance or a second humiliation of Russia. Russia, I pointed out, would reap
such advantages from the settlement that would follow the war that she would be
very ill advised were she to fight about this one single point. He admitted that
Servia ought to be satisfied with an arrangement, that would safeguard her economic
interests, but feared that she would never abandon her present claim. He then talked
a great deal about Russian public opinion and of the impossibility of resisting it —
quite forgetting how he had regarded the same public opinion a few weeks ago — and
said that if Austria tried to expel Servia from any port, of which she was in occupation,
Russia would be forced to intervene.

During the last two or three days his attitude has become much more pacific. Not
only has he told Servia that she cannot count on Russia's armed support, but he has
also held more conciliatory language at Vienna. Whether this is due to the fact that
the Powers of the Triple Alliance have declared themselves "solidaires" on this
question or whether the Emperor has enjoined caution I do not know ; but there is
a marked difference in Sazonow's tone. A Russian journalist, who came to see me
this morning, told me that the language now held at the Foreign Office was quite
different to what it was a few days ago and that he could not understand this sudden
change of front. I am myself inclined to believe that it is owing to the knowledge chat
Russia will not have to deal with Austria alone but with Germany and Italy a^j, well.

I am not in a position to judge whether Austria's opposition to a Servian port on
the Adriatic is justifiable or not ; but by persisting in it and by enlisting the services
of her allies on her side she has lost an opportunity, which may not again recur of
establishing really cordial relations with Russia. Whatever may be the final solution
of the question Russia has now gone too far in her support of Servia, to recede from
her original position without a certain sense of humiliation. Whether the Govern-
ment will be strong enough to resist the force of public opinion and to avert war at
this price the future alone can decide. The Press yesterday was very indignant with
an announcement, published in an agency telegram of the " Neue Freie Presse " that
Russia had notified Servia that she could not support her if she went to war with
Austria. On my mentioning this to Sazonow he said that the Austrians had no
business to publish such a statement and that, though he had told the Austrian
Ambassador that he was administering " des douches d'eau froide" at Belgrade, he
had never said anything that justified a statement of this character. He has now
published a communique to the effect that the Russian Government have taken no
engagement one way or another and that they are entirely free to act as they think
best for the real interests of the Empire C)

Ever yours,

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

(^) [The omitted paragraphs refer to the probable rectification of frontiers in the Balkans,
and to members of the Imperial famih'.]

\ED. NOTE. — Count Mensdorff reported an interview with Sir A. Nicolson on November 15,
in which the latter expressed strong views in favour of a conference but declared that he spoke
for himself and not for Sir Edward Grey. No trace of this interview can be found in the
British archives, v. O.-U.A., IV, p. 889, No. 4446.]

158

No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 48428/48428/12/44.

Tel. (No. 674.) Foreign Office, November 15, 1912, 12-35 p.m.

I think the question of the islands had better be considered first with Russian
Gov[ernmen]t, For instance the possession of Lemnosf*) by Greece would possibly
enable Greece to block all exit from the Straits by submarines : this might affect
Russia very seriously in the future. Some islands are in Greek and some in Italian
occupation and if Russia wishes to raise a question about any of the former, it will
provide an opportunity for discussing the question of all the islands with Italy and
the other Powers.

(') [cp. supra, p. 144, No. 188, and note ('), and infra, p. 167, No. 221. On the question of
guarantee, v. Siebert, pp. 401-2.]

No. 207.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. {^)
F.O. 49134/48428/12/44.

Tel. (No. 709.) Foreign Office, November 15, 1912, 6 p.m.

The Italian Ambassador having in conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson yester-
day asked why we were so much interested in the iEgean Islands I told the
Ambassador to-day that Cyprus being of no use as a naval base the question of getting
a naval base was constantly raised by our naval authorities. (^) The British Gov[ern-
men]t had always resisted this, not wishing to disturb the status quo or to provoke the
difficulties that would arise from an attempt to secure an advantage for ourselves.
But if any Great Power was to keep an Mgean Island for a naval base we should
certainly want something of the kind for ourselves ; other Powers would want some-
thing also ; there would be a regular scramble and the whole apple-cart would be upset.

The Ambassador explained the sentimental reasons for which Italy might have
liked to keep Rhodes without any intention of making a naval base, but said that if
there were all these difficulties they could not entertain the idea.

On his asking what was to be done with all the islands I said it must first be
settled whether in the terms of peace Turkey was going to give up any of them : if
any were given up they might perhaps be neutralized under the guarantee of the
Powers and the administration given to Greece. (^)

You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs].

(1) [This telegram was repeated to Rome (No. 512) ; to St. Petersburgh (No. 1236), with the
addition: "You should inform M[inister for] F[oreign] A[ffairs]."]

(2) [cp. the Admiralty memorandum of June 20, 1912, in Gooch Temperley, Vol. IX (1),
pp. 413-6, No. 430, and end., and Sir Edward Grey's minute on p. 416.]

(^) [cp. infra, p. 187, No. 251, and Sir Edward Grey's minute.]

No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

F.O. 48499/42842/12/44.
(No. 549.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 15, 1912.

M. Cambon told Sir A. N[icolson] on Nov[ember] 9 that M. Poincare agreed
with me that it would be better that whatever Servia said or whatever action she took

159

in regard to the Adriatic question should be treated as forming part of military or
warHke operations, and that the question of a Servian port should be left over to be
dealt with later. M. Poincare therefore had instructed the French R[ep]r[esentatives]
to hold similar language at Berlin and also at St. Petersburg. (')

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(>) [cp. D D F., S'"' Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 420-1, Nos. 401-3.]
No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. C-)

F.O. 48808/42842/12/44.
(No. 553.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 15, 1912.

On Nov [ember] 14 M. Cambon read to Sir A. N[icolson] a telegram from
M. Poincare stating that the Russian Gov[ernmen]t had enquired what attitude
France wo'uld adopt if Austria Hungary intervened actively in regard to Servia.

M. Cambon pointed out that active intervention was not quite the same thing
as armed intervention. Sir A. N[icolson] told Hfis] E[xcellency] that it seemed to
him that there was not much practical difference.

M. Poincare had replied that he would first like to know what line Russia
proposed to follow in a similar case before he could give a reply, and he would wish
to have some precise information on that point. (-)

[I am, &c.]

E. G[REY].

(1) [This despatch is printed from the original draft by Sir A. Nicolson. Sir Edward
Grey added the following note: "Count Benckendorff put the question to me ye.sterday and I
have recorded my reply. E. G." {v. supra, pp. 154-5, No. 202). cp. Siehert, pp. 399-400,- which
gives views of both Sir A. Nicolson and Sir Edward Grey which are not recorded here.]

(2) [cp. D.U.F., 3""^ Ser., Vol. IV, p. 459, No. 443, and notes {-) and (3).]

No. ^10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.{^)

F.O. 48865/42842/12/44.
(No. 264.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 15, 1912.

The Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that he was not making an ofi&cial
communication, but he would like to give me a "resume" of what the Marquis di
San Giuliano had telegraphed to him recently, though he had not been instructed
to make a communication. The Italian view was that the principle of nationahty
required an autonomous Albania, and that no Servian demand could be allowed to

I diminish it. Once this had been settled, the fundamental desire of Italy to maintain
peace between the Great Powers would lead her to join all her efforts to those of her
Allies and friends to get a solution which would reconcile the legitimate aspirations
of Servia with the principle of an autonomous Albania. Italy desired the complete
independence, both political and economic, of Servia. The Ambassador laid stress
on the word " economic," and said that Italy would ask for full liberty of commercial
competition in the Balkan Peninsula on the same conditions as any other Power. He

I then asked me for my views.

I T told him of the advice which I had given in Belgrade, as described in my
telegram to Sir Fairfax Cartwright recounting my conversation with the Austrian

j (') [This despatch is endorsed as having been sent to the King and to the Cabinet.]
I ■

160

Ambassador. (^) I said that I did not think that any one would seriously dispute the
principle of an autonomous Albania. The Austrian Government said that it must not
be too small, and on the other hand there was the consideration that it should not
be too large : the exact limits must be discussed when the general settlement was being
made.

The Italian Ambassador agreed as to this, and asked me whether I sympathised
with the principle of commercial liberty.

I replied that of course we sympathised with that, and would support it.

The Ambassador then told me that he wished Austria would be more precise as
to what she required in the way of commercial privileges in Servia. The Marquis
di San Giuliano could not defend in the Italian Parliament conditions of economic
privilege for Austria in Servia that would place Italy at a disadvantage. He laid much
stress on this point, and expressed a wish that Austria would make it clear thai
there was no question of a Customs Union between her and Servia. He also said
that, speaking for himself personally, he thought that it would be a good plan if
Albania could be neutralised under a European guarantee. (^) This would remove
possible apprehensions and suspicions between Austria and Italy, and would be 'much
better than placing them in a privileged position with regard to Albania.

It was clear to me from this conversation that, while Italy is at one with Austria
in disliking any port on the Adriatic that might fall under the influence of a strong
Power, and in resisting any proposal of the kind, she is almost equally apprehensive
that Austria may obtain commercial privileges, and she does not wish to be left alone
with Austria as regards Albania. In fact she is on her guard against Austrian influence
in Albania, she is strictly opposed to special economic advantages for Austria in Servia
and only on the one point of an Adriatic port is she in agreement with Austria.

[I am, &c.]

E. G[EEY].

(2) [v. supra, p. 147, No. 193.]

(^) [Sir Edward Grey communicated this suggestion to Count BenckendorfF, v. Siebert,
pp. 401-2.]

No. 211.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.C)

Paris, November 16, 1912.

E.G. 48904/42842/12/44. D. 5-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 198.) R. 9-20 p.m.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to whom I read this afternoon your telegram
to Belgrade No. 93 of 13th November(=) and the reply No. 58 of 14th November,(^)
said that his communications with Servian Government, and their reply, had been to
much the same effect, and that Servians are at present suffering from swelled head.

His Excellency concludes that if an Austrian and an Italian ship of war be sent
to Durazzo in the event of Servian General Zukovic [sic] appearing there with troops
it will be in the nature of a protest, and had best be so considered unless the ships
take forcible action.

(1) [This telegram was sent to St. Petersburg (as No. 1244) ; to Sofia (as No. 170^ ; to
Belgrade (as No. 106). Copies were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval
Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 145, No. 190.]

(3) [v. supra, pp. 152-3, No. 198.]

161

No. 212.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

F.O. 48903/42842/12/44. Belgrade, D. November 16, 1912, 6-45 p.m.

Tel. (No. 64.) R. November 17, 1912, 8 a.m.

Servian Government are informing the Bulgarian Government with regard to
the overtures made hj Turkey that they are willing to discuss preliminaries of peace.

(1) [This telegram was sent to Sofia (as No. 169). Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to
the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military Operations.]

No. 213.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Paris, November 16, 1912.

F.O. 48906/42842/12/44. D. 6-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 200.) Very Confidential. R. 9-10 p.m.

My telegram No. 198 of today. (^)

French Minister for Foreign Affairs learns that Russian Government have been
representing at Belgrade that French and British Governments have announced that
they will not support claim of Servia to territory on the Adriatic.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is remonstrating to Russian Ambassador at this
endeavour of Russian Government, when counselling moderation at Belgrade, to save
their face at the expense of France and England.

His Excellency strongly objects to a repetition of position in which France was
placed in 1909 in regard to annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (^) He admits that
public opinion in France would not countenance forcible measures' in order to place
Servia on the Adriatic, but he has not made any announcement to that effect. (*)

(1) [This -telegram was sent to St. Petersburgh (as No. 1246); to Belgrade (as No. 107).
Copies were sent to the Admiralty; to the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the Director of
Military Operations.]

(2) [v. supra, p. 160, No. 211.]

(^) [v. Gooch cfc Temperley, Vol. V, Subject Index, sub Bosnia and Herzegovina.]
(*) [cp. D.D.F., 3""' Sir., Vol. IV, pp. 480-2, Nos. 468-9.]

No. 214.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.{^)

Paris, November 16, 1912.

F.O. 48907/48428/12/44. D. 6-50 p.m.

Tel. (No. 201.) R. 9-30 p.m.

jEgean islands.

I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day contents of your
telegrams (numbered in error 674 and 679) of 15th November. (^)

His Excellency said he would raise question with the Russian as well as the Italian
Government.

He is much less preoccupied by idea of Greece retaining islands than by any
retention of an island by Italy, which the French Government could not admit.

(>) [This telegram was sent to Rome (as No. 521) ; to Constantinople (as No. 1042). Copies
were sent to the Admiralty ; to the Director of Naval Intelligence ; to the Director of Military
Operations.]

(==) [v. supra, p. 158, Nos. 206-7. The telegrams referred to are actually Nos. 674 and 709.]

[6272]

162

No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

F.O. 48135/33672/12/44.
(No. 381.)

Sir, Foreign Office, November 16, 1912.

Count Benckendorff called at this Office on Nov [ember] 9th and handed to
Sir A. Nic-olson the text of the communication which he had been instructed to make
to me on the 7th inst[ant]. I enclose a copy of the communication, as it may be of
interest to have the ipsissima verba of the communication,

[I am, &c.
E. GREY.]

Enclosure in No. 215.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff .{^)

Nous ne nous opposons pas a une occupation temporaire de Constantinople par
les allies. Mais nous tenons a attirer I'attention sur les difficultes qui en resulteraient
pour les negociations ulterieures.

Le Gouv[ernemen]t turc, retire en Asie, pourrait profiter des avantages d'une
situation oii il serait garanti de toute perte ulterieure. L'armee turque a I'abri
d'attaques pourrait suffisamment se reformer ; et la Turquie n'ayant plus rien a
perdre n'aurait aucune raison pour se montrer conciliante.

D'un autre cote les ressources des allies sont limitees, et I'unanimite de[s]
Puissances insuffisamment etablie. Pour le cas de negociations prolongees la premiere
de ces circonstances pent avoir des resultats facheux pour les interets des allies; la
seconde mettrait en peril la paix Europeenne.

En vue de cette possibilite d'une occupation prolongee de Constantinople par les
allies nous nous verrons obliges d'envoyer a Constantinople, avant I'arrivee des allies,
notre escadre de la j\Ier Noire qui y sejournera autant que se prolongera I'occupation
par les allies de la capitale turque.

Nous pensons qu'apres la demarche de la Turquie aupres des Puissances celles ^i
devraient immediatement eclaircir la question si elles sont disposees a agir comme
mediatrices maintenant, et ensuite s'adresser aux allies avec leurs propositions.

(1) [The text

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